

FEDERALISM IN GREEK ANTIQUITY

EDITED BY HANS BECK
AND PETER FUNKE



FEDERALISM IN GREEK ANTIQUITY

The world of ancient Greece witnessed some of the most sophisticated and varied experiments with federalism in the pre-modern era. In the volatile interstate environment of Greece, federalism was a creative response to the challenge of establishing regional unity, while at the same time preserving a degree of local autonomy. To reconcile the forces of integration and independence, Greek federal states introduced, for example, the notion of proportional representation, the stratification of legal practice, and a federal grammar of festivals and cults. *Federalism in Greek Antiquity* provides the first comprehensive reassessment of the topic. It comprises detailed contributions on all federal states in Aegean Greece and its periphery. With every chapter written by a leading expert in the field, the book also incorporates thematic sections that place the topic in a broader historical and social-scientific context.

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EDITORS

HANS BECK AND PETER FUNKE



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Preface

For many decades, the study of federalism in the ancient Greek world has been associated with Jakob Larsen, who dedicated his scholarly life to the exploration of the topic. Starting in the 1920s, Larsen produced a high volume of studies that appeared in all possible formats, ranging from more minute contributions to substantial scholarly articles and an award-winning series of public lectures. Moreover, and perhaps even more profoundly, it is fair to assert that Larsen was actually the one who put the topic on the radar of ancient historians and classicists. In this sense, the rise of a more multi-faceted perception of Greek history, one that extends beyond Athens and Sparta, as witnessed gradually since the 1980s, was also made possible through Larsen's work. In the later stages of his career, Larsen's lifelong commitment to the topic merged into the magisterial monograph *Greek Federal States. Their Institutions and History* (Oxford University Press 1968), which became one of the most frequently cited books in Greek history.

Ancient History and Classical Studies research has experienced a knowledge increase since Larsen's day that is nothing short of breathtaking. A very significant amount of new evidence has surfaced in the form of inscriptions, coinages, and archaeological material, the latter by means of, at times, spectacular discoveries and also by way of complex data sets assembled by survey archaeologists. At the same time, new conceptual approaches and methodologies have been crafted that allow for a meaningful integration of diverse bodies of evidence. The 'ethnic turn' was clearly the most impactful development along the way, as it initiated a true paradigm shift. Yet the richness of the results accumulated from research on ethnicity and identity issues owed much to the circumstances of the day with which it coincided; in part, it was also fueled by a new sense of vibrant regional diversification of Greek history. Finally, it is obvious but nonetheless important to acknowledge that in neighboring disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences,

federalism, its cognate concepts and proxies – for instance the conceptual understanding of political institutions and integration – have been re-negotiated, with important consequences for the understanding of federalism in its ancient Greek variant.

We have both endeavored to disclose the many forms and features of federalism in Greek antiquity from the early days of our respective academic journeys. Over the last decade or so, it gradually became apparent to us that the time was ripe for a new synthesis. The response to the idea was extremely encouraging. The announcement of the ‘New Larsen’, as the project was soon and maybe somewhat presumptively called, was met with much enthusiasm. In June 2010, we held a symposium at Münster University to strategize with contributors and oblige them to, as much as this was tolerable, common themes and approaches (agreed, some might say that at times we extended our authority as editors for which we would make the same excuse as always, i.e., we did so “for the greater good of coherence”). In the aftermath of the Münster meeting, everyone returned to their desks to draft their chapters. The manuscript central at McGill held consultations with contributors and steered the editorial process. All the while, our research collaboration quickly grew into a tight network of organization and knowledge exchange between McGill and Münster, a lively exchange that included established scholars, junior colleagues, graduate students, and staff.

The project received much help and generous support from many. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the MacNaughton Chair of Classics at McGill University, and the Cluster of Excellence “Religion and Politics in Premodern and Modern Cultures” at Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster all offered their generous financial support, for which we are genuinely grateful. At the Press, Michael Sharp and Elizabeth Hanlon saw to a seamless development of the book from commission to publication; as ever, their precision, efficiency, and professionalism is much appreciated. They also initiated and steered the meaningful scholarly exchange with Readers A and B, whose comments no doubt helped to improve the manuscript in its very final stages and iron out some errors. Michael Tieke compiled the maps in Münster, while Marie Drauschke provided the English translation of [Chapter 5](#). At McGill, the editorial work was, at various stages of the project, assisted by Ruben Post, François Gauthier, Erin Crochetière, and Katrina Van Amsterdam. Alex McAuley was once again the strong right (and sometimes also left) arm who supported all

areas of editing and critical review. He also translated [Chapters 8 and 11](#) from French into English. To all of these, we offer our gratitude and heartfelt thanks.

December 2014

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A note on the transliteration of ancient Greek

The transliteration of ancient Greek proper names, terms, and citations from the sources poses a notorious problem. There is no single solution to this, and our approach might appear as subjective as those adopted by others.

In general terms, we favor proximity to the Greek over Latinized English, i.e.: Boiotia (rather than Boeotia), Arkadia, Chaironeia, Kleomenes, Ephoros, etc. Akhaia and the Akhaian League, however, we found somewhat puristic; hence Achaia and the Achaian League. There are a few exceptions to our prioritization of Greek-style transliteration, mostly where English nomenclature has gained overall recognition: Corinth, Crete, Cyclades, also Thucydides, Herodotus. Greek technical terms appear in italics (*koinon*, *polis*, *sympoliteia*) unless they are used in Anglicized form: synoikism, dioikism, syntely. The same goes for proper names, i.e., *Boiōtoi*, *to koinon tōn Aitolōn*. To avoid unnecessary barriers, we forewent the use of source citations in Greek script. When necessary, the relevant sections were transliterated. Accents were abandoned along the way, but the distinctions of the Greek alphabet were kept in place: *eta* appears as ē, *omega* as ō, *ypsilon* as y. Transliterated citations from the sources are accompanied by English translations throughout.

We hope that scholars in the field and in other Humanities and Social Sciences disciplines will find this an agreeable and indeed convenient way to navigate through the chapters that follow.


Abbreviations

<i>ATL</i>	B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor (eds.), 1939–1953. <i>The Athenian Tribute Lists</i> . 4 vols. Princeton
Austin	M. M. Austin, 2006. <i>The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest. A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation</i> . 2nd edn. Cambridge
<i>BE</i>	<i>Bulletin Épigraphique</i>
<i>BNJ</i>	<i>Brill's New Jacoby</i>
<i>CEG</i>	<i>Carmina epigraphica Graeca</i>
<i>CID</i>	<i>Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes</i> Paris
<i>CIG</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum</i>
<i>DNP</i>	<i>Der Neue Pauly</i>
E&R	H. van Effenterre and F. Ruzé, 1994. <i>Nomima. Recueil d'inscriptions politiques et juridiques de l'archaïsme grec</i> . 2 vols. Paris
<i>FdD</i>	<i>Fouilles de Delphes</i>
<i>FdXanthos</i>	<i>Fouilles de Xanthos</i>
<i>FGrH</i>	<i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i>
<i>FHG</i>	<i>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum</i>
Fornara	C. W. Fornara, 1983. <i>Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War</i> . Translated Documents of Greece and Rome I. 2nd edn. Cambridge
Harding	P. Harding, 1985. <i>From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus</i> . Translated Documents of Greece and Rome II. Cambridge


<i>I. Alexandria Troas</i>	<i>The Inscriptions of Alexandria Troas (Inchriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 53)</i>
<i>I. Bouthrotos</i>	<i>Corpus des inscriptions grecques d'Illyrie méridionale et d'Épire. 2.2. Inscriptions de Bouthrôtos</i>
<i>I. Cos</i>	<i>Iscrizioni di Cos</i>
<i>I. Cret</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Creticae</i>
<i>I. Délos</i>	<i>Inscriptions de Délos</i>
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
<i>IGR</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes</i>
<i>IGUR</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae Urbis Romae</i>
<i>IK</i>	<i>Inchriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien</i>
<i>ILLRP</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae liberae rei publicae</i>
<i>I. Magnesia</i>	<i>Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander</i>
<i>I. Mylasa</i>	<i>Die Inschriften von Mylasa I–II (Inchriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 34–35)</i>
<i>I. Oropos</i>	<i>Oi epigraphes tou Oropou [The Inscriptions of Oropos]</i>
<i>IPArk</i>	G. Thür and H. Taeuber, 1994. <i>Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der griechischen Poleis aus Arkadien</i> . Vienna
<i>ISE</i>	<i>Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche</i>
<i>IvO</i>	<i>Die Inschriften von Olympia</i>
Koerner	R. Koerner, 1993. <i>Inchriftliche Gesetzestexte der frühen griechischen Polis</i> . Cologne
<i>LSAG</i>	L. H. Jeffery, 1990. <i>The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece. A Study of the Origin of the Greek Alphabet and Its Development from the Eighth to the Fifth Centuries</i> . Revised edn. Oxford
<i>M&L</i>	R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, 1988. <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century</i> . Revised edn. Oxford
Merkelbach and West	<i>Fragmenta Hesiodica</i>
<i>Milet</i>	<i>Inschriften von Milet</i>
<i>OGIS</i>	<i>Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae</i>
<i>PMG</i>	<i>Poetae Melici Graeci</i>
<i>RE</i>	<i>Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaften</i>

R&L	P. J. Rhodes with D. M. Lewis, 1997. <i>The Decrees of the Greek States</i> . Oxford
R&O	P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, 2003. <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions 404–323 BC</i> . Oxford
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
SGDI	<i>Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften</i>
SIG	<i>Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 3rd edition.
SVA	H. Bengtson, 1975. <i>Die Staatsverträge des Altertums</i> . II. Band: <i>Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt</i> . 2nd edn. Munich. H. H. Schmitt, 1969. <i>Die Staatsverträge des Altertums</i> . III. Band: <i>Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr.</i> Munich
TAM	<i>Tituli Asiae Minoris</i>
TGF	<i>Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta</i>
Tod	M. N. Tod, 1948. <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions II: From 403 to 232 B.C.</i> Oxford


Maps



Map 1: Northern and Central Greece




Map 3: Crete and the central Aegean




Map 4a: Lesbos and surroundings



Map 4b: Lykia and Rhodes



Map 5: Southern Italy and Sicily



Map 6: The Kyrenaïka

*An introduction to federalism in Greek antiquity**Hans Beck and Peter Funke*

Federalism begins with a paradox. In a transhistorical perspective, federalism represents a design to unite a multitude of state-entities whose powers and prerogatives are safeguarded in the course of integration. But in its attempt to achieve unity, federalism empowers constituents and grants them authority in such a manner that they might also jeopardize the goal of integration. Federalism therefore requires persistent and complex negotiation. There is a wide range of possible responses to the challenge of shaping a federal union. To maintain federal equilibrium, members may engage in, for instance, economic, cultural, linguistic, juristic, and genuine political negotiations. Today, in federal systems with highly developed state-bureaucracies, as is the case in the European Union or in Canada, the notion of fiscal federalism has become one of the most pressing issues of such negotiations. In response to potential tensions within their organization, federal systems thus draw on a broad platform of dialogue and exchange; in turn, each response offers the opportunity to readjust the terms of cooperation and, effectively, reinvigorate the foundations of unity (Ward and Ward 2009; Erk and Swenden 2010).

In historical scholarship, the common associations of federalism depend largely on the political, societal, and cultural environment that surrounds them. As an historical category, federalism is subject to references that vary through time and space. This ascribes a distinct meaning to federalism in each historical epoch. For instance, the triangular conception of state as an organization with a monopoly on the use of force over a defined group of people within a certain territory may well be a functional template for several periods in history. But the morphology of each of these tiers, and the emphasis that is put on each, differs from society to society. Along with the idea of sovereignty, the vital determinants of state are entrenched in networks of presumptions that make political cultures distinguishable from one another. The same goes for related conceptions

of, e.g., citizenship, constitution, and commonwealth.¹ Beyond the historical encodings of statehood, federalism refers to a hardwired principle that cuts across the dividing lines of history. It indicates that the traditional boundaries between the inside and the outside of a state are somewhat yielding. In a federal state, the members subscribe to a design that extends this dichotomy through the creation of an intermediary. While each of the constituents maintains its own inside, their mutual relations, which are traditionally in the sphere of their outside affairs, are transferred to a new extended – or federal – inside. In consequence, this extended inside also demarcates the new boundary between a collective of insides and their shared outside. This pattern links the present-day Republic of India to the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands after its inception in 1581 and the Iroquois League of Five (after 1722, Six) Nations.²

The world of ancient Greece witnessed some of the most elaborate experiments with federalism in the pre-modern era. In general terms, Greek history is of course marked by the coexistence of a high number of independent ‘city-states’ or *poleis*. A recent inventory lists over 1,000 *poleis* for the Archaic and Classical periods alone (roughly five times the membership of the United Nations today), a great number of them in the relatively small natural environment of Greece itself (Hansen and Nielsen 2004). As is to be expected, *poleis* maintained a dense network of relations. The exchange was regulated through customary procedures that governed the foreign behavior of a city-state: the idea of guest-friendship (*proxenia*) and ritualized friendship (*philia*), awards of citizenship to individuals (*[iso]politeia*), adherence to a commonly accepted protocol of interstate arbitration, and the respect for the integrity of ambassadors (*presbeis*, *theōroi* or *spondophoroi*) are but few of those procedures that were regarded as *agraphoi nomoi*, or “unwritten laws” in the exchange between Greeks.³ In addition, the interaction between *poleis* was streamlined by multiple forms of political cooperation. The broader picture of such initiatives, each with its own inherent agenda, included grand military alliances (*symmachiai*), notably the Peloponnesian League and the Second Athenian League; the so-called amphictyonies, usually clustered

¹ See Fibiger Bang and Scheidel 2013. On the particular encoding of sovereignty in antiquity, see Davies 1994. Citizenship as a historical paradigm: Magnette 2001.

² On the intellectual foundations of the inside/outside approach towards state-units and their foreign policy, cf. the research carried out by the ‘Normative Orders’ Cluster of Excellence at Frankfurt University, www.normativeorders.net/en. See Hellmann, Fahrmeir, and Več (forthcoming).

³ “Unwritten laws”: Thuc. 2.37.3; cf. also Soph. *Ant.* 449–461; R&O no. 35, lines 14–15, speaks of “the common laws of the Hellenes”; Thomas 2005: 50–51. For an overview of governing norms in Greek interstate affairs, cf. Low 2007. Studies on individual devices include Adcock and Mosley 1975; Marek 1984; Herman 1987; Perlman 2000; Cojocaru 2013.

around a regional cult center, that oversaw the conduct of religious and other matters related to the sanctuary; bonds between mother-cities and their colonies; the integration of neighboring cities; and, at the microlevel, the absorption of smaller villages into larger city-states.⁴

All of these projects of interstate cooperation impacted the spheres associated with the city-state in one way or the other. Take, for instance, the issue of autonomy that is considered so vital to the nature of the *polis*. The political discourse in Classical Greece was heavily influenced by questions of *autonomia* – literally speaking, self-governance; for a few decades in the fourth century BCE, the call for autonomy steered the course of the political, diplomatic, and military history of Greece (Ostwald 1982; Jehne 1994; Raaflaub 2004). Naturally this has triggered a high volume of studies that explore the notion of autonomy and its implications for the city-state.⁵ But fascination with the autonomous city-state should not obfuscate the plain insight that all Greek states were interconnected with one another in a tapestry of exchanges. While some of these exchanges recalibrated their autonomy, others suspended it for the time being; yet others, such as the absorption of one *polis* into another, discontinued it altogether. Interstate integration impacted the course of Greek history just as much as the quest for independence did (cf. Beck, forthcoming).

Federalism stands as the landmark in these forms of cooperation. The sheer prevalence of the phenomenon is staggering. As calculated in a recent study, towards the end of the Classical period almost half of all city-states in mainland Greece and the Peloponnese were integrated into one federal state or another.⁶ For the longest time, however, the study of federalism in Greece was an uphill expedition, for two reasons. First, the *polis* has long been an extremely powerful paradigm in Classical scholarship. It has always been acknowledged that Greek history was shaped by a rich diversity of states that were not necessarily *poleis* but so-called *ethnos*-states or ‘tribal states’ (see below). But those states were considered something of an embarrassment to the discipline. Preoccupation with the *polis* as the quintessential form of Hellenic statehood fostered the interpretation that *ethnos*-states were merely backwaters, characterized by a lesser form of cultural advancement and even lesser political development – and hence less worthy of examination. This view also seemed to be supported by some

⁴ See Funke 2013a; Figueira and Jensen 2013; Ager 2013; on symmachies, Dreher 2003 and Buraselis 2003; see also Chapter 24 by Kurt Raaflaub below.

⁵ In particular the works published under the aegis of the *Copenhagen Polis Centre* (CPC) between 1993 and 2004. See Hansen and Nielsen 2004: xii–xiii for a full list of publications.

⁶ Mackil 2013: 1 and n. 3 calculates that up to 40 per cent of all city-states were associated with a league.

ancient authorities, most eminently Thucydides in the so-called *Archaeology* section of his work.⁷ Today, *polis*-centric readings of Greek history have given way to significantly more colourful renderings that account for both *poleis* and *ethnos*-states “beyond Athens and Sparta” (Gehrke 1986; cf. also Brock and Hodkinson 2000). More generally, it has become axiomatic to acknowledge the rich diversity of political organizations, *poleis* and non-*poleis* alike, that branded Greek political culture. Beyond the city-state and its thrust towards the local, the forces of regionalism, emanating from *ethnos*-states everywhere, were equally commanding. This puts the study of Greek federal states on a new footing.

The second obstacle revolved around the federal paradigm as such, and its application to the ancient world. Since federal states require certain criteria to qualify as federal, it was sometimes remarked that it is not justified to attribute federal concepts to antiquity. The suitability of the paradigm was denied because its application would be anachronistic and in any case *avant la lettre*, since federalism was deemed an intrinsically modern concept. Its explanatory force, it was argued, only unfolds in response to certain traits of state development that, if posited in the context of antiquity, might obfuscate the object under examination (Giovannini 1971; *contra*: Walbank 1976/1977). Jakob Larsen, the greatest authority on the topic, addressed this concern in the opening sections of his authoritative study *Greek Federal States* (Larsen 1968), remarking that “[t]he statement which follows would be almost equally appropriate as a part of the conclusion of the book, but it is impossible to follow an account of the history and accomplishments of Greek federal states without some knowledge of the nature of such a state” (xi). In other words, in his effort to disclose the mechanics of Greek federalism, Larsen built on a set of presumptions that, to a certain degree, predetermined the conclusions of his analysis.

Today, the implicit danger of anachronistic concept attribution is less pressing than in Larsen’s day. First, tremendous progress has been made with the disclosure of genuine federal discourses in Greek political thinking. Whereas Larsen had complained about the general lack of ancient reflections on the topic – which he explained with the extent to which ancient political thought was dominated by the *polis* (Larsen 1968: xiv; cf. Walbank 1970) – subsequent scholars were able to restore the traces of federal discourses in the writings of several authors, including Xenophon, Polybius, and Aristotle, among others. These studies adumbrate a different picture than Larsen had

⁷ See esp. Thuc. 1.5–10 on the implied cultural backwardness of many *ethnos*-states. See also Luraghi 2000; Nicolai 2001.

in mind. They indicate that the intellectual reflection on federalism in antiquity was much more sophisticated than previously believed.⁸ In the fourth and third centuries BCE, those reflections were complemented by what has been interpreted as a federal movement in mainland Greece and the Peloponnese, with an ever-increasing number of states adopting federal features and adjusting them to their particular needs and circumstances of governance.⁹ Second, it has become a red herring to argue against the existence of federal designs in pre-modern times simply because the study of federalism has undergone a major transformation in recent years. The way in which social scientists view institutions has been altered on various accounts; in particular, it is now widely acknowledged to apply an approach that is receptive to the forces of social meaning and historical change.¹⁰ As has already been noted, the variant of federalism in antiquity differs – by default – from that in other periods of time; the transformation of the related concepts and cognate vocabularies in the present day once again adds its very own layer of meaning to the topic. Yet this poses no hindrance to the investigation. Today's debate is not so much impacted by the question of whether federalism existed in antiquity, but rather by the disclosure of the specific circumstances and configurations that shaped the design of federalism in ancient Greece. In sum, the rigid application of the federal paradigm to modernity is now relinquished for a historically layered, multi-faceted conception.

A brief history of scholarship: trends, themes, and today's operating consensus

The debate over the concept-attribution problem indicates just how much the understanding of ancient Greek federalism owes to the persistent advancement of scholarship. A brief survey of the major protagonists in the field and the development of trends and themes over time is in order.¹¹

⁸ See Winterling 1995; Funke 1998; Hansen 1999; Lehmann 2001; Beck 2001b; Bearzot 1994 and 2004a. Note the substantial amount of *politeiai* studies on federal states that were written in Aristotle's school, including treatises on the Aitolians (fr. 473R), Akarnanians (474R), Arkadians (483R), Eleians (492R), Epeirotes (494R), and Thessalians (495R). Of most of these, only the title and a few fragments survive, but the composition itself speaks to the rich intellectual engagement.

⁹ A federal movement was advocated for by, for instance, Hornblower 2002: 200; see also Beister 1989. The thrust towards federalization of Greek politics was, however, in all likelihood driven by power politics rather than the cognitive reproduction of political structures: Beck 2000; Funke 2009: 4–6.

¹⁰ See Ward and Ward 2009, especially parts 1 and 2; Greif 2006; Mackil 2013: 10–13.

¹¹ For an annotated research bibliography that traces the landmark contributions to the debate, see also Beck 2015.

The history of scholarship begins with the first volume of Edward A. Freeman's *History of Federal Government*, published in 1863 in London.¹² Writing in the decades following the Greek War of Independence (1821–1832), Freeman regarded federalism as a means by which to restore freedom in a country that was struck both by internal division and foreign domination – in antiquity as much as in his more recent past. Although he distanced himself from another major political upheaval that had occurred only a generation before him, that is “the excitement of the War of Secession of America” (Freeman 1893: xiii), occasional references to *The Federalist Papers* betray just how much Freeman's scholarly interest was triggered by the “late events in America” (xiii). The intellectual link between both, *The Federalist* and the freedom-paradigm as ascribed to federal states such as the Achaian and Aitolian Leagues, was Polybius, who, in Freeman's words, had served as a “chief guide throughout . . . my work” (xi). With no predecessors in the field, the accumulation of references from the body of literary sources available at the time amounted to nothing less than a Herculean task. Freeman mastered it in almost dazzling fashion, offering minute narrative histories of all forms of political aggregation beyond the local level, both in Greece and Italy, including the Lombard League and a “Fragment of the Kingdom and Confederation of Germany” (Freeman 1893: 618–634).

Despite this promising start, however, the book did not set the pace for subsequent scholarship. In J. B. Bury's *History of Greece* (Bury 1900), which became the trend-setting account in the English-speaking world for the next two generations, federalism was entirely marginalized. To be sure, Bury had served as editor of the second edition of Freeman's work, published in 1893; hence, he was intimately familiar with the subject matter.¹³ For his own monograph, however, Bury chose a decidedly Athenian and, to a lesser degree, Spartan perspective on Greek history, full of veneration for the grandeur of both city-states. By the turn of the century, the tides in federal scholarship had shifted from England to the continent. In German-speaking academia, Georg Busolt and Heinrich Swoboda supplanted Freeman's antiquarian approach with a more systematized analysis. The key notion of their investigation revolved around the idea of double citizenship, which soon became the heuristic tool with which to define a Greek federal state. The implicit *Staatsrecht*-approach

¹² Freeman's work was originally designed as a two-volume project but he never returned to the topic again after the completion of the first volume. With J. B. Bury's second edition of that volume from 1893, Freeman's *History of Federal Government* became factually a one-volume publication.

¹³ See the [previous note](#).

was not altogether dissimilar to that of Theodor Mommsen in the field of Roman history (Swoboda had worked with Mommsen as a postdoc in 1880 and 1881 in Berlin). At the same time, the double-citizenship paradigm was fueled by the political controversy that had arisen in German state-law, more precisely the attempt to solidify the constitution of a German federal state, or ‘Bundesstaat’, vis-à-vis a confederation of German states (‘Staatenbund’). In the 1920s, this approach culminated in the publication of two towering volumes of *Griechische Staatskunde* (Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926), which cemented the double-citizenship paradigm in scholarship.¹⁴

The axiomatic belief in two layers of citizenship enjoyed great longevity, even though the *Staatsrecht*-approach itself was soon on the retreat. Victor Ehrenberg, who was professor in Prague (where Swoboda had taught until 1926) until he was forced into emigration to England in 1939, fostered the concept in the relevant sections of his influential *The Greek State*, from 1960. According to Ehrenberg, the “true federal state” was characterized by the “transfer of the Polis constitution to the league” (Ehrenberg 1960: 126). Along with this went an inversion of political power: while the city-state was geared towards direct citizen participation, the nature of the league made it more difficult for all members to engage in politics. Effectively, federalism called for a strong league executive, whose authority was sanctioned by the abstract powers of a common citizenship. Ehrenberg’s reading again owed much to Polybius and his emphatic portrayal of the Achaian League as one super-*polis* (2.37.1; Ehrenberg 1960: 130). In a similar vein, Ehrenberg argued for a model of a generic advancement from the “primitive form of tribal or cantonal state” to the leagues of the Hellenistic Age, whose greatest political achievement was viewed in their “overcoming the old Greek state” (Ehrenberg 1960: 130).

The true breakthrough in the post-War generation was made in North America. Jakob All Ottesen Larsen, a contemporary of Ehrenberg, first got involved with the study of Greek federalism in 1921 (see Larsen 1968: vii). In 1928 he received his PhD from Harvard University for a thesis entitled *A Study of Representative Government in Greek and Roman History. Part I: Greek History*.

¹⁴ The notion of double citizenship was first established by the Austrian scholar Emil Szanto (Szanto 1892). On Busolt, see Chambers 1990. Busolt died in 1920. The second volume of the *Staatskunde* was edited by Swoboda, based on Busolt’s manuscript. The economic crisis of the day had prevented the publisher from pushing for publication of the second half along with the first in 1920: cf. Busolt and Swoboda 1926: v–vi. Swoboda’s own *oeuvre* included several studies on individual federal states (1910, 1912) and a separate volume on “Staatsaltertümer”: Swoboda and Hermann 1913. The topic of his inaugural address as Principal of the University of Prague in 1914 was entitled *Die griechischen Bünde und der moderne Bundesstaat* (Swoboda 1914).

The dissertation was not published but it earned Larsen enough esteem to land prestigious appointments at Ohio State and, from 1930, at the University of Chicago. In 1955, *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History* was published (Larsen 1955). A prize-winning book, *Representative Government* clearly built on Larsen's PhD thesis. The manuscript itself, however, was actually the result of Larsen's appointment as Sather Professor in Berkeley in the previous year; the book resembled a set of eight lectures rather than a genuine monograph. The latter came only with the masterly *Greek Federal States*, already mentioned above, published when Larsen was eighty years of age (Larsen 1968). *Greek Federal States* was thus the great synthesis of a scholarly engagement that had lasted almost fifty years.¹⁵

Larsen's approach was straightforward. Its very core lay in the narrativization of political structures and institutions; i.e., Larsen offered an account in which the narrative exposition of the history of Greek federalism was also the main methodological tool to carry out the analysis. The strength of this approach, in which Polybius once again figured as the key witness, was the accessibility of the topic, the weakness its lack of in-depth structural analysis. In Europe, the new wave of Polybius studies led Frank Walbank (1957–1979) and Paul Pédech (1964) towards similar, philology-driven investigations. Yet in their accounts, the study of federalism was subordinated to philological questions and compartmentalized, limited mostly to the Achaian League. It was left to Larsen to craft the first synoptic study since the days of Freeman, and in fact the first monograph ever that was focused, comprehensive, and systematic enough to qualify as a true handbook on Greek federalism.

The study of individual regions of the Hellenic world had always been on the radar of scholarship (for instance, Oberhummer 1887; Woodhouse 1897; Schober 1924; Stählin 1924). In some accounts, such regional approaches also amounted to interspersed studies on individual federal states (Aymard 1938; Sordi 1958; Roesch 1965a). But only in the 1980s did federalism transform from a tentative object of investigation into a dynamic research topic, witnessing a formidable diversification of approaches and a broadening of scopes. Hitherto the study of regionalism drew largely on individual sets of evidence and the scholarly approaches associated with them, including historical topography, archaeology, numismatics, and epigraphy. The inherent quality of the new interest in regional studies was that they attempted to

¹⁵ Larsen: see the obituaries in *Classical Philology* (70, 1975: 126) and *The American Historical Review* (80, 1975: 746–748). *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History* won the C. J. Goodwin Award of Merit in 1957. The road to both monographs was paved by multiple article publications on individual leagues, including Larsen 1952, 1953, 1955, 1957, and 1960.

integrate various bodies of evidence; in conjunction with the methodological premises of the “New Archaeology” and its commitment to contextual analysis (cf. Hall 2014b: 13–16), this trend promoted a focus on regional distinctness and diversity rather than universal readings of Greek history and culture. The exploration of Boiotia became in many ways a forerunner: first, the discovery of the *Hellenika* from Oxyrhynchos in the early twentieth century triggered considerable excitement over the expansion of the literary sources that came with the new papyrus fragments. Second, the literary tradition was appended by an ever-growing multitude of non-literary sources. By the mid-1980s, scholarly fascination with the region manifested itself in a sparkling research output, including two publication series and an ongoing review bibliography emanating out of one university in Canada alone.¹⁶ In the same vein, over the next decades numerous articles, edited volumes, and monographs appeared that (re-)examined the history of all Greek federal states.¹⁷

The trend of regional diversification – and, by implication, fragmentation – of scholarship was complemented by a marked increase in systematic analyses that tried to grasp the federal paradigm through the lens of certain themes. Among others, this included the general morphology of the Greek federal state (Daverio Rocchi 1993; Beck 1997; Siewert and Aigner-Foresti 2005); patterns in territoriality (Corsten 1999); the impact of a common coinage (Psoma 2001; Warren 2007); and the reception of Greek federalism in political thought and theory of later ages (Lehmann 1981 and 1985; Knoepfler 2013a; Meyer-Zwiffelhofer 2014). Very recently, the theme of common currencies was developed further in a work that skilfully disentangles the realms of political, cultural, and economic integration in a Greek federal state (Mackil 2013).

The great thematic shockwave, however, came from a series of studies that disclosed the mechanics of ethnic identity formation at the regional level. In short, the ‘ethnic turn’ and its associated paradigm shift (Hall 1997; Morgan 2003) redefined the correlation between tribe and league. In particular, it toppled the orthodox view that primitive cantonal states transformed into modern federal states, as for instance Ehrenberg understood. With this came a new conceptual approach towards the fashionable academic label of ethnicity. The impact of this “ethnicity school”¹⁸ will be

¹⁶ *Boeotia antiqua*, the *Proceedings of International Conferences on Boiotian Antiquities* series, and *Teiresias. A Review and Bibliography of Boiotian Studies* (www.mcgill.ca/classics/research/teiresias), all of which emanated from McGill University.

¹⁷ See the bibliographies in the regional case studies below for details.

¹⁸ See Beck 2003: 179; Mackil 2013: 7, n. 23.

discussed in greater detail below. Here it is important to note that the ethnic identity-approach prompted a second wave of regional studies that married the themes of regionalism and ethnic identity with federalism (McInerney 1999b; Kühn 2006; Luraghi 2008). Despite the tremendous knowledge increase that derives from these studies it has also been remarked, with regards to the potential direction of future research, that there remains a wide gulf between patterns of ethnic identity formation on the one hand and the fermentation of political structures in a federal state on the other. The interface between tribal togetherness and federalism has so far been deciphered only in part.¹⁹

This brief survey reveals how Greek federal scholarship was exposed to great tidal waves of externalism. From an overtly constitutional approach to the primacy of philology and on to the conceptual ramifications of the cultural studies turn, research has undergone several paradigm shifts. In the nineteenth century, under the triple impression of state-unification processes in Europe, new intellectual foundations of the idea of nation, and an all-new juristic conception of politics, the prevailing theme in federal studies was the notion of double citizenship. After the Second World War, federalism was associated with the paradigm of freedom and its inherent capacity to unite against a common enemy. At one point, in the early 1960s, this view culminated in a study that explored Greek federalism from the perspective of nuclear balance and hegemonic rivalry (Larsen 1962; cf. also Larsen 1944). Since the late 1980s, the politics of transnational integration in the European Union has triggered a new wave of studies that have committed themselves to the cultural legacy of ancient Hellenic federalism. This has led to repeated conferences and symposia that were dedicated to the study of, for instance, the “roots of the common European house” (Aigner Foresti et al. 1994). Most recently, the rising prominence of the twin paradigms of ethnicity and identity coincided with, and most likely was a reflection of, the political milieu of globalization and the responses it invites in the present day, including the violent competition between ethnic groups and their quest for identity at the regional level.

Today’s scholarship is not free from the remnants of externalism either, but its force is arguably less imperative. This has mostly to do with the hesitation among scholars about operating with universally viable definitions that hamper the investigation by fitting as badly as a Prokrustean bed

¹⁹ Note, in this regard, the edited volume Funke and Luraghi 2009, which explores the intersection between ethnicity and the rise of federal structures, at one particular moment and in a specific political constellation (i.e., affairs in the Peloponnese in the 360s BCE).

(although this tendency might be in itself an academic reflection of the more general state of apprehension in the world today). In lieu of monolithic explanations, the notion of flexibility and the dynamics of change have become characteristic of prevalent approaches. A good example for this is the delineation between federal designs of integration and other forms of regionalism. The region of Attica was incorporated into one *polis* by means of a sophisticated political and territorial organization. Traditionally associated by the Athenians with the synoikism performed by their legendary founding hero Theseus, the unification of Attica became a functional reality only in 508/7 BCE with the passage of Kleisthenes' political reforms. Kleisthenes' measures precipitated "a fully integrated region-state" (Anderson 2003: 42) in which the entire Attic peninsula became one with the *polis* of Athens. In neighboring Boiotia, which is very similar to Attica in terms of size (Farinetti 2011), the integration of the region followed a different trajectory. With city-states mushrooming around the shores of Lake Kopais and along the valleys of the Asopos and Kephisos rivers, any movement towards integration was prefigured by the existence of developed *poleis*. When the Boiotians extended their mutual exchanges and intensified their cooperation, roughly at around the time of the Kleisthenic reforms, the only viable way to do so was to respect the powers and privileges of their respective cities.²⁰ The Peloponnesian League followed a different path once again. When the league was transformed into a more coherent fighting alliance at the end of the sixth century BCE (Cartledge 2002: 226), the cooperation of its members was steered to only a minimal degree of integration into any kind of state-structure. Its formulaic prescription to "follow wherever Sparta should lead" (M&L no. 67bis) held little, if any impact on the genuine state-quality of its participating communities.

The trajectories towards integration and (trans-)regional cooperation are distinct enough to be presented in opposite terms: Boiotia was united by federalism and Attica was brought under the state-authority of one *polis*, whereas the Peloponnesian League was a military alliance. While the general delineation is clear, many nuanced forms of integration existed between these alternatives.²¹

²⁰ See Chapter 7, below.

²¹ See, however, Figueira and Jensen 2013, who note that the Peloponnesian League, in its earliest phase, "shows affinities with alliances formed through ethnic solidarity" (481). A similar sense of notorious hybridity applied to the Athenian Empire, where the notion of symmarchy was intermingled with a strong thrust towards *polis*-integration. Cf. Morris 2009, who advocated for the Athenian domain as some sort of "super state." The strict separation between symmachies and other forms of interstate cooperation (as suggested by Tausend 1992) should thus be viewed with caution.

The picture is again more complex than advocacy for a universal definition suggests. In some regions, such as Elis, Messenia, the Chalkidike, or on the island of Keos the incorporation of larger territories was facilitated through measures that drew on the models of both *polis*-synoikism and federalism. In others, for instance in Phokis, the regional character of interaction is well attested through common magistracies and a vibrant sense of communality, but it is hard to assert just how this communality was negotiated at the grass roots level of cities and villages. Yet in others, regional cooperation was mostly concerned with the conduct of warfare. In Thessaly, southern Italy, and on Crete, for instance, members of the respective leagues were at times tied together mostly by the strands of military integration; with such a strong (yet not exclusive) vector of warfare, the league effectively resembled a fighting alliance. The concepts of regionalism and federalism thus often overlapped, but they were not identical.

The scholarly *communis opinio* here is to view those Greek regions as a federal state in which different sets of political authority are traceable; this also accounts for the idea noted above, that participating constituents in a federal state maintained their own political insides, while at the same time shaping a new collective that governed their relations with the outside. As was indicated in the survey over scholarly approaches, the most common expression of different sets of state-authority has long been considered to be the existence of two layers of citizenship. Such an approach is, however, also fraught with problems (see below, pp. 18–19), including the tendency to isolate and, effectively, prioritize the realm of politics over other modes of state-incorporation. In most pre-modern societies, and in the dynamic environment of ancient Greece in particular, the world of politics was inextricably intertwined with other realms – religious, cultural, societal, economic, and monetary, to name but the most evident ones. In more recent examinations of coin emissions, for instance, it was demonstrated how the production of “cooperative coinages” requires a substantial degree of cooperation between those who engage in them. Although those coinages have long been interpreted as an economic rather than a political phenomenon, it has now become obvious that it bears little promise to tell both features strictly apart (Mackil and van Alfen 2006; cf. Psoma 2001). On the whole it has become axiomatic to chart the integration of an *ethnos* along various trajectories (e.g., political, economic, cultural) and craft thick descriptions that account for multiple features of federalism rather than

one. The disclosure of those features is a good benchmark that separates federal integration from other forms of regionalism.²²

Another consensus concerns modern language practice. It was attempted by Larsen, among others, to discern the different meanings between these terms and attribute varying degrees of integration to each one of them. To this end, Larsen reserved the term confederacy for the “true federal state” and applied league only to “looser organizations” (Larsen 1968: xiv–xv). But Larsen immediately recognized the difficulties that such a division causes with the classification of some organizations, as the negotiation of federal affairs at times has led to either more or less unity. Some organizations might have floated between high levels of integration and low ones; hence they oscillated between the status of league and confederacy. This alone suggests that it is difficult to impose tight categories. But there are other objections. The first has to do with practicality. It has become conventional, for instance, to use the designations ‘Boiotian League’ and ‘Boiotian Confederacy’ mostly interchangeably. In Anglophone scholarship, both labels are well established and applied with no marked difference.²³ Second, what makes a restrictive language practice less desirable is that the semantic underpinnings of the English vocabulary do not necessarily resonate in other modern languages. For instance, the German distinction between ‘Bundesstaat’ and ‘Staatenbund’, which builds on its own legal tradition, is a notorious case. Its common denominator ‘Bund’ equals the French ‘fédération’, but the English terms ‘league’ and ‘confederacy’ do not fully match with either one of these. The semantic gap between ‘federal’, ‘fédéral’ and ‘föderal’, too, is significant.²⁴ Finally, the diversity of federal designs, with many regional variations and multiple moments of adaptation and change, speak against rigid terminological definitions. The breadth of federal experiments clearly exceeds crude dichotomies such as “loose” and “true” state-integration. The scholarly vocabulary today largely avoids preconceived classifications. It is preferable to apply a terminology that is receptive to diversity and allows for a meaningful description of dynamic federal designs in the particular political culture of ancient Greece.

²² See Beck 2014: 34–35; see also the tentative list of criteria by McNerney 2013: 470–I, that is designed to flesh out the “isomorphism” of regions integrated by means of federalism.

²³ But see Chapter 24 by Kurt Raaflaub below, who favors a more discriminate distinction.

²⁴ See Stewart 1982, with reference to a more centralized semantic underpinning of the word federal, especially in American English, whereas föderal and fédéral imply a more peripheral perspective.

Political features of federalism in ancient Greece

The Greeks had their own issues with terminology, and accordingly there is a rich vocabulary in ancient Greek that relates to federalism. In the literary and non-literary evidence – inscriptions especially, but also coinage – federal states are regularly referred to simply by the collective plural of their *ethnikon*, their tribal designation, i.e., Arkadians, Aitolians, Euboians, and others. In a more technical sense, a federal state is conventionally labelled a *koinon* (plural *koina*), which simply means league or confederacy. The term implies some sort of association of constituent members; hence, more generally, it can also be applied to the *koinon* of craftsmen, theater performers or colleges of priests (Fröhlich and Hamon 2012). In politics, the *koinon* of, for instance, the Achaians or Akarnanians refers to the federal state of those groupings, often in juxtaposition to its constituent members. Another term that occurs frequently is the already mentioned *ethnos* (plural *ethnē*), usually translated ‘tribe’. Its overtones of primordial relations and blood-ties trigger associations of ethnicity (see below, pp. 20–26), but it is also used as the technical designation of a federal state (Mackil 2013: 5). Moreover, in the Hellenistic period, the noun *sympoliteia* is attested, which propels the idea of a joint polity. Upon its first appearance in the sources, in the first half of the fourth century BCE, the word is introduced by means of a verb, *sympoliteuein*, which means, literally, to share in politics or in a common *politeia*.²⁵ Although each of these terms has a slightly nuanced connotation, their usage is by no means exclusive. In the Hellenistic period, all three are sometimes present in one and the same document. It is not always clear just how stringent their application is (*SEG* 18.570 from c. 167 BCE). The literary sources also betray conspicuous combinations. Polybius, for instance, in an attempt actually to provide terminological precision, speaks of the Achaian League as an *ethnikē sympoliteia* (2.44.5; cf. 2.50.8: *koinē politeia*; 28.14.3, with Reger 2004a: 148–9). By implication, this means that the term *sympoliteia* covered a wider range of unions from which the *ethnikē sympoliteia* was somewhat distinct. So by the time of Polybius’ writing, the term *sympoliteia* alone was not altogether unambiguous.

The governing bodies in a *koinon* were basically the same as in a *polis*. The full slate of institutions in a federal state includes the federal *ekklēsia* (“assembly”, sometimes also *koinē ekklēsia* or *synodos*). In most leagues, the

²⁵ On *sympoliteuein*, Beck 2001b; Bearzot 2004a: 48; *sympoliteia* in general, Reger 2004a and Schmitt 1994, with an attempt to shape different categories of *sympoliteiai*, notably federal and synoikistic sympolities; cf. also Rzepka 2002: 240–244; Funke 2007b: 194–200.

common assembly met in one city, for instance in Elis, Olynthos, or Thebes, which effectively acquired the status of a capital, despite the difficulties such a definition entails (see Roy 2007: 291). If the *ekklēsia* was organized as a primary assembly, this obviously gave a political advantage to the inhabitants of the capital city as they enjoyed a formidable majority among the assembled voters at any given time. To counter such dominance, some leagues held meetings in rotating cities or locations. The members of the Arkadian League founded a new federal center, the city of Megalopolis, to neutralize the attempts of any one city to dominate the federal *ekklēsia*. Another way to respond to the challenge of local predominance was to replace the primary assembly with a representative body, usually based on the size of the population in constituent cities; or to take the votes in the federal assembly by cities, a principle that was well established in the Achaian and Boiotian Leagues of the second century BCE.

In many *koina*, then, the politics of federal integration were interwoven with ideas of representative government. On a practical level, representation was achieved through the sending of delegates to the federal center who acted for their member-communities and had the authority to make decisions on their behalf. As most cities maintained meticulous registers of citizens,²⁶ and hence fairly accurate records of their respective citizen body, it was relatively easy to refine this principle and extend it to the proportional representation of member-states in the federal government. To make such an arrangement workable, several *koina* created subdivisions of their territory which provided a formula for league membership. The standard terms to denote such subdivisions were *meros* (plural *merē*), meaning simply part or division, and *telos* (plural *telē*), best translated as “district.” In the literary sources, the term *synteleia* occurs in relation to territorial districts, but the term also has a strong connotation of dependency.²⁷ The nature of those divisions is often misunderstood. It will be best to discuss the feature of *telē* further below, when the examination turns to the question of how a federal state emerged. For the moment it suffices to say that in any subdivision, the capacities to make contributions to the *koinon* and send contingents to the federal army were pooled and then determined in relation to the number of citizens in a *meros*. The same goes for taxation

²⁶ The evidence for Athens from (Arist.) *Ath. Pol.* 42.1 is most likely paradigmatic rather than unique. The *dokimasia*, which included positive proof of citizenship, is also attested outside of Athens: Feyel 2009: 363–370. See Scafuro 2013 for a survey of public record-keeping practices.

²⁷ See Bakhuizen 1994; the concept of *synteleia* is addressed in various case studies below, including the chapters by Thomas Heine Nielsen, Hans Beck and Angela Ganter, Peter Funke, Giovanna Daverio Rocchi, and Ralf Behrwald.

purposes and contributions to the federal treasury. Participation rights of members were estimated accordingly. When a *koinon* was built on *merē*, those subdivisions were reference figures and at times artificial units for the mechanics of representative government. Unlike the Swiss cantons or the American states, the Greek *merē* were not the members of the federal state in themselves, but they were used to calculate the privileges and contributions of the actual member-communities to the central government.

The politics of representation can be traced in other institutions, too. For instance, the law courts (*dikastēria*) of the *koinon* were often staffed with delegates who represented their local communities, as were other federal boards and colleges. The federal army was, almost naturally, mustered from member-contingents in relation to their hoplite and cavalry capacities. But the bodies that were most susceptible to the idea of political representation were the federal council, the *boulē* or *synedrion*, the league executives, the archons (“officials”) and *stratēgoi* (“executive commanders”), and federal bodies for the reconciliation of grievances. The *boulē* was appointed to run the daily affairs of the league, which naturally put it at the center of the political administration. It was there that federal negotiations between member-states were most commonly conducted, and it was the place in which league members formulated their policies within the *koinon* and in relation to others. Such negotiations are attested in both the literary and epigraphical sources, although it is not always clear if member-states were represented proportionally or directly, with each one community casting one vote.²⁸ Be that as it may, the idea of sending delegates to the federal government demonstrates that they were vested with the authority to fully represent their communities and take action in their stead; in turn, delegates reported from the center back to their cities and informed them of league affairs.

For executive magistrates, the idea of representation was even more vital, since they were in a position to yield immediate political power. The board of commanders and executive leaders shaped the affairs of the *koinon* like no other institution, both in war and in other league affairs, and members had a natural desire to be represented and make their voices heard in this process. The representation of a member-state in the executive board was therefore an important step towards a federal equilibrium. None the less, with this in mind it should be stressed that some federal states abstained from such a representative policy and elected their highest magistrates in a

²⁸ The recently discovered inscription *SEG* 58.370 from Messene from c. 180 BCE exemplifies this, dealing with a border dispute with Megalopolis in the broader frame of reference of the Achaian League. The text sheds light on multiple instances and institutions of federal reconciliation. See Luraghi and Magnetto 2012 and Athanasios Rizakis in Chapter 6 below.

primarily federal assembly, with no recognition of their local origin and member-state affiliation. In this scenario, a *koinon* might have functioned without provision for representation of constituent members at all.²⁹

The designation of federal institutions was often derived from a regional vocabulary of proper names that voiced the league identity; again, the practice resembled that of many city-states. In Boiotia, the leading executives of the federal state were called boiotarchs, literally “leaders of the Boiotians”, which highlighted the call for federal authority; the offices of lykiarch, *libyarchēs*, or *phokarchai* signaled the same claim in their respective leagues. In Thessaly, the traditional designation of regional leaders, *tagos* and *tetrarch*, amalgamated with the league language. The short-lived Arkadian League designed its own brand label, *Arkadikon*, while the central meeting place of the Phokian League was called *Phokikon*. In Aitolia, the cyclical gatherings of the federal assembly were named after the great regional market gatherings, *Thermika* and *Panaitolika*; the latter emphasized the claim for a body that spoke for all Aitolians.³⁰ Many leagues thus promoted their regional identity through a variety of technical terms that related to their tribal *ethnikon* and gave to it a political twist; again, the large body of federal laws and decrees attests to the vast variety of official formulae that signaled the political identity of the league. At the same time, the local communities of a *koinon* continued to identify themselves by means of their city-ethnic, or local *ethnikon*. In practical terms, this supported the trend towards a language use that was characterized by the listing of two *ethnika* in a *koinon* rather than one. In a federal state, the identification of citizens was often made in the form of tribal ethnic + city-ethnic, e.g., an Achaian of Aigion or an Akarnanian of Alyzeia.³¹

It would be misleading to present this duality between the *koinon* and its local constituents by means of a uniform model. The dichotomous nature of the federal organization was more complex. This had to do with the vast diversity of constituent members at the local level. The nature of the members of a *koinon* varied substantially both in size and shape. Most federal states comprised of a larger number of *poleis*, some of them with large citizenries and vibrant urban centers. Beyond member-cities, some federal states integrated smaller towns, sometimes mere villages or loose

²⁹ In such a scenario, the division between federal cooperation and other forms of regional integration is once again more difficult to discern. At one point in its history, in the fourth century BCE, the Boiotian League appears to have experienced such a thrust towards the political dominance of the city of Thebes. Similarly in the Chalkidic League, affairs were geared towards the dominance of Olynthos.

³⁰ See Funke 2013c and Chapter 5 by Peter Funke below.

³¹ IG II² 13 (Achaia), SEG 42.1041 (Akarnania), but see below on the multi-layered meaning of such expressions.

agglomerations of farmsteads (*komai*). In Akarnania, the members of the league were divided into *poleis* and *ethnē*, a distinction which referred to members with and without an urban center.³² In other federations, the membership was mostly made up of tribes or scattered sub-tribes. In yet others, for example in Arkadia, a diverse mixture of all of these is attested.³³ While the political organization of larger city-state members is generally fairly well documented, very little is known about the political life in smaller constituents such as *komai* or sub-tribes. For instance, it is not altogether clear how developed and, effectively, how exclusive the mechanism of political participation was in such communities. It is particularly hard to assess precisely how advanced the concept of citizenship was in such sub-tribes, and what privileges it entailed. The notoriously high number of Phokian communities provides a perfect example. According to the sources, the Phokian League comprised over twenty communities that were labelled *poleis*. But few of them had any urban features or a local administration to manifest their political identity; most of them comprised only scattered villages or, at times, just a few hamlets.³⁴ Very little is known about their political organization, let alone their citizenship regulations. In Lykia, one of the most eminent examples of representative government, the league came into being significantly before advanced political institutions were implemented at the local level of member-communities. Examples from other federal states include the nature of constituents in Messenia, Elis, and Aitolia, but also in the peripheral regions between Boiotia and Thessaly, notably in Doris, Malis, and Ainianis.³⁵

The observation is of some importance because it challenges the idea that the existence of double citizenship is the decisive factor in the definition of a Greek federal state. As was noted above, it was long held that Greek federalism was characterized by two layers of citizenship, a federal and a local one, which defined the political realms of *polis* and *koinon* and which demarcated their respective spheres of action. Such a scheme is attested for many federal states, but not for all; for some, such as the Cretan *koinon*, a joint league-citizenship can be actively denied.³⁶ The expression of two *ethnika*, too, seems to support the view that double citizenship was a vital feature of Greek federalism. Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind

³² Cf. Gehrke and Wirbelauer 2004: 352; see Chapter 4 by Klaus Freitag below.

³³ Nielsen 2002; cf. also Thomas Heine Nielsen in Chapter 13 below.

³⁴ Dem. 19.123; see Beck 1997: 108; McInerney 1999b: 40–85; Oulhen 2004.

³⁵ For details, see the various case studies below.

³⁶ See Chapter 20 by Angelos Chaniotis below. Similar conditions seem to have prevailed in Lykia, see Chapter 22 by Ralf Behrwald.

that the combination of ethnics does not automatically point to the workings of citizenship, as *ethnika*, more generally, might be used as expressions of origin or regional identity; their application is inconsistent, and they are not necessarily tied to the legal frame of citizenship (Gschnitzer 1955; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 58–69). If such a connection was in place, the mere existence of two *ethnika* says little about the actual groundings of citizenship. From the examples that survive in the sources, including the many grants of federal citizenship to foreigners or other privileges such as the rights to own property (*enktēsis*) or intermarriage (*epigameia*), it is reasonably clear that the use and application of citizenship regulations differed widely from league to league. The corresponding privileges of individuals who enjoyed two citizenships also varied significantly. In many cases they were merely the result of ad hoc settlements, coined under the particular circumstances of the day, rather than the product of grand designs of juristic demarcation or the separation of legal realms.³⁷ The case of double citizenship should therefore not be overstated. It is a lively expression of federalism, but on the whole it is preferable to operate with a broader definition of federalism that recognizes the existence of two arenas in which the conduct of politics took place.

Regional identity and territoriality

The delineation of those arenas is intertwined with the development of statehood in Greece. The issue is among the most difficult pertaining to federalism. It will be left to the [next chapter](#) to discuss the problem in detail,³⁸ but some of the more basic implications are too important for the general understanding to be passed over in silence here. It has long been recognized that the majority of Greek federal states had an ethnic background. They were related one way or another to the Hellenic tribes, called *ethnē* in Greek. Hence, the word *ethnos* related to both a developed federal state (see the previous section) and a group of people with a shared ethnic identity.³⁹ Although both kinds of *ethnē* were not the same, it is widely accepted that

³⁷ This is highlighted by the high volume of grants of *isopoliteia* that survive from many cities and leagues, especially from the third century BCE; see Gawantka 1975; Rousset 2013.

³⁸ See [Chapter 2](#) by Jonathan Hall.

³⁹ The most basic overview, also with regards to the development of conceptual paradigms, continues to be McNerney 1999b: 8–39. Note the potential disconnect between what the Greeks meant by *ethnos* and what modern scholars have chosen to study under the label ethnic/ethnicity (McNerney 1999b: 25; Hall 2002: 18). More recent comparisons between the complex of ethnicity in anthropology and ancient manifestations of it make the analytical concept stand on uncertain ground. Another caveat noted by Mitchell and Greatrex 2000: xiv comes with the ease with which ethnicity,

the tribe was in some way formative for the networks of political integration. In a reference that serves as *locus classicus*, the anonymous author of the *Hellenika* from Oxyrhynchos (fourth century BCE) digresses on the affairs in the Boiotian League, which he calls a *koinon*. Towards the end of the section, when a summary conclusion is offered, he remarks that “in this way the entire *ethnos* came together to join in politics” (*Hell. ox.* 19.4 Chambers). The immediate implication is that the Boiotian League embraced the whole Boiotian tribe, which was noteworthy enough to be spelled out. But the passage also betrays the assumption that tribe and league were, in principle, different entities, with different modes of participation and expressions of belonging. While what was at the heart of the Boiotians’ tribal identity is left unsaid, the character of the league was described as determined by their desire to come together in politics.⁴⁰ In later periods, various *koina* extended their political organization beyond the region associated with their tribe and admitted ‘foreign’ members to their league, mostly through the award of citizenship or grants of associated political and economic rights. This force of federalism is attested as early as the fourth century BCE, but the great leagues of the Hellenistic Age, the Achaian and Aitolian Confederacies, are the evident landmarks in this process of trans-tribal integration.⁴¹ While the relation between *ethnos* and league is fairly well understood in later periods, the early relation between the two is more difficult to assess. When did federalism emerge? In other words: when, and how, did federal structures that offered the opportunity for a distinct form of regional integration come into being, and what was the interface between tribal bonds and federal cooperation (see Beck 2003; Morgan 2009)?

The quest for a uniform answer bears again little promise, but there are two ways to approach the subject. The first is to examine the development from the perspective of emerging local communities. Federalism requires a certain degree of advancement in order to facilitate infrastructures for the political negotiation between member-states and the *koinon*. It is easy to see how developed city-states meet the criteria for such an advancement,

identity, and culture are often conflated in scholarship, and scholars take different definitions for each, which amounts to an unresolvable problem, cf. Cooper and Brubaker 2005. In a more recent contribution that determines the effect of theoretical assumptions on the conceptualization of antiquity, ethnic identity in Greece is labeled as “heterological ethnicity” (Siapkak 2003), highlighting its non-uniformity, flexibility, and notion of change.

⁴⁰ *Hell. ox.* 19.2–4 Chambers; Bearzot 2009.

⁴¹ Among the earliest attested cases of federal expansion beyond the boundaries of the tribe ranks the integration of Kalydon on the northern shores of the Corinthian Gulf into the Achaian League, which was initiated at some point before 389 BCE: Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.1. See Moggi 2002; Freitag 2009. On the later development in the Aitolian League in particular, see Chapter 5 by Peter Funke below.

but the issue is again more complicated in regions where the process of *polis*-formation was somewhat delayed. In Aitolia, for instance, the earliest *koinon* of the late fifth and fourth centuries BCE comprised a series of tribes, Eurytanes, Ophiones, and others, which in themselves consisted of smaller sub-tribes. Among them was the tribal group of the Kallieis on the fringes of the territory of the Ophiones. Next to nothing is known about this group during the Classical period, except for Thucydides' statement (3.96.3) that the Kallieis were recognized as a sub-tribe that contributed its own contingent to the federal army of the Aitolians. At some point in the fourth century, the Kallieis founded their own urban center, Kallipolis, laid out as a planned city with its own defense circuit and reserved public spaces within. To reflect this advancement, the Kallieis henceforth called themselves Kallipolitai, indicating that their community had merged into a developed *polis*. In Aitolia, then, the interaction between multiple tribes and sub-tribes fueled the emergence of local infrastructures, both in an urban and administrative sense; ultimately, this culminated in the creation of fully developed local communities (Funke 1987, 1997).⁴²

Together with examples from other federal states, the case of the Kallieis demonstrates that the state-formation in a *koinon* was determined by divergent forces. As in any other *polis*, the development of local communities was shaped by the internal process of urbanization and institutionalization, and it was of course subject to outside force or hostile interaction with foreign parties. Rising state communities acquired control of their surrounding countrysides, staked their claims in opposition to neighboring cities and fought wars over territories and natural resources. These actions were complemented by power negotiations within each community, where the exercise of political authority was gradually absorbed by citizen assemblies, councils and *polis* executives. If anything, the notion of autonomy became a guiding principle for the political action of those communities long before *autonomia* evolved as a governing principle in interstate affairs.

This said, it has to be kept in mind that the rise of independent communities never fostered a total segregation of those cities from the tribal bonds that surrounded them. Between the manifold expressions of a *polis*' local identity and the macro-identity of Panhellenism, belonging to one of the

⁴² See also Morgan 2000 for a similar development in Achaia. – The relation between urban development, tribe, and sophistication of the *koinon* is also reflected in a much debated passage in Arist. *Pol.* 1261b 22–31. Aristotle's verdict that "it is by this characteristic that a city (*polis*) will also surpass a tribe (*ethnos*) in which the population is not scattered among villages but organized like the Arkadians" continues to be somewhat puzzling, despite the various interpretations that have been offered (see above n. 8).

ethnic sub-branches of the Hellenes marked the third, intermediate layer of communal identity.⁴³ In a *koinon*, the identity forces of city and tribe differed from region to region, and at times they might have worked in open competition with each other. In Boiotia, for example, the city of Thebes developed a notoriously strong sense of an independent community, so much so that it almost gave the impression of overpowering the other Boiotian *poleis* (there were many of them) and, effectively, dominating the Boiotian tribe. In Achaia or Aitolia, *poleis* such as Pellene, Pleuron, or Kalydon often went their own ways, with little intention of engaging in the affairs of their tribes, and vice versa. In Thessaly, on the other hand, developed city-states such as Pharsalos and Pherai were entrenched in the networks of feudal lordships and other forms of tribal bonds that gave a nuanced meaning to their status as independent communities (Sprawski 1999). Despite these variations, it is important to recall that in each of these cases the conduct of local politics was impacted by a sense of tribal togetherness that cut across the narrow borders of the *polis*. The *ethnos* provided a frame of reference that transcended the realm of otherwise independent city-states. Its members persistently interacted with each other and negotiated their relations; along this process of interaction, the members of a tribe refined their local organization, and they forged new means of exchange with one another. Naturally, this trend strengthened not only their local institutions but it instilled in them a sense of political self-reliance, if not sovereignty.

At the same time, increasing regional exchange also helped to structure the interaction between the members of an *ethnos* and enhance their collective identity as a tribe. This points to the second path of inquiry, which traces the nascence of federalism from the perspective of developing tribal identities. The correlation between early tribal organizations and federal states has long puzzled scholars. Only recently has the dynamic between the two been properly understood. Today, the orthodox view is that the regional identities of the various Hellenic tribes (Arkadians, Phokians, Malians, and others) were not societal relics of a remote past. Rather, they ought to be regarded as essentially changing, flexible, and, at times, relatively late constructs that took shape only in the Archaic period.⁴⁴ So when the earliest federal states

⁴³ It is a truism to note that this goes also for Athens and Sparta as leading protagonists of the Dorian and Ionian tribes, no matter how the process of identity formation in both *ethnē* is conceived of, and when it actually took place. On Panhellenism, see Chapter 3 by Lynette Mitchell below.

⁴⁴ According to the *communis opinio* of the day, the historical *ethnē* were viewed as sociopolitical extensions, as it were, of tribal organizations that dated back to a time of great migrations. This opinion was already challenged by Roussel 1976 and Bourriot 1976 but it took almost another generation to topple the prevailing orthodoxy. See the contributions by Funke 1993, Ulf 1996,

emerged towards the end of the Archaic period, they were not a revival, or modernization, of early tribal organizations; the pre-existence of such tribal aggregations has in itself become questionable. Federalism did not evolve in a linear process from backwater tribes to developed *koina*, but rather it worked in parallel with the rise of a new tribal awareness. Both trends, the fermentation of ethnic identities and the development of (proto-)political structures, were mutually dependent. On the one hand, the rise of *poleis* and non-urban communities reinstated the sense of togetherness, as reflected in distinct material cultures, tales of epic ancestry, and also more 'rationalized' expressions of ethnic cohesion, such as calendars and, from the fifth century BCE, regional histories and chronicles.⁴⁵ On the other hand, the belief of common descent complemented the advancement of new patterns in political interaction. It is now widely acknowledged that this new sense of togetherness was not only formative for the creation of a league but continued to play an important role in the ongoing process of federal negotiations in later periods (cf. Freitag 2007a).

This requires further explanation. Recent scholarship has entertained the idea that Greek ethnogenesis overlapped with federalism in the sense that ethnicity offered a vibrant platform for the integration of local communities into a league. For example, three more recent studies on Boiotian ethnogenesis show how the region's political integration was practically predisposed to and, in turn, made possible through a common set of regional cults and foundation myths that go back to the late eighth century BCE. All three works argue, independently from another and with different methodologies, that the federal integration of Boiotia was driven by vivid reflections of a shared ethnic identity (Kühr 2006, Larson 2007, Kowalzig 2007; cf. Freitag 2010). First, the fundamental belief of common primordial descent and legends of collective action fueled the idea of political cooperation. Second, unification in a *koinon* supported the idea of separation from other tribes; hence, it reinstated the notion of tribal distinction. In the conduct of regional affairs, there were of course various ways in which the agencies of the tribe and league intersected. For instance, in their regional networks, aristocratic leaders no doubt finessed narratives of heroic descent, which realigned the political action in a *koinon* with ideas of legendary ancestors and foundation heroes. The Homeric *Catalog of Ships* is the earliest example for such an imagined realignment with the

Gehrke 2000, which, in conjunction with the works of the Anglo-American 'ethnicity school', have become immensely impactful along the way.

⁴⁵ Material culture: Morgan 1991 and 2003; epic ancestry: e.g., Prinz 1979; Scheer 1993 (with regards to Hellenistic cities); Gehrke 1994; calendars: Trümper 1997.

past; indeed, almost every federal state of the later period associated its tribal roots with the respective section of the Homeric text, despite some variations over time.⁴⁶

Foundation myths and stories of primordial togetherness were accompanied by, and in turn fed into, the rise of tribal cults and the veneration of specific gods and heroes associated with them. In the *koina* of the Classical and Hellenistic periods, many of those gods became the chief deities of the federal state, venerated in state cults, festivals, and games. This leads to yet another, and probably the most intensive intersection between tribe and *koinon*, the role of regional sanctuaries that acted as a platform for the expression of tribal cohesion and, along the way, as centers of political interaction.⁴⁷ The earliest history of those sites is sometimes associated with their roots as so-called amphiktyonic centers, a term that implies that the *amphiktyontes*, literally “those who dwell around” the site, engaged in various acts of exchange there (Funke 2013a). The religious economy of sanctuaries – and competition between them – put the histories of individual sites on vastly different trajectories. In some cases, early cult sites developed into flourishing federal centers; in others they went through repeated cycles of growth and decay; in yet others, their regional impact perished altogether. The shrine at Kalapodi in Phokis is just one fascinating example for the long and volatile history of a regional cult center, and the various functions it might absorb from the Late Bronze Age to the Classical period and beyond.⁴⁸ In southern Italy and Epeiros, the eventful histories of both *koina* were inextricably associated with those of the sanctuaries of Zeus Homarios and of Zeus at Dodona. On Delos and on Lesbos, the sanctuaries of Apollo and Zeus at Messon were apparently the real engine of federal integration, whereas their impact was again magnified by the specific geographical setting of the island-world of the Aegean.⁴⁹ Despite

⁴⁶ Simpson and Lazenby 1970; Visser 1997; Kühr 2006: 54–70 (Boiotia); cf. Chapter 2 by Jonathan Hall below.

⁴⁷ Funke and Haake 2013 include many case studies; to these, add Grainger 2011 and Schachter 1994 on the intriguing case of the *Basileia* near Lebadeia and their impact on the Boiotian League.

⁴⁸ Kalapodi: Felsch 1996 and 2007, which has contributed immensely to the identification of the site, vis-à-vis the site of Hyampolis nearby; Ellinger 1993; McNerney 2013. Another example is the volatile history of the sanctuary and site of Onchestos in Boiotia.

⁴⁹ See the chapters by Elizabeth Meyer, Kostas Buraselis, and Michel Fronza below. A similar force was at work in the three regional sanctuaries of western Asia Minor as described by Herodotus, the Panionion with the sanctuary of Poseidon on Cape Mykale (1.148), the sanctuary of Apollo at Gryneion as the common meeting place of the Aiolian League (1.149), and the Dorian Hexapolis, which celebrated a festival with games in honor of Triopian Apollo on a promontory near Knidos (1.144). Of these, at least the site of the Panionion enjoyed substantial longevity (*Milet* 1.2.10; Lohmann 2005). Yet none of these sanctuaries developed enough gravitational force to integrate their surrounding cities into a lasting political body.

the differences in scale, these examples all attest to the inherent quality of sanctuaries as nodes of trans-local interaction that provided the members of a tribe with a hub for non-violent cooperation, exchange, and, effectively, the construction of “aggregative identities”⁵⁰.

The implication of all this is that it has become increasingly difficult to argue for a blunt delineation between early tribal states and advanced federal states. Both marked a distinct form of communal aggregation, but at the same time, cooperation in an *ethnos* and political integration into a *koinon* were two sides of the same coin. Many Greek federal states were not only glued together by legislation, representative governance, or citizenship regulations, but also by the sense of ethnic togetherness and the expression of this identity as a tribe in cult and ritual. In other words, the political workings of federalism were tied to a “symbolic system” (Funke 2013b: 12) of religious practices and institutions, sanctuaries, and other cultural expressions of ethnic cohesion that demonstrated the binding force of their order. With this in mind, it is important to recall that a *koinon*, unlike a tribe or kinship group, is characterized by the existence of a federal center which embodies genuine state-authority (whatever the definition of state may be at the time). In many federal states, the ultimate stimulus for such a center came from outside, when hostile interaction with others triggered coercive attempts to raid settlements, sanctuaries, and territories of another tribe, or to unite against a foreign invader. Under the influence of outside pressure, many tribes moved towards closer cooperation in politics.

All the while, the road to political integration was also at times less straightforward. Coercive action in response to outside threat was only one among many ways of interaction between the members of a tribe. Other forms included, as mentioned before, the social networking of local aristocracies and their competition at regional games, or the celebration of common cults and festivals. The resources that were necessary to facilitate the infrastructure for all this quickly exceeded the means of any one individual community. So in their attempt to carry out any one of those activities, for instance the building of a regional hero shrine or temple precinct, the members of a tribe were quickly led towards yet another form of interaction, that of pooling of resources and, more generally speaking, economic exchange (Mackil 2013). In the process of such lively interaction,

⁵⁰ Hall 1997: 47–50, who detects a shift from patterns in aggregative-identity construction to oppositional patterns in the aftermath of the Persian Wars. The picture has recently become more complicated as scholars point also to the inherent capacity of regional sanctuaries to generate instability, social pressure, and intercommunal rivalry, cf. McInerney 2013. The aggregative force of sanctuaries was thus complemented by their quality as potential fracture zones.

the exchange between communities became almost invariably more structured. As this process unfolded, the local members of a tribe were pressed to position themselves, explore new means of collaboration, and regularize their contacts with others states that stood beyond their tribe. Eventually, all this prompted the advancement of a political organization that served as a permanent platform of regional exchange. At the end of this process, the *koinon* emerged as a new intermediary unit, a developed entity that extended the genuine inside-realms of local communities, with its own set of common institutions, laws, and magistracies, and so on.

Some scholars have advocated that federalism necessarily calls for some sort of founding act, with which the members of a tribe officially mark the transition of their organization to a developed *koinon*. Furthermore, it was conjectured that such an inauguration was usually accompanied by the creation of territorial subdivisions (*merē* or *telē*), which legally demarcated the rights and privileges of the league's participating members (Corsten 1999). The nature of *merē* has already been discussed; as mentioned above, if a league operated on the principle of proportional representation, they served as arithmetic references for the calculation of the league shares held by each member-community, usually in relation to its citizen number. It is indeed conceivable that some *koina*, for instance when admitting new members or reforming their affairs, formally adopted a policy of representation according to *merē*. Further, it goes without saying that some federal states over time will have reinvigorated their organization through reforms and constitutional change that might have started a new chapter in the league's history. Such refoundations are attested for various *koina*; at times, the initiated measures resembled a genuine refoundation of the league that was performed by the participating members. This aspect once again highlights the quality of federalism as a persistent negotiation, and its power to provide a multi-faceted response to the political challenge of the day. But the act of reform or restoration as such had little bearings on the nature of federalism. Beyond all discontinuities and adaptations over time, the politics of federalism were intertwined with the social dynamics of tribal affairs. This, rather than constitutional features alone, was the quintessence of federalism in the Greek world.

The scope of this book

Federalism, it was remarked by Frank Walbank (1981: 157–8), “exemplif[ied] the continuing ability of the Greeks to respond to a new political challenge with new solutions. One is bound to ask whether,

given another century without Rome, federalism might not have developed fresh and fruitful aspects . . . Federalism offered the possibility of transcending the limitations of size and relative weakness of the separate city-state. But time ran out." This verdict is somewhat emphatic, yet it encapsulates one of the defining traits of federalism in ancient Greece: that is, the skilfulness with which the Greeks, in all periods of their history, experimented with the idea of federal integration. In the Archaic Age, the rise of federalism complemented the naissance of tribal identities. By the late sixth century BCE, *ethnē* such as the Thessalians, Akarnanians, and Aitolians had developed a strong sense of tribal togetherness, yet at the local level, the growth of political communities in cities and villages, too, fostered a sense of belonging and participation. As the citizens in those communities felt loyalties towards both their city and tribe, the relation between these two entities became increasingly charged. Federalism offered a cognitive solution to bracket divergent loyalties and mould them into one political unit. In the Classical period, federal integration enabled many city-states to evade Athenian and Spartan attempts at control, if not subjugation. By the fourth century BCE, federal states such as the Thessalian, Arkadian, and Boiotian Leagues rose to significant power; their combined resources put them in a formidable position to safeguard the interests of their members and, in some cases, rise to the status of trans-regional hegemonic powers. Finally, in the Hellenistic Age, the federal states of Aitolia and Achaia embodied the idea of city government and local independence in a world that was dominated by large-scale territorial monarchies and, ultimately, the rise of Rome. Sandwiched between overwhelming forces, federalism offered an alternative that quintessentially guaranteed the survival of the city-state. In the Lykian Confederacy, this trend extended well into the era of Roman domination. Throughout these periods of time, the politics of federal integration varied greatly in shape and type, and the multiplicity of the phenomenon was once again complemented by regional diversification and adaptation to historical change. The dazzling variety of experiments with integration and unity alone makes the exploration of federalism in ancient Greece worthwhile.

The present volume offers a new research tool. It is the first synoptic work on Greek federalism since Larsen's seminal 1968 book. Today's research continues to be deeply indebted to Larsen's achievement, but it is not surprising that this volume differs substantially from its predecessor in form, content, and scope. The outline of the book itself takes a different avenue of inquiry. Over the past three decades, a high volume of studies has

become available examining the history and institutions of individual federal states. Regional scholarship has fostered a tremendous increase in knowledge, as has the ongoing refinement of methodologies and conceptual advances. In addition, countless archaeological, epigraphic, and numismatic discoveries have put scholars in a new position where they can augment, and often revise, the traditional understanding of many federal states. The conceptual call for diversity and plurality of the phenomenon adds its own momentum to the investigation. As the boundaries between federalism and other forms of regional integration have become more permeable, the present volume draws on a broader variety of regional case studies. Among them are the federal states (sometimes appended with a question mark) of Elis, Messenia, the Kyrenaïka, and various island leagues in the Aegean. In Central Greece, the study of microleagues in Doris and Oitaia reveals the creative force of federalism in a truly small natural environment.

The increasing specialization of regional scholarship makes it concurrently difficult for any one author to maintain a steady grip on a blossoming body of evidence, and to keep up effectively with the swift advancement of knowledge about all regions of the Hellenic world alike, through all layers of time. Our obvious response to this challenge was to assign each *koinon* to scholars who are fully engaged in the ongoing exploration of their assigned regions; indeed, many of the authors assembled in this volume are the leading researchers globally in the respective areas. It speaks to the vibrant spirit in Greek federal studies, we believe, that our invitations to contribute to this 'New Larsen' were greeted with so much enthusiasm, despite the tight publishing schedules everyone encounters. The – equally obvious – challenge that emanated from our opting for an edited volume was the potential issue of disparity. A round-table meeting was held at Münster University in 2010 that assembled contributors to explore the grounds for a common conceptual approach. Many consultation sessions followed. Subsequently, the write-up stage saw a lively exchange among authors and between authors and editors, in order to provide for as much coherence as possible. The result is more than 'just' an edited volume. Rather, it attests to the willingness to engage in a research project, the outcome of which depends so heavily on the ability of participants to collaborate along the lines of common conceptual premises, and their consent to compromise. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of genuine scholarly disagreement. This, too, is reflected in some of the chapters below.

Unlike Larsen's book, this volume includes various thematic chapters that build upon, and extend, the research agenda of systematic studies on

Greek federalism. Much has been achieved in that field in recent decades. Rather than treating those aspects in passing, we felt that they should be examined in sections that are separate from the regional case studies. The last one of these, on the *Nachleben* of Greek federalism in federal thinking of later periods in history, discloses the impact of *koina* such as the Achaian and Lykian Leagues on the *Federalist Papers* from 1787 and 1788. From there, it is only a small step to the publication of Freeman's *History of Federal Government*, which marks the beginning of the history of scholarship on Greek federalism as referenced above. Thus closes the circle of the investigation.

The conceptual advancement of scholarship is reflected throughout the book. As monolithic approaches to federalism have lost much of their attraction, a broader understanding is necessary. The new benchmark is the disentanglement of multiple fabrics of integration: the organizational features of federalism and its multiple manifestations in different arenas of communal life, its grounding in ethnic identities, and its interconnectedness with other forms and means of regionalism. The twenty-eight chapters that follow address each of these aspects in one way or the other. And, they disclose once again, we believe, that Greek political culture was framed as much by federalism and features of regional cooperation as it was by the autonomous city-state.

*Federalism and ethnicity**Jonathan M. Hall*

In one important respect, the federal states of the ancient Greek world display a marked difference from their modern counterparts. While there is no ethnic basis to federal unions such as the United States of America, federations such as Belgium, Switzerland, India, Canada, or the former Yugoslavia incorporate ethnically differentiated sub-units. By contrast, an ethnic dimension has long been recognized in the majority of ancient Greek federal states at the confederated level rather than at the level of its constituent entities. Modern Belgium, for example, is constituted by three regions that are based on ethnic (Flemish; Walloon) and linguistic (Dutch; French; German) divisions, but the designation “Belgian” is a political or civic-national – rather than ethno-national – marker. Conversely, at the beginning of the fourth century BCE the Boiotian League consisted of eleven parts (*merē*), each dominated by one or more *poleis* (*Hell. ox.* 19.3 Chambers). None of those constituents were differentiated from one another on ethnic grounds; rather, the confederation as a whole proclaimed a singular Boiotian ethnicity. Interestingly, leagues or associations that did embrace a plurality of ethnic groups, such as the Pylaian-Delphic Amphiktyony (Aischin. 2.116) or the Kalaureian Amphiktyony (Strabo 8.6.14), do not seem to have aspired to political union.

In describing federal states, our sources commonly employ the terms *koina* (“leagues,” “confederacies”) and *sympoliteiai* (“common constitutions”), but also *ethnē*. For example, the Oxyrhynchos historian, who offers our most detailed account of the constitution of the Boiotian League, concludes his description by saying that “the constitution of the whole *ethnos* was arranged in this way and the common assemblies (*synedria koina*) of the Boiotians were convened on the Kadmeia” (*Hell. ox.* 19.4 Chambers). Polybius characterizes the Achaian League as an *ethnikē sympoliteia* (2.44.5), while Pausanias (7.16.9) describes it as an “assembly (*synedria*) according to *ethnos*.” Though the root of our terms “ethnic” and “ethnicity,” the Greek word *ethnos* simply denotes a class of beings who share a

common identification: Homer could use it not only of bands of warriors (e.g. *Il.* 2.91) but also of flocks of birds or swarms of flies (*Il.* 2.87, 459, 469), while Sophokles deployed it to describe packs of wild animals (*Ant.* 344; *Phil.* 1147).¹ When applied to population groups, however, it is sometimes conjoined with the word *genos*, which has the general sense of a “descent group”: Herodotus, for instance, refers to the population of Attica as both an *ethnos* (1.57.3) and a *genos* (5.91.1).² Christopher Jones has argued that Herodotus employs both *ethnos* and *genos* for what we would term an ethnic group, but that the former is “viewed as a geographical, political, or cultural entity, often in relation to the time of the narrative context” while the latter “is such a group viewed as united by birth, and often in relation to some point previous to the narrative time.”³ This is significant, because the Boiotians, Arkadians, and Achaians – all attested as federal states by the fourth century BCE – are already in the fifth century explicitly defined as *ethnē* by Herodotus (5.77.4; 8.73.1–2). This presumably explains why simple ethnonyms such as *Boiotoi*, *Arkades*, and *Achaioi* could be regularly used on inscriptions and coins to refer to the later federal states without the qualifying force of a term such as *koinon* or *sympoliteia*.

The ethnic origins of the federal states were championed most famously by Jakob Larsen, who argued that the “prerequisites for the formation of federal states were both a feeling of kinship and geographical propinquity.”⁴ In Larsen’s view, “[t]he federal states developed from tribal units or groups, such as the Boeotians, Achaeans, Aetolians, and Arcadians. Where there was a feeling of tribal kinship, some tradition of co-operation in war, or a special religious cult kept up by the group, it was natural enough, when cities grew up, for a federal state to develop.”⁵ I shall return to a “feeling of tribal kinship” shortly. With respect to “co-operation in war,” Larsen pointed to the role that resistance against Thessalian domination played in the emergence of a Phokian confederation while the case of a “special religious cult” could be exemplified by that of Athena Itonia for the Boiotians or Zeus Homarios for the Achaians.⁶ The apparently effortless transition from a loose ethnic league to a full-blown confederacy is signaled by the first evidence recording grants of dual citizenship by both local and federal authorities.⁷ At this point, however, Larsen loses interest in the ethnic component of federated states and focuses more on their institutional arrangements. Indeed, he justifies this shift in approach by arguing that “to create federal states of any considerable size and power, it

¹ Roussel 1976: 161–162; Donlan 1985: 295. ² Hall 1997: 34–35. ³ Jones 1996: 317.

⁴ Larsen 1968: xvi–xvii. ⁵ Larsen 1968: xvi. ⁶ Larsen 1968: 28, 40, 84. ⁷ Larsen 1968: xv.

was necessary to overstep the ethnic boundary and admit members of other tribes.”⁸ A case in point would be the admission, shortly before 389 BCE, of Aitolian Kalydon to the Achaian League (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1).⁹

The question of how ethnic sentiments first arose among what were often scattered communities is largely unexamined. For Larsen, the accounts of ancient authors relating to population movements were sufficient explanation:

The invading tribes may well have been groups which acquired their feeling of kinship from living together in some area before their invasion of Greece. Similarly within Greece old and new inhabitants of a district might become amalgamated into what seemed a homogeneous people speaking a common language, though that language might well contain survivals from the languages of earlier submerged groups of inhabitants. Thus a tribe was pretty much an artificial creation of geography and politics. Nevertheless, it had a language of its own and its members felt akin to each other.¹⁰

There are two, somewhat contradictory, respects in which Larsen’s views on ethnicity are firmly rooted in the scholarship of his time. On the one hand, his concession that an admixture between newcomers and indigenes would have resulted in “an artificial creation of geography and politics” conforms to a reaction, common in the decades after the Second World War, against earlier views that focused on the “essence” or “purity” of Greek ethnic groups.¹¹ On the other, the belief that the incoming group transported with it a pre-existing sense of kinship that it successfully imposed on resident substrate populations owes much to what have been termed “primordialist” approaches to ethnicity – that is, the view that ethnic groups are historical “givens” with origins in a distant and remote past and that they are biologically self-reproducing populations whose members share a common, identifiable culture.¹²

Such primordialist approaches have been challenged in recent decades. In 1969, the year following the publication of Larsen’s *Greek Federal States*, Fredrick Barth’s edited volume on *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* shifted the focus from the “essential content” of ethnic groups to the maintenance of the boundaries that differentiate them.¹³ This, in turn, led to the proposition that ethnicity could be exploited to serve “purposes other than the cultural goals which its spokesmen proclaim to be its *raison d’être*” and that ethnic and cultural differences could be marked and

⁸ Larsen 1968: xvii. ⁹ Larsen 1953: 809; 1968: 9. ¹⁰ Larsen 1968: 5–6. ¹¹ Hall 1997: 13–15.

¹² Hall 1997: 17; McNerney 1999b: 25; Malkin 2001a: 15. ¹³ Barth 1969.

mobilized – if not invented outright – in the pursuit of political goals.¹⁴ It is important not to grant undue emphasis to such “instrumentalist” or “circumstantialist” approaches, as they have variously been termed. The success of ethnic invocations resides in the fact that ethnicity is very much a social reality – even a primordial truth – for those who profess it. Nor would it have such purchase were it merely invented *ex nihilo*. As Arjun Appadurai has argued, the past is not a “boundless canvass for contemporary embroidery”; certain constraints exist regarding the credibility of the past, including the authority invested in those who narrate the past and the degree to which any one account of the past is interdependent with other versions.¹⁵ Nevertheless, studies conducted from an instrumentalist perspective do indicate that ethnic consciousness is not a transhistorical given and that appeals to primordial, pre-migratory origins have little explanatory power in themselves.

In addition to the anthropological objection, there are also historiographical considerations. From where did ancient authors derive their information for the migrations of populations such as the Dorians, Thessalians, Boiotians, or Achaïans – especially since these migrations are supposed to have taken place at least 700 years prior to our earliest detailed authorities? On the assumption that such information is not outright invention, we would have to conclude that it has been transmitted orally across the generations. In this respect, however, there is little to distinguish migration accounts from myths, by which I mean not fictitious fables but “ideology in narrative form.”¹⁶ And since ideology functions to justify the here and now by masking the contingent conditions of its production, we would have to conclude that the accurate preservation of historical events – of the past for its own sake – was not of primary concern to those who transmitted and inherited such migration stories. This is not to deny the mobility of ancient population groups: the archaeology of Greece in the transition from the Late Bronze to Early Iron Age offers plentiful evidence for settlement discontinuity with the abandonment of old sites and establishment of new ones, and this can only satisfactorily be explained by positing demographic relocations.¹⁷ Rather, it is to caution against a view that regards such accounts as the direct, unmediated reflection of early migrations as opposed to attempts to rationalize and explicate conditions

¹⁴ Smith 1986: 9. See Hall 1997: 17–18; McNerney 1999b: 25–6. For an attempt to reconcile primordialist and instrumentalist approaches: Smith 1986: 32; Bentley 1987.

¹⁵ Appadurai 1981: 201–203. ¹⁶ Lincoln 1999: 147.

¹⁷ Whitley 2001: 77–80; Dickinson 2006: 62–67; Hall 2014a: 44–51; Demand 2011: 203–204.

that were undoubtedly more complex and haphazard than our literary sources would suggest.¹⁸

Many current definitions of ethnicity are “polythetic,” that is to say, they define ethnicity according to a variable range of features – a sense of kinship, physical characteristics, language, religion, customs and culture, regional affiliation – where no one criterion is, on its own, either sufficient or necessary for the definition.¹⁹ In studies of ancient ethnicity, for example, David Konstan has argued that “it is to the general currency of and competition among asseverations of ethnic identity, each availing itself of the traits most suitable in the context, whether common blood or customs or gods or language, that one ought to apply the name of ethnic discourse.”²⁰ At first sight, such a definition seems eminently commonsensical: there are clearly ethnic groups in which language is more important than religion (the Welsh in Britain), others where religion is more important than language (Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia), and still others where religion is relatively insignificant compared with language or culture (the Pennsylvania Dutch in the United States). Furthermore, for the scholar of antiquity, the advantage of focusing on markers such as language, religion, or culture is that they are often regarded as somehow more “objective” indications of ethnicity. Thus, in his study of the early Boiotians, Albert Schachter focuses on archaeology, dialect, cults, and social and political institutions on the grounds that literary traditions “do not constitute a source of the first order since each one was compiled with a very precise aim – that of explaining or justifying an already existing state of affairs.”²¹

Yet, on the instrumentalist view detailed above, what a people says about itself, far from being a distorting distraction, lies at the very heart of ethnic self-identification. Consider Michael Moerman’s study of the Lue of Thailand: in the absence of any distinctive differentiation in terms of lifestyle, language, custom, or religion, Moerman was forced to conclude that “[s]omeone is Lue by virtue of believing and calling himself Lue.”²² In fact, the limitations of a polythetic definition of ethnicity are that it fails to distinguish adequately between ethnic identities and other non-ethnic forms of collective identity.²³ Stockbrokers and hippies

¹⁸ Ulf 1996; Hall 1997: 51–66; 2002: 56–89.

¹⁹ Haarmann 1986: 38; Esman and Rabinovich 1988: 3; Brass 1991: 18; De Vos 1995: 18.

²⁰ Konstan 1997: 109. His defining ingredients are, of course, precisely those that Herodotus (8.144.2) enumerated as constituting Hellenic identity.

²¹ Schachter 1996: 8 (my translation). ²² Moerman 1965: 1219; cited in Eriksen 1993: 11.

²³ Finkelberg 2005: 18.

constitute distinctive cultural groups and each employs its own linguistic register, but neither is ethnic; nor are Catholic congregations who attend mass in Latin, nor Freemasons. Furthermore, features such as language, religion, or culture are not always transhistorically stable within the same ethnic group. When separating from India in 1947, Bangladeshis stressed their Islamic religion but, when it came to independence from Pakistan, it was the Bengali language – which they shared with their Hindu neighbors in Indian West Bengal – that came to act as a marker of differentiation.²⁴

Similar fluctuations between the relative salience of language and religion can be seen in Greece at the time of the War of Independence. Orthodox Christianity had been the primary marker of Greek identity during Ottoman occupation and continued to act as such throughout the uprising, which is the reason why many Greek Catholics chose not to participate. Orthodoxy also served to co-opt non-Greek-speaking groups such as the Serbs, Souliots, and Arvanites, who fought valiantly for the liberation of Greece from Turkish domination. In the successful aftermath of the war, however, religion was incapable of serving as an ethnic marker to distinguish Greeks from other Orthodox populations in the former *Millet-i-Rum* and a greater emphasis came to be placed on the Greek language, even though it was not universally spoken throughout the liberated region.²⁵ It is difficult to escape the conclusion that being Greek in the modern era has as much to do with *feeling* Greek as with any externally measurable characteristics.

This is why Donald Horowitz's distinction between the criteria and the indicia of ethnicity is a useful one. The indicia are the operational set of distinguishing attributes or "surface pointers" that may, with varying degrees of salience in different contexts, be associated with membership in an ethnic group and would therefore include features such as biological characteristics, language, religion, and cultural traits. The criteria, on the other hand, are the "core elements" which ultimately determine membership in an ethnic group.²⁶ If we ask what property is sufficient to act as a universal defining criterion of ethnicity, distinguishing it from other forms of collective identity, the answer would appear to be a sense of consubstantiality, chartered by reference to ideas – however fictive – of common descent and kinship, as well as to a common territory and a

²⁴ Das Gupta 1975: 471; Horowitz 1985: 68–69. ²⁵ Livanios 2008.

²⁶ Horowitz 1975: 119–121. For "core elements" and "surface pointers": Nash 1988: 10–13. See Hall 1997: 20–21; 2002: 9–10.

shared history.²⁷ These are subjective and discursive expressions and, as such, they can only effectively be communicated to us through written evidence. The study of dialects and material culture can certainly illuminate how ethnicity was signaled, but in the absence of specific articulations of how populations thought about themselves we can never be absolutely certain that they are ethnic indicia rather than markers of other identities. For this reason, the methodologically safest course to follow is to chart the self-conscious expression of ethnicity when it first occurs in our literary testimony and only then – and only cautiously – attempt to use linguistic and archaeological evidence to trace possibly earlier expressions of ethnicity.

The Homeric *Catalog of Ships*, which appears in Book 2 of the *Iliad*, has featured prominently in many accounts of early *ethnos* states and with good reason: while the mere existence of a name cannot guarantee the ethnic status of a population group, it is a *sine qua non* for it.²⁸ Furthermore, since the *Catalog* locates several named populations – many of them described by later authors as *ethnē* – in the very regions where federal states would eventually arise, it offers early testimony for a sense of peoplehood in association with a specific territory. Although there is considerable scholarly dispute as to whether the *Catalog* constitutes an integral part of the *Iliad*, and which period the *Catalog* describes,²⁹ we can at least be sure that it predates the seventh or sixth centuries BCE. Furthermore, there is reason to suppose that it was meaningful to audiences at that time. To the modern reader or listener, the *Catalog of Ships* is exceedingly tedious compared with the rest of the *Iliad*. Its list of contingents from 178 settlements across the Aegean occupies 267 of the 877 lines that make up Book 2, but the detail with which this information is furnished presumes a receptive audience that probably derived considerable pleasure from hearing its local contingent, as well as those of its neighbors, listed among the ranks of the Greeks. As Edzard Visser has argued, the Mycenaean elements that have been identified in the *Catalog* have probably been transmitted through local

²⁷ Horowitz 1985: 57; Smith 1986: 24; Nash 1988: 10–11; Tambiah 1989: 335; Eriksen 1993: 12; Connor 1994: 74–78.

²⁸ Smith 1986: 23.

²⁹ An originally independent composition: Page 1959: 124; Hope Simpson and Lazenby 1970: 159; Kirk 1985: 178, 238; Anderson 1995: 187; Schein 1996: 352. An integral part of the *Iliad*: Visser 1997. Derived from a Mycenaean document: Allen 1921; Burr 1944; Page 1959; Hope Simpson and Lazenby 1970; Latacz 2001: 261–296. A composition dating to the eighth/seventh centuries: Niese 1873; Jachmann 1958; Giovannini 1969b; Milani 1988; Anderson 1995. Composite: Kirk 1985: 238–239; McInerney 1999b: 123–126.

heroic myths that were familiar to both the poet and his audience.³⁰ The *Catalog of Ships*, then, offered ancient listeners an overview of their place in the wider world; the descriptions of the regional contingents were chartered by reference to myths of the Heroic Age, but these were relevant to audiences of the Archaic period because it was precisely these same myths that were being deployed to construct local – and perhaps ethnic – identities.

Among the contingents listed by the *Catalog*, the *Boiotoi* (Hom. *Il.* 2.494–510), *Phokeis* (517–26), *Lokroi* (527–36), *Arkades* (603–16), and *Aitoloi* (638–44) are all populations that would eventually establish federal states. The *Boiotoi* are said to occupy 29 settlements that cover an area largely coextensive with the territory later controlled by the Boiotian League, though it does not include the region to the northwest of Lake Kopais. Significantly, the two settlements that are recorded in this area, Aspledon and Orchomenos, are assigned to a separate contingent of Minyans (2.511–16).³¹ The settlements allocated to the *Arkades*, the *Phokeis*, and *Aitoloi* are, to varying degrees, roughly equivalent to the territories later controlled by the respective federations, though the Lokrian contingent is confined to what would eventually be known as Eastern (Opuntian and Epiknemedian) Lokris while Western (Ozolian) Lokris is ignored entirely. The regional names (Boiotia, Phokis, Lokris, Aitolia), which, linguistically speaking, are secondary adjectival formations derived from the names of populations, are generally absent from the *Catalog of Ships*, though an exception is made for “Arkadia under the steep mountain of Kyllene” (2.603). But there are some hints that these regional names were in fact known to the poet because elsewhere in the *Iliad* (14.476; 17.597) the heroes Promachos and Peneleos are described as *Boiotioi* rather than the more normal form *Boiotoi*, and it is a reasonable inference that this is an adjective derived from the regional name Boiotia.³² Similarly, the hero Tydeus is described as *Aitolios*, rather than *Aitolos* (4.399).

There are two glaring omissions from the names listed in the *Catalog of Ships*. The first is the Thessalians. No fewer than nine contingents come from the area that was, by the Classical period, under the domination of the Thessalians, including groups such as the *Ainianes*, *Perrhaiboi*, and

³⁰ Visser 1997, esp. 744–746.

³¹ Schachter 1996: 15, who suggests that Homeric Graia should be associated with Tanagra, which is absent from the *Catalog*. Elsewhere, Schachter (forthcoming) draws attention to the similarity between the Homeric contingent (led by five Boiotians and two Minyans) and the Hellenistic Boiotian *koinon*, which was under the authority of seven boiotarchs.

³² Larson 2007: 36. The *ethnikon* “Boiotios” also appears on a dedication made by Epidallos of Orchomenos at Delphi c. 475 BCE (*FdD* III 1.574): see Larson 2007: 147.

Magnetes (Hom. *Il.* 2.749, 756), which were constituent members of the Pylaian–Delphic Amphiktyony and brought into a relationship of peri-oikic dependency upon Thessaly in the sixth – if not the seventh – century.³³ Yet there is no mention, either in the *Catalog* or elsewhere in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, of the *Thessaloi*.³⁴ For those who believe that the *Catalog* is based on a genuine Mycenaean document, the omission of the Thessalians might lend support to the tradition that placed them in Thesprotia until after the Trojan War (Hdt. 7.176.4). But the tradition of the Thessalian migration was closely linked to that of the Boiotians (Thuc. 1.12.3–4), which makes it difficult to comprehend why the *Catalog of Ships* would have located the Boiotians, but not the Thessalians, in their historical homeland. Similarly, if Homer’s silence is a deliberately archaizing act undertaken in knowledge of the tradition concerning the Thessalian migration,³⁵ why does the same not hold true of the Boiotians? There is, of course, another possibility: no deep-seated or unitary sense of Thessalian identity yet existed when the Homeric epics first circulated.

The second omission concerns the *Achaioi* of the northern Peloponnese. Again, one might explain this by noting the traditions that told of the northerly movement of the Achaeans to the shores of the Corinthian Gulf after their expulsion by the Dorians from Lakonia and the Argolid. But those traditions held that the historical region of Achaia had previously been inhabited by Ionians and the poet makes no mention of them either (Hdt. 1.145, 7.94, 8.73.1; Paus. 7.1.5–7). It is true that, since *Achaioi* is one of the terms – along with *Argeioi* and *Danaoi* – that Homer employs to designate the Greeks collectively, it would have complicated matters considerably to also employ the name in describing the populations of the northern Peloponnese. Indeed, it may not be accidental that the ships from the Achaian settlements of Hyperesia (Aigeira), Gonoessa (Donoussa?), Pellene, Aigion, Aigai, and Helike are placed under the command of Agamemnon, the supreme commander of the Achaian force.³⁶ Nevertheless, it is not without interest that, of the twelve districts (*merè*)

³³ Hall 2002: 139–144.

³⁴ A hero named Thessalos is named at Hom. *Il.* 2.679, but he is associated with Kos and its surrounding islands. This prompted Marta Sordi (1958: 1) to derive the origins of the Thessalians from the Dodekanese; *contra* Larsen 1960: 229–230.

³⁵ E.g. Kirk 1985: 184.

³⁶ It is also the case that Agamemnon needs to be granted an extended dominion because most of the Argolid is placed under the command of Diomedes, Sthenelos, and Euryalos (Hom. *Il.* 2.559–80) – an indication that this passage, at least, must reflect conditions in the eighth or seventh centuries rather than the Late Bronze Age: Hall 1997: 90.

into which Achaia was divided by the fifth century (Hdt. 1.145; Strabo 8.7.4), only the five most easterly are enumerated in the *Catalog*; the more westerly *merē* are ignored – save for the district of Olenos, which is listed under the contingent of the *Epeioi* of Elis (2.617).³⁷

The Greeks had something of an obsession with genealogies. Aside from the obvious function of celebrating aristocratic lineages, the genealogical linking of eponymous figures served to explain and legitimate topographical features, institutions, and the relationship between population groups, thereby, locating them in time and space. Although some doubts have been expressed concerning the value of genealogy to expressions of ethnicity,³⁸ and although we cannot automatically assume that every genealogical tradition serves an ethnic purpose, it remains the case that genealogies containing eponymous names that are clearly constructed from the names of population groups and which serve no narrative purpose other than to personify those groups must represent an attempt to conceptualize peoplehood and the relationships between populations.³⁹ It is not that the Greeks necessarily subscribed to a belief in direct lineal descent from such ethnic progenitors; rather, the ethnic genealogies conform to what Anthony Smith has termed “ideological” – rather than “genealogical” – myths of descent which, by providing a sense of “spiritual kinship” with the ancestors, trigger the vague acknowledgement of an underlying consubstantiality.⁴⁰ Thus, at a very basic level, the tradition that made Panopeus the son of Phokos (Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.47) was a way of articulating the affiliation of the eastern Phokian city of Panopeus to the *ethnos* of the Phokians,⁴¹ while that which derived Itonos’ filiation from Boiotos (Diod. 4.67.7) sought to establish an indissoluble bond between the Boiotians and what would emerge as one of their most important federal sanctuaries, that of Athena Itonia near Koroneia.⁴²

Since ethnicity is dynamic and malleable, rather than static and monolithic, it follows that ethnic genealogies might express contested claims and be reconfigured to justify new social realities. The late Archaic poet Asios of Samos (fr. 2) seems to have named Boiotos’ mother as Melanippe (cf. Diod. 19.53.6) but in the later fifth century Hellanikos of

³⁷ Morgan and Hall 1996: 198.

³⁸ Malkin 2001a: 9–12 and, with regard to Hellenic ethnicity particularly, Finkelberg 2005: 16–18.

³⁹ For the use of genealogy in constructing ethnic identities in medieval Europe: Wenskus 1977.

⁴⁰ Smith 1999: 57–58, 70–71. ⁴¹ McInerney 1999b: 128.

⁴² Kühr 2006: 263. Another tradition, reconstructed from Steph. Byz. s.v. Malos, Paus. 5.1.4, 9.1.1 and Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 1.551, made Itonos the father of Boiotos and son of Amphiktyon, symbolizing the Boiotians’ affiliation to the Pylaian-Delphic Amphiktyony while still maintaining the link with the cult of Athena: Hall 2002: 150–151; Larson 2007: 24.

Lesbos (*FGrH* 4.51) substituted Arne for Melanippe, thus articulating what may possibly be a relatively new tradition concerning the Boiotians' origins in the Thessalian district of Arne (Thuc. 1.12.3).⁴³ A particularly rich – as well as the earliest – source for ethnic genealogies is a fragmentary poem entitled the *Catalog of Women*, attributed erroneously in antiquity to Hesiod and composed at some point in the sixth century, although it comprised some elements that almost certainly date back earlier.⁴⁴ The high status this poem enjoyed among later authors argues in favor of its being the first deliberate attempt to reconcile and rationalize within a single, overarching schema various local myths and genealogical traditions. Several ethnic eponyms are already attested in the Hesiodic *Catalog*: Aitolos is named as the son of Endymion (fr. 10a.60–63); Boiotos is the father of Onchestos (fr. 219) – a personification of the sanctuary of Poseidon at Onchestos, which would become another significant center of Boiotian identity; and Pallas, representing the Arkadian city of Pallantion, is the son of Lykaon (fr. 162) – a figure who invokes the sanctuary of Zeus Lykaeos, later attested as the federal sanctuary of the Arkadian League.⁴⁵

The figure of Achaïos represents an interesting case because, of the eponymous figures who represent *ethnē* that would later federate, he is the only one who is included in a line of direct, lineal descent from the Hellenic *Urvater*, Hellen (fr. 10a.20–24). I have argued elsewhere that the tradition that made Aiolos and Doros – eponyms for the Aiolians and Dorians respectively – the sons of Hellen (fr. 9) originally developed independently from that which linked the brothers Achaïos and Ion, and that it was probably not until the early sixth century that the two stemmata were linked through the intermediary of the non-eponymous Xouthos, son of Hellen and father of Achaïos and Ion.⁴⁶ The kinship that is signaled between Achaïos and Ion probably reflects, in part, the fact that both the Achaïans of the Peloponnese and the Ionians of Asia Minor were *ethnē* organized into twelve subdivisions (Hdt. 1.145–6) but the reason for this parallelism was attributed to the belief that the Ionians had originally settled Achaïa before they were expelled by the Achaïans (Hdt. 1.145–6; Strabo 8.7.4; Paus. 7.6.1). In fact, the violence inflicted by the Achaïans against the Ionians was a central charter of the former's

⁴³ Larson 2007: 22. West (1985: 102) tentatively suggests that Boiotos' filiation from Arne was already noted in the *Catalog of Women*.

⁴⁴ West (1985: 168–171) dates the poem to the late sixth century, Fowler (1998: 1) to c. 580 BCE.

⁴⁵ Kühr 2006: 263; Larson 2007: 18; Breglia 2008: 313; Nielsen 1999: 33–34; Pretzler 2009: 94.

⁴⁶ Hall 1997: 48–49; 2002: 162.

identity – siblinghood need not preclude fratricide, as the example of Romulus and Remus shows. This “founding” act of violence was reaffirmed in the early fourth century, when the Achaians of Helike drove out an Ionian delegation that was requesting the ancient statue of Poseidon for its own cult center in Asia Minor (Diod. 15.49.1–4; Paus. 7.24.6). Strabo (8.7.2) even says that the earthquake and tsunami that overwhelmed Helike in 373 BCE were Poseidon’s punishment for such an act of impiety.⁴⁷ But this conflict also recurs in the context of the Achaian settlements of south Italy with the story of how the Achaians of Metapontion, Siris, and Kroton violently expelled the Ionian inhabitants of Siris – an event that is probably to be dated around the middle of the sixth century.⁴⁸

To sum up thus far, there is sufficient literary evidence to suggest the existence, by the sixth century at the latest, of named population groups that were conscious of being associated with a specific territory and that chartered their sense of peoplehood through heroic myths and genealogies. In at least one case, what we witness may actually be an ethnic consciousness under construction rather than one that is fully formed. As we have seen, the Achaian cities listed in Agamemnon’s contingent are all located to the east of Mt. Panachaikon, representing only a part of the territory that constituted the twelve *merē* of Achaia in Herodotus’ day. That this eastern stretch of Achaia, also known as Aigialeia (Hdt. 7.94; Strabo 8.7.1; Paus. 7.1.1), already professed an Achaian identity by the middle of the sixth century is suggested by the story that the Spartans claimed at around this time to have located the physical remains of the Achaian king Teisamenos, grandson of Agamemnon, in the vicinity of Helike (Paus. 7.1.8).⁴⁹ By contrast, the fact that the names of the more westerly *merē* are based on second-order “tribal” names (Patreis; Phareis; Tritaieis) rather than settlements (Helike; Aigion) may suggest not only a more dispersed pattern of settlement in this part of the region but also a longer period of independent development prior to their incorporation within a broader Achaian identity – probably not earlier than the later fifth century.⁵⁰ Larsen was right, then, in his belief that a sense of ethnicity seems to have preceded the formal foundation of federal *koina*, but is there any non-literary evidence that might indicate just how far back we can trace the expression of ethnicity in these areas?

⁴⁷ Moggi 2002: 120; Freitag 2009: 20–21. ⁴⁸ Hall 2002: 63–65. ⁴⁹ See Leahy 1955.

⁵⁰ Morgan and Hall 1996: 198–199; Rizakis 2002: 53.

The cult of Zeus Lykaïos on Mt. Lykaion in southwest Arkadia was clearly of sufficient importance to the Arkadians for them to place the head of the god on a common coinage, struck from c. 490 BCE.⁵¹ In this period, a festival held in the sanctuary was attracting competitors from as far afield as Opuntian Lokris, Corinth, and Argos (Pind. *Ol.* 9.96, 13.108; *Nem.* 10.48), which surely testifies to a supraregional significance even if there are no hints of Arkadian exclusivity.⁵² Parrhasia, the district in which Mt. Lykaion was located, is already named as part of Arkadia in the *Catalog of Ships* (Hom. *Il.* 2.608) and the first excavations of the sanctuary, conducted in the early twentieth century, dated the origins of the cult to the seventh century.⁵³ But the most recent excavations in the sanctuary, undertaken by the Greek Archaeological Service, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Arizona, have revealed a continuous sequence of ceramics and metal artefacts that stretches back from the Hellenistic to the Mycenaean periods, with further evidence for activity at the site in the Late Neolithic and throughout the Bronze Age.⁵⁴ It is not yet – and may never be – possible to determine at what precise point in time the sanctuary assumed a pan-Arkadian significance, though the sheer antiquity and continuous use of the sanctuary may explain why the notion of autochthony was so central to Arkadian ethnicity, symbolized as early as the Hesiodic *Catalog of Women* (fr. 161) with the filiation of Lykaon from the earth-born Pelasgos.

From the fourth century, the sanctuary of Zeus Homarios near Aigion served as a federal cult center for the Achaian *koinon* (Strabo 8.7.3; Polyb. 5.93.10; *SEG* 14.375), although there are some hints in our sources that the sanctuary of Poseidon at Helike had fulfilled this purpose prior to the earthquake of 373 BCE (Paus. 7.7.2).⁵⁵ Unfortunately, neither sanctuary has yet been located with absolute certainty, though the site of Nikoleïka – where cultic activity dates to the ninth or tenth centuries and an apsidal temple was constructed c. 725–700 BCE – has been tentatively identified as the sanctuary of Poseidon.⁵⁶ An interesting case is, however, provided by the sanctuary of Artemis Aontia, situated on the Rakita ridge near the modern village of Ano Mazaraki, ten kilometers southwest of

⁵¹ Williams 1965; Roy 1972; Nielsen 1999: 27–28. ⁵² Morgan 1999: 407–8.

⁵³ Kourouniotes 1904: 178–214; see Jost 1985: 183–187; Morgan 1999: 407–408.

⁵⁴ Reports online at www.lykaionexcavation.org (accessed December 16, 2012).

⁵⁵ Morgan and Hall 1996: 196; Tausend 2002: 21–26. Aymard (1938: 277–293) suggested that the sanctuary of Zeus Homarios had originally belonged to Helike but was absorbed within the territory of Aigion after the earthquake; contra Walbank 2000: 26.

⁵⁶ Kolias 2011.

Aigion. Excavated between 1979 and 1996, the sanctuary boasts one of the oldest peripteral temples in Greece, dating to the eighth century. Bronze and iron jewelry and figurines testify to the importance of the site, while the ceramic evidence suggests that the sanctuary lay on a major route of communication southwards and that its cultic constituency initially included not only the residents of the Pharai valley (part of Achaia in the Classical period) but also communities such as Lousoi, in the Azanian region of Arkadia.⁵⁷

A similar situation appears to be attested in Phokis. The cult at what is believed to be the sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis Elaphebolos at Kalapodi (ancient Hyampolis) stretches back to the Mycenaean period. For the first 350 years or so of its existence, the sanctuary served a constituency within a geographical radius that was narrow but which spanned what would later become the border between Phokis and East Lokris.⁵⁸ Indeed, the tradition that the original inhabitants of Hyampolis were Hyantes from Boiotia (Strabo 9.2.3; Paus. 10.35.4) would seem to dissociate the settlement from the rest of Phokis.⁵⁹ From about 950 BCE, there is a centrifugal shift in the focus of activity – both westwards to Elateia and eastwards to settlements on the coastal plain of Lokris – which might indicate the consolidation of a territorial border. At the same time, however, pottery and metalwork show long-distance connections – probably via Lokris – with Thessaly and Euboia and, eventually from the eighth century, with Corinth and the Cyclades.⁶⁰ In terms of material assemblages, burial practices, and patterns of imports, there are marked differences between this part of Phokis, north of Mt. Parnassos, and the southern part of the region, where Delphi was undoubtedly the most important sanctuary. In fact, Jeremy McNerney has argued that the catalyst for a consolidation of Phokian identity was not only aggression from Thessaly but also a reaction to the control that the Amphiktyony of central Greek states exercised over Delphi.⁶¹ In McNerney's view, the earliest concrete expression of Phokian ethnicity is the first issue of a common Phokian coinage c. 510 BCE and, shortly afterwards, the construction of a "federal" sanctuary, the Phokikon, at the intersection of the east–west route between Panopeus and Daulis and the north–south corridor linking northern and southern Phokis.⁶² This is also the period in which the terrace at Kalapodi was enlarged and two peripteral mudbrick temples were constructed with

⁵⁷ Morgan 2002: 109; 2009: 26; Rizakis 2002: 52; Petropoulos 2002; Gadolou 2002.

⁵⁸ Morgan 2003: 114–117. ⁵⁹ McNerney 1999b: 129–130. ⁶⁰ Morgan 2003: 118–119.

⁶¹ McNerney 1999b: 156–157; cf. Morgan 2003: 26. ⁶² McNerney 1997; 1999: 61–62.

tilled roofs and wooden columns, with the sanctuary witnessing the revival of dedications, especially of a martial character.⁶³

By the late fourth century, the sanctuary of Athena Itonia at Koroneia was hosting the Pamboiotia – the festival of all Boiotians – and served as a federal sanctuary for the Boiotian *koinon*.⁶⁴ Quite how far back the festival stretched is difficult to determine, though a fragment of Pindar (fr. 94b.41–9) refers to the “celebrated victories with swift-footed horses . . . around the famed shrine of Itonia,” while a series of mid-sixth-century black-figured vases depict festival scenes which include boxing, running, chariot and horse-racing competitions.⁶⁵ Excavations of a site that has been identified with the sanctuary of Athena Itonia have revealed cult buildings which date to the sixth century, and it may not be coincidental that the earliest reference to a temple of Athena at Koroneia is a fragment of Alkaios (fr. 325).⁶⁶ That a lyric poet from Mytilene could be familiar with the sanctuary might, however, hint against any early ethnic exclusivity. Pindar pairs the games at the Itonion with those “on the shores of famous Onchestos.” Since, in the *Catalog of Ships* (Il. 2.506), Homer invokes “sacred Onchestos, the glorious grove of Poseidon,” while the Hesiodic *Catalog of Women* (fr. 219) names the eponymous Onchestos as the son of Boiotos, Stephanie Larson may be correct in imagining that Poseidon’s sanctuary at Onchestos possessed a cultic significance for the region as a whole from the early Archaic period.⁶⁷ Again, we have no detailed information about the constituencies that the sanctuary served. Indeed, the sanctuary makes an appearance in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (230) while describing Apollo’s journey from Olympos through Euboia to Delphi, and it is entirely possible that Onchestos’ fame derived not from any pan-Boiotian significance, but from its location on a principal thoroughfare that led from Euboia and Attica to Delphi. In short, there is no compelling evidence in favor of the view that sanctuaries served as primordial foci for ethnic groups in the earliest periods.⁶⁸

Over the past three decades, there has been a considerable amount of research into the archaeology of ethnicity, with a growing consensus that, while ethnic groups may well signal their differences in the material record, there is seldom a direct or unproblematic correlation between material cultural patterning and the expression of ethnicity.⁶⁹ In the time period under discussion here, matters are complicated further by the fact that

⁶³ Morgan 2003: 132. ⁶⁴ *IG* IX.2 1.170. See Larson 2007: 133–135; Breglia 2008: 308.

⁶⁵ See Bacchyl. fr. 15. See Larson 2007: 133–135.

⁶⁶ See Strabo 9.2.29. For the excavations: Fossey 1988: 326. ⁶⁷ Larson 2007: 18.

⁶⁸ Morgan 2002: 107. ⁶⁹ Among a vast bibliography, see Shennan 1989; Jones 1997; Insoll 2007.

craftsmen were frequently itinerant and not necessarily attached to the specific communities to which they catered. Indeed, it is entirely possible that geographical factors played as great a role as ethnic affiliation – if not greater – in shaping material cultural complexes. The relative ease of communication in the Kopais basin may offer one explanation for the appearance of a relatively distinctive regional style of Geometric pottery, terracotta figurines, and bronze jewelry in Boiotia.⁷⁰ By contrast, as we have seen, Mt. Parnassos divided Phokis into a northern and southern zone and, for the Early Iron Age and Archaic periods, the material differences between the two areas outweigh the similarities.⁷¹ Similarly, Mt. Panachaikon separates eastern Achaia from the rest of the region, where no fewer than three sub-zones can be identified on the basis of settlement patterns and the distribution of particular types of artefacts,⁷² while at least six cultural sub-zones have been traced in Arkadia – many of them influenced by neighboring regions such as Achaia, Elis, Messenia, Sparta, and the Argolid.⁷³

Nor does the evidence of linguistics add much that is conclusive. This is largely because of the relative scarcity, prior to the fourth century, of inscriptions – our most important source for regional dialects. The fact that the Boiotian infinitive ending in *-men* is paralleled in eastern, but not western, Thessalian has been taken as arguing for the historicity of the migration of the *Boiotoi* from eastern Thessaly – the area from where they are supposed to have transplanted the cult of Athena Itonia (Strabo 9.2.29).⁷⁴ But we cannot rule out the possibility that the cult was borrowed at a later period and that the isogloss is the result of interaction rather than a shared linguistic heritage: after all, the Boiotian dialect also shared some isoglosses with that of the ethnically unrelated Athenians.⁷⁵ Arkadian is defined by certain shared features that reveal it to be the closest historical dialect to the Mycenaean idiom represented in Linear B, but there are internal differentiations: original labiovelars are represented by *-s-* at Mantinea but by *-(t)z-* at neighboring Tegea; and infinitives end in *-en* at Tegea, but in *-ēn* at Lykosoura.⁷⁶ In any case, dialect seems not to have been a crucial marker of Arkadian ethnicity in the fourth century, when the Triphylians, who spoke a northwest Greek dialect close to Elean, were incorporated within the Arkadian confederacy.⁷⁷ The occupants of Phokis, Aitolia, Achaia, and Elis, on

⁷⁰ Coldstream 2003: 201–206. ⁷¹ Morgan 2003: 24, 121. ⁷² Morgan and Hall 1996: 166–193.

⁷³ Morgan 1999. ⁷⁴ García-Ramón 1975: 77. ⁷⁵ Buck 1968: 269.

⁷⁶ Palmer 1980: 65; see Hall 1997: 175. ⁷⁷ Nielsen 1999: 20.

the other hand, spoke dialects that were only minimally differentiable within a common northwest Greek idiom.

Ultimately, then, while the possibility cannot be definitively ruled out, there is no convincing evidence to prove that groups such as the Boiotians, Arkadians, or Achaians entertained an ethnic self-consciousness much earlier than the Archaic period. Indeed, there are some indications that this was precisely the period in which ethnicity came to play a more prominent role in social identifications.

In earlier treatments of state formation, the *ethnos* was typically viewed as an alternative form of political organization to the *polis*.⁷⁸ Yet, while it does seem to be the case that *poleis* emerged later in so-called *ethnos* states than in areas that had earlier been under Mycenaean administration, ancient testimony makes it perfectly clear that *poleis* could coexist with *ethnē* (Hdt. 7.199.1; Thuc. 3.92.2).⁷⁹ Nor is it the case that *ethnos* and *polis* represent “different levels of social organization.”⁸⁰ In an inscription (*IG* 1³ 2.501B), set up on the Athenian acropolis shortly after 506 BCE and cited by Herodotus (5.77.4), the Athenians commemorate their victory over the *ethnē* of not only the Boiotians but also the Chalkidians – that is, the residents of the *polis* of Chalkis – while elsewhere, Herodotus (7.161.3) has an Athenian envoy refer to the Athenians as the “oldest *ethnos* of the Hellenes.” The two terms *polis* and *ethnos* constitute entirely different categories of classification: the former is concerned with place, the latter with peoplehood.⁸¹ This is why, in describing the populations of the Peloponnese, Herodotus (8.73) can refer to the “numerous and famous” *poleis* that belonged to the *ethnos* of the Dorians or the *poleis* of Hermione and Asine that belonged to the *ethnos* of the Dryopes.

What distinguishes an *ethnos* such as the Boiotians or the Arkadians from one such as the Dorians or Dryopes is that the former is geographically consolidated while the latter is geographically dispersed, with constituent *poleis* chartering their ethnic unity through a tradition of an original homeland in which their ancestors had once cohabited.⁸² It is probably not insignificant that all the indications point to the forging of ethnic consciousness among such dispersed *ethnē* in the course of the

⁷⁸ E.g. Snodgrass 1980: 42. The distinction is ultimately based on Arist. *Pol.* 2.1.5; for the correct interpretation of which, see Hansen 1999.

⁷⁹ *Poleis* cannot be attested prior to the later sixth century in eastern Arkadia, the fifth century in Achaia, and the fifth or fourth centuries in Aitolia: Nielsen 1996; Morgan and Hall 1996; Funke 1997. For the correlation between Mycenaean states and areas where the *polis* developed earlier: Kirsten 1956: 100–101. See generally Hall 2008.

⁸⁰ Archibald 2000: 214. ⁸¹ Hall 2014a: 91. ⁸² Hall 2014a: 92.

Archaic period – precisely the period in which we are first able to discern the ethnogenesis of consolidated *ethnē* such as the Boiotians, the Phokians, the Arkadians, and the Achaians.⁸³ In other words, the context in which the population groups of Archaic Greece constructed a sense of their ethnic heritages was one of simultaneous and mutual self-identification, offering those “interdependent pasts” that Appadurai considers so essential for the legitimation of myths of origin. In the more settled conditions that accompanied the end of the Dark Age, affiliation to an *ethnos* no doubt offered a community a sense of belonging that transcended local, parochial boundaries. In any case, the instability of settlement, demographic contraction, and disruptions in communications that characterized the Dark Age mean that, even if communities had entertained a consciousness of supralocal affiliations at an earlier date, ethnic attachments would have had to be constructed anew in the subsequent period.

There must, however, be more to the construction of ethnicity in the Archaic period than simply an emotive yearning for a broader network of affiliations. Emily Mackil has recently drawn attention to what she and Peter van Alfen have termed “collaborative coinages” – that is, the adoption by several communities of a coinage based on the same weight standard and guaranteed by uniform emblems (for example, the characteristic cut-out shield of the late sixth-century Boiotian issues).⁸⁴ Interestingly, in Boiotia and Arkadia, these coinage issues seem to predate the earliest attestation of federal institutions and Mackil argues that the creation of “monetary zones” would have facilitated exchange by reducing transaction costs and established networks of codependency that could later be politically institutionalized.

We can, perhaps, go further. The introduction of coinage represents, through the stamp of the issuing authority, a formal and official guarantee of value rather than the invention of money itself.⁸⁵ From literary sources and a handful of early inscriptions, we know that fines could be levied and transactions made in uncoined bullion or metal vessels in the centuries prior to the appearance of the earliest coins. It is not at all unlikely that the Boiotian *poleis* of Thebes, Tanagra, and Hyettos, followed closely by Akraiphia, Koroneia, Mykalessos and Pharai, which first adopted a collaborative coinage in the last quarter of the sixth century, had all participated in economic networks of exchange from an earlier date and that the shared

⁸³ The Dorians and Ionians are already attested in Homer (*Il.* 13.685; *Od.* 19.177), the Aiolians in Hesiod (*Works and Days.* 636). In the case of the Dorians, the process of ethnogenesis may have still been continuing as late as the sixth (Hall 1997: 69–70) or fifth (Ulf 2008: 231–233) centuries.

⁸⁴ Mackil 2013; Mackil and van Alfen 2006. ⁸⁵ Schaps 2004: 96–101.

coinage was merely a formalization of those transactions. Hesiod's sententious statement that in times of crisis, "neighbors come ungirt, but kinsmen take the time to gird themselves" (*Works and Days* 345) surely implies a normative expectation that kinsfolk should be counted on for assistance. The construction, then, of kinship-based relationships through subscription to a shared ethnicity could have established "trust networks" which provided some guarantees regarding economic exchanges. Interesting in this respect are the archaeological indications that sanctuaries, which have loomed large in the literature about pre-federal associations, seem to have served as important nodes in exchange networks from an early date.⁸⁶

Larsen was undoubtedly correct in regarding ethnicity as a crucial factor for the creation of federal states but he was, I suggest, mistaken in assuming that the *ethnē* that federated were primordial categories that had entertained a consciousness of their ethnic unity in the period prior to the supposed migrations that brought them to the territories they occupied in the historical period. Such an assumption gives too much credence to later literary sources – which were concerned more with explaining the present than with describing the past – and fails to take account of the active, dynamic, and constructive nature of ethnicity. Since there are some indications in our evidence that this process of ethnogenesis could be quite protracted, continuing even into the Classical period in areas such as Achaia, the implication would seem to be that ethnicity was not simply a pre-requisite for federalization, but rather one of the means by which it was accomplished.

⁸⁶ Bronze workshops are attested, from at least the eighth century, in the sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea and at Olympia: Voyatzis 1999: 131; Morgan 1990: 32, 36, 44.

*The community of the Hellenes**Lynette G. Mitchell*

A phenomenon that is closely linked to federalism among the Greek city-states is the development and definition of the Hellenic community. As regional and local identities were taking shape, by at least the mid-sixth century the peoples of the Greek peninsula had also developed another, supra-identity, to such a degree that they began to give themselves the collective name of the ‘Hellenes’. Those who claimed to belong to the Hellenes felt that they shared things in common, which they expressed, for example, in the formulation of genealogies, such as the *Catalog of Women*, which set out for communities the lines of descent from Hellen the son of Deukalion, and in the establishment of the specifically ‘Panhellenic’ stephanitic festival circuit, comprising Olympia, Delphi, Isthmia and Nemea. In the late fifth century, Herodotus had the Athenians confidently declare that Hellenicity (*to Hellenikon*) resided in “common blood, common language, common sanctuaries of the gods and festivals, and a common way of life” (8.144.2).

Yet, despite these apparent certainties about the nature of Hellenicity, the boundaries of belonging to this shared community were not readily determined. Genealogies represented an imagined kinship that shifted and changed according to current needs.¹ So too, sanctuaries were often dominated by individual *poleis*, undermining the sense in which they were shared by all.² Furthermore, far from the sense that there was a clearly defined community of language, it was controversial whether some, such as the Epirote tribes, spoke a dialect of Greek, and whether this at some level qualified them for ‘Greekness’ (Thuc. 2.68.5).

However, the stories told by the community asserted that it was a community. Irad Malkin has recently offered a subtle new model for

¹ On the creation of genealogies in ancient Greece, and the representation of the past according to the present, see Thomas 1989: 155–195.

² The case is put forcefully by Scott 2010, esp. 250–273.

how the idea of Hellenic identity first came into being in the context of the colonial movement, and how it emerged from the multiplicity of small network connections between colonial communities.³ It was surely in these 'colonial' contexts that questions of inclusion and exclusion must first have been voiced,⁴ and through the many networks which existed between communities that this sense of something shared, the stories of belonging, must have been dispersed. As a result we find the idea of Hellenic consciousness being realised at a number of different locations around the Greek world at about the mid-sixth century.⁵ Further, that around this time the limits of the community were being defined and tested (even if only on an ad hoc basis), and distinctions were being made about who might and might not belong, indicated the community had at least on one level acquired a political nature, even if it did not have a political center or political machinery.⁶

In this chapter, we will begin by looking at the role of the sanctuaries in creating a shared identity for the Hellenes. As arenas where one could share cult, demonstrate kinship, and take part in communal activities, they provided spaces in which the boundaries for inclusion could be tested on a number of different levels. In the [second section](#), we will then turn to the explicitly political activities for which this political will towards community and commonality could be utilised. In the [final section](#), in considering why these ventures enjoyed only limited success (whether or not they were later fabrications or exaggerations of earlier events), we will discuss how the accounts of Panhellenic enterprises of various kinds fed back into the story-telling of the community, strengthening and maintaining its very existence.

The Hellenic community and the Panhellenic sanctuaries

The relationship between cult and the political community of the Hellenes is a complex one. It is often said that the sense of community of the Greeks as a whole arose out of their shared activities at major sanctuaries. This has been illustrated from passages in our sources such as Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* where (in the context of the final years of the Peloponnesian War) Lysistrata reproaches the Greeks for destroying each other even though they sprinkle altars from one bowl like kinsmen at Olympia, Thermopylai and Delphi and as many other places as she could name

³ Malkin 2011: 4–64. ⁴ See Mitchell 2005; Mitchell 2007: 44–63.

⁵ See also Mitchell 2007: 63–65. ⁶ See esp. Mitchell 2007: 39–75; Hall 2013.

(1128–1134). Yet, it has also frequently been noted, following Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, that Greek religion was *polis* religion, and that even the so-called Panhellenic centers were dominated by individual *poleis*,⁷ although over extended periods of time it was not always the same *polis*. Certainly in the fourth century, Elis lost control of Pisatis and therefore Olympia (even if the accounts of struggles between Eleians and Pisatans in the Archaic period are unhistorical),⁸ and the varying influences brought to bear on the sanctuary of Hyampolis (Kalapodi) in Phokis, and the resulting changes in its focus, is another.⁹

Nevertheless, Sourvinou-Inwood and others have argued that these individual *polis*-based locations of cult collectively were all part of a system of cult, which stretched across the Greek world, creating a sacred landscape. Central to this sense of a shared cultic map were the Panhellenic sanctuaries. Catherine Morgan argues that the establishment of the Isthmian Games in 582/1 BCE by the Corinthians in imitation of those at Olympia was a self-consciously Panhellenic move.¹⁰ That the move to express an explicitly Hellenic identity was self-conscious is also demonstrated by the nomenclature of officials at the sanctuaries. At Olympia the officials, known as *diatitēs* in a late sixth-century inscription, were renamed *hellanodikai*, ‘Hellenic’ judges.¹¹ This must have been achieved at least by 476 BCE, when Pindar refers to an Aitolian *hellanodikas* (*Ol.* 3.10–15), and an inscription from Olympia gives the enforcing official the title *hellanozikas* (Buck no. 61).¹² Nemea also introduced these Hellenic officials at some stage, though they are not attested before the end of the third century BCE.¹³

The Panhellenism of these sanctuaries seems to have resided in the fact that they were places where Hellenes could participate communally, especially in the games, but also in the sacrifices, even if no one sanctuary appealed to or catered for all the Hellenes at any one time. For example, Michael Scott has talked about the ways that even the major sanctuaries of Delphi and Olympia could have different catchment areas, or offered shifting roles in the cultic landscape.¹⁴ Yet at the level of the stories that were told about these sanctuaries, and the way the sanctuaries presented

⁷ Sourvinou-Inwood 1990.

⁸ For current bibliography on the Pisatans, see Roy 2013; cf. Roy 2004b: 500–1, and Chapter 14, below; Nielsen 2007: 30–45.

⁹ Morgan 1997; Morgan 2003: 113–120; cf. McNerney in this volume.

¹⁰ On the stephanitic festival circuit: see Morgan 1990: 16, 39, 212–23; Morgan 1993: 33–37.

¹¹ For the *diatitēs*: Siewert 1992: 115; Nielsen 2007: 20–21.

¹² For date of the *hellanozikas* (475–450 BCE), see LSAG no. 15.

¹³ Volgraff 1916: 111 = Moretti 1967: 41; for the date: Amandry 1980: 226–227 n. 30. ¹⁴ Scott 2010.

themselves, the picture tends to be one of commonality. Pindar says that the periodic *panagyria* were places for the Panhellenes to compete (*Isthm.* 4.28–9), and associates Delphi with Panhellenas (*Paian.* 6.62–5). Nevertheless, it is probably significant in the general development of the community, and the fact that it did not consistently formalize political structures, that no single sanctuary could provide a unifying focus for Hellenic cultic activity.

Outside the circuit created by Olympia, Delphi, Nemea and Isthmia, other sanctuaries also opened their doors to all Hellenes. Isokrates says that the sanctuary of Zeus Hellenios at Aigina was “common for the Hellenes” (*Euag.* 15; cf. Paus. 1.44.9; 2.29.8; 2.30.3), and Dodona, regarded as the most ancient of the oracular sanctuaries (Hdt. 2.52.2), was said by Euripides to speak “to those who were willing in Hellas” (*Mel. Dep.* fr. 14.15–17 Jouan and van Looy), although it seems it was also prepared to speak to Kroisos of Lydia. In fact, Kroisos made representations to a number of Greek oracles, made sacrifices and dedications at Delphi (Hdt. 1.56), and dedicated at least three columns for the Artemision at Ephesus (Tod no. 6). At the end of the fifth century, the Athenians invited all Hellenes to bring first fruits to Eleusis (supported by a Delphic oracle: M&L no. 73, lines 14–34). Herodotus says that any Athenian “who is willing” (*ho boulomenos*) or any of the other Hellenes may be initiated at Eleusis (8.65.4). Isokrates, on the other hand, says that all barbarians were banned from the mysteries because of the hatred induced by the Persian Wars (4.157).¹⁵

The claim that a sanctuary was common for Hellenes presupposes that Hellenicity was a definable quantity, and that it was possible to know who belonged to the community and who did not – that is, who were Greeks, and who barbarians. To some degree, the issue of belonging was determined by the sanctuaries, by whom they allowed or invited to participate. Although it is not clear when the practice started, a number of the major sanctuaries sent out officials (variously called *spondophoroi*, *presbeutēs* and *theōroi*) to declare a sacred truce.¹⁶ At least by the mid-fourth century, in addition to the four periodic sanctuaries, the Asklepieion at Epidauros also sent out *theōroi* (*SEG* 11.410 [Perlman 2000: E.1]; *IG* IV 1504 [Perlman

¹⁵ Mylonas 1961: 247–248. A late tradition also suggests that those who spoke in a language unintelligible for Greeks could not take part (Libanios 13.1), and in the Roman period non-Greeks could be made initiates.

¹⁶ On heralds and the sacred truce: Rougemont 1973; Dillon 1997: 1–20. An inscription from the second century BCE gives a list of the cities invited to the games at Delphi: Plassart 1921. See also Parker 2004 for the phenomenon of mobility generated through festivals. For a Panhellenic declaration of a sacred truce at Eleusis, the Argive Heraion and the Epidaurian Asklepieion, as well as the four stephanitic festivals, see Boesch 1908: 101; Perlman 2000: 14–16.

2000: E.2]), as did Eleusis to announce the Mysteries (Aischin. 2.133).¹⁷ In this way, they made a positive, although general, statement about who might belong, since it seems the declaration of the truce did not necessarily aim to be comprehensive.

The fact that one entered the games at all could be seen as indicative of one's willingness to be considered one of the Hellenes. Herodotus suggests the Persians at least thought competing for honor rather than financial reward was an odd Greek custom (8.26). Nielsen, however, has shown how the specifically Hellenic nature of athletic events was part of the way that the Greeks constructed their identity.¹⁸ To the Greek mind, then, participation in athletics itself, which was also a ritual event,¹⁹ was a statement of inclusiveness both by participants and the games' organizers, and marked a difference from those non-Greeks like Kroisos, who made dedications but did not compete.

However, what is striking is that the emphasis of the summons to join the common festivals was inclusive rather than exclusive. In fact, it appears that the rubric for inviting participants to Olympia was largely self-defining: Herodotus says that the Eleians told the Egyptians that the games were open to Eleians and to any of the Greeks "who wished to take part" (2.160), *hoi boulomenoi*. An obvious objection to the claim of a rather laissez-faire attitude to participation is the so-called exclusion clause, for which Olympia is famous. Herodotus gives an account of Alexander I of Makedon, who was allowed to compete in the games, which were restricted to Greeks, because he could prove he was Argive (Hdt. 5.22). Nevertheless, it is not clear from Herodotus or from other sources how formal the rules for exclusion were at Olympia. Alexander had to prove his Hellenic credentials because the other competitors objected, although it was the *Hellēnodikai* who resolved the dispute. So it seems there was a general inclusion clause, and then this was only tested if others objected. Alexander's evidence for belonging was apparently based on a mythical and folkloric story of three brothers descended from Temenos, the Heraklid king of Argos, who fled from Argos and came eventually to Makedon (Hdt. 8.137–8). As Buxton has so eloquently written, "myths function like shoes: you step into them as they fit,"²⁰ and even in the fourth century not everyone was convinced of Makedonian pretensions to be Hellenes. Demosthenes was still objecting in the *Third Philippic* of 341 BCE

¹⁷ At least by the end of the fourth century BCE, the Argive Heraion was also sending *theōroi*: Perlman 2000: 16 and A 1.

¹⁸ Nielsen 2007: 12–17. ¹⁹ Burkert 1985: 105–107; Nagy 1986.

²⁰ Buxton 1994: 196; see also Hornblower 1991–2008: 2.63–64 with n. 146.

that as a barbarian Philip was organizing the Pythian Games, “a contest common for Hellenes” (31–32). Tellingly, however, there is no recorded opposition to the participation of the Molossians in the games (the fourth-century Arybbas had victories at Delphi and Olympia [R&O no. 70]), despite their ambivalent Hellenicity.²¹ Philip II of Makedon had Olympic equestrian victories in 356 BCE (Plut. *Alex.* 3.5), and perhaps also 352 and 348.²² The Makedonian Archelaos appears to have won a victory at the Nemean Games in the mid-fifth century (*SEG* 29.652).²³

That the boundaries of belonging could be quite unclear, and that exclusions were not always rigorously tested, seems also to be suggested by the Etruscan involvement in the sanctuaries. The Agyllaioi of Etruria certainly consulted the Delphic oracle and also probably built a treasury (Hdt. 1.167.1–2; Strabo 5.2.3), as did the Etruscans from Spina (Strabo 5.1.7, 9.3.8; Plin. *nat.* 3.120).²⁴ Herodotus thinks that the Agyllaioi were Etruscan (interestingly, Herodotus also says the oracle instructed them to establish games in expiation for stoning the Phokaian prisoners), though Strabo thinks they were originally a Pelasgian foundation from Thessaly which was attacked by the Etruscans. Strabo also thinks that the people of Spina must have been a Greek foundation because they had a treasury, and Pliny says the city was founded by Diomedes. There is also evidence that Etruscans made dedications at Olympia, and may have even participated in the games there.²⁵

In fact, because of the fluid and discursive ways in which the Greeks constructed kinship, descent was nearly meaningless in practice as a basis for excluding individuals or cities from membership of the group. Aischylos’ *Suppliants* of the 460s BCE demonstrates how ambivalent the boundaries could be between Greeks and non-Greeks (in this case the Egyptians) in the mid-fifth century,²⁶ just as even earlier the *Catalog of Women* had included Asiatic elements connecting Hellenes to Egypt and Asia (Aigyptos, Belos and Arabos, for example: fr. 127 and 137 Merkelbach and West) in the Inachid stemma.²⁷ The versatility of genealogies also had a bearing on participation at sanctuaries. When the Spartan Kleomenes was refused entry to the temple of Athena at Athens because he was Dorian, his rejoinder was that he was not Dorian but Achaian (Hdt. 5.72.3).²⁸ It is not clear whether the implication is that only Dorians were excluded, or that Kleomenes’ Achaian heritage made him also Ionian!

²¹ Malkin 2001b; Hall 2002: 165–166; Mitchell 2007: 205. ²² Borza 1982: 13.

²³ Engels 2010: 92–93. ²⁴ Treasury of the Agyllaioi: Jacquemin 1999: 72–74.

²⁵ Camporeale 2004: 98–99. ²⁶ Mitchell 2006. ²⁷ West 1985: 76–8, cf. 132.

²⁸ See Parker 1998.

Further, exclusions at the major sanctuaries were usually aimed not at keeping non-Greeks out but at scoring political points against other members of the Greek community. The Spartans were excluded by the Eleians from the temple, the sacrifices and the Olympic Games at least in 420 for failing to pay a fine for the alleged breach of the Olympic truce (Thuc. 5.49–50). There are suggestions that the ban on participation lasted down to 400 BCE, although Hornblower argues against this.²⁹ Likewise, while Lysias in his *Olympic Oration* urged unity at the Olympic Games of either 388 or perhaps 384 BCE,³⁰ he also called for a common war against the king of Persia and the so-called tyrant, Dionysios I of Syracuse. Dionysios had also sent a lavish contingent to the festival, though the crowd turned against them (Diod. 14.109; 15.7–2–3). In this way, Lysias used the festival symbolically to cut the Syracusan out of the Greek community by aligning him and his tyranny with barbarism.³¹

All this is not to say that cult could not be exclusive. There are a number of examples of Greek cults which excluded people because they were *xenoi*, outsiders, or on the basis of tribal or *polis* affiliations.³² However, at the Panhellenic level it was the conceptual boundaries which were important. Benedict Anderson has talked about how the boundaries of the symbolic community are imagined, because it is impossible to know everyone who could belong.³³ Unlike the more realistically face-to-face societies of individual *poleis*, many of which had total populations of no more than 10,000 in the mid-fifth century (Morris estimates that Athens was the largest with about 35,000 in 450 BCE, although other estimates are much higher),³⁴ Hansen has calculated that the total Greek population in the mid-fourth century was between 7.5 and 10 million.³⁵ For this reason alone the Hellenic community had an abstract existence as a symbolic identity rather than one that was, or needed to be, closely defined.

Cult was an important way in which the political nature of the community could be expressed, especially at the sanctuaries which declared that they were for all Greeks. However, as with kinship, language and culture, there were no hard edges. The major sanctuaries were not places where membership was being defined by keeping people out. Instead, at least in

²⁹ Hornblower 2000; Hodkinson 2000: 311 accepts the ban was in place until 400 or even 396 BCE.

³⁰ See Lewis 1994: 139 n. 82.

³¹ Dionysios, however, was very careful to represent himself as a legitimate ruler, and rejected claims of tyranny. In his own poetry he says that *tyrannis* is the mother of injustice (fr. 4 *TGF*).

³² See esp. Butz 1996; see also Hall 2007: 84. ³³ Anderson 1991: 5–6.

³⁴ Morris 1991. Hansen 2006: 30, thinks that in the fourth century, *poleis* of 10,000 would not have been exceptional.

³⁵ Hansen 2006: 1–34, esp. 28.

the earlier periods, these were the places where people were let into the community, by the sharing of cult. Lysistrata's exhortation that the Greeks remember their shared libations was an inclusive declaration of unity through cult (like that of kinsmen): it invited Hellenes to remember (or discover) they were Hellenes. The major sanctuaries were places for imagining the Hellenes into being, even if the details of what that might mean were rather vague.

Panhellenic activities

However unclear the boundaries, the political community of the Hellenes had developed a strong and self-conscious sense of its identity by about the middle of the sixth century BCE. Once this sense of community had crystallized, the political nature of the community was reinforced by the possibility of joint activities and ventures. For example, some of the cities of Asia Minor (Chios, Teos, Phokaia, Klazomenai, Rhodes, Knidos, Halikarnassos, Phaselis, and Mytilene: Hdt. 2.178.2) collaborated in order to found the Hellenion at Naukratis in about 570 BCE, where cult was offered "for the gods of the Hellenes" (*tois theois tôn Hellēnōn*).³⁶ It seems that at least the rhetoric of community was also used to power the Ionian Revolt. As Herodotus tells the story, when Aristagoras of Miletus came to Sparta and Athens in 499 BCE, he tried to invoke the community to encourage the two cities to join the revolt against the Persians. In his speech at Sparta Herodotus says Aristagoras called on the Spartans by the "gods of the Greeks" to "rescue the Ionians, men of the same blood, from slavery" (5.49.3),³⁷ only adding at Athens that the Milesians were colonists of the Athenians (5.97). In the event the Athenians and the Eretrians joined the Ionians, although the Spartans did not. Typically, even explicitly Panhellenic ventures (just like Panhellenic sanctuaries) did not necessarily capture the whole community.

A significant milestone for the Hellenic community was the invasion of the Persians at the beginning of the fifth century. The discussions regarding joint resistance focused on a sanctuary, this time probably Isthmia, although Herodotus is vague about the location of the original meeting of the Greeks in 481 BCE "who had concerns for the better interests of

³⁶ On the inscriptions: Hogarth 1898/9: 44–45; Lloyd 1988: 3.224. For the doubts about the identification of the Hellenion, however: Bowden 1996.

³⁷ See Alty 1982 for the power of claims of tribal kinship, and Hornblower 1991–2008: 1.66–80 for the importance of kinship ties in Classical Greek politics, especially in the Peloponnesian War as Thucydides describes it.

Hellas" (Hdt. 7.145.1, 172.1), where they exchanged a pledge of faith (*pistis*), as *synōmotai*, "joint oath-takers", against the Persians (Hdt. 7.145.1, 148.1).³⁸ While Pausanias does give another later tradition of the Greeks meeting at the Hellenion in Sparta (3.12.6), we have no independent evidence for the Hellenion at this early date, and it probably makes more sense as a result of the victory celebrations for the Persian wars than as antedating them.³⁹ Herodotus does say that the later meeting of what was now the common alliance met at the Isthmus (Hdt. 7.175.1), and so it is not improbable to assume that the first was held there also. Herodotus does not tell us how representatives from the cities were summoned, though we might imagine that a general call had been made (possibly by the Spartans who set themselves up as the leaders of the resistance movement at an early stage) on a network not dissimilar to that used for the *epangelia*.

Later accounts suggest a relatively strong and formal council of this alliance, especially Plutarch in his *Life of Aristideides*.⁴⁰ Yet from our fifth-century sources it would appear that the council struggled to produce a coherent or unified policy.⁴¹ For example, in Herodotus' account the Thessalians had originally made representations to the council at the Isthmus that the pass at Tempe should be defended, but when the council changed its mind and decided to pull back to Thermopylai, the Thessalians went whole-heartedly to the Persian side (Hdt. 7.172–174, cf. 8.27–31). There are also stories of Themistokles bribing the Spartan commander, Eurybiades, to stay to fight the Persians at Artemision (Hdt. 8.5), and in the arguments over whether the fleet should fight at Salamis or withdraw to the Isthmus, Themistokles, acting on his own, forced the issue by tricking the Persians into fighting (Hdt. 8.74–83).

Herodotus' account, in particular, also presents us with a Greek world which was disunited in the bickering over the leadership, and, except for a few key players, largely uninterested in resisting when Persian victory seemed to be assured. Gelon of Syracuse refused take part unless he could have control of the Greek forces, or at least the command by sea, because of arguments over the leadership (Hdt. 7.157–162).⁴² The Korkyraians, on the other hand, promised to send help, but then did not

³⁸ On the sanctity, power and importance of oaths, see Parker 1983: 186–188.

³⁹ Cartledge 2006: 99–103. Peter Brunt (1953: 148 and n. 2) argues in favour of Pausanias' account.

⁴⁰ Rhodes 2010: 17 doubts the value of these later sources, though Kienast 2003 and Jung 2006 place higher value on them because of the assumption they are based on Ephoros.

⁴¹ See Cartledge 2006: 106–107.

⁴² Herodotus gives two versions of why the Argives refused to take part: the first that they declined to be involved if they could not share the honours of leadership with the Spartans; and the second (though Herodotus found this story unlikely) that the demand concerning leadership was a ruse to

because they were sure that the Persians would win (Hdt. 7.168). The Cretans also refused to join forces because of advice from Delphi (Hdt. 7.169). In fact, the role of Delphi in campaigning against resistance suggests that there was a feeling that much could be gained in the event of what must have seemed an inevitable Persian victory by appearing to suppress any attempts to oppose Persia (cf. Hdt. 7.148).⁴³ The betrayal of the Thessalians itself suggests something about the weakness of the ties that bound the Greeks together, as did the later suggestions by the Peloponnesian members of the council only to defend the Isthmus (Hdt. 8.40, 49.2, 56–63, 71–72, 74–75, 78–83, 9.7–9, 15.1). Boiotian medizing became legendary (see Hdt. 9.2, 17.1). In fact, we know independently that very few states took part in the resistance, and there were some notable exceptions. Of the estimated thousand or so Greek cities in the Classical period, only thirty-one had their names on the victory dedication erected at Delphi after Plataia.⁴⁴ Herodotus says that a number of Peloponnesian cities were not concerned about invasion, and offered no assistance to the rest (8.72).

Further, the so-called Hellenic League was actually only a temporary association, and it is likely that the oath-takers ceased to meet soon after the end of the conflict, though there are other views.⁴⁵ Plutarch says that, after the Greek victory at Plataia, there was a meeting of the joint council at which a decision was taken to meet annually, to raise a confederate army and to celebrate the *Eleutheria* every fourth year (Plut. *Arist.* 21; cf. Diod. 11.29). Jung thinks both that the alliance took on a more formal shape after Plataia, acting under the leadership of Sparta as an interstate forum for resolving conflicts, and that there was a confederated army as

cover the fact that they felt themselves bound to the Persians by bonds of kinship, and so wanted to remain at peace with them (7.148–52).

⁴³ Elaborate stories were told about how the sanctuary defended itself with divine aid when the Persians did attack (Hdt. 8.36–9), but these accounts probably were invented to explain why the sanctuary's treasures were not in fact plundered by the invaders: Hignett 1963: 439–447; Burn 1984: 425–426; Cartledge 2006: 101.

⁴⁴ On the number of *poleis* in Classical Greece, see Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 53–54 (1,036). Victory dedication at Delphi: M&L no. 27 with commentary (not all listed communities were cities). Other dedications were made at Olympia and the Isthmus (Hdt. 9.81). Pausanias (5.23.1–2) describes the dedication at Olympia, and lists the names of the states involved in the conflict, although he only records twenty-seven.

⁴⁵ Jung 2006: 276–279 thinks that there may have been a number of meetings of the council, until 462/1, while Kienast 2003 argues for continuous activity of the council until after the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 BCE. Most of their examples are difficult to pin down, though it is possible that the accusations against Pausanias and Themistokles emerged from such a council (see Diod. 11.47.1). Thucydides seems to indicate the indictments against them arose from Sparta and Athens respectively, though 1.130.2 may suggest a meeting of the council.

Plutarch claims.⁴⁶ However, Herodotus says Pausanias, the Spartan regent, who had laid siege to Thebes by agreement of the council (9.86.1), disbanded the coalition army once the Thebans handed over their leaders (9.86–8). Herodotus gives no indication of any further discussions at Plataia, apart from the dedications to be made at the sanctuaries from the spoils (9.81). Decisions were made in Asia Minor about the fate of the Ionians, though the Athenians seem to have taken a firm lead rather than a decision being made by decree of the council (Hdt. 9.106). Further, after 478 a joint council effectively had no real practical purpose, especially since the Delian League had taken over the principal functions of its predecessor. There is also little sign of a joint army, except perhaps at Ithome in 462 BCE (Thuc. 1.102.1), where the Athenians were sent away.⁴⁷ Doubts have also been raised about the establishment of the festival of the *Eleutheria* before the fourth century,⁴⁸ although some now see a fifth-century festival as an appropriate performance context for Simonides' *Plataia Elegy*.⁴⁹ Whether there were meetings of the council or not, the alliance of cities seems to have continued in principle down to 462 BCE, although at that point it was dissolved by the Athenians as a reaction to Spartan mistrust (Thuc. 1.102.4).⁵⁰

Apart from this temporary alliance, there do not seem to have been any other formal attempts to provide political structures for the Hellenic community, especially not a federated structure, although models did exist for other kinds of permanent political formations. For example, from the late sixth century the Peloponnesian League met in council to decide on joint actions (e.g., Hdt. 5.91–3 (cf. 5.75–6); Thuc. 1.66–87). Some commentators think that the Hellenic League was an extended version of the Peloponnesian League, although as Jung points out, what we see in 481 BCE looks like the start of something new.⁵¹ The Peloponnesian League itself continued into the fourth century, despite the foundation of the Delian League out of the Hellenic League (although as we have noted the Hellenic League retained a separate existence, at least in theory, until the 460s).

Also in the sixth century, the Ionians had established a common council at the Panionion at Mt. Mykale, which was limited in membership, and determined by the twelve cities who participated in the festival of the Panionia. The Ionians probably first developed political institutions with

⁴⁶ Jung 2006: 271–281. ⁴⁷ See Hornblower 1991–2008: 1.158, though note Kienast 2003.

⁴⁸ Étienne and Piérart 1975. ⁴⁹ Boedeker 1995. ⁵⁰ See Hornblower 1991–2008: 1.158–9.

⁵¹ Jung 2006: 276.

Cyrus' invasion of Asia Minor. Rubenstein argues that there must have been political institutions prior to this since Herodotus says that Cyrus opened negotiations with the Ionians for submission before his invasion of Asia Minor (Hdt. 1.76.3).⁵² However, this conclusion is not inevitable, and one could understand Herodotus to mean that the Ionians only became galvanized into an explicitly political institution as a result of Cyrus' defeat of Lydia (Hdt. 1.141.1–4, esp. 4). Certainly it appears that they did not have a building for meetings, since Thales is said to have suggested at some unspecified time before the defeat of Ionia itself that they should establish a single *bouleutērion* at Teos and reduce the status of the cities to those of demes (Hdt. 1.170.3). Thales' model, however, would have produced not a federal state as such but, as Asheri has pointed out, a synoikism on the model of Athens.⁵³ When Thucydides describes the synoikism of Athens by Theseus he says that he dissolved the *bouleutēria* and magistracies of the separate *poleis*, “creating one *bouleutērion* and *prytaneion*” (Thuc. 2.15.2).⁵⁴ It has recently been recognized that political autonomy was not a defining feature of a *polis*.⁵⁵ Yet what Thucydides (and Thales) suggest is symbolically important in supplanting and replacing local political identities altogether with a single-tiered and unified identity.

Yet the Hellenic community never again attempted to formalize its structures or procedures. By the fourth century, some of the major sanctuaries had provided a focus for debate, especially Olympia, although this was not always part of the official organization of the games. For example, important orations were delivered by important speakers at the games (such as Gorgias or Lysias) but did not form part of the official competitive program, which at Olympia was only athletic. Nevertheless, such performances (which Kokolakis thinks may have happened between the athletic contests)⁵⁶ could have quite powerful effects – as Lysias' tirade against Dionysios makes evident. Nevertheless, the informality and lack of formal structures for conducting these debates are important. Large numbers attended the Olympic Games: Nielsen gives the number as 45,000 in the Classical period based on the seating capacity of the mid-fourth-century stadium, though significantly less at other stephanitic sanctuaries – 4,000 at the Isthmian sanctuary, for example.⁵⁷ Those who attended the games could be viewed as representative of the whole community (see Aristoph. *Peace* 583–586), and the sanctuary was used as a location of public

⁵² Rubenstein 2004: 1056. ⁵³ Asheri in Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007: 191.

⁵⁴ See Hornblower 1991–2008: 1.262. ⁵⁵ Hansen 1995c. ⁵⁶ Kokolakis 1992.

⁵⁷ Nielsen 2007: 56.

declarations in the form of inscribed dedications, decrees, treaties and alliances.⁵⁸ Likewise, Hieron of Syracuse used the occasion of his Pythian victory in 470 BCE to announce the foundation of his new colony, Aetna (Pind., *Pyth.* 1.29–33). However, it is significant that the games themselves, though a place where views could be aired about the community and its activities, provided no mechanisms for proper debate or collective decision-making. The Hellenic community remained an abstraction.

Telling the story of the Hellenes

Nevertheless, there was a strong narrative for the community. Despite their relatively small numbers and the in-fighting amongst council members, the Greek coalition founded in 481 BCE did eject the Persians, and the story of the united Greek defense became part of Greek legend and an essential part of their story-telling about the community of the Hellenes. The altar of Zeus Eleutherios at Plataia to commemorate the victory was inscribed:⁵⁹

The Hellenes, by the might of Nike, by the work of Ares,
having driven out the Persians, common for free Hellas
(*eleutherai Helladi koinon*),
built this altar of Zeus Eleutherios.

Thus, despite Herodotus' more complicated and acerbic account, at a very early stage the Greeks who took part wanted to see the victory over the Persians as a victory "common for Hellas." However, alongside this emphasis on common action, there was still the need, pulling in other directions, to show that individual states predominated in the struggle. It has been argued, for example, that the *Plataia Elegy* was commissioned by the Spartans to show-case Sparta's role in the war and elevate their position among the other Greeks.⁶⁰ Pausanias' alleged inscription on the Delphic monument (though erased by the Spartans: Thuc. 1.132.2–3) certainly makes such claims look plausible. It is notable, however, that even Pausanias apparently tried to present himself as the leader of a specifically *Hellenic* force (*Hellēnōn archēgos*) – though of course this position would have redounded greatly to his personal glory and prestige – and there was a constant tension between the desire to promote the glory of individual

⁵⁸ See Nielsen 2007: 55–83.

⁵⁹ Plut. *Herod. malig.* 42 = *Mor.* 873b; Plut. *Arist.* 19.7; cf. Beck 2010: 65–67. Molyneux 1992: 197 and 209 n. 101 accepts this as written by Simonides, although Page 1981: 212 rejects the attribution on the basis of meter and quality of composition. A slightly different text is also preserved in the *Palatine Anthology* 6.50.

⁶⁰ Aloni 1997; Aloni 2001; Jung 2006: 237–241.

cities and that of the collective. Beck has in fact argued that the relationship between the individual cities in promoting their part in the war and the promotion of the war as a Panhellenic venture was inextricably interlinked.⁶¹

The Persian Wars provided significant impetus for the sense of commonality and unity of the Hellenes, and became an essential element in the story-telling of the Hellenic community. The initial response to the war, the Delian League, was represented as a Hellenic offensive to carry on the war against Persia (Thuc. 1.96.1; cf. 3.10.2–3), whose officials were called *hellēnotamiai*, Hellenic stewards (Thuc. 1.96.2), even though the Peloponnesians were not involved in the league or its project. Heading in another direction, Aristophanes, in the *Lysistrata* of 411 BCE, amid the turbulence of the final phase of the Peloponnesian War, has the Spartan ambassador call on Remembrance (*Mnamōn*), the Muse who knows the deeds of the Spartans and the Athenians at Artemision and Thermopylai (1147–1161) to celebrate the peace they have just agreed. The memory of past action was important, and became increasingly so, in the call to put aside differences and be at peace, even if the alleged desire for peace was itself spun around with ideas of ambition and imperialism.

Nevertheless, the story of joint action was a powerful one, even if the interval between what happened and how it was recorded could be complex. It was especially in the disappointment of interstate rivalry and fracture that there was a need to perpetuate the idea of a shared community. For example, the refoundation of Sybaris at Thurioi certainly seems to have been promoted in Panhellenic terms (Diod. 12.11.2–4). Diodoros says that the colonists were summoned from Hellas, and the ten tribes were named for the peoples who comprised them: Arkas, Achais, Eleias, Boiotia, Amphiktyonis, Doris, Ias, Athenais, Eubois. There was respectability, and even prestige, in representing the foundation as a Panhellenic event, even if it was in truth a thinly disguised gloss for Athenian imperialism.⁶²

Likewise, the so-called Congress Decree (for which the only evidence is Plut. *Per.* 17), demonstrates the need to tell stories of the shared will of the community. The Congress Decree also purports to belong to the 440s, and is said to have been initiated by the Athenians for the purpose of deliberating jointly for “the peace and common action of Hellas” (17.3). Significant doubts have been raised about the historicity of the decree, and many

⁶¹ Beck 2010: 61–68.

⁶² Andrewes 1978; Lewis 1992: 141–143; Hornblower 2011: 59. Rutter (1973) argues that Athens’ role in the foundation has been exaggerated; see also Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 304–305 (no. 74).

consider it to be a fourth-century forgery.⁶³ Whether or not the decree is fabricated, the fact that the memory of it was preserved as an attempt at joint action and peace into the Second Sophistic, where such stories had a particular significance, emphasizes the way in which the Greeks wanted to tell stories of Greek unity, and to maintain them. By telling stories of joint action, the possibility of commonality was in some sense actualized, and the community of the Hellenes was given a shared heritage. So whether or not the Congress Decree was actually proposed in the fifth century, or whether the idea of it was invented in the fourth, there was a need to tell a story of the possibility of the Hellenes acting together, just as it was necessary to perpetuate the idea that the Hellenes collectively, as Hellenes, acted together to save Hellas from the Persians.

It was in the various kinds of story-telling about the community that the Hellenes were imagined into being. Pindar wrote poems declaring that the Hellenes existed in the games at common sanctuaries, just as Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* declared that it was shared libations that drew them together. Some stories may have been mythical genealogies which formed the basis for claims of kinship, such as the *Catalog of Women*, even though genealogical details could be taken up, left aside, or adapted as the current need required. In this way, the Hellenic community existed in its stories of commonality and belonging, even if the stories were sometimes idealistic, contradictory, or intended to promote the interests of one city over another. At their base, they still assumed the existence of that community, even to critique it, and in that way they maintained it.

The purpose of this volume is to examine the nature of Greek federalism, and Walbank recognized long ago that the story of the Greek community was linked to that of Greek federalism.⁶⁴ The Greek community was not a political community in the sense that it had shared political structures and machinery. During the Persian Wars the joint council was fumbling, and because of rivalry, ambition, and distrust seems to have fallen into disuse at an early stage. Even if Perikles' Congress Decree is authentic, it is significant that it was rejected. The community felt no need for such structures in order for the community to have an existence, if not a politically federated existence.

However, we should not think about the imagining of the community, as it sometimes has been, as something that was incomplete, as a struggle

⁶³ Seager 1969 argues it was a forgery dating to 346 BCE. Bosworth 1971 places the fabrication after the battle of Chaironeia in 338 BCE. There are, however, some who believe in the authenticity of the decree, notably Griffith 1978, and Rhodes 2010: 55–56.

⁶⁴ Walbank 2002.

for unity that was never achieved. The Hellenes as a community existed in the political imaginations of those who saw themselves as belonging to it. For them, it was possible to tell stories of commonality in terms of cult, blood, language, and way of life, even if it was harder to say who did not belong. However, the fact that there were imagined boundaries was important. The political nature of the community resided in the fact that these boundaries were asserted, even if the testing usually resulted in inclusions rather than exclusions, and there were shifts and changes in where the boundaries were imagined to be.

From the fifth century BCE, war in the Greek world was endemic, generated to a large degree by the competitive values of envy and ambition. Yet war between cities in the community could be represented as civil war (*emphylos stasis*: Hdt. 8.3.1), which gives added point and poignancy to Herodotus' accounts of the effort against the Persians – he was more than well aware of the difference between the rhetoric of a freedom common to all, and the infidelities and ambitions of individual states. So far from damaging the integrity of the community, it was at the moments of greatest stress that the community was most vigorously asserted. Just before the Peace of Nikias in 421, Trygaios in Aristophanes' *Peace* summons the Hellenes to lay aside petty politics and war to drag Peace out of the pit, and the Chorus comes to help, declaring themselves to be Panhellenes (292–295, 301–303). Lysias, in his oration at Olympia attacking Dionysios in the 380s, opens by declaring that Herakles established the Olympic Games so that by meeting together “there might be a beginning for the Hellenes of friendship (*philia*) with each other” (33.1–2). Hellenicity did not always have a similar valence across the Greek world at the same time. Not all Greek states saw the importance of, or need for, resisting the Persians in 481. Even the Spartans drew back from the Hellenic League in 479/8, as the Athenians were keen to establish a new Panhellenic league in the form of the Delian League. Yet many Greeks were willing to listen to stories of Panhellenic actions, and some were also prepared to act on them, even if for their own ends. However, being able to tell the story of the Hellenic community, asserting that it did exist despite the particularism of interstate relations, gave the idea of the Hellenic community, the idea of a shared Hellenic identity, potency and power. It did not need to create centralized political and federated structures, or a political center, in order to exist in the political imaginations of its constituents.

Thus the community of the Hellenes, while not a Greek federal state, can tell us quite a lot about Greek federalism, even if more by what the Hellenic community did not desire or need to do than what it did. It was possible to

call the community a *koinon* (Plat. *Men.* 242d), but it was a *koinon* of the imagination, even of the heart. It did not develop a political federal structure because the need for that was not as great as the need to express ambition and rivalry. Even pressure from outside in the form of the Persian invasion was only just enough to create for a time a common council, but even then only for a small number of states. In addition, there was no real focus for truly communal activities. Olympia was important as a location for display for some Hellenes, Delphi for others. However, for the Hellenic community the diversity of foci, variable forms of expression, and adaptability of the boundaries of inclusion brought vibrancy, flexibility, and longevity.

*Akarnania and the Akarnanian League**Klaus Freitag*

The name Akarnania has long appeared among ancient authors: it is first mentioned by Hekataios of Miletos (*FGrH* 1 F 110–111); Herodotus, too, refers to Akarnania, stating that the Acheloos river passed through it (2.10.3), and Thucydides writes of the Akarnanian *chōra* (2.102.6). In the literary tradition, Herodotus was the first to use the designation *Akarnan* to refer to people from the region (Hdt. 1.62.4; 7.221), while the feminine form *Akarnanis* or *Akarnanissa* makes several appearances in the epigraphic record (*IG* ix.1² 2, 585 and *IG* 11/111² 2332). In the fourth century BCE, a dedication from Oropos mentions an Athenian with the name Akarnan (*I. Oropos* 520). The association of the Akarnanians with an *ethnos* (*IG* ix.1² 2, 583; see Habicht 1957: 109) has a similarly long history, first appearing as early as in the *Periplus* of Ps.-Skylax (34) in the middle of the fourth century BCE, and also at the end of the third century BCE, the term *ethnē kai poleis* was used in a decree of the league (*SVA* 523; see Giovannini 2007: 293–294); the precise meaning of this formulation, however, remains unclear. Some scholars think that the Akarnanians here referred to a fundamental division of their league and that the formula *ethnē kai poleis* was coined to apply to all members of the *koinon* in its entirety.¹ Others, however, assume that the term simply refers to a nebulous group of people who were somehow involved in the festival for Apollo Aktios.² Finally, the official league designation *to koinon tōn Akarnanōn* appears from the fourth century BCE.³

Attestations to both the territory and its inhabitants are thus amply clear in the ancient record. But the precise meaning and contexts in which these references were made are not quite as obvious. Our chapter must begin at the most basic level of geography. The general territorial character of

¹ Habicht 1957: 109–111; Gehrke 1986: 159; Gehrke and Wirbelauer 2004: 352.

² Habicht 1957: 109–111; Czech-Schneider 2002: 80; Corsten 1999: 104.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.4; *IG* ix.1² 2, 208; Polyb. 9.32.3. “*plēthos tōn Akarnanōn*”: *IG* ix.1² 2, 583.

Akarnania can be defined as the western part of the Greek mainland, dominated by mountain ranges in the northwest, then spreading out along the west banks of the Acheloos, and extending south to the delta of the river, where it branches into the Gulf of Patras.⁴ Lying off the coast are the Echinades Islands which were considered as being in part Akarnanian.⁵ Off the west coast lie various small islands, some inhabited and some deserted. Leukas, the largest of these, is situated close to the territory of Palairos (Wacker 1996) and was able to exert some measure of control over the mainland across the straits.⁶ The ancient sources distinguish Akarnanians living in the interior from those living on the coast.⁷ Along the Acheloos valley, agriculture was the main economic activity that provided the Akarnanians with rich supplies, especially in the areas around Stratos (Strabo 10.2.3) and Oiniadai (Paus. 4.25.1; Strabo 10.2.3). The mountainous regions were used for seasonal farming and grazing livestock, which was often carried out by slaves (Gehrke 1996: 77).

Many advantageous harbors were located off the region's west coast. (Ps.-Skyl. 34; Strabo 10.2.21). Because of its imposing proximity, the island of Leukas heavily influenced the maritime routes in the region; ease of navigation along the coast thus depended heavily on political relationship with the island. But the channel of Leukas was liable to be blocked by silt, which made navigation often difficult.⁸ Since the Hellenistic period Leukas was connected with Palairos on the mainland by a stone bridge (Strabo 10.2.8; cf. 1.3.18). In the south, the Acheloos was navigable up to Stratos (Ps.-Skyl. 34; Strabo 10.2.2). Important overland routes connected Rhion with the Akarnanian *mesogeia* and further with the Ambrakian Gulf, where the main settlements were lined up along a coastal road. In the Roman Imperial period a public road, with milestones from the third century CE, extended from Nikopolis/Actium through Akarnania all the way to Kalydon in Aitolia (Axiote 1980).

The list of self-determined *polis* communities in Akarnania numbered roughly twenty-five. Among these are: Alyzeia, Anaktorion (since 425, Gehrke and Wirbelauer 2004: 356), Astakos, Derion, Echinós, Euripos, Herakleia, Hyporeiai, Koronta, Limnaia, Matropolis, Medion, Oiniadai, Palairos, Paianion, Phokrea, Phoitiái, Sauria, Stratos, Thyrrheion,

⁴ IG 1x.1² 1, 3A; Strabo 8.2.3; 10.2.1. ⁵ Strabo 8.2.2; Marcotte 1985: 253–258.

⁶ Thuc. 3.94.1; Ps.-Skyl. 35; Front. 3.4.5.

⁷ “*mesogeia tēs Akarnanias*” (Thuc. 2.102.1); “*to Akarnanikon pedion*” (Thuc. 2.102.1); “*hoi apo thalassēs Akarnanes*” (Thuc. 2.80.1; 2.33.2; 2.83.1); Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.1.

⁸ The canal was not always navigable, Thuc. 3.81.1; 4.8.2.

Torybeia, and finally, from the third century BCE, Leukas.⁹ But not all of those *poleis* took part in the common polity of all Akarnanians. For instance, in the fifth century BCE, Oiniadai abstained from the league, as did Thyrrheion (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.37), Astakos, and Alyzeia (*SIG*³ 201; Diod. 18.11.1) in the fourth century. It is still a matter of dispute as to whether or not the places mentioned in the so-called *theōrodokoi* lists from the fourth century BCE can be considered as members of the federal state; similarly, the precise status of non-*polis* settlements in the league is uncertain. In part, this problem relates to the more general issue of the development of settlement structures in Akarnania. According to Thucydides, the Akarnanians settled only *kata komas* which impacted, or rather curbed, the rise of urban settlements patterns in the region for the longest time.¹⁰ Some scholars believe that urban centers developed in Akarnania only in the Hellenistic period; prior to that, the existence of monumental fortifications is often considered merely as a means to provide shelter for people, their movable property, and livestock.¹¹ The relevant sources and recent archaeological explorations¹² now seem to indicate that most settlements in the region were both fortified and had an urban outlook by the dawn of the Classical period.¹³

In light of our scanty evidence, it is not surprising that it is almost impossible to retrieve meaningful population figures from the sources. Drawing on the available figures of military contingents, scholars conjecture a number of around ten thousand citizens in Akarnania in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, and place the total number of the region's population at around thirty-five thousand.¹⁴ For the Hellenistic period, the figure appears to have been substantially lower (Oberhummer 1887: 4; Dany

⁹ Stephanos of Byzantium mentions the following settlements: Akra, Apollonia, Athenai, Erysiche, Marathos, Psophis, Taphos, Telebois. Yet the list is problematic. Some of the entries might have been settlements on the islands offshore. Others, (Taphos, Telebois) appear already in Homer. Yet others (Psophis) might be erroneously associated with Akarnania; cf. Murray 2000: 803–817; Gehrke and Wirbelauer 2004: 352; Pharaklas 1996.

¹⁰ Thuc. 1.5.3; Eur. *Phoin.* 137; Antonetti 1990.

¹¹ Kirsten 1940: 298–316; Funke 1987 and 1991a; Corsten 1999: 102–104.

¹² Alyzeia (Murray 1982: 112–114), Astakos (Gehrke and Wirbelauer 2004: 358), Echinon (Pritchett 1992: 93–97), Koronta (Pritchett 1992: 103), Oiniadai (Gehrke and Wirbelauer 2004: 368), Palairos (Murray 1982: 145), Phoitiiai (Schoch 1997: 57–58), Stratos (Schwandner and Kolonas 1996: 8–22; Stavropoulos-Gatsi 2010), Torybeion (Dakaris et al. 1994: 250–260).

¹³ Anaktorion (Thuc. 4.4), Oiniadai (Freitag 1994), Stratos (Thuc. 2.81.2), Thyrrheion (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.37).

¹⁴ The strength of the federal army in Classical times was 5,000 at most, see Oberhummer 1887: 221. At Sellasia in 222 BCE, 1,000 hoplites and 50 horsemen were present: Polyb. 2.65.4. In 219, 2,000 hoplites and 200 horsemen joined the army of Philip V: Polyb. 4.63.7.

1999: 7), when the manpower of the federal league was significantly weaker than in the preceding centuries.

Akarnania and the communities that were later considered as members of the *ethnos* are notoriously absent from the *Catalog of Ships*. One potential explanation for this might be that the people living in Akarnania were generally considered as subjects to Odysseus' domain on and around Ithaka. Others believe that Leukas, with Akarnania as its annex, might be equated with Doulichion mentioned in the *Catalog* (Hom. *Il.* 2.625–630; Warnecke 2008: 17–22). Another explanation, however, is more plausible. The absence of the Akarnanians suggests, especially in comparison to other *ethnē* that are in fact mentioned, that their *ethnos* had not established itself as a distinct tribal group at the time of the composition of the *Catalog*, in the early Archaic period. Recent works on the rise of ethnic identities help to better understand the process of ethnogenesis in Akarnania. In particular, the traditional hypothesis of the immigration of the Akarnanian tribe into northwestern Greece has now been thoroughly dismissed. As a result, it has been demonstrated that the Akarnanian *ethnos* had no pre-Archaic Age roots; there is no reason to consider them as a primordial tribal organization that later transformed into a complex political cooperation. In the early eighth century, the Akarnanians (*avant la lettre*, so to speak) did not have any traditional tribal gods or common cultic sites that would serve as a crucible for their ethnogenesis.¹⁵ With the arrival of the Corinthians in the region, in the context of their colonizing efforts in northwestern Greece, this picture began to change. As we will see, the interaction with Corinth marked a decisive turn in their trajectory of ethnic self-perceptions and patterns of belonging.

In Thucydides' *Archaeology*, the Akarnanians are notoriously dismissed as a primitive and backward political community (1.5.3), yet it has long been recognized that such a verdict was most obviously the product of a drastically narrowed *polis* perspective. Elsewhere, Thucydides (2.102.2–6) mentions the main threads of the mythical traditions associated with the region. The interface with the broader context of Hellenic genealogies came through the heroes Alkmaion and Amphilochos, whose narratives were embedded in the topography of the delta of Acheloos.¹⁶ Through the

¹⁵ See Corsten 1999: 120–122; Latte 1959: 31. This reconstruction is not contradicted by what is known about the dialect that was spoken in ancient Akarnania. There was no specific Akarnanian dialect, strictly speaking. The so-called northwestern Greek dialect was predominant in Akarnania as well as in neighboring Aitolia.

¹⁶ Jouan 1990; Martin 1984; Gehrke 1994/1995; Corsten 1999: 97–103; Dalfen 2005.

deeds of both legendary figures, the ‘history’ of the Akarnanians was soon connected with that of Argos, one of the great epicenters where the various threads of Greek mythology were woven together (Breglia 1991–1992). At the same time, other traditions were superimposed upon the Akarnanians from the outside, notably the legendary cycle of Herakles. It is striking how pale, if not shadowy, Akarnan as the eponymous founder of the *ethnos* remained. His counterfeit is not found on Akarnanian federal coins, he is not represented in monuments and statues, and his deeds left no traces in the memorial landscape of the region. In comparison with Aitolos, who played such a vital role for the Aitolian *ethnos*, the low profile of Akarnan appears even more striking.

By the early eighth century BCE, Corinthian involvement in the region provided the trigger for the shaping of the *ethnos*.¹⁷ Apart from the more distant Korkyra, which later might have become involved in the founding of Corinthian colonies in Akarnania proper, the Corinthian *apoikiai* Ambrakia and Leukas were first established. Around the same time, Anaktorion was founded in a strategically important position on the mainland at the entrance of the Gulf of Ambrakia (Thuc. 1.55.1; 4.49). Furthermore, the Corinthians founded a *polisma* named Sollion which was a coastal settlement in the vicinity of Palairos, yet its precise location remains unknown (Thuc. 2.30.1). Other foundations along the southern shores of the Ambrakian Gulf possibly added to the grand scheme of Corinth’s colonizing actions in the region.¹⁸ Situated on the eastern edge of the Gulf, Argos Amphilochikon soon claimed a special status. The city became an important player in the Gulf region, but it was not a Corinthian colony, and neither was its indigenous population absorbed into the rising Akarnanian *ethnos*. In the Classical period, it was never a member of the Akarnanian League.

It is unclear how the Akarnanians interacted with the arriving settlers from Corinth. The relationship between the two groups is characterized by only two references in the ancient sources, but both are difficult to understand. In a corrupt passage in Ps.-Skylax (34) we learn that Leukas was formerly named Epileukadoi, and that during a period of *stasis* the Akarnanians received a thousand new settlers (*epoikoi*) from Corinth. Later, after the new settlers had killed “these people” (the Epileukadoi?), they alone controlled the territory. The context of the Akarnanian *stasis*, and how it relates to a (joint?) Corinthian and Akarnanian foundation of

¹⁷ Graham 1964; Salmon 1984; Domingo-Forasté 1988.

¹⁸ Such as Herakleia, Plin. *nat.* 4.1.4–5; Steph. Byz. s. v. Herakleia; SEG 1.94.

Leukas, are unclear. The second reference is found in a passage in the *Periplus* of Ps.-Skymnos (459–61). According to this, Anaktorion was founded by Corinthians and Akarnanians together, but the details of this cooperation, if indeed it was authentic, are lost on us. In Akarnania proper, the presence of the Corinthians led to an almost magnetic force of attraction on the region's cities. The coastal *poleis* Alyzeia, Astakos, and Oiniadai all were not themselves Corinthian colonies, but later regularly sided with Corinth rather than the Akarnanians. The colonies, for their part, maintained close relations with their *mētropolis*. Leukas and Ambrakia, for instance, prepared ships for the Battle of Salamis; with the support of Anaktorion both cities dispatched 1,500 hoplites to fight alongside Corinthian forces in the Battle of Plataia (Hdt. 9.28.5; M&L no. 27). The political landscape of Akarnania was thus heavily impacted by Corinth and its maneuvers both in the Gulf of Patras and along the western coast of the Greek mainland.

By the fifth century BCE, the main goal of the Akarnanians was to curb the power of the Corinthian colonies and allies that occupied their coasts. It appears that the Akarnanian League was established against precisely this background, although the nature of this early federation continues to be controversial among scholars. From the middle of the fifth century, the evidence for closer regional cooperation becomes more traceable, especially in Thucydides' account of the First Peloponnesian War (Giovannini 1971: 58–60). With the Athenian settlements of a group of Messenians in Naupaktos (c. 455 BCE), affairs in northwestern Greece became increasingly more complex (Thuc. 1.103.2). From Naupaktos, the Messenians set out and conquered Oiniadai in the Acheloos delta. The Oiniadaians were driven out and sought support from their neighbors in Akarnania. A battle ensued which restored Oiniadai to its previous inhabitants (Paus. 4.24; 5.26). The episode, however, has often been considered a fictitious account of local Hellenistic historiographers. But more recently it was demonstrated that the affair can indeed fit in well with the broader trajectory of regional developments. Most notably, it attests to the political will of the Akarnanians to fight against the Messenians collectively and with joint forces (Freitag 1996b; cf. now Fantasia 2010).

Only a few years later, in 454/3 BCE, the Athenians tried to capture Oiniadai themselves.¹⁹ The expedition was led by Perikles, whose fleet was assisted by the Peloponnesian Achaians. It seems that Oiniadai stood on its own and, this time, was able to defend itself against the attack; hence, the

¹⁹ Thuc. 1.111.3–4; Diod. 11.85.2; Plut. *Per.* 17 and 19.3.

Akarnanian support against the Messenians from Naupaktos had not led to the integration of Oiniadai into the league. Why the Akarnanians supported Oiniadai in the first place remains a matter of conjecture. Most likely, the Messenians' expansion towards the west must have been seen as a danger to the Akarnanian settlements in the Acheloos valley; in this sense, it would have added to the already present threat posed by the Corinthian colonies. Whether or not the alliance was bolstered by an appeal to common legendary ancestry or ethnic bonds of loyalty is not known, though quite conceivable.²⁰ Regardless, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, Oiniadai was still separate from the Akarnanian League.

All the while, the conflict with Corinth and its colonies persisted (Stickler 2010: 115–158). Ambrakia in particular exerted considerable pressure on the surrounding *poleis*. In response to ongoing Ambrakian incursions on Argos Amphilochikon, the Akarnanians formed an alliance with Argos (probably in 437 BCE) and shortly thereafter with Athens (Thuc. 2.68.5–8). With the help of Athenian troops they drove out the Ambrakiotēs from Argos and re-settled the city, with Argeians and Akarnanians now living side by side.²¹ This set the pattern for the subsequent years. From the very outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the Akarnanians staked everything on their alliance with Athens in their attempt to bring Corinth's colonies under their control (Consolo Langher 1968; Fantasia 2006). In 431 BCE they took Sollion (Thuc. 2.30.1–2). The city was incorporated into the *chōra* of Palairos, a decision that was made in all likelihood by the Akarnanian *koinon* (Wacker 1999). In the following year, the Akarnanians expelled the tyrant Euarchos from Astakos (Thuc. 2.30.1; Wacker 1996). Even though the Corinthians managed to reinstate him for a brief period, Athenian support enabled the Akarnanians to incorporate Astakos in their *koinon* in 429/8 (Thuc. 2.30.2; 2.33. 2.102). Anaktorion was taken in 425/4. Thucydides reports that after its capture citizens from all parts of Akarnania moved in to settle in the former Corinthian colony.²² After a series of fierce campaign seasons, Oiniadai was forced into the league in 424 BCE (Thuc. 4.77). The details are again obscure, but the diplomatic activities of the Athenian general Demosthenes had possibly led to a treaty with Oiniadai which governed

²⁰ Just. *Epit.* 28.1. On historicity, Corsten 1992: 195–210; Mazzoni 1997: 3–11. But see also Strauch 1996: 150–152.

²¹ Gehrke 1985: 34; for another reconstruction, Krentz and Sullivan 1987.

²² Thuc. 4.49; *IG* II/III² 403. From now on Anaktorion was considered an Akarnanian *polis*; whether its integration did also impact the prestige and administration of the sanctuary of Apollo Aktios, still under the protection of Anaktorion, cannot be determined.

the city's incorporation into the Akarnanian League (*IG* 1³ 180). Apparently none of the inhabitants were expelled, nor was there a traceable resettlement of Akarnanians into Oiniadai. In sum, close cooperation with Athens paid off for both sides. Throughout the war all settlements of Akarnania had come under the rule of the *ethnos* of the Akarnanians. Leukas alone was the one notable exception that managed to avoid integration into the league, at least for the time being.

For the age of the Peloponnesian War Thucydides mentions a *koinon dikastērion* at Olpai which was located somewhere near Argos Amphilochikon. The precise character of Olpai has been the subject of intense speculation.²³ Some assume that Olpai, which according to Thucydides was fortified by the Akarnanians, served as a center of jurisdiction for the entire league (Fantasia 2010: 152–154). Others prefer to think of Olpai as a federal sanctuary that gradually absorbed the role of being the site of law courts dealing with federal matters. Yet this appears difficult to accept in light of the very location of Olpai in the border lands of Akarnania and Argos.²⁴ Shortly after the Peloponnesian War, Olpai disappears from our record, which again makes it difficult to follow up on the hypothesis that it was the site of a permanent federal court. Most likely, the sanctuary served as a seat of a court which had been established for the sole purpose of mediating controversies between the Akarnanians and Argos. All conjectures set aside, it is evident that both parties tried to govern their relations by means of a stable, non-violent vector of communication. Argos was not made part of the league but nonetheless was associated with it by means of a third party, the sanctuary at Olpai, without losing its political autonomy. Additional evidence on the political structure or design of the league is scarce. From what can be extrapolated from Thucydides, the Akarnanians were able to shape a coherent and independent foreign policy. They sent and received embassies, and made alliances with others, appearing and presenting themselves as “the Akarnanians.”²⁵ The federal army consisted of contingents provided by member *poleis* which continued to operate as distinct units under their local *stratēgoi*.²⁶ After the Battle of Olpai the spoils were distributed among the individual *poleis* (Thuc. 1.114.1). Thucydides calls Stratos the greatest *polis* in Akarnania at the

²³ Thuc. 3.105.1; Steph. Byz. s.v. Olpai; Schoch 1996: 87–90.

²⁴ Olpai is located near today's Agrilovuni, with remains of walls and a large temple; see Pritchett 1992: 22–23.

²⁵ Alliances with Argos Amphilochikon and Athens (438, Thuc. 2.68.4–7), with Ambrakia and Argos (426, *SVA* 175), with Sparta in 389 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.1), with Athens in 375/4.

²⁶ Thuc. 3.107.2–4; 3.109.1; 3.111.3.

time (Thuc. 2.80.8). Accordingly it is most likely that federal institutions and officials gathered at Stratos, which can also be inferred from the remark in Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.6.1–71) that Agesilaos sent envoys to the *koinon tōn Akarnanōn* in Stratos in 389. At that time, Stratos was by all accounts considered the permanent seat of all federal institutions.

From the late fifth century onwards epigraphic evidence begins to appear, providing us with further insight into the constitutions of individual cities within the league. An early proxeny decree (*IG IX.1² 1*, 139, lines 9–10) indicates that Stratos had an assembly, a council, and annually changing magistrates. Among the boularchs appears a man who was identified as an inhabitant of Phoitai, a settlement some ten kilometers away from Stratos. Archaeological remains suggest that in the Classical period Phoitai was a place with an urban outlook. The nature of the relationship between Stratos and Phoitai cannot be determined; the inscription may indicate that various forms of political hierarchy existed in Akarnania. Temporarily, or so it seems, Stratos had gained control over Phoitai and its agricultural production. Later on, Phoitai appears as an independent member of the Akarnanian League (*IG IX.1² 1*, 3A).

In 388 BCE, the alliance with Athens came to an end.²⁷ By that time, the military campaigns of the Akarnanian League extended as far as Kalydon, a member of the Achaian League and protected by an Achaian garrison (Xen. *Hell.* 5.6.1–7). After Agesilaos' incursion in the previous year,²⁸ which had led to the devastating destruction of their territories, the Akarnanians sought an alliance with Sparta (Xen. *Ages.* 2.20). For the time being, Akarnania remained in the Spartan camp and was loyal to this alliance even after the King's Peace. Yet in 375/4 BCE, the Akarnanian League joined the Second Athenian League. The league made this move as a collective,²⁹ yet not every city chose to follow. Thyrrheion, for instance, did not agree with this realignment of Akarnanian foreign policy and therefore seceded from the league.³⁰ Whether other *poleis* followed this example or not in the subsequent years is uncertain. In 356, Anaktorion and Alzyeia offered sums of money to the Boiotian League to support its preparations for a Sacred War against the Phokians, who then held the territory of the sanctuary at Delphi (*SIG³ 201*). It is possible that both cities were members of the

²⁷ Akarnanian membership in the Corinthian alliance against Sparta in 395: Diod. 19.82.1.

²⁸ At this time, 389 BCE, there was an Athenian fleet anchoring near Oiniadai: Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.14; Howran 2005: 18–33.

²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.65–66; Diod. 15.36.5; Beck 1997: 37.

³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.33–38. After Leuktra, the Akarnanians probably joined the Boiotian alliance for several years; they took part in Epameinondas' first Peloponnesian campaign (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23).

Akarnanian League at that time (which did not support the Boiotians in their efforts against Phokis), but had some leeway in their decision to participate in an enterprise that was considered religious in nature, i.e., the support of Apollo's sanctuary. Another member of the league, Echinon, concluded a separate treaty with Athens in c. 349 (SVF 325). It appears that Echinon was free to enter into the agreement individually rather than follow the policy of the *koinon*, although the fragmentary character of the document does not fully reveal the extent of the role which the Akarnanian League might have played in the treaty (IG II/III² 208; Giovannini 1971: 57).

As a result of the Battle of Chaironeia, the political landscape of north-western Greece was altered. The Akarnanians fought in the anti-Makedonian camp at Chaironeia, which put them on a difficult trajectory (Aischin. 3.97–98; SVF 343). After the battle, Philip ordered that the pro-Makedonian partisans take the lead over their cities in Akarnania; influential advocates of an anti-Makedonian course were expelled from their homes. Aitolia annexed Oiniadai in 331/330 BCE, an act that prompted Alexander the Great to promise – ostentatiously – to repatriate the Akarnanian inhabitants of Oiniadai (Diod. 18.8.6; Plut. *Alex.* 49.15). Unsurprisingly, the message was well received by the Akarnanians. From now on, Akarnania stood staunchly on Makedon's side. In the Lamian War, only Alyzeia fought in the anti-Makedonian alliance.³¹ In 314, Kassandros ordered that the Akarnanians retreat from their small unfortified villages in the borderlands and resettle at Stratos, Sauria, and Agrinion, that last of which was at the time a member of the Akarnanian League (Mendels 1984). The measure did not amount to a comprehensive synoikism or a new urban plan; rather, it was designed to protect those Akarnanians who lived on the fringes of the region from the omnipresent threat of Aitolian attacks (Berktoed 1996). For as long as Kassandros offered his protection, the Akarnanians fared well. Only one year after the relocation of citizens into the major urban centers, Oiniadai seems again to have been incorporated into the league (Diod. 19.74.2–6). As soon as Kassandros departed from northwestern Greece, the pressures from Aitolia immediately resurfaced.

In this constellation, the Akarnanian League concluded a treaty with Pyrrhos of Epeiros.³² About this time the Akarnanians at last – and for the

³¹ Diod. 18.10.5–11; Paus. 1.25.4, mentioning Akarnanian members of the Aitolian League.

³² Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6; SVF 459. Akarnanian mercenaries went with Pyrrhos to Italy in 279 BCE: Dion. Hal. *ant.* 20.1.

first time in their history – succeeded in annexing Leukas, but neither the exact date of the event nor its background can be elucidated. In any case, Pyrrhos' death marked the end of Akarnanian attempts to withstand the expanding forces of the Aitolian League by means of alliance with other powers. Around 261, they were forced to conclude a *symmachia*, *isopoliteia*, and boundary treaty with the Aitolians,³³ which put the Akarnanians into a clearly inferior position, but nonetheless preserved their general political independence. A recently discovered inscription which documents a treaty from 289 BCE between Demetrios Poliorketes and the Aitolians mentions a territorial dispute between Aitolia and Akarnania, along with a series of other minor agreements (Lefèvre 1998b). Unfortunately the fragmentary state of the inscription does not allow us to specify how the conflict was resolved. In the document from c. 261, the Acheloos was established as the new frontier between Akarnania and Aitolia; effectively, the Akarnanians were henceforth limited to the west banks of the river. Only a few years later the Aitolians went one step further and concluded an agreement with Alexander II of Epeiros which divided all of Akarnania into two dependent spheres, one Aitolian, one Epeirotan.³⁴ In the southeast, Phoitiiai, Metropolis, Oiniadai, and Stratos all went to Aitolia. Epeiros took the lion's share in the northwest, with Leukas, Anaktorion, Thyrrheion, Palairos, and Medeon. The Akarnanian League thus disappeared from the political map of Hellas.

Our knowledge of the decades that followed is altogether fragmentary; it is extremely difficult to trace even the most basic outline of the course of events. After Alexander II died, the Epeirotan part of Akarnania once again came under pressure from the Aitolians. In this situation (about 239 BCE) some Akarnanians sent out a distress call to Rome to seek support – which they did not receive, for the time being.³⁵ Left on their own, the north-western cities established a 'rump-*koinon*' around 232/1 (Scherberich 2010: 51), while the more southern centers, notably Stratos, remained in Aitolian possession. The resurgent league sought an alliance with the Illyrians which was favored by geography. In a battle near Paxos, an Akarnanian naval contingent fought alongside the Illyrians and defeated the combined navies of the Aitolian and Achaian Leagues (Polyb. 2.9.6). In

³³ *SV4* 480; Klaffenbach 1955; Dany 1999: 70–81; Grainger 1999: 327, with a different date. But see Scholten 2000: 253–256.

³⁴ Polyb. 2.45.1; 9.34.7; *SV4* 485.

³⁵ To support their request, the Akarnanians pointed out that they had not participated in the war against Troy: Just. *Epit.* 28.1.1–7; cf. Corsten 1992: 195–210 (with a different date); Dany 1999: 98–119.

224, the Akarnanians joined the Hellenic League of Antigonos Doson (Polyb. 4.9.4; *SVA* 507). Thanks to support from Philip V, some Akarnanian cities were later on wrenched from the Aitolians. Around the same time, the Makedonian king initiated large-scale building activities at Oiniadai with a focus on the harbor citadel and its adjacent shiphouses. In 215, Akarnania joined the alliance of Philip V against Rome (Polyb. 9.7.1–7). When the Aitolians, for their part, entered into an alliance with Rome in 212, the treaty named Akarnania as an explicit target zone for further Aitolian expansion (Liv. 26.24.11). Only a year later Oiniadai was conquered by the Romans and handed over to the Aitolians in accordance with the treaty (*IG* IX.1² 2, 241; Liv. 26.24.11–15). The Akarnanians remained in Philip's camp: they were listed among his *adscripti* in the Peace of Phoinike (205 BCE, Liv. 29.12.11; *SVA* 543) and fought on his side throughout the Second Makedonian War, until their surrender to Rome in 197. It took the Akarnanians a long time to realize where they would find a better stake. In the Third Makedonian War, they sympathized greatly with Perseus (Polyb. 28.5.2; Liv. 43.17.6–9). As a punishment for this, the Romans detached Leukas from the Akarnanian League in 167 BCE (Liv. 45.31.12). In the same year the league issued a proxeny decree for a Roman named Cn. Baebius (*SEG* 43.227). Most likely, the decree was issued in connection with a final change of course. In the aftermath of the Third Makedonian War, a pro-Roman party seems to have taken control over the *koinon*, whose main base seems to have now been in Thyrrheion (Polyb. 32.5.1). The switch to Rome came late in Akarnania, but it seems to have secured the existence of the league well after 146.³⁶

Most likely, the league was never officially dissolved. Its new center, Thyrrheion, seems to have flourished, but obviously at the expense of both its neighbors and the other Akarnanian cities. From that time period comes a *senatus consultum*, as yet unpublished, which refers to a violent conflict between the *poleis* of Thyrrheion and Nesos. The inscription – which attests that Rome and Roman officials were involved at various moments as the conflict unfolded – also refers to the Akarnanians as a group. Unfortunately, their status cannot be narrowed down because of the fragmentary condition of the text. Neither is it possible to identify or locate Nesos, the opponent of Thyrrheion, with any degree of certainty. In 94, Rome offered Thyrrheion a *foedus* which no longer makes mention of the

³⁶ Two Akarnanian proxeny decrees from the time after 146 BCE survive: *IG* IX.1² 2, 208 and 209. In a *psēphisma* of the Molossians, Thessalian judges who were involved in a dispute between the *Molossoi* and the *ethnos* of the Akarnanians are honored. The inscription belongs to the second half of the second century BCE: Tziafalias and Helly 2007: 421–474.

Akarnanians (Freitag 2007b). When Octavian founded his ‘City of Victory’, Nikopolis, to celebrate the outcome of the Battle at Actium, the populations from various cities in the region (Palairos, Alyzeia, Leukas, Anaktorion, and also Thyrrheion) were relocated to inhabit the new center. Urban life continued in Akarnania (Strauch 1996), as it did in so many other corners of the Empire, but the days of an Akarnanian League, in whatever form or design, were over forever.

From Aristotle’s collection of Greek constitutions, the fragments of a *Politeia of the Akarnanians* survive. Yet the few extant pieces provide neither insight into the work’s contents nor the structure of the league (Arist. fr. 474 and 475 R; cf. Lehmann 2001: 34–36). Given the modest body of epigraphic evidence and the fact that the decrees vary considerably in their official terminology, we cannot decide with any certainty when the federal institutions attested in the Hellenistic period, for example, were originally put in place. The existence of an Akarnanian League in the fifth century BCE was challenged by Thomas Corsten, who thinks that the Akarnanian *ethnos* did not take a decisive step towards a federation until the fourth century, when a system of seven districts was created (Corsten 1999). Corsten refers to three fourth-century lists of *theōrodokoi* from Epidauros, Argos, and Nemea which register both cities and individuals by regions, including a section of Akarnanian cities that received *theōroi*. Corsten believes that the order of the listed cities followed their arrangement in districts. At Epidauros, the rubric of “*theōrodokoi* from Akarnania” contains fifteen cities (in 356/5 BCE): Limnaia, Oiniadai, Stratos, Phoitiiai, Koronta, Medion, Astakos, Euripos, Thyrrheion, Echinon, Torybeia, Alyzeia, Lefkas, Palairos, and Anaktorion. In the list from Argos, the entries of seven *poleis* survive (from 331/330 BCE; the list is incomplete): Medion, Anaktorion, Thyrrheion, Palairos, Alyzeia, Turbeion, Leukas. Finally, in the evidence from Nemea, thirteen cities appear (314–311 BCE): Palairos, Anaktorion, Echinon, Thyrrheion, Euripos, Limnaia, Oiniadai, Stratos, Derion, Medion, Photiai, Koronta, Astakos.

Various arguments seem to point against Corsten’s thesis of a listing according to districts: first, we do not know by which criteria the lists, some of which include later supplements, were compiled. It is notable that the list from Epidauros includes Leukas, cited between Alyzeia and Palairos (Perlman 2000: 215). This leads Corsten to conclude that Leukas must have already been part of the Akarnanian League in around 355 (Corsten 1999: 128). Since the Nemean list (315 and 313, Perlman 2000: 236–238) refers to Leukas separately from the other Akarnanian *poleis*, Corsten infers that Leukas had left the league in the meantime. But this view, artificial as it is,

does not match the picture of the development of political relationships in northwestern Greece. As we have seen earlier, in the fourth century there was some measure of cultural and economic rapprochement between Akarnania and Leukas, but we hear nothing about the political integration of Leukas into the Akarnanian League.

It would seem wise not to treat the *theōrodokoi* lists as mirrors of the actual membership of the league. Nor should it be taken for granted that the cult personnel at Epidauros saw to it strictly that under the rubric of a region, such as Akarnania, only the members of the corresponding league were cataloged. Moreover, topographical considerations, which are so crucial for Corsten's argument, do not support the district thesis. He passes in silence over the fact that many of the places from the lists have not yet been located with certainty. All that we know of the list's composition indicates that there was a prominent pattern of presenting the greatest possible number of *poleis* in such lists in order to demonstrate the extent of a sanctuary's popularity (Perlman 2000: 74). The list was mainly compiled from the records of envoys and arranged by geographical aspects; possibly because it followed their itinerary. It follows that the evidence of an Akarnanian system of territorial districts is no more than slight (Beck 2001a: 525–531).

This does not mean that the league's constitution did not contain representative elements. What is of more importance is the overall view that is facilitated by the literary tradition. Based on the accounts of Thucydides and Xenophon, there can be no doubt that an Akarnanian federal state existed as early as the fifth century BCE. Apparently, the *koinon* developed a constitution which was typical for other federal states of the day. The crystallization of strong centralized power occurred in Hellenistic times: the number of *stratēgoi* was reduced from seven to one between 263/2 und 216 BCE. The Akarnanian *stratēgos* is first attested in Polybius for the year 218 (Polyb. 5.94.7). The members of the Akarnanian League seem to have conserved a remarkable degree of independence in certain fields of life. They were authorized to grant the right of proxeny (IG IX.1² 2, 211 and 243), *politeia*,³⁷ and further privileges of their own accord. As far as we can determine the constitutions of the member-states are not uniform in any sense.³⁸ To provide *theōrodokoi* was usually a task administered by *poleis* rather than leagues (IG IX.1² 2, 388, from Medion), even though in the case

³⁷ IG IX.1² 2, 243, 391, 392, 417 (Stratos, at that point Aitolian).

³⁸ *Prytanis* in Anaktorion (IG IX.1² 2, 212) and in Thyrrheion (IG IX.1² 2, 247), *grammateus* of the Alia in Anaktorion (IG IX.1² 2, 212).

of Akarnania the league was involved. A federal decree of 207 BCE demands that each city of the Akarnanians was supposed to nominate its *theōrodokoi* who were responsible for accepting *theōrodokoi* from Magnesia (IG IX.1² 2, 582; Rigsby 2001:186). Key issues such as peace and war, or foreign policy in general, could only be decided on the federal level (Liv. 26.12.3). The federation also reserved the right to mint silver coins (Dany 1999: 263). The league could also grant citizenship in its turn, both to individuals and to whole communities (IG IX.1² 2, 593). The privilege of guest-friendship was awarded by the single *poleis* members as well as by the league (IG IX.1² 2, 393, 209, 208, 582, 588). An inscription from Stratos which grants both proxeny and federal citizenship affirms that the honored person may choose the *polis* in which he wishes to exercise his citizen rights (IG IX.1² 2, 393). The label “an Akarnanian from [name of city]”, which refers to the so-called dual citizenship, is first attested in an Ephesian inscription dating from the fourth century BCE.³⁹

In the mid-third century, the league was led by a board of seven *stratēgoi* (IG IX.1² 1, 3A). When exactly this college was introduced is not attested. Still it is conceivable that such an institution existed as early as the fifth or fourth century, especially since Thucydides mentions *stratēgoi* leading the Akarnanian federal army (Giovannini 1971: 59). All of the seven *stratēgoi* came from different cities. The offices of the eponymous *stratēgos*, *hipparchos*, and *grammateus* were held by citizens from the same *polis*. Together, the *stratēgos* and these two magistrates apparently formed an inner committee to allow for efficient handling of government business (Gschnitzer 1964; Funke 1993; Corsten 1999: 200). At some point between 216 and 206, the Akarnanian constitution changed. The annual magistrates, nominated in rotation, disappeared in favor of an eponymous *stratēgos*, now acclaimed leader of the league by means of an election;⁴⁰ for his part, the new *stratēgos* was no longer assisted by a government panel from his home city (IG IX.1² 2, 582; Funke 1997). It is not known whether multiple terms in office were precluded by law. The *stratēgos* was at the same time commander of the Akarnanian army. The first mention of a *nauarchos* (from Leukas) occurs in a federal inscription from 216 but this certainly does not imply that Philip V was the first to persuade the Akarnanians to build a federal navy and place it in the hands of such a naval commander.⁴¹ The federal magistrates, now also called *koinoi archontes* (IG IX.1² 2, 593), included one *promnamōn*

³⁹ SEG 42.1041; cf. also IG II/III² 206; IG IX.1² 2, 579; SGDI 2658; FdD III 1, 106 and FdD III 3, 203).

⁴⁰ IG IX.1² 2, 583. The colleagues of the *stratēgos* are here referred to as *synarchontes*.

⁴¹ Polyb. 2.6.9–10.

(“president of the councilors”, *IG IX.1² 2*, 298, 209, 582, 583, 588) and two or three *sympromnamones* (“associate presidents of the councilors”, *IG IX.1² 2*, 208 and 588) attested from 216 onwards, who may have formed a small executive committee of the federal council elected for a year by the members of the league (Gschnitzer 1964: 379). A *grammateus* of the council (*IG IX.1² 2*, 208, 209, 583, 588, *boulē* or *synedrion*) and of the *stratēgos* (*IG IX.1² 2*, 582) is attested in Hellenistic times. In the second century we find as an eponymous magistrate a *hierapolos* of Apollo Aktios (*IG IX.1² 2*, 209b; 208; 588); the term indicates that his main responsibility concerned religious affairs. We may also conjecture, but cannot substantiate, that his appearance marks a shift in the league’s character from a political to a religious association. It is also possible that a year counted by *hierapolois* alternated with one by *stratēgoi*, as a second-century dossier of federal *proxenia* decrees from Aktion seems to suggest (*IG IX.1² 2*, 298a-c).

The ancient sources do not refer directly to any federal assembly open to all citizens of the league and all its member-states. Inscriptions suggest, however, that such an assembly existed and that it was called *koinon* (*IG IX.1² 2*, 209). A primary assembly at Stratos might have been the destination of those embassies sent by Agesilaos to the Akarnanians in the fourth century. In 314, a federal assembly which was styled *koinē ekklēsia*, decided on Kassandros’ suggestions to reinforce the Akarnanian borders (Diod. 19.67.3). Diodoros states that this took place near the river Kampylos during a campaign in enemy territory within Aitolia (Dany 1999: 256). A few years later an inscription (now gone missing) is said to have mentioned *hoi chilioi* (“the Thousand”) who were to vote on a treaty with the Epeirote king Pyrrhos (*IG IX.1² 2*, 207). These *chilioi* are attested by two further inscriptions: in an Akarnanian federal decree dating from 207 (*IG IX.1² 2*, 582) and also in a federal proxy decree for a Roman in 167 (Funke, Gehrke and Kolonas 1993). Most scholars think that *hoi chilioi* was used as a synonym of *to koinon tōn Akarnanōn*. This probably means that the citizens from all *poleis* had equal access to this meeting (Liv. 33.17.1) but it is unclear how the Akarnanians voted there. One possible objection is that such a number, if used to signify the assembly of all federal citizens, appears rather small. Jakob Larsen (1968: 95) has already pointed out that the Classical period may have known some limitation of access to the federal assembly in the guise of a hoplite census, which would have kept the number of participants relatively low.

Federal decrees were binding on all members. Votes may have been cast by member-states individually (Liv. 33.17.1). We do not know how often

the primary assembly convened, though several extraordinary meetings are documented.⁴² Apart from the assembly there was a federal council, once referred to as the *synedrion*⁴³ but more often called *boulē* (IG IX.1² 2, 581, 583, 588). How the councilors came into office and in which way their votes were cast is uncertain. For matters concerning the central authority an unanimous resolution of all cities was necessary (Liv. 33.16.3). The administrative work of the *boulē* was supported by a *grammateus* (Oberhummer 1887: 218). Several laws of the Akarnanians are attested (IG IX.1² 2, 208, 583) and a law court (*dikastērion*, IG IX.1² 2, 583) passed judgement on infringement of federal laws and subsequent punishments. There is evidence for a *nomothesia*, a systematic and regularly recurring procedure that permitted revisions of laws if necessary (IG IX.1² 2, 583). When and under which circumstances both the court and the *nomothesia* were installed is controversial. In certain cases the federal assembly itself might have acted as a law court (Liv. 33.16. 5–10). The very existence of the *nomothesia* implies that there must have been some kind of federal archive (Habicht 1957: 116).

The Akarnanian League did not establish a federal sanctuary, in the strict sense, until 217. Nonetheless, the festival of Apollo Aktios had long been held in high regard among the Akarnanians. This is shown by the simple fact that federal decrees were put up at Aktion well before 217/6 (IG IX.1² 1, 3A, 208; 209), even though the league had no direct influence on the sanctuary, which at that time belonged to Anaktoron. It was only in the course of the Social War that discussion on how the league might participate in the administration of the sanctuary evolved (see above).

In the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, Stratos was both Akarnania's most important city and the seat of federal institutions. Corsten also emphasizes the general importance of Oiniadai and deduces an eminent position of that city, which does not imply any political predominance (Corsten 1999: 112–114). In the third century, Leukas was able to assume certain functions of leadership. After its departure from the league in 167, the torch was passed on to Thyrrheion. While its influence appears to have been steadily rising throughout the late second and first centuries, the importance of the league itself diminished significantly during that time.

We do not know much about the federal finances. There was probably no direct federal taxation system in place. The federal treasury, watched over by a *tamias*, was funded by contributions of the cities that were determined by the number of citizens (IG IX.1² 2, 582 and 583). From 216

⁴² Leukas in 197: Liv. 33.16.3–4; 33.17.1. Thyrrheion in 170/69: Polyb. 28.5.1; Liv. 43.17.6–9.

⁴³ *Grammateus* of the *synedrion*, IG IX.1² 2, 582, but the same inscription mentions a federal *boulē*.

onwards the league maintained the temple of Aktion and financed its yearly festival; in exchange, the *koinon* received half the returns of the celebrations (half of the *pentekostē*, “the Fiftieth,” as well as of other taxes, and also half of the proceeds from the sale of slaves, Polyb. 23.1.10–11). The fair accompanying the festival was now organized by the league in conjunction with Anaktorion. Each of them nominated four *pentekostologoi* (“collectors of the *pentekostē*”) four *grammateis*, and one *agoranomos* for that purpose (Habicht 1957: 108).

Some kind of Akarnanian federal coinage seems to have emerged around 400. Two types of silver emissions are presumed to be federal coins (Dany 1999). Type I shows a head of Acheloos on the obverse and a female head on the reverse, probably representing the nymph Kallirhoë (Dany 1999: 279–281). The obverse of Type II has the bearded Acheloos but its reverse bears the Greek letter digamma (Dany 1999: 280–281). These coins are usually considered as federal emissions and assigned to the “federal capital and mint of Stratos” (Head 1911: 331; Imhoof-Blumer 1878: 12–14). Most of the discussion concerning federal coinage revolves around the digamma (Psoma 2007: 8–11). Some propose that this letter stands for *FAkarnanōn* (Babelon 1932: 24); it would thus mark the coins as having been struck by the Akarnanians. It is evident that such an interpretation entails philological obstacles, especially since other place-names within the region such as Oiniadai have been suggested instead (Gardner 1883: 189). Under these circumstances, caution is advised as to whether the Type II coins are to be ascribed a federal nature.

The appearance of the river god Acheloos and of Kallirhoë on the Type I issues, also dating from the fifth and fourth centuries, has led some scholars to consider them as some kind of federal coinage. Greek tradition makes Kallirhoë the daughter of Acheloos and mentions her in the myths concerning Alkmaion, Herakles,⁴⁴ and the river god himself. The Acheloos was the longest river in Greece as well as that of the greatest prestige. People in antiquity worshipped Acheloos as the river god *par excellence* (Isler 1996: 172). The following arguments are in favor of Stratos as the origin of the early Acheloos coinage (see Dany 1999: 280): ancient Stratos is situated on the river, which was navigable up to the city (Strabo 10.2.2), where a harbor gate provided access to a fixed anchorage place (Strabo 10.2.2; Ps-Skyl. 34; Polyb. 4.63). The local coinage of Stratos also reflects the importance of Acheloos: the obverse of these coins again has the god himself, with his

⁴⁴ Strabo 1.3.6; Dion. Hal. *ant.* 4.35. On the Herakles and Acheloos myths, see Gehrke 1994–1995: 103–104; Hilpert-Greger 1996.

daughter Kallirhoë and the legend ΣΤΡ on the reverse, which may be confidently associated with Stratos (Psoma 2007: 7–9). These local emissions are the only evidence that in fifth-century Stratos both the cult and myths of Acheloos were firmly established. Yet without further corroboration it has been presupposed that the silver coins discussed above were struck at Stratos. Surprisingly, neither the known myths nor any other contexts associate Acheloos with Stratos. No cult or sanctuary of Acheloos is attested for Stratos, nor is there any other hint that a common cult or festival of the god was celebrated there.⁴⁵ Accordingly, we cannot tell for certain where the coins presented above were struck and whether we are dealing with an emission which was issued under the aegis of an Akarnanian League at all. Last but not least, there remains the problem of dating. The coins under discussion so far have been dated not only by numismatic and stylistic criteria; the main impetus to advance a date is in fact the historical context in which the advocates of the thesis in favor of an association with the league would like to locate the Acheloos types. If, however, the Acheloos coins date from c. 420 to 380 BCE, this time slot is supported by the testimonies of Thucydides and Xenophon alone. It is advisable to exercise caution here. The dates of both those series remain an open question.

Sometime during the second half of the fourth century, the Akarnanian coinage went new ways. Quite a few Akarnanian cities now struck silver coins, so-called *pēgasoi*, that copied the Corinthian style and weight (Dany 1999: 284–288). On their obverse appears a flying Pegasos, on the reverse side the head of Athena in a Corinthian helmet. As the legend ΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΝ shows beyond doubt, even Stratos now produced Corinthian-style staters (Dany 1999: 282). Although the relations between Akarnania and the Corinthian colonies were fraught with deep enmity,⁴⁶ economic and financial cooperation prevailed over such divisions. This is expressed by *pēgasos*-issues from Leukas which carry the symbol of the Akarnanian *ethnos*, Acheloos, as an obverse mark. In one variety of this type struck in Leukas the monogram AK (for *Akarnanōn*) replaced the head of Acheloos. There has even been speculation that these coins may have been struck in a central mint on Leukas which would make the island a member of the league as early as the fourth century instead of a late membership after 280 (see above). The numismatic evidence alone does not allow a verdict on the

⁴⁵ Only the *scholia* on Homer (*Il.* 24.616) provide information about *agones* for Acheloos that were celebrated by the Akarnanians.

⁴⁶ *Pēgasoi* with Acheloos also appear on Ambrakian coins in the fourth century, see Isler 1996: 170.

position of Leukas (Dany 1999: 290–307). Such coins are in the first place a document of the economic convergence in northwestern Greece in the fourth and third centuries BCE.⁴⁷

Federal coinage, in a strict sense, started only in the third century. Gold and silver coins have Acheloos on their obverse while the reverse sides now show Apollo Aktios and the legend *Akarnanōn* (Dany 1999: 285–290). Unfortunately, yet again major questions concerning the date of these emissions remain unanswered. We cannot say, for instance, whether Akarnanian federal coinage featuring Apollo Aktios on the obverse began in the first half of the third century at all, or emerged only after 230 and therefore in a time when federal structure had undergone significant changes. After 167, the federal symbols of the league also appear on the civic coinage of Thyrrheion (Liampi 1996b: 173–182). In the coins as in the inconsistent purview of the federation, we see the evidence for a region that, despite being driven with deep divisions and perpetual territorial disputes, still could not resist the gravitational pull of some form of federal structure, however minimal it may at times have been.

⁴⁷ See Mackil and Alfen 2006, with their remarks on “cooperative coinages.”

*Aitolia and the Aitolian League**Peter Funke*

In the *Catalog of Ships* (*Il.* 2.638–644), the northern coastal strip of the Corinthian Gulf between Cape Antirrhion in the east and the estuary of the Acheloos river in the west appears as the core area of Aitolia.¹ Participating with forty ships in the campaign against Troy were the inhabitants of the coastal cities, Pleuron, Olenos, Pylene, Chalkis, and Kalydon, all under the leadership of Thoas. The earlier mythological tradition, in which the Aitolians as an ethnic unit had already played a significant role (see Antonetti 1990: 43–68), also mentions only the coastal cities, not the Aitolian interior. Both the fertile basin landscape around Lake Lysimachia and Lake Trichonida, with the central Aitolian cult site in Thermos and the adjacent mountain areas, are entirely disregarded.² This perception did not change substantially during the course of the sixth century BCE, when the coastal cities detached themselves from the inland community and developed into politically independent *poleis*.³ In the course of this process the Aitolians lost control over their coastal region. It was only in the fourth century BCE that they managed to win it back gradually. Until the end of the fifth century BCE, their area of influence was mostly limited to the region's interior. So for a prolonged period of time they all but disappeared from the political map of Hellas.

Accordingly, contemporary reports of ancient authors on the Aitolians are sparse and often of little help, as they do not allow insight into ethnic cohesion among the Aitolians and the internal structures of their leagues in late Archaic and early Classical times. However, a report by Thucydides (3.94.1–98.5), which will later be discussed in more detail, indicates a strong

¹ This chapter is a profoundly updated summary of the results of my unpublished German *Habilitationsschrift: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Struktur des Aitolischen Bundes* (Cologne 1985). For some aspects of the thesis see also Funke 1987; 1991a; 1997; 2007a; 2013c. – Coastal region: Hom. *Il.* 13.217–8; 14.115–18; also Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1; Strabo 10.3.1.

² On the geography, see Philippon 1958; Bommeljé et al. 1987.

³ Thuc. 3.102.5; see Bommeljé 1988.

fragmentation of the Aitolian tribe into various sub-tribes, which in turn were divided into numerous smaller subunits. This may suggest a strong segmentation of the Aitolian tribal structures without a complete loss of overarching ethnic cohesion. Any assumption of this kind needs to remain hypothetical, because when they reappeared on the political stage, the Aitolians acted (once again?) as a uniform ethnic and political entity. However, this was no earlier than the Peloponnesian War, during which the Aitolians were increasingly involved in the conflicts between Athens and Sparta. Contemporary external political pressure enhanced the impetus for internal cohesion and caused a profound change not only in Aitolia, but also in other parts of the Greek world, which was characterized by a transition from tribal to federal structures. This process by no means took place uniformly; rather, different forms and structures evolved, which over the course of time were still subject to continuous alterations and reversals. A common aspect of this evolutionary process was the tendency towards dissolution of obsolete tribal structures, accompanied by the corresponding formation of new political levels of decision-making and centers of power.

Taking the evolution of the Aitolian League in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE as an example, it is possible to chart this process of change with relative clarity. Despite the sparseness of the sources, some remarks in Thucydides, combined with later historiographical and epigraphic traditions, allow us to better understand Aitolia's transition from a tribal to a federal state. In this sense, the Aitolians appear as an example for the political change that took place everywhere on the fringes of the Greek world during the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. Whatever can be observed for Aitolia should – at least to some extent – also be pertinent to many other regions in northwestern Greece and the Peloponnese for which the sources are even less informative.

The starting point needs to be Thucydides' representation of the campaign of the Athenian general Demosthenes undertaken against the Aitolians at the instigation of the Messenians in summer 426 BCE (3.94.1–98.5). Despite its brevity, this description is the most detailed contemporary depiction of a tribal state's internal organization. Thucydides' report of the plan of attack presented by the Messenians to Demosthenes is particularly significant in this context. With reference to the powerful army available to him, the Messenians presented the conditions for an attack on Aitolia as extremely favorable to the Athenian general and described the region's subjection as a task that would be easily achieved:

The Aitolians, they said, though a large and warlike people, dwelt in unwall'd villages, which were widely scattered, and as they had only light-armed soldiers, they would be subdued without difficulty before they could combine. They told him that he should first attack the Apodotians, then the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytians. The last are the largest tribe of the Aitolians. (Thuc. 3.94.4–5; trans. B. Jowett).

Shortly afterwards, Thucydides reports that the Aitolians had already heard of the campaign's preparations and were thus able to respond to Demosthenes' attack on the Apodotian city of Aigion: "The Aitolians were aware of his designs from the very first; and no sooner did he enter their territory than they all collected in great force; even the most distant of the Ophioneians, the Bomieians and Kallieians who reach down towards the Malian Gulf, came to the aid of their countrymen" (3.96.3; trans. B. Jowett).

After a detailed description of the course of the fight at Aigion and a brief mention of affairs in Sicily, Thucydides continues with his report on further events in western Central Greece and delineates the – ultimately unsuccessful – campaign of the Spartan Eurylochos against Naupaktos. The Spartan intervention had taken place at the Aitolians' initiation. They had previously sent an embassy, consisting of one representative for each of the three Aitolian sub-tribes, with a corresponding request to Corinth and Sparta: "During the same summer [426 BCE] the Aitolians, who had some time before dispatched Tolophus the Ophioneian, Boriades the Eurytarian, and Tisander the Apodotian on an embassy to Corinth and Lakedaïmon, induced the Lakedaïmonians to aid them by sending an army against Naupaktos, in order to punish the inhabitants for inviting the Athenian invasion" (Thuc. 3.100.1; trans. B. Jowett).

The following evaluations need to be based on these statements by Thucydides. The first aspect to be noted is that already, on the very first occasion that they are mentioned as participants in the political events of the Classical period, the Aitolians appear as a tribal community acting in unison. The fact that the Messenians, in planning the attack, already took into account that the Aitolians would *symboëthein* their forces ("combine": Thuc. 3.94.4; see also 3.97.1), illustrates that the mobilization of Aitolian contingents followed a fixed arrangement of armed forces, which included all sub-tribes of the Aitolians. On other occasions, when Thucydides describes comparable scenarios of the military contingents of the Akarnanian and Boiotian Leagues, he equally uses the verb *symboëthein*.⁴

⁴ See for Akarnania: Thuc. 2.80.1; 81.1; 81.8; 83.1; 3.105.2; Boiotia: Thuc. 4.76.4.

This has sometimes been thought to imply only rudimentary elements of a more solid tribe, which although able to display uniform action in critical situations, otherwise showed an entirely underdeveloped form of political cooperation. But sending an embassy to Corinth and Sparta demonstrates that the Aitolians at that time were already willing and able to pursue common political measures that went far beyond the simple coordination of military resistance in defense situations.

The formulation of collective political aims was based on the consent of all sub-tribes (as is also suggested by the composition of the embassy) but its implementation was realized by the tribe appearing as a unified entity (*hoi Aitōloi*, “the Aitolians”). This impression is confirmed by the extant historiographical mentions of the Aitolians in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE.⁵ Political and military undertakings are always associated with the Aitolians as a tribe acting in unison rather than a sub-tribe acting independently. The same can be observed in the epigraphic sources, where the collective name of the tribe (*Aitōlos*, *Aitōloi*) always appears before it is differentiated into individual sub-tribes and cities. In the sources, this expression evidently no longer marked only the ethnic but also the juridical and political character of the community of the Aitolians.⁶ The Aitolian tribal community of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, constituted in this manner, probably already had distinctive organizational forms that enabled it to continuously carry out politics in the name of the entire tribe. The political performance of the Aitolians at the time implies the existence of a fixed system containing all sub-tribes and corresponding, permanent institutions, thus an “efficient central government of some sort” (Larsen 1968: 79).

The *terminus ante quem* for the existence of a centralized governmental organization of this kind is offered by an Athenian inscription dating to autumn 367 BCE.⁷ It is an Athenian decree instructing the council to send a herald immediately to the “*koinon* of the Aitolians” (R&O no. 35, lines 8 and 16–17) in order to complain about the breach of the “truce for the Mysteries of Eleusinian Demeter and Kore” (lines 9–10), which the *koinon* of the Aitolians had accepted, and to demand the release of two Attic *spondophoroi* who had been imprisoned by the inhabitants of the Aitolian city Trichonion “against the common laws of the Greeks” (lines 13–14). This inscription is a key document for the understanding of the development of the Aitolian League. The text leaves no doubt that at that time

⁵ Compilation of literary evidence: *IG* IX.1² 1, pp. XI–XV.

⁶ See Sordi 1953: 433. As early pieces of evidence, the following should be mentioned: *FdD* III.1.146–148; 4.399; *IG* II² 177 (with an addition by U. Köhler).

⁷ Schweigert 1939: no. 3 = *SEG* 15.90; R&O no. 35.

there was already an institutionalized Aitolian central power, which had the authority to enter into legally binding commitments on behalf of the entirety of the Aitolians and was able to command and enforce adherence to its decisions (Giovannini 1971: 62; Larsen 1968: 196).

The issue of the origins and first institutional formation of a central decision-making and governmental authority in Aitolia is markedly difficult to answer. Some rather general indicators, derived from the reports of ancient authors about the Aitolians' political activities prior to 367 BCE, may offer some help. Accordingly, it is a decisive observation that a distinct Aitolian policy can be traced back to the early years of the Peloponnesian War; a policy characterized by a communal and coherently pursued aim. This policy was intended to extend the Aitolian sphere of influence to the northern coast of the Kalydonian and Corinthian Gulfs and beyond. The primary aim was recovering control over the strip of coast stretching from the estuary of the Acheloos river to Cape Antirrhion. In addition, the conquest of Naupaktos – cooperation with Sparta in 426 BCE had already served this interest⁸ – was a consistent goal of Aitolian policy in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE;⁹ and the Aitolian commitment on the side of Elis in the war against Sparta of 402–400 BCE evidently served to reinforce their influence on the western Peloponnese.¹⁰ The realization of such a policy, characterized by a common determination to expand and to increase their power, is only conceivable if the Aitolians already had a tribal organization at this point in time with central decision-making bodies accepted by all constituents.

These contemplations could be countered with the argument that the time frame as established here is based primarily on the interpretation of Thucydides' evidence. The assumption that the Aitolians agreed on a common policy no earlier than the mid-fifth century BCE can however be substantiated by other observations. Aitolian myths, as is generally known, contain comparatively young strands of tradition, some of which developed no earlier than in the period of Aitolian dominance in the third

⁸ Thuc. 3.100.1. – Perhaps a treaty between Sparta and the Aitolians, or rather the Aitolian *[E]rxadieis* (M&L, add. p. 312 [no. 67bis] and SEG 51.449) needs to be associated with the Aitolian–Spartan relations in 426 BCE. However, considerable uncertainty remains regarding the date and connection of the hitherto unknown *[E]rxadieis* with the Aitolians; see Rhodes 2011; Antonetti 2012c; Mackail 2013: 483–488 (T 48).

⁹ After unsuccessful attempts to conquer Naupaktos with Spartan support during the fifth century BCE, the Aitolians assisted the Spartans also during the Corinthian War (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.14). However, the Aitolians gained lasting success only after 370 BCE with the help of Thebes (Diod. 15.75.2); see Bommeljé 1988; Merker 1989; Landucci Gattinoni 2004.

¹⁰ Diod. 14.17.9; on date and context see Funke 1980: 32–33.

century BCE, probably originating mostly from the poetry of Nikandros of Kolophon.¹¹ Some elements can be assigned to the second half of the fifth century or the first half of the fourth century BCE, since they differ both from older traditions (Hekataios, Herodotus) and from the mid-fourth century BCE at the latest, when other versions were fully established. Strikingly, these traditions all seek to craft close relations in myth between Aitolia to Lokris and Elis, i.e., to regions that were direct target areas of Aitolian foreign policy. Thus, in the Aristotelian constitutional history of the Opuntians the Aitolian eponymous hero Aitolos appears, inserted into the Lokrian genealogy between Amphiktyon and Physkos. In this way, he had been elevated to the status of progenitor of the Lokrians, prior to the integration of western Lokris into the Aitolian League.¹² Pseudo-Skymnos (587) attests the rule of Aitolos over East Lokrian Opus. William Oldfather (1918) considered this remark an especially pointless statement, since the Aitolians had never gained a true foothold in eastern Lokris. However, should this information be derived from Ephoros (Oldfather 1926), then it could certainly be an Aitolian attempt to deduce a claim of ownership from the alleged kingship in Opus over the greatly sought-after west Lokrian Naupaktos, which had been refounded in the first half of the fifth century BCE as an Opuntian *epoikia*.¹³

The political significance of these mythological traditions and their peculiarities at the dawn of the fourth century BCE becomes particularly clear in Ephoros' description of the relations between Elis and Aitolia. The legends about foundation and immigration concerning the early settlement of both sides of the Kalydonian Gulf – especially of Elis and the area around Pleuron and Kalydon – have been divergent since the time of Ephoros himself regarding whether the Eleians were *apoikoi* ("colonists") of the Aitolians or the Aitolians were *apoikoi* of the Eleians. It is remarkable that Ephoros in this context was able to refer to two epigrams in Elis and Thermos whose claims corresponded and which, because of their general outlook, can be dated no earlier than the latter half of the fifth century

¹¹ See Vollgraf 1909, who was able to disclose references to the political events of the third century BCE in Nikandros' Aitolian poetry, indicated the lasting influence of this poetry on the later tradition; see also Cazzaniga 1973; Rzepka 2008.

¹² Arist. fr. 560R. Hekataios (*FGrH* 1 F 13.15.16) did not yet know this stemma; cf. also the pieces of evidence compiled in Arist. fr. 561R. In the Aristotelean *Constitution of the Aitolians* the early relations between Aitolians and Lokrians were also subject of discussion (fr. 473R = Strabo 7.7.2).

¹³ Opuntian *epoikia*: *IG* IX.1² 3, 718. A later remark in Johannes Tzetzes, *Allegoriae in Iliadem* 9.103–105, according to which Naupaktos may have belonged to the Aitolians at the time of Meleagros, indicates that the Aitolians most likely tried to reinforce their claim on Naupaktos by means of a manipulation of the early traditions.

BCE¹⁴. In Thermos, the Aitolians had put up a statue for Aitolos, “the founder of the country, once reared beside the eddies of the Alpheios, neighbor of the race-courses of Olympia, son of Endymion” (Strab. 10.3.2.; trans. H. L. Jones). In Elis there was a statue of Oxylos, accompanied by an inscription explaining that he had returned in the tenth generation and founded Elis after his ancestor Aitolos had left the autochthonous people of Elis and conquered the land of the Kuretes – namely Kalydon and Pleuron.

Both inscriptions are based on a new genealogical conception unknown to the older traditions, according to which Aitolos no longer appears as the son of Oineus, king of Kalydon, but as the son of the Eleian king Endymion takes over the rule in Aitolia, including the coastal area.¹⁵ As is well known, the transmission of this genealogy can be traced back to the Eleian traditions (Müller-Graupa 1942), which evolved in the period after the foundation of the city of Elis in 471 BCE. It is revealing that the Aitolians also adopted and propagated the Elean version – and evidently with the full agreement of the Eleians since the second half of the fifth century BCE, as the Aitolian dedication in Thermos demonstrates. Thus by the idea of the return (*kathodos*) of Oxylos, it became possible to express the close relations between Aitolia and the Eleian–Pisaian part of the Peloponnese more clearly than in the older tales of the Heraklids’ *kathodos*, while at the same time continuing to support the Aitolian claim to the northern area of the Kalydonian Gulf.¹⁶ This conscious adoption, or rather embellishment, of mythical traditions needs to be understood in the context of growing cohesion among the Aitolians in the course of the fifth century BCE, as they sought to reinforce their political self-conception and their claim to power in this manner. Thus, the thoughts just described on the historical and temporal general conditions for an institutional formation of a federation in Aitolia that was capable of political action are thereby plausibly confirmed once more.

So far, our observations have left the organization of the inland Aitolian tribe largely unconsidered. However, the determination of its general

¹⁴ *FGrH* 70 Ephoros F 122a = Strabo 10.3.2; see also *BNJ* 122a. On the date see the commentary by F. Jacoby (*FGrH* II C, p. 5) on *FGrH* 65 Daimachos F 1, who believes that both epigrams are no older than the military assistance given by the Aitolians to the Eleians in 402. This military assistance came about as part of existing close relations between both sides (Meyer 1958: 48, n. 2), so that the time of the Peloponnesian War can certainly still be considered; see also Antonetti 2012b.

¹⁵ Aitolos as the son of Oineus: *FGrH* I Hekataios F 15. Aitolos appears as the son of Endymion for the first time in Deimachos, an older contemporary and informant of Ephoros: *FGrH* Deimachos 65 F 1. Whether Ephoros’ information *FGrH* 70 Ephoros F 122a derives from Deimachos cannot be determined; see on this *FGrH* II C, p. 5; *BNJ* 65 F 1; Antonetti 2005.

¹⁶ This ‘Eleian’ version remained the “tradition officielle des Étolien” (Robert 1978: 489) also in the following period and was evidently further embellished, above all by Nikandros of Kolophon (cf. *FGrH* 271/2 F 6).

pattern and its diachronic development provides the basis on which the process of federal formation in Aitolia can be demonstrated. Once again, Thucydides' report concerning events in Aitolia in 426 BCE (3.94.1–98.5) needs to be the discussion's starting point. Thucydides presents a clear image of the internal structures of the Aitolian tribe, which at the time consisted of the three sub-tribes of the Apodotians, Ophonians, and Eurytians. This triple subdivision is also confirmed by the Aitolian embassy to Corinth and Sparta (see above, pp. 88–89).

The composition of the Aitolian embassy is also of significance in a different regard. It has already been stated that sending this embassy is in and of itself an expression of the sub-tribes' ability to appear externally as a federation acting in unison, with shared political aims. Then again, it becomes clear how influential each sub-tribe was in the political decision-making process. Even though the sub-tribes were of different sizes numerically (Thuc. 3.94.5), each provided only one representative to the embassy. The divergent population numbers of the individual sub-tribes do not seem to have been taken into account when it came to their participation in the decision-making process. The sub-tribes stood side by side on an equal footing and each evidently formed an independent legal entity, having within the borders of the tribe a certain degree of autonomy and the corresponding political institutions to protect their status.¹⁷ These three big sub-tribes were divided into further smaller units; Thucydides (3.96.3) only mentions two of these units in passing – the Bomieis and Kallieis – as belonging to the Ophonians. The Aitolian tribal structure was thus tripartite with two further levels below that of the general confederation.¹⁸

Such a tribal structure is entirely foreign to the Aitolian federal state of the third and second centuries BCE. By that time, the big individual sub-tribes had lost their significance as constitutive elements of the tribal state. Instead they had ceded their place – without mentioning the cities gained in the meantime – to the former sub-groups of these sub-tribes, whose inhabitants no longer derived their legal status from affiliation to a sub-tribe, but exclusively from membership in a civil association of one of these sub-groups. These subordinate groups of the sub-tribes had developed into independent and autonomous legal entities, so that their political and legal status equalled that of a *polis*. In this form, they (and, hence, no longer the

¹⁷ Sordi 1953: 432–433; cf. Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926: 1508.

¹⁸ Swoboda 1912 assumed a triple subdivision; see also Swoboda and Hermann 1913: 326. A different view already in Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926: 130, 146, 1508. The subdivisions in Sordi 1953 (428–430, 438–439, 441–442) are too vague.

sub-tribes) comprised the basic element of the Aitolian *koinon*, which was now organized on a federal principle.¹⁹

The transition of the Aitolian tribal state into a federal state and correspondent dissolution of old tribal structures have given rise to various explanatory models in contemporary research. According to the predominant opinion, the change resulted from a methodical and systematically realized transformation of the constitution, by means of which the Aitolians had tried to adjust their state's system to the new political realities of the time. The procedure itself was thought of as a restructuring process undertaken in a relatively short period of time.²⁰ In contrast, Marta Sordi (1953) attempted to explain the development of the Aitolian federal state not as a result of radical reorganization but as a slow and gradual evolution that resulted in the gradual disassembling of a 'primitive' tribal system. According to her, the basic principles of a federal state had already been realized to some extent in the relatively autonomous status of the individual sub-tribes within the general tribe; in this capacity, the macro-tribe had also developed its own legal entity. There was, in principle at least, no legal difference between the Aitolian tribal state and the Aitolian federal state: because the legal structure basically remained the same, the transition from an organizational principle based on tribal subdivisions to one based on independent *polis* communities did not come about abruptly, Sordi argues, but as part of a gradual process of development; thereby, both organizational systems had long existed side by side.

It is not possible, however, to speak of an undisrupted coexistence of tribal and *polis* structures within the Aitolian League. There are no indications in the sources that the three sub-tribes continued to exercise their former legal authority alongside newly created member-communities of the *koinon*. From the rare pieces of literary evidence on the sub-tribes in later times it can only be extracted that these continued to exist as ethnic groups in various parts of Aitolia. In any case, a status in any way comparable with that of the federation's member-states does not result from this.²¹

¹⁹ This is also reflected in the terminology of the documents, in which Aitolian citizens are no longer addressed by their affiliation with a sub-tribe (see Thuc. 3.100.1), but with an urban or village community: e.g., in the form *Aitōlos ek Titrān* (FdD III 3.199) or with the ethnic *Titraios* (IG IX.1² 1, 11, line 48).

²⁰ See Swoboda and Hermann 1913: 325–332; Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926: 1509–1510; see also Klaffenbach 1939: 191–192; Larsen 1968: 80, 195–196.

²¹ Strabo 10.1.10; 2.5; 3.6. The mention of this Aitolian sub-tribe in the Aristotelean *Politeia* of Ithaka (Arist. fr. 508R) and in the *Aitolika* of Nikandros of Kolophon (FGrH 271/2 F 7) is evidently connected with an explanation of old legends relating to an oracle of Odysseus in the territory of the Eurytians; see also Lykoph. *Alex.* 799. On the mention of the Apodotians by Philip V in 198 BCE (Polyb. 18.5.8) see Woodhouse 1897: 76–77 and Walbank 1957–1979: 2.557. Steph. Byz. s.v. *Apodōtoi*; *Eurytānes* is derived from Thucydides. For the mention of the Aitolian ethnic *Ophieus* in

We thus need to retain the conclusion that the sub-tribes lost their original political function in favor of the new member-states and were no longer a constitutive element of the federal state. The old tribal structures may at best have survived on the level of a regional organization, which may possibly be inferred for the case of the Aitolian League, although no secure evidence for this can be found. There are very few indications in the sources that the league was divided into districts. The only hint that an overarching federal structure organized all member-states – including the non-Aitolian areas integrated at this point – into seven taxation and military districts is provided by a mention of a college of seven treasurers (*tamiai*) and seven sub-commanders of the federal contingent (*epilektarchontes*) in the treaty of alliance between the Aitolians and the Akarnanians of c. 263/2 BCE.²² To what extent this was still based on an ordering system determined by the tribal structure cannot be determined, even though such an assumption seems a definite possibility, since the sub-tribes probably continued to exist as ethnic–geographical units and could have provided a suitable organizational framework.

In this context the *telos Stratikon* (“district of Stratos”) and the *telos Lokrikon* (“district of Lokris”) have often been cited, whose existence as part of the Aitolian League is attested for the second half of the third or the first half of the second century BCE.²³ Some have wanted to see in these districts the proof of a general district organization of the league according to a principle of geographic division.²⁴ These districts (*telē*), which had their own political institutions, magistrates, and far-reaching competences, contained by all appearances only those parts of Akarnania and West Lokris that were integrated into the Aitolian League. There are thus many indications that the introduction of the *telē* was connected with the integration of originally non-Aitolian tribes and *koina* into the league. Thus, in this way (at least to some extent) an equivalent for the dissolution of their own federal organization entailed by entry into

two Delphian manumission documents and one proxeny decree from Thermos from the first half of the second century BCE (*SGDI* 1978, line 3. 1862, line 2; *IG IX.1² 1*, 32, line 46), see Daux 1939: 156 n. 2.

²² *IG IX.1² 1*, 3A (*SVA* 480), lines 18–22. For the date see Klaffenbach 1955; Will 1979: 227–228; cf. Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926: 1529, n. 5; Corsten 1999.

²³ *Telos Stratikon*: *IG IX.1² 1*, 3B, line 2; *telos Lokrikon*: *SGDI* 2070, lines 1–2; 2139, lines 1–2; *IG IX.1² 3*, 618, lines 1–2; 625a, line 1.

²⁴ Larsen 1968: 197; cf. also Sordi 1953: 442–445; Rzepka 2006: 33–45; Mackil 2013: 380–384; Corsten 1999: 133–159, whose interpretation of the Aitolian districts as administrative districts of equal size and split up “ohne Rücksicht auf ethnische Zugehörigkeit [with no regard for ethnic togetherness]” (158) is not convincing.

the Aitolian League was granted to the member-states of previously independent *koina*.

So far, only the district around the Akarnanian city of Stratos and the (west) Lokrian district are the only two securely attested *telē* in the sources. Yet it is likely that there were other districts in the remaining regions of Central Greece, provided that they were integrated into the Aitolian League.²⁵ The existence of these *telē* could thus enable the preservation of the distinct identities of the *koina* of the Lokrians, Dorians, Aianians, Oitaian, and others, which had disintegrated into several politically independent member-states of the Aitolian League. This may also explain why the Central Greek *koina*, resurrected after 168 BCE, were surprisingly swift in their ability to operate and act independently despite their long integration into the Aitolian League.

It was primarily a political rather than an ethnic-geographical aspect that determined the formation of these *telē*. It should not be ruled out in principle that these *telē* could have been integrated also in the system of districts encompassing the entire league. Their existence, though, does not necessarily prove that the league was divided into districts. Above all, there is not the least indication in the sources to suggest that the special political rights of these *telē*, which went far beyond simple coordination and organization, were equally characteristic of the districts of the Aitolian heartland. Accordingly we cannot assume that important political and representative functions of the old tribal territories and in some way also the old tribal organization continued to exist in the *telē* (*contra* Sordi 1953: 444).

All indications therefore support the idea that the transformation of the Aitolian tribal community into a federal league was not a lengthy process but took place over a shorter period of time. But the question remains as to whether or not the moment at which this new formation occurred might be determined with any precision. As a *terminus post quem* in this context, a short note in Arrian's work on Alexander has been repeatedly cited. The passage relates that after the fall of Thebes in 335 BCE the Aitolians sought an audience with Alexander the Great in order to profess their loyalty, even though they had previously taken part in the Theban resistance (Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.4; Diod. 17.3.3). In the words of Arrian: "The Aitolians sent embassies,

²⁵ At least the region of Doris seems to have constituted its own *telos* during its membership of the Aitolian League. This is suggested by an inscription from Xanthos of the year 206/5 BCE containing several documents regarding an embassy of the *polis* Kytenion in Doris, which was part of the Aitolian League (SEG 38.1476). It needs to be considered whether the differentiation between the *koinon* of the Dorians, the *polis* of the Kytenians, and the remaining Aitolians (esp. lines 7–11, 35–37) may be an indication of the existence of a *telos* *Dōrikon*.

tribe by tribe (*kata ethnē*) and begged forgiveness for revolting” (*Anab.* 1.10.2; trans. P. A. Brunt). Arrian’s phrasing time and again served as an indicator that the old tribal structures of the fifth century BCE still survived unchanged or had been restored under contemporary pressure from the Makedonians. In the expression *kata ethnē* and in the plural *presbeiai* (“embassies”), some saw an indication of the non-existence or at least temporary dissolution of the political unity of the Aitolians.²⁶ Yet the expression “the Aitolians sent embassies” does not allow any other interpretation but that the *presbeiai* acted on behalf of the entirety of the Aitolians.²⁷ If Arrian had here wanted to describe the dispatching of several independent embassies, then we would expect a more detailed description of the origins in the genitive or by means of a prepositional expression with *ek* or *para* (“from”).²⁸ Instead, the *presbeiai* are explained by the addition *kata ethnē*, thus highlighting a particular procedure in the composition of the embassy.

But how should we understand this procedure, and how should the expression *kata ethnē* be interpreted? Arrian’s testimony gives the impression that the ambassadors of 335 BCE had been selected in the same way as those that the Aitolians had sent to Sparta and Corinth in 426 BCE as representatives of the three big sub-tribes. Yet this conclusion is by no means compelling. The expression *kata ethnē* does not imply anything about the nature or the number of these *ethnē*.²⁹ Therefore we must take into consideration the possibility that by *kata ethnē* Arrian was trying to express a subdivision of the Aitolian League into smaller sub-units than the three sub-tribes. In this context, a decree of the Akarnanian League (*IG IX 1²* 2.583 [216 BCE]) is of interest, in which its member-states, usually simply called *poleis* in epigraphic documents, are differentiated as *poleis kai ethnē* (line 40). These *ethnē* are, on the basis of all that is known about the internal structure of the Akarnanian *koinon*,³⁰ not comparable with the big Aitolian sub-tribes, but were doubtless communities of the extra-urban population which, were nevertheless counted alongside urban

²⁶ See Niese 1893–1903: 1.58, n. 2; Pomtow 1897: 748; Schweigert 1939: 8–9; Bosworth 1976 and 1980: 92.

²⁷ Cf. for instance Freeman 1893: 255–256; Dubois 1885: 23; Swoboda and Hermann 1913: 327; Sordi 1953: 434–435.

²⁸ See, e.g., Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.1; 7.15.4; 19.1. It remains to be determined whether *presbeiai* (“embassies”) is here used in the sense of *presbeis* (“ambassadors”). However, this use is not attested anywhere else in the work of Arrian.

²⁹ This has been emphasized by Larsen 1968: 6, n. 1. At 196–197, Larsen nevertheless assumes a continued existence of the old tripartite tribal structure and supposes for 335 BCE “some regards for the old tribal subdivisions in the choice of ambassadors”; similarly Freeman 1893: 256, n. 1.

³⁰ See Chapter 4 by Klaus Freitag, above.

communities, as equal and independent member-states of the league (Habicht 1957: 109–110). In this respect the Akarnanian expression *poleis kai ethnē* describes an internal structure probably resembling that of the Aitolian League, in which cities and village communities (*ethnē*) are conceptually separated as different types of settlement, while in all other respects, however, standing side by side as equal member-communities (see L. Robert, in Habicht 1957: 110, n. 1).

The expression *kata ethnē* could thus have described a consideration of the individual member-states in the appointment of the ambassadors,³¹ especially if we consider this to be a shortened account of what were facts elaborated in much greater detail. Furthermore, if we bear in mind that in later times, too, the Aitolian member-states had the possibility of sending their own embassies in agreement with the league,³² it seems very possible that in 335 BCE each member-state sent an embassy to Alexander the Great because of a federal decree in order to profess the loyalty of all Aitolians in a special way. This would be a satisfying explanation for the plural *presbeiai*.

Such an interpretation remains in part just as hypothetical as the assumptions of others who prefer to see in Arrian's *kata ethnē* an indication for the continued existence of the tribal state organization in Aitolia. Nonetheless it at least makes it clear that the testimony of Arrian cannot be invoked alone as an unambiguous piece of evidence against a restructuring of the tribal federation that had already taken place some time before 335 BCE. In order to continue proceeding in this consideration, it is necessary to search for further indications of the existence of member-states of the Aitolian League in the fourth century BCE.

Faced with only sparse and disparate sources, the Athenian *psephisma* of the year 367 BCE mentioned above (SEG 15.90; R&O no. 35) takes on central importance. Contrary to earlier opinions, it is justifiably assumed today that the expression *to koinon to tōn Aitōlōn* (lines 8 and 16–17), used there for the first time to designate the entirety of the Aitolians, is not sufficient evidence for the existence of a federal organization. The term *koinon* is too vague to serve on its own as conclusive proof.³³

³¹ See Dubois 1885: 23, who was followed by Flacelière 1937: 42, n. 6.

³² See the embassy sent by the Kytenians in Doris to Xanthos in 206/5 BCE, in accordance with the Aitolian League (SEG 38.1476; see above).

³³ Schweigert 1939: 8–9 and Klaffenbach 1939: 191–192 still considered the expression *koinon* as the decisive criterion for the existence of a federal organization; see in contrast the explanations on the variety of meanings of this term in Sordi 1953: 422–424; Larsen 1968: xiv–xv, 196; Giovannini 1971: 16–20; Rhodes 1995: 100–102; Rzepka 2002 and 2006: 5–28. See also the introduction by Hans Beck and Peter Funke to this volume.

More crucial for our understanding of the internal structure of the league is the fact that the Athenians took it for granted in their decree that the *koinon* of the Aitolians would be able to enforce the liberation of the Athenian *spondophoroi* imprisoned in Trichonion. The Aitolian League could thus exercise jurisdiction directly over the inhabitants of Trichonion, a member of the league, and call them to account for having broken the treaty. This implies a direct legal connection between the central authority and Trichonion that is only conceivable if the league had already been divided into constituent member-communities.³⁴ The regulations for the treatment of external sacred ambassadors, who were sent out to announce the celebrations of festivals, may then have been the same as they later were in the third and second centuries BCE, when the *koinon* instructed the individual member-states to appoint *theōrodokoi* to care for such festival embassies and the *koinon* controlled the observance of the accepted duties.³⁵

Thus a *terminus ante quem* has been found for the internal restructuring of the Aitolian League, to which, thanks to the information provided by Thucydides, the year 426 BCE can be added as a *terminus post quem*. A more precise dating than this window is hardly possible. The procedure in any case needs to be connected to an internal differentiation within the Aitolian tribal association. The emancipation of the numerous sub-units of the great Aitolian sub-tribes that was taking place simultaneously needs to be seen in close relation, in both causality and chronology, with the increasing politicization of the entire Aitolian tribal community in the fifth century BCE. It is impossible for us today to determine the original reasons for the affiliation of the Aitolians to their respective sub-divisions.

In the beginning, such cohesion was probably based on the gentilitian or clan relations within the larger sub-tribes. It may be assumed, though, that already during the course of the fifth century BCE, the smallest tribal units started to distance themselves more clearly as politically and legally independent entities, both from each other and from the superordinate sub-tribes.³⁶

³⁴ Larsen 1955: 70–71 and 1968: 196; Mackil 2013: 76–78.

³⁵ IG IX.1² 1,179 (= FdD III 3.240), lines 24–25. See also the list of Aitolian *theōrodokoi* from Epidauros dated to the 350s BCE (IG IV 1², 95). Among the places listed there, Kalydon and perhaps also Naupaktos and Proschion (lines 6–7, 38) belonged to Aitolia (Thuc. 3.102.5); also Therminaea and Phyleia in lines 34–37 may well have been located in Aitolia; see Antonetti 1987: 100–101; Perlman 2000: 68–74, 78–81, 180–184 (cat. E 2). The Epidaurian list of *theōrodokoi* is a further indication for the division of the Aitolian League into member-states by the fourth century BCE.

³⁶ Two Aitolian border stones of the fourth century serve as examples for the efforts for demarcation: that of the *Eiteaioi* and the *Eoitanes* (IG IX.1² 1, 116) and that of the *Arysaioi* and the *Nomenaioi* (*Archaiologikon Deltion* 22, 1967 (1969): 322 (= BE 1970, no. 325); cf. Antonetti 1987: 96–97, 106 (no. 1).

A development of this kind best explains the organization of internal state-structures and the elimination of the sub-tribes as constitutive elements of the tribal association. Around the early fourth century BCE at the latest, the transformation seems to have been completed. After that, the internal political structure was no longer determined by the interaction of individual sub-tribes and their sub-units, but by the direct interaction between a central authority that had gained power on a federal level, while the sub-tribes' sub-units that had also gained in strength in their role as member-states. The sub-tribes themselves had lost their old political function. In this way, the newly constituted Aitolian League consisted of a great number of member-states that are in principle comparable with the member-states of the Boiotian or Arkadian Leagues of the Classical period.³⁷

In this context, a side effect that is of some significance for the transition from tribal state to federal state should be mentioned. As early as the end of the fifth and then more strongly in the fourth century BCE, a process of urbanization had begun in Aitolia, which seems to have taken place at the same time and according to similar patterns that we can perceive in other parts of Central Greece. In regions that had previously seen only partial or no urbanization, systematically planned urban centers developed. Both the historiographical and the archaeological evidence show that by the fourth century BCE there were some member-states with urban centers,³⁸ though at the same time numerous other member-states that did not have urban centers continued to exist.³⁹ The distinction made between *poleis* and *ethnē* within the Akarnanian League (*IG IX 1² 2.583*, line 40; above) seems to reflect exactly this settlement–geographical aspect, which was important also for the Aitolians. This aspect was at first irrelevant for the new internal political structures of the Aitolian League, since all member-states were legally and functionally equal regardless of their divergent settlement

³⁷ See the chapters by Hans Beck and Angela Ganter, and Thomas Heine Nielsen, below.

³⁸ An excellent example is the Kallion / Kallipolis near Velouchovo. The results of the archaeological research undertaken from 1970 to 1979 have brought to light that the city was already set up in the mid-fourth century BCE. By then at the latest, the *Kallieis*, while in Thucydides still a sub-group of the Aitolian sub-tribe of the Ophionians who settled in scattered villages (Thuc. 3.94.4 with 3.96.3), had created a fortified center in Kallipolis. Both the dense residential constructions in many parts of the urban area and the discovery of more than six hundred seals from an archive (Pantos 1985) indicate that this place was the urban and administrative center of the *Kallieis*. According to the excavators, it was constructed during the fourth century BCE, diligently planned, and established in one go (Bakhuizen 1992; Themelis 1999). This date is supported by the inscriptions. The earliest documents of the Aitolian League, from the first third of the third century BCE, attest the ethnic *Kallipolitas* besides the ethnic *Kallieus* (*IG IX.1² 1*, 13, lines 37, 42, 46; cf. also a dedication for King Pyrrhos by the *polis [Kallipol]itan* [*IG IX.1² 1*, 154]); see Rousset 2006: 410–417.

³⁹ For more details, see Funke 1987; 1991a; 1991b; and 1997: 168–172.

structures. Therefore, the accelerated pace of urbanization in the fourth century BCE did not provide the conditions for the genesis of the federal state, but was rather a (partial) consequence of the political emancipation of the sub-tribes' sub-groups. In other words, it was an expression of the political significance gained by these sub-groups as member-states of the newly constituted Aitolian League.

Legal Foundations

In the preceding, the date of the beginning of Aitolia's federal reconstitution has been demarcated more precisely and the essential features of this development process at the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE have been described; regarding its legal and institutional organization, however, detailed statements have not yet been possible. It is only for the third and second centuries BCE that a sufficient amount of epigraphic and literary evidence is available in order to make more precise observations in this regard. The following explanations can thus only claim to be valid for this period, and while inferences about the conditions of the fourth century BCE may often seem obvious, they are not always secured by the sources.

The transition from tribal state to federal state was connected with a fundamental change in the legal status of the Aitolians within their political community. In the old tribal order consisting of many complex levels, gentilitian principles determined the status of each individual in his tribe and its subdivisions. In the new federal system the legal status of citizens was tightly governed. This so-called double citizenship provided – as in other federal states – the essential link between the central authority of the federation and the individual member-states.⁴⁰ The principle of this double citizenship in practice consisted of an additional common citizenship possessed by all Aitolians as citizens of one of the member-communities of the league. In this way, they were directly involved in the decision-making processes of both their own political community and their *koinon*. Since this specific form of citizenship was not based on ethnic affiliation but was in principle open towards non-Aitolians, this opened up entirely new and highly flexible patterns of interstate relations; effectively, an all-new degree of political integration became possible. It was this legal construct that in large part, but not exclusively, contributed to the great interstate success of

⁴⁰ The double citizenship is usually labelled as *sympoliteia*. The term does not, however, possess the unambiguity that is often associated with it; see Beck 1997: 9–29, 174–187; Funke 1997b. See also the introduction by Hans Beck and Peter Funke in this volume.

the Aitolian League in the third century BCE and supported its expansion far beyond the borders of the Aitolian heartland.

It is difficult to determine the nature of Aitolian federal citizenship. Only very disparate literary and epigraphic sources are available for our analysis, often rendering it impossible to go beyond individual observations and form an overall picture. This applies above all to aspects of private law. In contrast, the political privileges of citizenship can be deduced from available source material without contradiction.⁴¹ Direct and unlimited access to the common federal assembly, the highest decision-making body of the *koinon*, enabled every Aitolian citizen to take part in the decision-making of the state. In possession of active and passive voting rights, the citizen could in principle not only influence the staffing of all federal bodies, but he himself would be eligible for all magistracies. The Aitolians' participation in federal business was thus fundamentally arranged according to democratic principles, so that every citizen was fully enfranchised and had unlimited access to all offices.

All citizens of the Aitolian League were indiscriminately entitled to full political rights. Ernst Kirsten, on the other hand, held the opinion that full citizenship was restricted to members of the old Aitolian and Akarnanian tribal territories, while the citizens of the remaining member-states integrated into the Aitolian League later on did not have equal political rights but were virtually only *perioikoi*.⁴² However, the assumption of the legal discrimination against a great part of the Aitolian citizen body is not at all supported by the sources. In all leading posts, citizens from both Aitolia and all Central Greek regions that were later annexed can be found (see Grainger 2000). In addition, numerous regular and exceptional federal assemblies (see below, pp. 108–110) were held outside of the Aitolian heartland, facilitating participation of the remaining inhabitants of the extended Aitolian federal territory.

The legal equality of all citizens *in politicis* is also reflected in the composition of the federal council (see pp. 110–113). The election of councilors did not take place directly on a federal level but in the individual member-states, which sent out a certain number of *bouleutai* ("councilors") in proportion to their respective size. In this case, the individual citizen was thus not able to assert his federal citizenship directly in respect to the league, but was required to exercise it in the member-community to which he belonged. This arrangement offered him the possibility of influencing

⁴¹ See Swoboda and Hermann 1913: 208–212; Busolt 1924.

⁴² Kirsten 1940: 315; for similar contemplations, see Lerat 1952: 2.85–89.

the policies of the *koinon*, at least indirectly, even if he was unable to participate in the league's primary assemblies. Here the principle of double citizenship becomes particularly clear: the full exercise of political rights on a federal level was only possible for someone who at the same time was a citizen of a member-state.

Simultaneous citizenship in multiple member-states seems to have been ruled out by law (Swoboda 1924: 24). Yet citizenship of a member-*polis* always automatically entailed federal citizenship: when the citizens of Naupaktos, a member of the Aitolian League, awarded *isopoliteia* to the citizens of Keos, the Keans as (potential) citizens of the Aitolian city Naupaktos also became (potential) Aitolians. It was thus appropriate that the Keans replied with an award of their citizenship to all Aitolians.⁴³ The close connection between local and federal citizenship was also mirrored by the provision that citizens were required to render their obligations to the league within their respective member-*polis* which – in proportion to its citizen figure – was responsible for both the provision of military contingents and the payment of a league tax (Mackil 2013: 302–303).

While the political rights and duties associated with federal citizenship can thus be determined relatively precisely, questions concerning the character and quality of private law can be assessed only with ambiguity. From a speech in Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.2.19; cf. Bearzot 2004a), delivered by a certain Kleigenes from Akanthos in 382 BCE in Sparta, we learn that at that time all citizens of the Chalkidian League possessed the unrestricted right of *enktēsis* (the right to acquire property) and of *epigamia* (the right of intermarrying between different member-states) and that these privileges were an important glue for the federation's political cohesion. It remains questionable whether this kind of extensive equalization of citizens across the boundaries of member-state may also be assumed for other federal states (see Hennig 1994). Despite the rich epigraphic material, in the case of the Aitolian League, no unambiguous conclusion seems possible.

In the decrees of the Aitolian League, *enktēsis* is often mentioned in connection with the award of *proxenia* – namely as an element in a longer list of various privileges (e.g., *asphalia*, *asylia*, [*iso-*] *politeia*) awarded to the *proxenos*.⁴⁴ But there is no information on the scope of *enktēsis*.⁴⁵ Instead,

⁴³ SVA 508, III [= IG XII.5, 532]; also IG IX.1² 3, 654; cf. Ziegler 1975: 198–206.

⁴⁴ See IG IX.1² 1, 6; 8; 10a; 11e and f; 19; 34a; 137b. On the individual privileges see Gschnitzer 1973: 710–721.

⁴⁵ In the treaty between the Aitolian and the Akarnanian League there is the regulation that “the Aitolian in Akarnania and the Akarnanian in Aitolia” shall be entitled to *epigamia* and *enktēsis* (IG IX.1² 1, 3A [SVA 480], lines 11–12), which extends to the entire territory of both leagues. In light of the

decrees tend to continue by simply declaring “and all the rest as also for the other *proxenoi*” (*kai tālla, hosa kai tois allois proxenoi*).⁴⁶ Most Aitolian proxeny decrees even forego listing individual privileges and the mention of the *proxenia* is merely followed by the formula *kata tōn nomōn* (“according to the law”).⁴⁷ Nevertheless, in these cases we need to assume that the award of *proxenia* was associated in conjunction with other privileges that were spelled out. However, both the Aitolian League and individual member-states honored not only citizens of foreign states but also Aitolian citizens with *proxenia*.⁴⁸ Since the award of *proxenia* was possible within the Aitolian League, this suggests that the privileges usually connected with it, such as *enkētēsis* and *epigamia*, were in principle limited to the territory of a member-state and could only be extended by the award of special privileges. It is impossible to be certain here, since in all *proxenia* decrees, and in part also in grants of *[iso-]politeia* within the league, the language that is used refrains from explicit provisions and associated privileges. Yet even if the scope of Aitolian federal citizenship under private law cannot be determined unambiguously, the formula *kata tōn nomōn* used in the decrees doubtlessly refers to legally binding regulations that define the scope and content of the privileges connected with the corresponding decrees of the league or the individual member-states.

Regarding proxeny awards, legal regulations of this kind are also attested for other states of the Greek world, but detailed provisions of these *proxenikoi nomoi* are nowhere reported (see Gschnitzer 1973: 705–707; Marek 1984: 142–149). In the award of citizenship (*[iso-]politeia*) to individuals or even *poleis*, the indication *kata tōn nomōn* is otherwise seldom found. Thus the frequent use of this formula in the decrees of the Aitolian League may well refer to the specific conditions in which the

remaining sources it seems problematic, however, to generalize from there. The clause is better understood as a special arrangement.

⁴⁶ See *IG* ix.1² 1, 6; 8; 10; 11e and f; 34d; 137b.

⁴⁷ See the evidence in *IG* x.1² 1, p. 119 (index); Rousset 2006; Antonetti 2012a.

⁴⁸ Until recently, only proxeny and citizenship decrees from members of the Aitolian League for recipients outside the league were known. It was therefore questionable if an Aitolian member-state was able to award proxenies to individuals in another Aitolian member-state. But the proxeny decrees of the Aitolian city Kallipolis for citizens of various member-states of the Aitolian League published by Rousset 2006: no. 2; 3; 6 (?); 7; 8; 12; 13 (= *SEG* 56.581; 582; 586 (?); 587; 588; 592; 593) indicate that the award of proxenies within the Aitolian League was possible. The awards of *proxenia* and *politeia* by the Aitolian League to citizens of Aitolian member-states on the coast of the Corinthian Gulf (*IG* ix.1² 1, 30a; 31d, lines 26–27; 31f, lines 40–44) need to be re-evaluated in this light. Since Klaffenbach wanted to rule out in principle the award of *proxenia* and *politeia* within the Aitolian League, he posited, in his commentaries to the named inscriptions, a temporary independence of these cities from the Aitolian League in the late third and early second centuries BCE. In light of the new inscriptions from Kallipolis, this assumption no longer appears valid.

award of (*iso-*)*politeia* was subject to the federal organization. Here the differentiation of competences between the central authority and the member-states is particularly pressing. Both the *koinon* of the Aitolians and each individual member-state were able to award unrestricted Aitolian citizenship to foreigners. The corresponding decrees of the league or of member-states had the same consequences: the recipient of Aitolian citizenship was, in principle, made equal to all other Aitolians.⁴⁹ In consequence, if recipients of *isopoliteia* activated their citizenship rights, the decisions of the league impacted the member-states and, vice versa, the citizenship grants by member-states impacted the league and other member-states. This situation implied a potential overlap of competences and the possibility of conflicting interests between league and member-states. It can thus be assumed that the laws referred to by the formula *kata tōn nomōn* were not only a more detailed description of the privileges connected with the award of federal citizenship, but above all contained precise regulations determining the legal effects and obligations for member-states as well as governing procedures for when the award was activated by recipients.

Awards of *isopoliteia* seem to have been valid throughout all member-states of the Aitolian League. It can thus be assumed that the member-states, too, in awarding *isopoliteia*, were bound by legal regulations that governed their action in this area. This opinion is supported by the award of isopolity by the Naupaktians to the citizens of Keos (*IG* XII.5, 532 = *SVA* 508). Beyond the Naupaktians, the text also references the members of the Aitolian federal council (*synhedroi*) as initiators of the decree. The decree was thus stipulated with the consent of Aitolian federal bodies whose agreement was evidently required in this process.⁵⁰

Regarding the award of an isopolity, the rights of the *koinon* and those of the individual member-states were thus neither independent from one another nor in open competition; rather, they were regulated by common legal provisions. Such a legal organization of the relations between the federal authority and the member-states highlights the specific character of the internal federal structure. Despite their involvement in the *koinon*, member-states retained certain political prerogatives that shaped the core of their ongoing existence as *poleis*. A federal decree (*IG* IX.1² 1, 179, line 25) designating the archons of all Aitolian member-states jointly as *hoi archontes hoi apo tōn poliōn* ("the officials of the *poleis*") demonstrates that the Aitolians themselves held this same view.

⁴⁹ E.g., *IG* IX.1² 1, 3A, lines 11–13.

⁵⁰ Larsen 1968: 204; Gauthier 1972: 256; see also *IG* XII *Suppl.* 249, lines 14–16.

A remarkable dynamic existed between the Aitolian League and its member-states. The internal structures and political offices were largely similar in all member-states of the Aitolian League. The political governing board in each case consisted of an annually changing college of archons normally comprised of at least three officials.⁵¹ The archons were supported by secretaries (*grammateis*). In addition, just like on the federal level, in the individual member-states *nomographoi* responsible for the laws and treasurers (*tamiai*) were present; we find, e.g., archivists, *agoranomoi* ("clerks of the market") and numerous cult officials.⁵² Even though these – probably also annually elected – magistrates are only sporadically attested, comparable institutional structures may be presumed for all member-states, especially since the attested examples stem from various regions and member-states of different sizes. Not only the principle of annual tenure, but also the existence of a council and an assembly as bodies of political deliberation and decision-making show that the basic principles of constitutional law were reflected in the internal structure of the individual member-states.⁵³

A few significant examples will suffice to demonstrate the extensive competences of member-states. Each member-state had its own laws regulating all internal affairs. In the city of Thestia a legal conflict was solved with reference to the *politikos nomos tās polios tōn Thestieōn* ("the civil law of the *polis* Thestia")⁵⁴; and also the work of the urban *nomographoi* (*nomographoi tās polios*) in Kalydon⁵⁵ doubtlessly required the existence of separate urban laws. It is possible that the member-states were also entitled to mint their own bronze coins, while the minting of gold and silver coins remained an exclusive right of the *koinon*.⁵⁶

⁵¹ However, no attempts were made to standardize the composition of the colleges of archons numerically (*contra* Swoboda and Hermann 1913: 369–370; Schönfelder 1917: 90; Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926: 1531). The number of the archons of the member-states mentioned in the documents varies between 1 and 5; see, e.g., *IG IX.1² 3*, 666 (1); *IG IX.1² 1*, 99 (2); *IG IX.1² 1*, 102 (3); *IG IX.1² 3*, 618 (4); 638 (5).

⁵² E.g., *grammateis*: *SGDI* 2137; *IG IX.1² 3*, 676; *nomographoi*: *IG IX.1² 1*, 186; 3, 750; *tamiai*: Klaffenbach 1936: 380–385; *agoranomoi*: *IG IX.1² 1*, 188; *theokoloi*: *IG IX.1² 1*, 98, 103, 155; 3, 616, 755; *hierophylakes*: *IG IX.1² 1*, 95, 98, 100, III.

⁵³ *ennomos ekklēsia* ("legal assembly"): Klaffenbach 1936: 367–370; see also *SEG* 12.303. While the city Lamia belonged to the Aitolian League, decisions were made by "the assembly of the citizens of Lamia and the council" (*ha polis tōn Lamieōn kai ha boulē*: *IG IX.2*, 61); cf. also the mention of the *boularchoi* in *IG IX.1² 3*, 748. In Naupaktos the function of the council was probably performed by the college of *thearoi* (Schönfelder 1917: 92, 143–145).

⁵⁴ *SEG* 23.398; see Klaffenbach 1936: 384.

⁵⁵ *IG IX.1² 1*, 186, line 4. Laws of member-states are also mentioned in *IG IX.1² 1*, 188, lines 28–29.

⁵⁶ Even during the early third century BCE local bronze coinage existed next to the league's gold, silver, and bronze coins. These local issues displayed Aitolian emblems, but instead of the designation of origin (*Aitolōn*) the name of the place or tribe was inscribed. Such emissions are attested for the Ainianes and Oitaianes as well as for Amphissa, Apollonia, Oiantheia, Poteidania, Thronion, and

The competences of the member-states, who carried their own seals as an expression of their political authority,⁵⁷ also included external affairs. Member-states could join together in order to form a new state (*sympoliteuein*), but they could also opt to separate (*apopoliteuein*) (IG IX.1² 1, 188). The appointment of *theōrodokoi*, too, whose duty was to care for sacred ambassadors of festival embassies (*theōroi*), was the responsibility of the individual member-states.⁵⁸ And member-communities might even send embassies to foreign states (SEG 38.1476).

However, all ‘foreign’ activities of member-states required mandatory coordination with the responsible league authorities. Effectively, this resulted in a specific network of relations that cannot easily be charted; simple alternatives such as dependence and independence fall short of the arrangement. There was rather a complex entanglement of areas of responsibilities in place, both at the federal and local level. For instance, the Aitolian federal decree recognizing the *Leukophryēna*, a festival for Artemis of Magnesia at the Maiander, mirrored decrees of the member-states on the same matter.⁵⁹ The Aitolian federal decree concerning the recognition of the Pergamene *Nikēphoria*, a festival for Athena, tells us that while the sending of Aitolian *theoroi* was a matter of the league, the election of the *theōrodokoi* was delegated from the league to the member-states, which in turn had to inform the *stratēgos*, the highest official of the Aitolian League, of their election results.⁶⁰ Finally, the citizens of Kytenion, a city in Doris, were allowed to send their own embassy to Xanthos in Asia Minor, with the aim of requesting help in rebuilding their city destroyed by earthquakes and acts of war. However, it was necessary that the Aitolian federal assembly first gave its agreement by decree (SEG 38.1476, lines 73–79). The individual member-states’ foreign relations were thus subject to the control of the league and generally required the approval of the federal assembly (see also Liv. 37.6.2).

Tithoreia. As these places – except Apollonia and Potidania – lay outside the Aitolian heartland, it is conceivable that this right was a concession to newly admitted member-states; see Liampi 1998; Tsangari 2007: 249–255; Mackil 2013: 252–254.

⁵⁷ Among the seals found in the archive of Kallipolis there are also official seals of individual member-states, e.g., from Kalydon (Pantos 1985: 286–287) and Kallipolis (Pantos 1985: 545–546).

⁵⁸ IG IX.1² 1, 179 and 186. On the role of the *theōrodokoi* in ancient federal states see Perlman 1995 and 2000.

⁵⁹ Decree of the Aitolian League: SEG 12.217. See with this the decree of Kalydon, undersigned by eighteen member-states: IG IX.1² 1, 186 (= I. Magnesia 28); cf. also the corresponding decree of the Akarnanian League signed by eight Akarnanian member-states: IG IX.1² 2, 582 (= I. Magnesia 31).

⁶⁰ IG IX.1² 1, 179, lines 21–25. In conjunction with the other federal officials, the *stratēgos* had to ensure that the *tōn theōrodokōn katastasis* (“the appointment of the *theōrodokoi*”) was in accordance with the league’s laws (lines 27–28).

On the whole, the organization of the relations between member-states and central league authority resembled that of many modern federal states, in that decisions of a member-state that impact other members and/or the federal union itself require a common vote. The same holds true for decisions of the federation, insofar as they concern the member-states' areas of competence. In the Aitolian League, the relations between the league and the member-states were evidently not characterized by fierce rivalry between the two forces, but instead by cooperation based on a coordination of competences. We cannot go beyond this rather general statement, as it is impossible to determine with any sense of clarity the scope of the member-states' freedom to act within the league, due to a lack of sufficient sources. Above all, the problem of the so-called 'competence-competence,' decisive for the characterization of a federal state, cannot be resolved in any satisfying way.

Institutional foundations

In a central location on the eastern edge of the Lake Trichonida in Thermos there was a sanctuary of Apollo, whose origins went back far into the Dark Ages and which by the last third of the seventh century BCE had already gone through a formidable process of 'monumentalization' with the building of a temple (Papapostolou 2012). This sanctuary formed the cultic center for the surrounding Aitolian tribes. Then, and indeed from very early on – from the fifth century BCE at the latest – Thermos and the sanctuary served as a gathering place for a yearly regular primary assembly (*synodos*).⁶¹ Just how far this tradition went back in the history of the Aitolian League is illustrated by a remark of Ephoros from the fourth century BCE, stating that the elections in Thermos even by his time took place "in accordance with traditional custom" (*FGrH* 70 F 122; see Mackil 2013: 202–204). In addition, Polybius reports that the Aitolians held their annual markets and league festivals there, and it was on this occasion that the elections of the federation's leading magistrates were held (5.8.5). He further notes that these elections took place regularly, immediately following the autumnal equinox (4.37.2).

Polybius calls these autumn meetings *hai tōn Thermikōn synhodoi* ("the assemblies of the *Thermika*").⁶² The term *Thermika*, however, indicated

⁶¹ See also on the following the detailed description in Funke 2013c.

⁶² Polyb. 18.48.5; see also the date marker *Thermikois* ("at the *Thermika*") in *IG 1x 1² 1,187* (= *I. Magnesia 91c*), line 2.

not only the autumn assemblies, but also the festivals taking place at the same time and in the same place.⁶³ The relation between the name of the league festivals and the federal assemblies cannot be determined securely. But the fact that they took place is beyond question: at the beginning of autumn the Aitolians regularly congregated in the league sanctuary in Thermos on the occasion of a common, prominent festival, using the opportunity to hold an assembly in which league offices were filled anew and all important political decisions of the league were made.

The autumn meeting was not the only regular meeting of the Aitolian League (*contra* Vlasikov 2005). Every year, there was a second regular assembly, the so-called *Panaitōlika*, taking place at the end of the winter half-year and, as a spring assembly, forming the counterpart to the autumn assemblies of the Aitolian League.⁶⁴ The *Panaitōlika* differed from the *Thermika* in that the participants met in alternating locations. The disparate sources do not allow any conclusions regarding the criteria according to which the respective meeting place was chosen. Nevertheless, it is striking that the few cities known as places of congregation for the *Panaitōlika* were situated without exception beyond the borders of 'Old Aitolia'. That it was conceivable, perhaps even the rule, to hold the spring assemblies in the most important centers outside the Aitolian heartland may well be a result of the efforts to integrate more closely those member-states that had joined the Aitolian League at a later date.

This aspect relates to the question of the age of the *Panaitōlika*. There are good reasons to assume that the *Panaitōlika* were created no earlier than the Aitolian League's phase of expansion, in order to respond to the challenge of significant territorial expansion. It is possible that an older tradition of a meeting of the Aitolians, perhaps always held in springtime, was thereby continued; but the *Panaitōlika* in the third and second centuries BCE display features that are only conceivable for this period, when the new political framework of the league had expanded far beyond the narrow tribal boundaries. The late development of the *Panaitōlika* is also suggested by the name itself. Robert Flacelière rightly considered the designation as an expression of "panaitolisme" that only evolved at the zenith of Aitolian displays of power in the third century BCE.⁶⁵ Many aspects suggest that the *Panaitōlika* were a new creation or at least the result of a structural rearrangement of an older institution, developed in the third

⁶³ Holleaux 1905: 366–367; cf. also *ISE* 78, lines 37–40; *SEG* 11.338, line 7.

⁶⁴ Holleaux 1905; Funke 2013c: 54–58. Extraordinary league assemblies could be convened when necessary; see the compilation of evidence by Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926: 1522, n. 1; Larsen 1952.

⁶⁵ Flacelière 1937: 43 with n. 3, following Roussel 1923: 21–32.

century BCE in an attempt to meet the political and institutional needs of the enlarged league.

In this context, it is significant that the *Panaitōlika* – in contrast to the *Thermika* – were not related in any way to a sanctuary. This was evidently a characteristic difference between both types of assemblies. While the change in meeting places of the *Panaitōlika* tried to take a stronger account of the interests of the member-states, Thermos as the location of the entire Aitolian League's central sanctuary had the function of strengthening cohesion within the league by means of common cult activity. Regarding this status, Thermos remained unchallenged (see Antonetti 2012b). Neither the sanctuary of Artemis Laphria in Kalydon nor of Apollo in Delphi, which both came under Aitolian control during the course of the fourth and third centuries BCE, rivalled Thermos. Although both developed a much stronger external impact than the sanctuary in Thermos, neither could, nor were meant to have, the same identity-building function within the Aitolian League.

Concerning the preparatory deliberations and convocation of a federal assembly, only very sparse information survives, primarily relating to extraordinary assemblies that were subject to special regulations. Conclusions regarding the procedure in regular assemblies are thus subject to reservations. However, we may assume that the federal council (see below), which also took part in the supervision of the federal assembly, was responsible for the preparatory deliberations of the drafts for the federal assembly. It was thus ensured that the concerns of the member-states were suitably considered. Since no joint decisions of federal council and *koinon* are mentioned in the Aitolian league decrees, no legally effective probouleutic resolutions for the decisions of the league assembly were made during the preparatory deliberations. These preparatory deliberations were limited to the determination of the subjects of discussion and the order of the day. The consideration of additional spontaneous proposals from among the federal assembly seems to have been possible.

Access to the federal assembly was open to all adult full citizens and not limited by any census or property regulations. Since the participants had a right of initiative and their decisions were independent of any probouleutic specifications, the vote in the *synodos* was crucial in the final decision-making process. The vote evidently took place according to heads and not corporately according to member-*poleis* (Larsen 1968: 202). The potential risk of an outvoting of those member-communities that were not part of the Aitolian heartland inherent in a procedure of this kind was in part counteracted by the change in the meeting place of the *Panaitōlika* and the

extraordinary assemblies. But even during the *Thermika* in Thermos, where the annual elections of the federal officials took place, the risk of a numerical preponderance of the inhabitants of 'Old Aitolia' seems to have been low. The attractiveness of the league festival taking place at the same time and connected with Panhellenic games probably had the effect that large numbers of citizens will have attended the *Thermika*, especially since the fixed date enabled attendees to plan and prepare their participation ahead of time. At any rate, since the federal offices in the third and second centuries BCE were held by citizens from all over the *koinon*, it is evident that the elections were far from a purely 'Old Aitolian' matter.

The federal assembly was supervised by a presidium consisting of not only the three highest federal magistrates (*stratēgos*, *hipparchos*, and *grammateus*), but also the executive committee of the federal council. The participation of the council in the supervision of the federal assembly arises from the fact that in the dating formulae of numerous Aitolian League decrees a varying number of *boularchoi* ("chairmen of the council") are listed in the place of the *stratēgos*, without there being any recognizable reasons for this different dating (Klaffenbach 1936: 372–373). Even though there is no mention of the *boularchoi* in the documents of the *koinon* from the end of the third century BCE, the federal council still seems to have participated in chairing the federal assembly. This assumption is supported by the frequent mention of the council's secretary (*grammateus tōn synedrōn*; e.g., SEG 44.438) along with the secretary of the league (*grammateus tōn Aitōlōn*) in the decrees.

Besides the federal assembly, the federal council, called either *synedrion* or *boula* in the documents,⁶⁶ was the second central institution of the Aitolian *koinon*. This council, representing the member-states on a federal level, was particularly important since the primary assembly of the *koinon* convened only infrequently and the league's great territorial size made it impossible for many citizens always to participate in the federal assemblies. The designation of the *synedrion* as "council of all cities of the Aitolians" (Just. *Epit.* 33.2:8: *Aitolorum universarum urbium senatus*) shows that in this board all member-states of the Aitolian League were represented without exception. The number of representatives that every member-state was allowed to send to the council was determined in proportion to its demographic size and economic capacity. The same criteria regulated both the

⁶⁶ The members of the council were called *synedroi* or *bouleutai*; see the compilation of most pieces of evidence in the index of IG IX,1² 1, s.v. *boula*, *bouleutai*, *synedrion*, *synedros*. For an official seal of the council with the inscription: *synedrōn Aitōlōn* ("[seal] of the *synedroi* of the Aitolians"), see Pantos 1985: 157.

payment of taxes by the members to the league and probably the provision of troop contingents to the league army (see *IG IX.1*² 1, 188, lines 16–21). This principle of proportionality ensured that the different sizes of the *poleis* were taken into consideration without questioning their claim to lasting and direct political representation on the level of the *koinon* – even in the case of the league’s less important members.

Since even the smallest communities were represented by at least one *bouleutas* in the federal council, the total number of *synedroi* must have been very large indeed. A rough idea of the number of council members is offered by Livy’s report (45.28.7) on the massacre of the anti-Roman members of the council in 168/7 BCE, when 550 *bouleutai* were killed. Thus, the *synedrion* at the time consisted of far more than 550 members, since many partisans of Rome were also in the federal council. Despite the territorial losses of the Aitolians after the end of the War of Antiochos in 189 BCE, approximately a thousand representatives of the member-states were still in the council until 167 BCE (Schwahn 1931: 1209; Larsen 1968: 199–200). During the period of the league’s greatest expansion – in the 230s and 220s and then again in the years 196 to 189 BCE – there may correspondingly have been up to 1,500 representatives.

The *synedroi* were annually elected in their respective home communities.⁶⁷ No concrete information has come down to us concerning the procedure of the council members’ appointment. It can thus not be said with certainty whether an unlimited re-election (*continuatio*), or at least – as was the case in the election of the *stratēgos*⁶⁸ – a later re-election (*iteratio*), was possible. However, both the detailed historiographical reports and the contemporary epigraphic documents prove that time and again it was the same group of men who in Hellenistic times not only held the leading offices but also as *apoklētoi* (see below) belonged to the inner committee of the federal council. There is thus every reason to assume that there was no prohibition of continuation or repetition regulating the membership of the *synedrion*.

The composition of the federal council was, therefore, not characterized by a complete replacement on an annual basis, implicating a broad participation of the entire citizenry. It is much more likely that the members of

⁶⁷ See the expression *hoi synedroi aei hoi enarchoi* (“the *synhedroi* holding office at a time”): *IG IX.1*² 1, 190, line 10; 192, line 13; *SVA* 564(A), lines 14–15.

⁶⁸ The prohibition of continuation can be inferred from the report about the election of the military generals in 231 BCE (Polyb. 2.2.8–11). The possibility of iteration is attested in numerous cases when individuals held the office of general up to five times; cf. the list of generals in *IG IX.1*² 1, p. XLIX–LII; Grainger 2000: 69–73.

politically prominent families of the individual member-states, from which in turn the more narrow circle of leading federal politicians were drawn, established themselves in the long run in the federal council and formed their own *classe politique* on the level of the *koinon* (Rzepka 2006: 111–135), which was legitimated by regular elections. A structuring of the federal council of this kind is also suggested by the Roman massacre of 168/7 BCE already mentioned (Liv. 45.28.7). If the core of the anti-Roman resistance in Aitolia could be eliminated by murdering the anti-Roman members of the federal council, we would have to assume that the *synedrion* as such comprised not a collection of more-or-less accidentally assembled members, but rather the main protagonists of Aitolian politics on a sustained basis. Because of their great number, federal councilors were only convened in certain intervals, and thus the everyday administration of the league's interests was placed in the hands of a special board, the *apoklētoi*, who together with the leading magistrates were responsible for dealing with current transactions.⁶⁹

The *apoklētoi* always acted together with the *stratēgos*, who was the chairman of their body.⁷⁰ They were not, though, an executive organ bound by directives and subordinated to the *stratēgos*; on the contrary, in the exercise of his duties the *stratēgos* was legally bound to the participation of the *apoklētoi* (Polyb. 4.5.9), who as a permanent board thus had not only a consulting function, but also a right of control regarding the *stratēgos* and probably also the other federal magistrates. Together with the *stratēgos*, the *apoklētoi* formed the core government of the Aitolian League. Polybius accordingly often calls them simply *archontes* (“magistrates”). However, the *apoklētoi* cannot be identified with the federal magistrates. A remark of Livy based directly on Polybius leaves no doubt that the *apoklētoi* were a separate body. Livy adds the following explanation to a mention of the *apocleti*: *ita vocant sanctius consilium; ex delectis constat viris* (“so they call the inner council; it consists of selected men”); shortly afterwards the same group is labelled a *consilium arcanum* (“secret council”).⁷¹ These characterizations show clearly that the *apoklētoi* may not be identified with either the federal magistrates or the *synedrion*, from which they were clearly separated as an inner council, whose members were specially elected and whose deliberations needed to be kept a secret. Their number was definitely greater than thirty, for Polybius reports that in 192 BCE *triakonta tōn*

⁶⁹ Swoboda and Hermann 1913: 361–364; Larsen 1968: 200–202.

⁷⁰ See, e.g., Liv. 35.35.5; 38.1.4; Polyb. 20.9.1; 10.11. ⁷¹ Liv. 35.34.2; 35.5; see also 36.28.8; 38.1.4.

apoklētōn ("thirty [members] of the *apoklētoi*") were assigned to advise King Antiochos III.⁷²

The sources do not inform us in a detailed manner by whom, and from which circle, the *apoklētoi* were appointed. But the strong correlation between their areas of responsibility and those of the federal council suggests a close association with the latter and supports the idea that the *apoklētoi* were a board elected by the *synedroi* from among themselves (Swoboda and Hermann 1913: 362). As a permanent body, the *apoklētoi* secured the council's influence on all important decisions and deliberations in federal politics during the intervals between the meetings of the *syne-drion*. At the same time it is likely that because of this mediating function between federal council and governmental apparatus, the status of the *apoklētoi* within the council increased in line with the growth of the Aitolian League into one of the most important powers in the Hellenistic world. The more extensive and complex the duties of the *koinon* became, the more difficult it was for the great number of *synedroi* – not to mention the federal assembly – to form an opinion on individual issues, and the more they were thus dependent in the decision-making on the advice of the *apoklētoi*.

Thus, the college of *apoklētoi* offered more possibilities to exert influence than any other board of the Aitolian League. Already the federal council's composition was characterized by the fact that a *classe politique* recruited from among the ruling elites of the member-states could establish itself permanently. However, the actual core of the Aitolian League's political elite probably also gathered within the circle of *apoklētoi* because the *apoklētoi* were allowed to reiterate their terms in office over an unlimited time period.

Expansion, change, and dissolution

The legal and institutional structures of the Aitolian League were characterized by a high degree of flexibility and adaptability. This turned out to be a great advantage when in the late fourth and the third centuries BCE the Aitolians extended their political area of influence far beyond the borders of Aitolia, becoming one of the most important powers in the Hellenistic world. Having expanded their territory from the Aitolian inland as far as West Lokris in the early third century BCE, and also brought Delphi under their control, following the victory over the Celts who had invaded Greece

⁷² Polyb. 20.1.1 (= Suidas, s.v. *apoklētoi*); Liv. 35.45.9.

(279 BCE),⁷³ the Aitolians managed to enlarge their federal state across the whole of Central Greece during the course of the third century BCE, even temporarily taking possession of parts of the Akarnanian League, Thessaly and the island Kephallenia. They even grasped at the Peloponnese, making Elis and parts of Triphyly their allies. At the end of the third century BCE, the Aitolians' area of influence stretched to include parts of the Aegean and of the coast of Asia Minor. While the states of Central Greece were entirely integrated into the federal structures of the Aitolian League, the Aitolians employed bilateral treaties of *isopoliteia* and *asylia* in order to gain influence over the more distant regions.⁷⁴

The victory over the Celts and the fact that the Aitolian League was the only serious opponent of Makedon provided the Aitolians with a prestige that made them a welcome – or at least the only possible – ally to many states. Joining the Aitolian League was facilitated by a skilful policy of integration. The refinement of federal interior structures created a comparatively stable basis for the league's broad expansion. All smaller Central Greek *koina* and tribal federations (West and East Lokrians, Phokians, Malians, Ainianes, Dolopians, etc.) were absorbed by the Aitolian League by integrating their subdivisions as independent member-states. Simultaneously, those *koina* and tribal federations were able to preserve their own identities, since certain institutional structures on an intermediary level between the federal authority and the member-states were conceded to them in the form of districts (*telē*; see above). When the Aitolian League was largely reduced to its old heartland after the end of the Third Makedonian War (168 BCE), this *telē*-structure contributed decisively to both the Central Greek states' and Thessaly's very quick and smooth recovery of political autonomy within their former boundaries (Martin 1975).

The Aitolian League's adaptability to new political challenges is reflected particularly well in the modification of the federal council's status in the third and second centuries BCE. In line with the league's growth, the federal council as the representative organ of the member-states with respect to the federal assembly became increasingly important. This development correlated with structural changes that are particularly recognizable in striking

⁷³ Paus. 1.4.1–4; 10.19.5–23.14; see Nachtergaele 1977; Champion 1996; Scholten 2000: 31–45.

⁷⁴ On the expansion of the league see Flacelière 1937; Lefèvre 1998a; Grainger 1995 and 1999; Scholten 2000; Sánchez 2001; Tsangari 2007: 22–36; Mackil 2013: 91–128, 359–361. The legal formula under which parts of the Peloponnese were tied to the Aitolian League cannot be determined securely; see Larsen 1968: 202–203; Scholten 2000: 116–130; on the Aitolian actions in the Aegean see Scholten 2000: 105–114; Funke 2000 and 2008.

innovations in the leadership of the federal council, highlighting the dynamics in the action of the member-states in their relations with the federal authority.

The management of the federal council was under the direction of a presidium that simultaneously participated in the supervision of the federal assembly (see above). The numerical composition of this board changed over the course of time. Initially, two or three *boularchoi* headed the *synedrion*; in the course of the third century BCE, its number increased at first to four, then to six.⁷⁵ This numerical enlargement of the council presidium took place simultaneously with the Aitolian League's great phases of expansion during the 270s and 260s as well as the 230s, when there was also a considerable extension of the *synedrion*, proportionally composed from the elected representatives of all member-states. The increase in the number of *boularchoi* and the numerical augmentation of the federal council can probably be traced back to the effort of adapting the organizational structures of the *synedrion* to the changed circumstances in the *koinon* which by now extended far beyond its inner boundaries. Thus, the claim to political participation of the new league-members was accounted for through not only proportional participation in the council, but also by an enlargement of the council presidium. The regulation mandating that the *Panaitōlika* take place in various locations (see above, p. 109) had a similar aim. A further change in the chairmanship of the council occurred at the end of the third century BCE. As part of a fundamental reorganization of the council's chairmanship, the responsibility and leadership of the *synedrion* was transferred to two magistrates now called *prostatai* ("principals"), who were provided with their own secretary (*IG* ix.1² 1, 188, lines 32–35).

It is possible that the restructuring of the Aitolian *synedrion* was not limited to a reorganization of the executive committee but linked to a farther-reaching reform of the federal council aiming at competency enhancement and stronger cooperation between the federal council and the federal magistrates. Since the primary assembly, convening only occasionally, was hardly able to react swiftly to the challenges of the rapidly expanding league, the political weight of the council and other governing bodies grew quickly. This development most likely corresponded with the need of the individual member-communities to participate as much as

⁷⁵ The increase in the number of *boularchoi* can be extrapolated from the chronology of the following inscriptions: *IG* ix.1² 1, 8, lines 11–15; 11f, lines 42–43; 12f, lines 39–41; 16b, lines 9–15; 9, lines 8–14; 22, lines 5–8; 23, lines 2–3; 6, lines 10–13; 7, lines 5–7; 31k, lines 74–76; *SVA* 542, lines 9–12; *IG* ix.1² 3, 605, lines 2–5; see also Antonetti 2012a: 179–181 (T 5), 192–193 (T 17), and 194–195 (T 19).

possible in federal politics, which was easier by means of a proportionally staffed federal council than through a primary assembly. Thus, the question arises as to whether the council's reform of the late third century BCE also triggered a re-allocation of competences between federal council and federal assembly, in addition to the institutional rearrangement of the *synedrion*. The sparse, and disparate, sources do not permit a definite answer. Yet despite all obstacles, we can conclude that the federal council as an independent, decision-making body figured clearly more prominently in Aitolian documents from the end of the third century BCE than in earlier documents.

The changed balance in the relation between federal assembly and federal council was based on a double aim. On the one hand, it certainly served to improve the political capacity to function; so it followed pragmatic aims. On the other hand, the insistence of the members for a more intensive participation in league affairs was probably crucial. This clearly contributed to the internal cohesion of the *koinon*, while at the same time it helped to preserve the member-states' political identity. The increasing extension of the principle of proportional representation thus offered the *poleis* a new radius of political action in a dramatically changing world. Thus, in Hellenistic times the Aitolian League contributed to the revitalization of its *poleis*, even though this contribution soon would follow a different trajectory through the intervention from the west. Once the Romans had arrived in Greece, the Aitolian League lost its political importance after 146 BCE and was dissolved at last in the course of the first century BCE.

*The Achaian League**Athanasios Rizakis*

The ancient Greeks believed that the inhabitants of the historical region of Achaia, that is to say the northwest of the Peloponnese, were of Achaian ethnic extraction. According to one tradition, which is difficult to verify, the Achaians succeeded an Ionian population at the time of the Dorian invasion of the peninsula, but in any event it is highly possible that at the beginning of the Iron Age the territorial and ethnic unity of the region was permanently shattered.¹ That there was indeed an ethnic transition at the time is confirmed by the fact that in Achaia a dialect of the northwestern group was spoken during the historical period. This implies that at the time of these migrations at the end of the Bronze Age this dialect was passed on by neighboring groups of Aitolians, Boiotians, Ainianians, Thessalians, and others, and that there was a concurrent shift in the ethnic composition of the region's population. The demographic shift perhaps also entailed a change of name, because at the time of the composition of the *Catalog of Ships* several centuries later (c. 750 BCE), the residents of Eastern Achaia are identified as Aigialians and their home as Aigialos, while those of the western part are known as Kaukones and Epeians.²

These tribal designations do not seem to have persisted for very long, however, because during the same period, or slightly later, the process of the creation of a new Achaian identity had begun. It was even suggested recently that this identity was already part of a common heritage since the eighth century BCE.³ It is possible that the transmission of the Homeric poems, in which the *poleis* of the eastern Achaia are directly related to the

¹ Hdt. 7.94; Strabo 8.7.1; cf. Sakellariou 1991; Osanna 2002: 274, n. 27.

² Hom. *Il.* 2.574–575; Eust. *Schol. ad* 2.2, 574–575 and 569; see Rizakis 1995: 114–116 nos. 151, 151a, 151b; Strabo 8.6.19; cf. Rizakis 1995: 302 no. 526; Steph. Byz. s.v. Aigialos, Aigialians. Hom. *Il.* 2.516–619; cf. Rizakis 1995: 116–118 nos. 152, 152a, 152b (Epeioi); Hom. *Hymn Ap.* (I) 425; cf. Rizakis 1995: 123 no. 160; Strabo 8.3.11, 17 (Epeians, Kaukones); Rizakis 1995: 300 no. 522 and 301 no. 523 with other references; see also Moscati Castelnovo 2002.

³ Mele 2002: 76 entertains the idea that a first Achaian core identity might even date to the ninth century BCE. We are unable to say with certainty whether the development of this regional identity

Achaians as they belonged to the kingdom of Agamemnon,⁴ contributed to either the reappearance of an already-extant sense of Achaian historical memory, or they aided in the creation of this 'Achaian' identity.⁵ If, in fact, we are unaware of the origins and early development of this identity-forming process, we can still say with more certainty that this process did not come to fruition until the sixth century, perhaps under Spartan influence.⁶ From this period onwards the name Achaia is applied to the entire region of the northwestern Peloponnese.⁷

Presumably, the context in which this identity was construed was initially the opposition between the Aigialian-Ionians and Achaian-Aiolians, crystallizing in the rivalry between Poseidon Helikonios and Zeus, the respective patrons of the two rival cities Helike and Aigion.⁸ This opposition facilitated the promotion of Zeus who became the custodian of the new Achaian identity – regardless of whether it was 'real' or imagined – and his sanctuary became their common religious center.⁹ Zeus, thanks to his tight links with the Achaian past, was far better equipped than any other divinity to absorb such an integrative function among the communities of the northwestern Peloponnese, while also facilitating the transition of the Aigialos-Aigialians into Achaia-Achaians. The god thus found himself at the heart of a developing system of ethnic-regional identity, and then in his capacity as Zeus *Homarios*, that is "he who unites" or "accommodates,"¹⁰ gradually succeeding in uniting people

was contemporary with or subsequent to the movement which began in the second half of the eighth century, at the time of the rise of the *polis*. The often-supposed delay in the development of Achaian cities, based on an overvaluation of the archaeological *argumentum ex silentio*, is rendered void by recent discoveries: see Rizakis 2012: 27 and, more generally, Mele 2002: 73–76; Osanna 2002: 274–275.

⁴ Hom. *Il.* 2.569–575; see Sakellariou 1991: 15–16; Mele 2002: 76–77.

⁵ On the common strategies in this search for an Achaian identity, as well as that of the inhabitants of the northwestern Peloponnese and the Argolid, see Giacometti 2001: 28, 31–39; on their relations in cult, Rizakis 2009. The process of the formation of regional identities in the Peloponnese is also described by McInerney 2001: 59–61.

⁶ See Körner 1974: 458–459. On the transfer of the remains of Tisamenos to Sparta during the first half of the sixth century, see Leahy 1955: 26–38; Achaian memory of Sparta: Lévêque 1991: 573–580.

⁷ On the rich tradition of the terms Achaia, Achaians, see Stern 1980: 67–70; Cassola 1996: 7–8. The geographic designator appears for the first time in Hekataios, where Dyme, the most western city, is defined as both Epeian and Achaian. See Moscati Castelnovo 2002: 171, who refers to McInerney 2001: 59–61 regarding the analogous definitions of the identity.

⁸ See Paus. 7.1.4; cf. Mele 2002: 77.

⁹ See Breglia 1984: 72–74. The valorization of the cult of Zeus coincides with a period in which Zeus also assumed a more prominent place in the mythological tradition of other cities of the period (ninth to sixth centuries BCE).

¹⁰ See, for instance, Foucart 1876: 100; Cook 1914: 16–17; most notably Aymard 1935: 467 n. 2 and 5; Durante 1957: 104–105, cited in Breglia 1984: 71–71; Osanna 1989: 56 n. 9; Rizakis 2013.

and providing the Achaïans with a political identity.¹¹ This new identity is, for the first time, clearly expressed – in a form that is not without political connotations – in the famous dedication in honor of Zeus in Olympia at the beginning of the fifth century BCE by the “common *ethnos* of the Achaïans.”¹² The Achaïans there presented themselves as the direct descendants of the Homeric Achaïans through descent from the hero Pelops, who was himself the grandfather or great-grandfather of Agamemnon and Menelaos. According to Pausanias (5.25.10), the accompanying inscription read: “The Achaïans, themselves the descendants of Tantalid Pelops, challenger of the gods, dedicated these statues to Zeus.”

The political union of the Achaïans and their dualistic identity

Questions which have interested scholars since the nineteenth century are: first, when and through what process did this ethnic group evolve and transform itself into a political union of the twelve cities of the north-western Peloponnese; and second, was the cult of Zeus Homarios established as the common cult of all the Achaïans before the creation of the league or was it simply an epiphenomenon of it? Answering these questions is complicated. It might be reasonable to suppose that external pressures – the threat from Sikyon to the cities of Eastern Achaia, and Spartan power ambitions in the middle of the sixth century BCE¹³ – were potentially influential by accelerating the evolution and facilitating a progressive shift towards a political union. The united attitude of the Achaïans during the Persian Wars perhaps indicates some form of military and administrative organization of the region, albeit admittedly loose and hybrid, which, according to Bruno Helly, is best illustrated by Herodotus’ mention of the division of Achaia into twelve *merē* (“districts”).¹⁴ This territorial organization might have corresponded with a more complex political form of cooperation during the second half of the fifth century

¹¹ The promotion of his cult limited the impact of the rival cult of Poseidon Helikonios who continued to be worshipped at the regional level.

¹² Paus. 5.25.8; see Eckstein 1969: 27–32; Doerig 1977: 20–21; Giacometti 2001: 28–31; Walter-Karydi 1987: 19–32 (on another dedication by Onatas). For the significance of the term *Achaïos* in this document as well as other contemporary inscriptions, see Moggi 2002: 126–128.

¹³ On the Sikyonian threat and its subsequent impact on the formation of Achaian *koinon*, see Giacometti 2001: 16–19; Rizakis 2002: 50; on the pro-Achaian policy of Sparta, see Leahy 1955: 26–38; Giacometti 2009: 9 and n. 5 with relevant bibliography.

¹⁴ Hdt. 1.145; see Rizakis 1995: 111–112; Helly 1997a; see also the commentary on this passage by Moggi 2002: 125–126. Certain scholars hold that the process of politicization crystallized only during the first half of the fifth century BCE. Others date the creation of the first *koinon* to 570–550 BCE: see Tausend 1992: 23–24; also Walbank 2000; Mele 2002; Cuche 2010: 104; Larsen 1968: 83.

BCE, even though many scholars believe that this happened only at the beginning of the following century.¹⁵ The Peloponnesian War provides, here as elsewhere, the context in which political and structural changes occurred at a regional level; a trend which reveals itself in a political sense with the appearance of the terms Achaia and Achaians in Thucydides,¹⁶ and for the first time the identification of Achaians as individuals with two ethnics, especially in epigraphic documents.¹⁷

The echo of this new political reality is also found in an interesting passage of Polybius,¹⁸ who tells us that the Achaian cities of Magna Graecia, after the anti-Pythagorean revolt (c. 430 BCE), used the institutions of their Peloponnesian homeland as their model, and subsequently erected a sanctuary of Zeus Homarios which was destined to be, like the sanctuary at Aigion, the location of their meetings and debates. This passage is fraught with problems which have led to divergent interpretations.¹⁹ On the whole, I agree with Mario Moggi that “the substance of the events is generally credible, as credible as the framework for the ethno-regional organization of Achaia, which can be extrapolated from the references of Polybius.”²⁰

The political union of the Achaians probably consolidated itself only after 417 BCE, thanks to Spartan support which allowed the league for the first time to outgrow its regional boundaries and expand into the Aitolian coast at the beginning of the fourth century.²¹ In fact, Xenophon informs

¹⁵ See Moggi 2002: 117–132. A recent update on this question with all relevant bibliography is offered by Rizakis 2012: 27–28.

¹⁶ I.111.3; II.5.1; 2.9.2; 3.92.5; 4.21.3; 5.82.1; see Moggi 2002: 124–125.

¹⁷ See Moggi 2002: 120–124; Rizakis 2012: 26–27. This double identity is not attested in the epigraphic records of the first half of the fifth century. Thus a citizen of Helike, buried on the banks of the Black Sea, is described in his epitaph (490–480 BCE) as a Peloponnesian of Helike: see Bultunova 1986: 59–61. no. 18 with photograph = SEG 36.718; Rizakis 1995: no. 740.

¹⁸ Polyb. 2.39.1–6; cf. Strabo 8.7.1. The date by which federal institutions were adopted by Achaian Italiote cities is usually placed around 430–420 BCE; see Osanna 1989: 205, n. 147 with all previous bibliography; add Gallo 2002: 133, n. 2. See also Chapter 21 by Michael Fronda, below.

¹⁹ See de Sensi Sestito 1994. The veracity of the passage from Polybius was questioned by Morgan and Hall 1996: 195, but their interpretation was challenged by Walbank 2000: 23–27; cf. also Rizakis 2012: 27–28.

²⁰ Moggi 2002: 118–119 (“la sostanza degli eventi è considerata in genere attentibile, così come attentibile è ritenuto il quadro della organizzazione etnico-regionale dell’Acaia, che si può ricavare dalle notazioni polibiane.”)

²¹ Notably in Kalydon and Naupaktos, but also in other cities on the Aitolian and Lokrian coasts: see Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1; Strabo 8.7.3; Paus. 10.18.1–3; cf. Aymard 1936: 6, n. 1; Walbank 1957–1979: 1.18; Merker 1989: 303–311; Tausend 1992; Beck 2001b: 356; Rizakis 2012. This expansion was facilitated by the links which had long existed between the two coasts, but also by political considerations of the day: Morgan 1997: 157 and 165–166; Bommeljé 1988: 311–314; Grainger 1990: 30–32; Freitag 2009: 18–19; Rzepka 2006: 54.

us that slightly before 389 BCE, the Achaians granted the status of federal *politeia* to the citizens of Kalydon across the Gulf, allowing their city's incorporation into the Achaian League.²² The fact that the Kalydonians maintained their civic identity while becoming Achaian citizens leads us to think that, on the one hand, this right of federal citizenship coexisted with the citizenship of each individual *polis*. On the other hand, Kalydon's integration in the league presupposes the existence of a political structure with a common citizenship that was distinct from that of local communities.²³

The hierarchical ranking of two ethnic identities, as it regularly appears in both Achaian epigraphic documents and in the legends of federal coins,²⁴ discloses the superiority of the federal *politeia* in the political arena. Achaian federal citizenship could only be granted directly by the central power, i.e., the federal assembly, but it could also be acquired indirectly by local citizenship which as such entailed federal citizenship.²⁵ While local citizenship was the title *par excellence* of any citizen and thus the expression of their political and social rights at the local level, federal citizenship broadened their rights, because it granted to each of its beneficiaries the ability to participate in the affairs of the community of all Achaians. The status of federal citizen accorded even more rights to those who held it, including the right of owning lands and property (*enktēsis*) anywhere in Achaia, to contract marriages, and to go freely about their economic activities.²⁶ Achaians living in a city other than their own hometown were not, however, integrated into the citizen body of the city which welcomed them; only native citizens of the local community were entitled to participate in the affairs of their local community. This restriction of local citizenship, consequently, created a sharp distinction between the political spheres of individual communities in Achaia and their respective *politeiai*. At the macro-level, they were of course all tied together as Achaians.²⁷

²² Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1; see Merker 1989: 303–311; Moggi 2002: 120.

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.19; 7.3.5 allows us to clarify certain issues regarding the relationship between local and federal citizenship; see Beck 1997: 194 n. 1; Bearzot 2004b. Beck (1997: 178) reminds us not to forget that the federal *politeia* evolved out of the local *politeia* and that the latter remained the fundamental source of identity for citizens even after their city had joined the *koinon*. On the local *politeia* in the Achaian confederation, see Rizakis 1990.

²⁴ See Rizakis 2012: 25 n. 11; add Weil 1882 and Benner 2008a: 22–23.

²⁵ See Niccolini 1914: 254; Aymard 1938: 293; Rizakis 2012: 29. On Achaian citizenship grants, see Polyb. 2.38.1–2 and 4.1.7; Plut. *Arat.* 9.4–6 and 23.3–4; *IG* v.2 344 = *SIG*³ 490.

²⁶ See Larsen 1968: 239.

²⁷ See Larsen 1971: 83–84; Rizakis 2012: 35–38; for the Aitolian League, see Peter Funke, chapter 5.

Federal institutions

The structure of the federal government in Achaia, based on that of the cities of the region, is tripartite. It comprises a group of federal magistrates, a federal council, and an assembly of the people. It is certain that there was a lively interaction between these three bodies of government in the handling of federal affairs, but the specific scope of the power of each, along with the procedures followed, are mostly unknown to us, at least during the Classical period. We are much better informed regarding these same questions in the second Achaian confederation, refounded in 280/79 BCE,²⁸ even though numerous details, some of them significant, remain obscure. The description of Polybius, our principal source with which we attempt to reconstruct the Achaian League, is plagued by many lacunae; the historian rarely bothers, in the surviving parts of his work, to provide a systematic analysis of these institutions or to linger on constitutional subtleties. The details provided by other literary sources and inscriptions are not sufficient to fill this gap. It is for this reason that certain aspects of the Achaian constitution continue to be the object of vigorous debate among researchers.²⁹

That said, we are certain of one thing: these federal institutions evolved and adapted themselves gradually to their political and social context. Before 255 BCE the Achaians appointed a common secretary and two *stratēgoi*,³⁰ but after this period a single *stratēgos* was elected whose precise functions are unknown. Polybius defines the powers in a fairly general manner – they presided over the administration of common affairs – but surely their functions took on greater importance and contributed to the first sizeable extension of the league's territory (251–229 BCE).³¹ This extension was briefly halted by the military success of Kleomenes, king of Sparta. Achaian setbacks during the war with Kleomenes (228–222 BCE), and the Social War which followed (220–217), along with the breakdown of the league, led to a traumatizing experience. In response, the leaders of Achaia introduced new institutional reforms that targeted the army and the financial system (217 BCE),³² and finally a very important reform regarding the decision-making process. The reform gave great prominence to the

²⁸ Polyb. 2.41.1–15 with Walbank 1957–1979 on this passage; Rizakis 1995: 259–262, n. 430.

²⁹ The most recent review of the debates regarding Achaian institutions is Roy 2003.

³⁰ Polyb. 2.43.1–2; Strabo 8.7.3; cf. Aymard 1938: 297–300.

³¹ See Aymard 1933 and 1938: 21, 298–299, 322, 358–359 and passim. On the expansion of the league during this period, Urban 1979.

³² The precise nature of these reforms remains unknown.

boulē, an organ which in its composition was now more flexible and effective. The integration of several large Peloponnesian cities in the league at the beginning of the second century entailed, at the instigation of Philopoimen, a final reform which put an end to Aigion's claims as exclusive meeting place of the league; the federal capital lost its monopoly on federal assemblies after 189/8 BCE in favor of a rotating schedule in various cities.³³

The layout of the redrawn map of the political geography was embodied, as demonstrated by Heinrich Chantraine (1972: 175–190), by a 'younger' series of Achaian coinage, including silver triobols and bronze coinage³⁴ struck by numerous member-states of the league. Two recent studies illustrate the issues concerning the production of Achaian silver and bronze coinage. A long controversy exists about the last period of federal mints (167–146 BCE).³⁵ Christof Boehringer's study (Boehringer 1991) of the Poggio Picenze coin hoard argues that federal mints continued even after the destruction of Corinth in 146 BCE, while others brought some chronological precisions to this hypothesis, supposing that these mints began during the time of Lucullus and Sulla; some mints might have continued down to the time of Actium (31 BCE). The majority of scholars now accepts partial mints during this period, which were mostly used in the context of military events.³⁶

For several generations, the question of whether or not the Achaians had a representative government has been a fundamental issue in scholarship. As indicated by Jakob Larsen (1955: 75–76), the critical terms in this debate are *synklētos* and *synodos* as indicated in our sources. The first was used from the second century onwards for an extraordinary meeting of all active citizens, which was called to address an issue of war or alliance, and later also to respond to a demand accompanied by letters from the senate in Rome.³⁷ The term *synodos*, on the other hand, was used to designate a regular assembly which met several times throughout the year at regular intervals. The crucial question is whether the *synodos* was a representative assembly,³⁸ but there is no scholarly consensus here. Andre Aymard (1938: 63) rejected out of hand the equivalence established between the

³³ Liv. 38.30.1–6; Aymard 1938: 293–302; Rizakis 1995: 131 no. 175.

³⁴ See more recently, Warren 2007 and Benner 2008.

³⁵ Benner 2008: 15–19, classifies the silver triobols after 280 into four periods: 280–200, 195–168, 167–146, and 88–30 BCE.

³⁶ On this issue see, most recently, Touratsoglou 2010: 239 and in n. 9 with bibliography.

³⁷ Polyb. 12.10.10–12; Aymard 1938: 192; Larsen 1955: 89.

³⁸ As suggested by Larsen 1945: 66, n. 5, who refers to his unpublished doctoral thesis (Harvard 1927).

synodos and the *boulē*,³⁹ because he was convinced that the Achaian League had not taken the decisive step towards having a representative government. He posited that the *synodoi* were the primary assemblies of government (next to the *boulē* and the magistrates), and that the term *boulē* in Polybius referred to the council; consequently, he believed that the *bouleutērion* was a council chamber.⁴⁰

This view, even though it previously met with some approval, has now been abandoned by the majority of scholars.⁴¹ Larsen has attempted to demonstrate, correctly, or so it seems, that the term *boulē* in Polybius originally refers to the council.⁴² He supposes that the *synodos*, the principal assembly before 217 BCE, transformed itself over the following years into a meeting of the *boulē*, thanks to a law passed during this period which stipulated that henceforth the ordinary people would only be able to come together in an *ekklēsia* to discuss questions of war and alliance.⁴³ Such a reform could only strengthen the prerogatives of the *boulē*; the arena of its authority soon became autonomous. From that time onwards, the *boulē* regularly met four times a year according to a less rigid procedure which now allowed the discussion of several subjects during any given meeting, while the *synklētos* was held to discuss a single one and specific item of business.⁴⁴

The administrative structure of the league

Aldo Ferrabino held that on the occasion of the military reform introduced by Aratos in 217 BCE,⁴⁵ which resulted in three military units each tasked with assuring the defense of a border (the Spartan, Eleian, and Aitolian borders, respectively), the *koinon* was accordingly subdivided into three distinct administrative units. In addition to the district of Patrai,

³⁹ The most important evidence for this comes from Polyb. 29.23–25. After Aymard, the question was picked up by Walbank (1957–1979: 3.406–412) and, on several occasions, by Larsen (1955: 75–85, regular assemblies = *synodoi* before 217 BCE; 86–105, *synodoi* = assemblies of the *boulē* after 217 BCE; cf. also Larsen 1968: 165–188).

⁴⁰ See Aymard 1938, 62–75; 92–95; 150–164.

⁴¹ As has already been observed by Larsen (1955: 157–159), Aymard goes too far in asserting that when Polybius (2.37.10) says that the Achaians have “the same magistrates, *bouleutai*, and *dikastai*”, *bouleutai* does not refer to the council but to the legislative assembly. Giovannini (1969a: 1–17) continues to support the position of Aymard, but cf. the responses of Larsen 1972: 178–185 and Walbank 1970: 129–143.

⁴² Larsen 1955: 77, 170–171; Larsen 1968: 156–188.

⁴³ See Larsen 1972: 178–185; also Giovannini 1969 and Walbank 1970.

⁴⁴ See Larsen 1955: 76–77 and 92–93; Walbank 1957–1979: 3.404; Funke 1994: 130.

⁴⁵ Referenced in Polyb. 5.92.7–10; cf. Ferrabino 1921: 297–301.

attested in an inscription of Magnesia on the Meander from c. 208 BCE (*I.Magnesia* 39), Ferrabino recognized a second district, that of Megalopolis. Thomas Corsten (1999: 166–177) adopted this theory, basing it on the list of *nomographoi* from Epidauros which, according to him, attests a subdivision of Achaia into five districts. Corsten, however, argued that the establishment of Ferrabino's three districts occurred only in 207 BCE as a consequence of the military reforms of Philopoimen.⁴⁶ The available evidence does not allow for an obvious conclusion between both positions.⁴⁷ If such subdivisions did in fact exist in one form or another, it does not seem to have impacted (unlike, for example, in the Boiotian League) the selection process of the representatives of member-cities in various federal bodies. The lists of Achaian *nomographoi*, the earliest of which from Epidauros dates to the period 210–207 BCE⁴⁸ and the latest from Aigion in 182 BCE onwards,⁴⁹ lead us to believe that the individual cities of Achaia selected and sent delegates to various federal institutions, rather than the administrative districts.⁵⁰

These documents, on the other hand, clearly demonstrate that the number of officials sent by the member-cities of the league was inconsistent: large cities provided three, mid-sized *poleis* two, and small communities one *nomographos*, respectively. Despite some uncertainties (for instance how the various member-states were chosen for representation⁵¹), the argument in favor of proportional representation is quite strong, as is acknowledged by many.⁵² While the absence of certain large cities remains puzzling, the absence of small cities can be better explained. The idea that they were represented alternately is a plausible hypothesis in the sense that we have similar situations attested in other confederations. Indeed, small neighboring cities, in Lykia and in Boiotia, could be represented on an alternating basis in federal structures, and they could equally make their

⁴⁶ See also Aymard 1938: 302–307; Errington 1969: 63–64; Anderson 1967: 104–105.

⁴⁷ For my own reservations regarding the existence of districts in Achaia, see Rizakis 2003: 202–206.

⁴⁸ *IG* iv.I² 73; cf. Lehmann 1983: 245–251; 2001: 82–89; Gschnitzer 1985.

⁴⁹ Rizakis 2008a: 168–170, no. 116.

⁵⁰ See Rizakis 2003: 102–107. We might also postulate a role of districts in military affairs as well as matters of taxation, but this has not yet been proven.

⁵¹ In the earliest list certain cities are not represented at all (Aigina, Corinth, Megara, as well as the cities of central Arkadia and of the south, except Megalopolis). Gschnitzer (1985) argued that, even though the small cities are not necessarily represented, the large cities must be present, and thus we must ask ourselves if their absence calls into question their membership in the league at the time of the inscription. Lehmann (1983), however, demonstrated that Mantinea, even though absent from the list, was a member in its own right with a significant population at the time when the text was composed.

⁵² E.g., Lehmann 1983: 249; Gschnitzer 1985; Rizakis 2003.

contributions to the league in the form of money or the dispatch of troops.⁵³ The idea that a similar system also existed in Achaia is not unreasonable.

The *boulē* was by its very nature a deliberating body, composed, in various confederations, of delegates from members who were represented either directly or proportionally to their population. Councils of proportional representation are attested for Aitolia, Boiotia, and possibly Arkadia,⁵⁴ in later periods also in Thessaly and Lykia. The latter case is the most interesting, given the resemblance between its institutions and those of Achaia. In fact, Strabo (14.14.3) informs us that in Lykia twenty-eight cities had the right to vote in federal affairs. These votes were then allocated according to the importance or population of the city, with large cities having three votes, mid-sized two, and the least important cities one vote.⁵⁵ A system of proportional representation in the council of the Achaian League, as in Lykia, is equally probable. For the college of *nomographai*, at least, such a scheme appears to have been in place.⁵⁶ If this is indeed the case, then it would confirm Achaia's role as the institutional 'parent' organization, as it were, of Lykia – indeed, the Achaian League might have served as a template for the Lykian League, whose emergence is usually dated to the beginning of the second century BCE.⁵⁷

Thanks to the lists of *nomographoi* the mode of representation and the quota entitlement of each of the member-cities are fairly well attested today, but we still do not know the total number of city delegates in the council. Their number must have varied from one period to another and will have hit its peak in the second century BCE when the league was at its greatest extent. By means of comparison, the Achaian council was probably more extensive than its Aitolian counterpart, which counted over 550 members, or the *synedrion* of the Thessalian League, which numbered 334.⁵⁸ But evaluating

⁵³ Moretti 1962: 204–206. Some small cities might have been admitted to the Lykian *koinon* without a vote in the *synedrion* (Moretti 1962: 206–207). We do not know whether a similar situation existed in Achaia in which the citizens of certain cities (e.g., Ascheion), who apparently were not part of the League, nonetheless used the ethnic *Achaioi* (see Rizakis 1995: nos. 597; 598; 605; 659; 66811).

⁵⁴ Larsen 1955: 68–75.

⁵⁵ See Chapter 22 by Ralf Behrwalde below. See also Troxell 1982; Behrwalde 2000; Knoepfler, 2013a.

⁵⁶ It is difficult to believe that the large cities of the league would have accepted being represented in the various federal bodies in the same manner as all other *poleis*, although such an equal representation cannot be dismissed explicitly, especially in the early history of the league, when twelve core cities – “equal in their mediocrity” (Plut. *Arat.* 11.1) – comprised the *koinon*.

⁵⁷ More precisely after 189 BCE: see the detailed discussion and relevant bibliography in Knoepfler, 2013a.

⁵⁸ Liv. 45.28.7 (Aitolia). Thessaly: *IG* IX.2 261 and Liv. 34.51.6 on corresponding census qualifications.

the number of delegates from member-cities is practically impossible for Achaia for lack of relevant documentary evidence.⁵⁹

Division of power between the local level and the federal center

Greek federalism is characterized by a duality of identity and a duality of political power between the federal and the local level, although the dividing line between the two is not always clear. Member-states maintained their own distinct identity as autonomous and distinct juridical and political entities because they preserved their respective political institutions, administrations, coinages, legal processes, and local constitutions (*politeiai*). If the Achaian League, as argued by Aymard, was the master of all affairs which were of common concern (most notably, external relations, the army and navy), and the league exacted financial and military contributions, then the members possessed a fair amount of autonomy and freedom of action that was not necessarily limited to the sphere of culture (e.g., the organization of cults, athletic competitions, etc).⁶⁰ Members might have been hindered to engage directly in relations with the outside world, but the idea of proportional representation in the main bodies of the league provided for an effective integration into the *koinon*. Cities could also make their voices heard in the primary assembly (*synklētos*, in which the most pressing decisions were made by vote according to city) and during regular meetings of the *boulē* (*synodoi*), in which decisions were made by the city delegates. The *stratēgos*, the supreme magistrate of the union, was not able to make any important decision without the approval of the popular assembly – in other words, without the support of the member-states. In this sense, it would seem fitting to characterize the league as a true *sympoliteia*.

Conflict resolution and arbitration

One of the arguments used by Polybius to show that the Achaian League had succeeded in unifying the Peloponnese is that the Achaians had magistrates, councilors, and judges who were common to all members.⁶¹ The historian mentions judges, *dikastai*, on various occasions, who charged

⁵⁹ Note that Eumenes offered 720 talents to the Achaians during the *synodos* of 185 BCE to be used so “that they might lend it out and spend the interest in paying the members of the Achaian assembly during its session” (Polyb. 22.7.3). But it seems impossible to conclude the number of representatives from this sum.

⁶⁰ The limitations to this autonomy are outlined by Aymard 1938: 166; cf. also Giovaninni 1971.

⁶¹ In general, see the account by Rizakis 2008b; cf. Luraghi and Magnetto 2012: 537–544.

magistrates and, if they were found guilty, either imposed a fine or condemned them to death.⁶² They were also responsible for hearing cases of treason, but the judges' powers were neither permanent nor clearly defined.⁶³ The assemblies could on occasion transform themselves into tribunals and punish citizens believed to be guilty with either exile or death;⁶⁴ the surviving judgements (four in total) all concern cases of high treason,⁶⁵ and this is certainly not a coincidence. Whatever the specific case may be, the most important observation to be drawn from this is that the federal assemblies also possessed judicial authority.⁶⁶

In addition to Polybius, epigraphic evidence also attests to a large number of conflicts, either between member-states and the central government, or among member-states themselves.⁶⁷ Most of those conflicts clustered around local border disputes, which are well attested in a series of epigraphic documents (collected by Harter-Uipopuu 1998). The recent discovery of a rich inscription from Messene adds to this picture. The text, which concerns an ongoing territorial dispute between Messene and Megalopolis, allows us to shed new light on the role of the Achaian League as arbitrator in internal disputes between its members.⁶⁸ Before we turn to the details of the inscription, it is imperative to understand the general outline of conflict resolution within the league. But this is a difficult endeavor.

Aymard (1938: 166–169) believed that the league (i.e., the assembly) mediated in cases of disagreement between its member-states and assigned arbitrators, if it did not judge the issue itself.⁶⁹ In particular, he rejected the view that such disputes were mediated by judges from cities which could, but did not necessarily have to be, a member of the Achaian League. In this vein, prior to Aymard, it was conjectured that if the disputing parties were to seek the mediation from an outside city, the approval from federal authorities was required to take this course of action.⁷⁰ Kaja Harter-Uibopuu presented a more nuanced interpretation of this necessary prerequisite to obtain league approval. She argues that we cannot speak of a mandatory arbitration by federal authorities and that, in short, the league's

⁶² Polyb. 38.18.2–3: death penalty for a *hypostratēgos*; cf. Paus. 7.13.5: fine of 50 talents imposed on a *stratēgos*. In the case of ambassadors, the trial was held before *dikastai*: Polyb. 38.18.3.

⁶³ See Aymard 1938: 183; Larsen 1968: 236–237.

⁶⁴ Examples are listed in Aymard 1938: 182, n. 4 and 183, n. 1; Larsen 1968: 237.

⁶⁵ See Aymard 1938: 183 n. 1.

⁶⁶ All relevant citations are assembled by Aymard 1938: 183 nn. 3 and 4.

⁶⁷ See Rizakis 2008b; Harter-Uibopuu 1998.

⁶⁸ See Themelis 2008; Arnaoutoglou 2009/10; Luraghi and Magnetto 2012.

⁶⁹ *IG* vii 189 lines 24ff. *SIG*³ 471 = *IG* iv 2.1 71, lines 4–5 and 9–10.

⁷⁰ E.g. Raeder 1912: 213–236.

role as arbitrational body cannot be proven altogether.⁷¹ This is not to say that the league played no role in the realm of arbitration; Aymard was not mistaken here. Its judiciary role is evident, for instance, in a conflict between Corinth and Epidauros in 242/1 BCE, which was judged by a jury of 181 judges from Megara, “according to the judgement of the Achaians.”⁷² The majority of known examples reveal that the league was able to intervene when a member-state made an explicit request for arbitration.⁷³ If the league itself did not pronounce judgement in the matter, it was referred to a federal commission, composed of judges from a city that was a league member or a “foreign” city. Numerous examples indicate that member-states were able to circumvent federal authorities by calling on an outside court to judge their case; an example of this is the conflict between Epidauros and Hermione that was referred to six Milesian judges.⁷⁴ Unfortunately, the document does not allow us to conclude whether or not the league played a part in the preliminary phase of the conflict’s resolution.

This ambiguity has now been clarified thanks to the new inscription from Messene which dates to the late 180s BCE. The document demonstrates that the league’s authorities were capable of playing a role in the process of arbitration.⁷⁵ It was the league which initiated the arbitration process, in response to an official demand made by the Megalopolitans during a *synodos* (lines 2–11). The case was then judged by an ad hoc commission composed of seventeen *hagemones* who were probably members of the league’s political elite (lines 11–43).⁷⁶ The document next turns to a new phase of the dispute which is arbitrated by a prominent member of the Achaian League, Aigion (lines 43–64). The final stage is marked by a lawsuit of the Messenians which was presented to a panel of judges from Miletos, whose arbitration represents the last chapter in the dispute (lines

⁷¹ Harter-Uibopuu 1998: 129; for a similar situation in Aitolia, see Rzepka 2006: 74–92 and 96–97.

⁷² *IG* IV² 71 = Harter-Uibopuu 1998: no. 3, lines 9–10. According to Arnaoutoglou 2009/10: 189 (and n. 26), this expression should be understood as “the decision of the (*synodos* of the) Achaians about the dispute resolution procedure.”

⁷³ See Moretti 1967: 131. ⁷⁴ See Ager 1996: no. 63.

⁷⁵ See Arnaoutoglou 2009/10: 189. In other sources, various references to the intervening capacities of federal authorities in the mechanism of conflict resolution among league members survive: see Harter-Uibopuu 1998: nos. 3, 5, and 9. See also *SIG*³ 665, lines 13–15 (judgement of a commission concerning a disagreement between Sparta and the league). Other instances of arbitration that included at least one judge from the Achaian League: Harter-Uibopuu 1998: nos. 2 and 4.

⁷⁶ They are possibly identical with those who Aristainos, *stratēgos* of the confederation, describes as the *principes Achaorum* (Liv. 32.21.1); see Aymard 1938: 328. These *principes* might be the most important magistrates of the league. The term is used by Livy in an Aitolian context to refer to either the supreme magistrates in office or members of the political elite, including influential persons who had never held a magistracy. See Rzepka 2006: 112–116 and 121.

65–78, 78–84). Although the latter cases were judged by non-federal bodies (the city of Aigion and a group of Milesian jurors), the league seems to have retained a supervisory role during the process, as indicated by the reference to federal *damiorgoi*. The *damiorgoi* intervened during the second arbitration, as they were in charge of collecting the documents produced by the legal opponents at an earlier point in the process (line 64).⁷⁷ Similarly, during the third arbitration – the one involving the six Milesian judges – the *damiorgoi* received the legal charges against the Messenians and brought the issue before the Milesian judges who finally made their verdict (lines 75–79).⁷⁸

The inscription informs us that the federal *damiorgoi* were also involved in the administration of justice. They received the legal challenge following the decision of a *synodos* and subsequently referred it to a commission that was capable of considering the issue and arriving at a judgement; elsewhere, they had the quasi-judiciary duty of imposing a monetary sanction on recalcitrant litigants who did not wish to abide by the procedure of the resolution.⁷⁹ Thus, when the Messenians refused to participate in the process of selecting the third court of arbitration because they considered the case closed, the *damiorgoi* imposed a fine on them. It appears, then, that different procedures existed for settling various disputes in the Achaian League, as is indicated by the rich variety of procedures in the Messenian inscription.⁸⁰

In conclusion we are able to say that the document of Messenia, beyond the numerous details and nuances it provides for our understanding of the judicial procedures in the Achaian League, also sheds light on the nature of federalism in ancient Greece in general. The document confirms that the cities of the Achaian League enjoyed a high degree of political independence, a verdict which also applies to many other leagues. It thus teaches us that federalism offered a much broader and indeed intriguing degree of autonomy and freedom to the members of a *koinon* than is commonly assumed.

⁷⁷ On the *damiorgoi*, see Velighianni-Terzi 1977: 104–107; Harter-Uibopuu 1998: 68; Arnaoutoglou 2009/10: 190–191. For other examples of their engagement, Harter-Uibopuu 1998: no. 8 (between 182 and 167 BCE).

⁷⁸ See Arnaoutoglou 2009/10: 189.

⁷⁹ See Arnaoutoglou 2009/10: 191.

⁸⁰ See Arnaoutoglou 2009/10: 190.

*Boiotia and the Boiotian Leagues**Hans Beck and Angela Ganter*

In the mid-fifth century BCE, the ruling elites of the cities in Boiotia united to shape the most sophisticated federal state of the day. Its political framework survives in a text written on papyrus pamphlets that were unearthed in Egypt, the so-called *Hellenika* from Oxyrhynchos. This “Boiotian Superstate” (Cartledge 2000) from the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* responded to a series of challenges that had a long history in the region. In particular, it created an equilibrium between the intrinsic interests of separate citizen communities (*poleis*) and their sense of belonging together in an *ethnos*. It thus recognized both the force of local independence and the desire to aggregate and act together in politics. The tension between these two forces was deeply rooted in Boiotia’s history. This chapter discusses the full array of federal policies which the Boiotians applied to overcome that tension and unite in a *koinon*, while at the same time safeguarding the political integrity of its member-communities.

Geography left the Boiotians with a clearly defined heartland. In the south, the high ranges of Kithairon, Pastra and Parnes marked the mountainous border with Attica and Megaris. The only direct connecting passage led through the territory of Oropos; control over Oropos was a notorious bone of contention between Boiotia and Athens. Towards the west and north respectively, the foothills of Mt. Parnassos, Messapion, and Ptoion separated Boiotia from rocky Phokis and Opuntian Lokris. The only major corridor here ran from Orchomenos – along the Kephisos valley – to cut through Doris to Anthela in Malis. The sea was omnipresent, but the impenetrable coast line sheltered the inland regions and emphasized its rural character. Boiotia’s best harbors lined the Euboian Gulf, including Aulis, Anthedon, and Larymna. In the southwest, the harbor towns on the Corinthian Gulf – Thisbe, Chorsiai, and Siphai – were all difficult to access from their hinterland.

The region was divided into two large plains that were separated by the well-stocked Lake Kopais in the center. The northwestern basin unfolded

along the Kephisos valley and branched out into the lake. Orchomenos was the leading city in the northwest, but Chaironeia, Lebadeia, and Koroneia all developed into formidable urban centers with significant population figures. The southeastern basin lay under the spell of Thebes. The city was situated at the northern edge of the Parasopia, the hilly area in southern Boiotia along the Asopos river. Vicinity to the Asopos attracted other *poleis* that all lay within a relatively short distance from Thebes; none of them was more than a two-hour horse ride away. Yet they were far enough from Thebes to go their own ways as separate citizen communities: Thespiiai in the southwest of Thebes, Plataia in the south, and Tanagra to the east. Thebes itself overlooked two lowland plains stretching northwards. At their distant edges, they merged into the transition zone between the two large Boiotian basins. The more western Theban plain stretched out towards Lake Kopais, with two of the most prominent regional cult places near the shoreline, the shrine of Onchestos and the sanctuary of Athena Itonia. From the latter, it was less than five kilometers to Koroneia, and hence to the northwestern Boiotian basin. The other Theban plain touched the eastern coast of Lake Kopais, where Mt. Ptoion hit the lakeshore. Here, too, was an access zone to the other Boiotian basin. It provided the magnificent site for another sanctuary of regional importance, the temple precinct of Apollo Ptoios. Effectively, the sites of Boiotia's most eminent sanctuaries served both as physical markers that separated the natural basins and as nodes that facilitated the communication between them. Geography provided the *ethnos* with a well-demarcated and structured space.¹

Both basins hosted renowned palaces during the late Bronze Age: Orchomenos and Thebes. Although the mythical traditions of Erginos and Herakles as defenders of their respective native communities – Orchomenos and Thebes – are most likely of a later provenance, they may well reflect rivalry and competition between both palatial centers in the later Bronze Age. In one of these legends, after he defeated Erginos in battle,² Herakles restored Theban supremacy by clogging the pipes of the Lake Kopais drainage system and flooding the northwestern basin, an act that effectively annihilated the economic base of Orchomenos' power.³

¹ For the geography, see Herakleides Kritikos *BNJ* 369A F I.6–25; Strab. 9.2.1–42; Paus. Book 9; Philippon and Kirsten 1951: 430–547; Fossey 1988; Farinetti 2011.

² Schol. Pind. *Ol.* 14.2; Eur. *Herakl.* 48–50. 220–221. 560; Isok. 14.10; Diod. 4.10.2–6; Strab. 9.2.40; Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.4.11; Paus. 9.17.1–2, 25.4, 26.1, 37.2–3.

³ Diod. 4.18.7; Paus. 9.38.7; Polyain. 1.3.5.

Competition between Orchomenos and Thebes is also attested in the *Catalog of Ships*. The Boiotian contingents come from a large number of communities in the *Catalog* (twenty-nine in total: Hom. *Il.* 2.494–510), yet Orchomenos is separated from them. It is listed along with Aspledon under the forces of the Minyans (511–516). But who were the *Boiōtoi* who are recorded in the *Catalog of Ships*? Recent scholarship has dismissed the traditional view of large-scale movements of tribes and territorial conquest towards the end of the Bronze Age. Instead, the existence of the various branches of Hellenic regional tribes is attributed to the dynamic process of identity-formation in the Archaic Age. The new orthodoxy dissociates the historical *ethnē* from their imagined Bronze Age forerunners. The rise of new aggregative ethnic identities is commonly dated to around 700, if not slightly earlier, but in light of many regional variations it offers little promise to postulate a template date that works for all *ethnē*.⁴

This does not exclude the possibility of a realignment of the *ethnē* of historical times with the remnants from the distant past of the Mycenaean world, such as surviving monuments, fragments of cultural traditions, or place-names. For instance, in the seventh century BCE, the Mycenaean ruins at Thebes and Orchomenos will have fueled the idea of ethnic linkage between the Boiotians of the present day and the glorious past. Legends of the arrival of the Boiotians and their earliest settlements referred to a place named Arne as the common homeland of the tribe. Yet references to the geography of Arne are inconsistent; sometimes it is associated with a mountain top in Thessaly, sometimes with one in northern Boiotia. Modern scholars debate if Arne was a place at all.⁵ It is futile to attempt to streamline these tales of epic ancestry and extrapolate a ‘true’ core. In a way this approach misses the point: the rich diversity of the mythical tradition corresponded with the divergent process of ethnogenesis itself, which was governed by the interaction of many groups of people from different backgrounds and with manifold traditions. Some of these groups undoubtedly consisted of smaller bands of invaders who arrived in the region from elsewhere (e.g., from Doris, Malis, or Thessaly) and brought their own narratives of descent with them. Over time, those groups appropriated tales of a common mythical homeland and tribal pedigree which was associated with their new collective of *Boiōtoi*.

⁴ Kühr 2006; Larson 2007; Kowalzig 2007: 352–391. For the previous view, see Larsen 1968: 28.

⁵ Hom. *Il.* 2.507; Hesiod, *Shield of Herakles* 380–382, 475 and F 218 Merkelbach and West; Strab. 9.2.34–35; Paus. 9.40.5–6; Steph. Byz. s.v. Chairōneia with Fossey 1988: 382–383 and 417–418; see Bakhuizen 1989: 65–66; Larson 2007: 40–41. 51–52. 63–64.

It is striking to note that the earliest references to the eponymous hero Boiotos as common ancestor of the tribe do not predate the sixth century BCE. And, unlike the time-honored myths of Minyans and Kadmeians, Boiotos and his legendary cycle never attained equal significance, remaining a shadowy figure. When the regional identity of the Boiotian *ethnos* took shape, it seems that it did not marginalize the established local identities as they were in place at Thebes and Orchomenos. While Boiotos supplemented those identities, he did not supersede them.⁶

The narratives of tribal unity were augmented by other cultural practices such as the development of a regional dialect and a more cohesive material culture.⁷ But the strongest expression of ethnic togetherness was the adherence to a set of common cults and sanctuaries.⁸ The cult place of Athena Itonia, or Athena Alalkomeneïs near Koroneia became the focal point of Boiotia's *ethnos* religion. As early as the sixth century BCE, a festival was held at the sanctuary which commemorated the settlement of the *Boiōtoi*. The trans-regional importance of the temple is already attested by Alkaios (F 325 Voigt) and Bakchylides (F 15 Snell) who make reference to musical performances in connection with the festival. Most likely the celebrations were complemented by horse parades and other processions.⁹ Along the lakeshore, further to the east, lay the shrine of Poseidon Onchestios, which in later periods was the administrative center of the Hellenistic *koinon*.¹⁰ It is difficult to assert the precise role of Onchestos in the earlier period. Strabo (9.2.33) remarks that it was the place "where the amphiktyonic council (*to amphiktyonikon*) usually assembled," but the nature of this amphiktyony is obscure.¹¹ The clue probably comes from Strabo's characterization of the site as an assembly place. This, in conjunction with cult activities that are attested at the site from the early eighth century BCE, betrays Onchestos' role in the communication between the settlements of the northwestern part of the region and those of the south-east. Such a role also applied to the third regional sanctuary, the shrine of

⁶ Hesiod F 219 Merkelbach and West; Asios F 2 Bernabé, *PMG*; Eur. *TGF* 5.1 FF 480–496; Korinna F 5 Page, *PMG*; Hellanikos *BNJ* 4 F 51; Diod. 4.67.2–6; Strab. 6.1.15; Hyg. *Fab.* 186 with K. Tümpel, *RE* 3.1 (1897) 665 s.v. Boiotos; Bakhuizen 1989: 69; A. Schachter, *DNP* 2 (1997) 739 s.v. Boiotos; Kühr 2006: 262–263; Larson 2007: 17–30. For Orchomenos as Minyan settlement, see Larsen 1968: 39–40.

⁷ For the Boiotian dialect see Vottéro 1998; Larson 2007: 111–127. The meaning of a common material culture for ethnogenesis is of course highly debated, see Hall 1997: 182; contra, Morgan 2003: 17 and 211.

⁸ Schachter 1981–1994.

⁹ See Schachter 1981–1994: 1.117–27; Larson 2007: 133–136. 161–162; Benichmol 2008; Ganter 2013.

¹⁰ History of the shrine and sanctuary: Schachter 1976; 1981–1994: 2.208–221; Crudden 2001: 109–110.

¹¹ Guillon 1963: 93; Tausend 1992: 27; Snodgrass 1982: 670. 689–690.

Apollo Ptoios near Akraiphnion. The oracle and sanctuary at the Ptoion ranked among the most widely known cult places in the sixth century BCE. Its prominence is documented not only by a large number of dedications – many of them of non-Boiotian provenance – but also by the attestation of visitors to the oracle hailing from various backgrounds.¹² By the second half of the sixth century, control over the sanctuary was contested between the Akraiphnians and the Thebans, and the latter seem to have gained possession of the precinct. Henceforth, the shrine marked the outmost boundary of the Theban *chōra*.¹³

The Ptoion offers an exciting glimpse of the various and sometimes divergent forces that drove the process of ethnogenesis. On the one hand, as the quarrel between Thebes and Akraiphnion indicates, control over any of the three regional sanctuaries could become instrumental in a *polis*' claim for leadership. The controversy over the supervision of the sanctuary thus speaks volumes to the rivalries between the rising citizen communities in the late Archaic period. Each of those *poleis* developed a strong sense of local identity and, *avant la lettre*, autonomy. On the other hand, excavations at the Ptoion brought early appearances of the regional ethnic *Boiōtoi* to light. Several dedications to Athena Pronaia were complemented by inscriptions that list the *Boiōtoi* as dedicators. Although the body of evidence itself raises various problems, it speaks to the fact that the dedicators of these offerings identified themselves as a new collective. In this sense, the Ptoion documents the rising sense of ethnic togetherness among the *Boiōtoi* in the sixth century BCE.¹⁴

The literary sources complement the picture. The driving theme of ancient historiography is warfare, hence it is no surprise that the narrative tradition captures the early Boiotians through the lens of the wars they fought. In later sources, a seminal battle between Boiotians and Thessalians is attested for the first half of the sixth century BCE. The details of this battle at Keressos are difficult to assess: allegedly it was a decisive Boiotian victory, but the tradition is glossed with a great deal of ethnic pride and self-esteem. Yet the very notion of hostile conflict between Boiotians and Thessalians lends credibility. Most likely, both groups were staking their claim to the mountain region between them, along with its adjacent plains. The

¹² See Hdt. 8.135 on the famous visit by Mys from Karia. Other attested consulters include the Athenians Alkmeonides (*IG* 1³ 1469) and Hipparchos (*IG* 1³ 1470).

¹³ For the history of the sanctuary and its cults see the overview in Schachter 1981–1994: 1.52–73.

¹⁴ See Ducat 1971: 396 no. 249; 409 no. 257; 419 no. 269a; cf. also 448 n. 5. Tripod dedications are discussed by Guillon 1943 and Papalexandrou 2008: 259–260. For recent discussions of the inscriptions see Larson 2007: 131–133; Ganter 2013 and Beck 2014.

controversy was most likely carried out by means of persistent raids and protracted warfare. In the later tradition, these skirmishes were condensed into an epic field battle.¹⁵

In Herodotus' *Histories*, the concerted action of the Boiotians becomes clearer. In a celebrated passage, Herodotus relates that the Thebans led an attack against Plataia in 519 BCE in an attempt to compel the Plataians "to partake in the *Boiōtoi*" (6.108.5). A few years later, in 506 BCE, the Boiotians, along with the Spartans and others, partook in a campaign against Athens. Although the Boiotians raided some smaller villages in the vicinity of Eleusis, the overall mission failed. In an inscription that accompanied their victory dedication on the Akropolis that is quoted verbatim by Herodotus, the Athenians boasted about defeating the "Boiotian *ethnos*" (5.77.4).¹⁶ Later on, Herodotus refers to the leading officials of the Boiotians as *boiotarchs* (9.15.1, in 479 BCE), and he also implies that the Boiotians held a common assembly in which their joint agenda was debated (5.79.2). The outline of concerted action in Herodotus is augmented by Thucydides, who speaks of an "ancestral constitution of all Boiotians"¹⁷ at the time of the Theban attack on Plataia.

The nature of this Boiotian union has long puzzled scholars. It is argued by some that Herodotus' *Boiōtoi* formed a federal state, a *koinon* or a prototype of such a league.¹⁸ Others advance the idea of a *symmachia*, a purely military alliance that was established at the turn of the century or earlier.¹⁹ Most recently, it was held that this first Boiotian League should be considered as an exclusively cultic organization.²⁰ The problem relates to the general conceptualization of federalism in the late Archaic period. More specifically, previous attempts to grasp the nature of Boiotia's earliest league suffer from the tacit assumption of exclusion: each of the interpretations mentioned above prioritizes one aspect of integration, while downgrading others; and sometimes those other facets are altogether dismissed, or excluded. Consequently, integration is understood as

¹⁵ Plut. *Mor.* 866e–f; *Cam.* 19.4; Paus. 9.14.2–3 with Schachter 1989: 81; Beck 1997: 109–110; Corsten 1999: 50 with n. 90.

¹⁶ The sketchy fragments are published in M&L no. 15, with commentary. A new *kioniskos* inscription from Thebes (*editio princeps* by Aravantinos 2006) now sheds additional light on this incident.

¹⁷ 3.66.1; see also 3.65.2.

¹⁸ See Roesch 1965a: 34–36 (with caution); Larsen 1968: 28–29; Buck 1979: 124; Knoepfler 1992: 422; Mafodda 1999: 101–102. Beck 1997: 87 calls it a "prototype of a Boiotian League."

¹⁹ Busolt and Swoboda 1926: 1412; Ducat 1973: 59–73; Tausend 1992: 26–34; see also Schachter, *forthcoming*, who speaks of "a coalition of bodies sharing a common purpose."

²⁰ Larson 2007: 170. 182.

something that might be charted in separate trajectories: integration in a tribe, in a cult, in military affairs, or in diplomacy and politics.²¹

A more inclusionary approach is preferable. In late Archaic Boiotia, and elsewhere in Greece, the inherent concepts of ethnic identities, politics, and religion all developed simultaneously, and they were closely interrelated. Herodotus' *Histories* reflect how the Boiotians, by the second half of the sixth century BCE, had emerged as an ethnic group whose members forged all-new means of political exchange with one another. Each city fostered its own offices, assemblies, and other local institutions. At the same time, the affairs of all *Boiōtoi* were debated in a common assembly which most likely met in one of the regional sanctuaries, or in Thebes. Like the attested *polis*-assemblies of the day, it was probably attended by the warrior elites of the participating cities.

The close cooperation between *poleis* is also attested by a large volume of coin emissions that bear the Boiotian shield on the obverse and incuse-stamped monograms with the initial of the minting *polis* on the reverse. Uniformity in weight and style indicate a significant degree of coordination between the communities that used them. This first Boiotian coinage comes from the southeastern basin only, so Orchomenos and the other cities of the northwest apparently stood apart from the coordinating efforts behind those emissions.²²

The new discovery of an inscribed bronze sheet from a public treasury in Thebes confirms the existence of the office of *boiotarch* at the time, independently from Herodotus (see above).²³ Thebes evidently played the most important role in this early league, but the very office of *boiotarchs* ("Rulers of Boiotia") captures both its broader regional notion and the commitment to collective action. Towards the end of the sixth century BCE, tribal togetherness and common cults gave rise to institutions that were shaped for the conduct of politics. The *Boiōtoi* had begun to merge into a nascent federal state.²⁴

²¹ See, e.g., the inspiring contributions of Sourvinou-Inwood and Schmitt-Pantel in Murray and Price 1990; more recently, Freitag, Funke, and Haake 2006; see also Funke and Haake 2013, which fleshes out the intersection of political and religious integration, and Beck, forthcoming, on the case of Boiotia in particular.

²² Head 1911: 295–296; Kraay 1976: 109–10; Buck 1972; Ducat 1973: 61–62; and now the detailed analysis by Mackil/van Alfen 2006: 226–231; Larson 2007: 67–109.

²³ The text is yet unpublished but the bronze sheet is on display in the museum at Thebes. A photographic reproduction is available on pages 166–167 in the museum catalog which is accessible online via the Electronic Library of the Latsis Foundation: www.latsis-foundation.org/en/elibrary/1/64/book.html.

²⁴ See the conclusions by Kühr 2006: 309–313.

The Persian War posed a huge challenge to that union. Geography put Boiotia in the center of affairs. On their march south, once they had passed Thermopylai, the Persian forces naturally headed for Boiotia, which provided the obvious route towards Athens and the Peloponnese. The Boiotian plains further offered an ideal location for the base camp of the Persian army. Faced with a seemingly omnipotent invader, the arrival of the Persians in Thessaly in late July 480 BCE caused a deep divide among the *Boiōtoi*. The Thespians sent out their entire citizen force to join the Greek army at Thermopylai, 700 hoplites in total, while the Thebans sent 400 men. Other Boiotian cities dispatched no troops at all.²⁵ After Thermopylai, the Thebans and the other Boiotians submitted to the Great King (as did virtually every other city and tribe in Central Greece) “except the Thespians and Plataians” (Hdt. 7.132.1). In the following year, at Plataia, the Thespians again fought in the Greek army while the other Boiotians staunchly supported the Persian side (Hdt. 9.67–9).

Throughout these events, each of the Boiotian *poleis* took its own stance vis-à-vis Persia. Submission to the Great King was made city by city, not by the Boiotian League. If the Boiotian assembly met in those troubled years, it is doubtful whether it had the authority to impose adherence to a joint course of action. As mentioned earlier, Herodotus references the office of *boiotarchs* before the Battle of Plataia (9.15.1), but the traits of their board are unclear. The college might have included aristocratic leaders from cities other than Thebes, but it appears that the *boiotarchia* was driven more by the ambition to speak for all *Boiōtoi* than by their actual cooperation. The overall impression is that the ruling elites at Thebes and elsewhere strove to coordinate their military actions on the battlefield, but the Boiotians were still far away from a league that united their entire tribe.

The experience of the Persian War threw many cities in a state of disarray. The legacy of medism further cut the ties between citizens. Various *poleis* opened their citizen registers in the years after 479 BCE to compensate for their losses in the war. In Thebes and Orchomenos, many aristocratic leaders were executed or driven into exile. A judgement from Olympia from the mid-470s showcases how the *Boiōtoi*, as an entire *ethnos*,

²⁵ Hdt. 7.202, 205, 222, 233. Following Herodotus’ tradition on the medism of Thebes, it is often inferred that the size of the city’s contingent at Thermopylai (400, usually considered as small) supports the idea of a lukewarm commitment to the Hellenic cause. But note that various peer cities sent similar contingents: Corinth 400 men, Tegea and Mantinea each 500 (Hdt. 7.202). The Theban detachment appears small only in hindsight. Plut. *Herod. malig.* 32 turns the anti-Theban sentiment of Herodotus’ account upside down and claimed that those 400 Thebans were true patriots who had fought independently of the city’s pro-Persian regime, volunteering for the Greek cause.

became the target of certain accusations and were levied with a fine; the “Thespians and their dependents,” on the other hand, were exempt from the penalty. Although the details of the affair remain nebulous, the dividing lines between medizers and pro-Hellenic cities such as Thespiiai clearly shine through.²⁶ The Thebans in particular, in the eyes of their fellow Greeks, were stigmatized as traitors to the Hellenic cause. Pindar records that the Boiotians were commonly disparaged as “swine,”²⁷ which might not necessarily have been caused by their stance in the Persian War after all. But the legacy of medism didn’t help to improve the image of the *Boiōtoi* either.

On the other side, such collective reviling from outside might have brought the Boiotians closer together. For instance, the Orchomenians were undoubtedly considered medizers, and so Orchomenos was as exposed to anti-Boiotian slander as Thebes.²⁸ Around the same time as the judgement from Olympia, a dedication made at Delphi attests to a certain Epiddalos who proudly identifies himself as a “Boiotian from Orchomenos.”²⁹ The circumstances are again obscure. But the inscription reveals that the citizens of Orchomenos had no troubles associating themselves with the *Boiōtoi*, despite their infamous reputation. It occurs that Orchomenos, in the aftermath of the Persian War, had fully arrived in Boiotia, as it were, and that the Boiotians in general had come together more closely.

The importance of this move revealed itself a few decades later. In 447 BCE, a group of exiles seized the city of Orchomenos and its satellite Chaironeia. The rebels were later remembered as ‘Orchomenizers’ but their group was larger than the term implies. One of their leaders came from Thebes and the band was joined by like-minded Boiotians and also oligarchic cliques from Euboia and Lokris.³⁰ The goal of the ‘Orchomenizers’ was to drive out the pro-Athenian factions from Boiotia that had been put in place as a result of the Battle of Oinophyta ten years earlier (457 BCE). In an attempt to confine the uprising to western Boiotia, the Athenians, in the spring of 446, sent out a thousand hoplites to check on Orchomenos. They quickly captured Chaironeia, but Orchomenos itself proved too difficult to tackle. Their main force then fell back to Haliartos to wait for reinforcements. But the rebels moved quickly.

²⁶ *SEG* 31.358 = E&R no. 60. Minon 2007: 104–112 offers an in-depth discussion on the date and circumstances.

²⁷ Pind. *Ol.* 6.89–90; cf. Schol. Pind. *Ol.* 6.152. ²⁸ See Hdt. 9.16.

²⁹ *FdD* 3.1.574; Larson 2007: 147–9; Beck, forthcoming.

³⁰ Plut. *Ages.* 19.2; see Dull 1977: 313. Exiles from Lokris and Euboia are mentioned in Thuc. 1.113.2.

Somewhere in the neighborhood of Koroneia,³¹ near the sanctuary of Athena Itonia, the Athenian army was ambushed and annihilated.³² Koroneia altered the political landscape of Central Greece. On the battlefield, it effectively ended the First Peloponnesian War, paving the way to the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Peace between Athens and Sparta only a few months later. In Boiotia, it inspired the local elites from both sides of Lake Kopais to found an entirely new *koinon*.

The main challenge was to conceive a league structure that married the deeply rooted sense of local self-governance to the equally forceful desire to unite. To achieve this, Boiotia's ruling oligarchs developed a political arithmetic that strove for the proportional representation of league members in the central government. The most basic assumption of this was the division of the region into artificially created districts, *merē*, which covered all of Boiotia. These districts are often understood as territorial subdivisions, yet the defining criterion of a *meros* was not, at least in the first place, its borders and the division of the land, but rather the idea was that each district comprised roughly the same number of citizens. Effectively, once the associated privileges and duties of *merē* were determined, their impact on the citizens of each district was distributed more or less evenly. When citizens were actually grouped into *merē*, this was done according to local provenance so that the citizens of one *polis* were all in the same district, or they shared in a district with citizens from one or more neighboring cities. By implication, this provided districts with a certain territorial outlook and geographical coherence, while in nature they remained citizen-bound.³³

According to the Oxyrhynchos historian, the number of *merē* amounted to eleven in 395 BCE. In his digression on league affairs in Boiotia, the unknown author offers an assiduous list of their distribution (*Hell. ox.* 19.2–4 Chambers): Thebes occupied a total of four districts, two for the city itself and two for the satellite communities of Plataia, Skolos, Erythrai, and Skaphai. Orchomenos and Hyettos held two districts; Thespiiai with Eutresis and Thisbe two; Tanagra one. The remaining districts were shared by three communities on the southern flank of Lake Kopais: Haliartos,

³¹ The exact site of the battle is unknown. Plut. *Ages.* 19.2 says it was near the temple of Athena Itonia, which complements Paus. 1.27.5, who claims that the Athenians were on their way to Haliartos. Most likely, the encounter took place near modern Alalkomenai: Gomme 1956: 338; Bowra 1938: 32; see Buckler 1996/2008: 60–62 on the topography of the second battle at Koroneia in 395 BCE.

³² Sources for the battle: Thuc. 1.113.1; Diod. 12.6; cf. Hellanikos *FGrH* 4 F 81; Plut. *Per.* 18.2. The term 'Orchomenizers' appears in Steph. Byz. s.v. *Chairōneia*. Under the same entry the Boiotian historian Aristophanes is cited (*BNJ* 379), who will have dealt with the issue in some detail. The fallen Athenians were honored in the epigram *IG* 1² 410.

³³ On the nature and principle of *merē*, see also Corsten 1999.

Lebadeia, and Koroneia held one district, while a series of smaller *poleis* from the opposite coast line, Akraiphnion, Kopais, and Chaironeia, held another.³⁴

Such a distribution implied a stark dominance of the Thebans who controlled four out of eleven districts, which is hard to believe in the early years of the league after the battle of Koroneia. The *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* also attests to the possibility of the adjustment of districts over time, so the high stakes held by the Thebans in 395 might have resulted from several changes along the way. Indeed, the historian reports that the two Theban districts that were administered for satellite settlements also included other places in the Parasopia “that previously cooperated with one another in politics [*sympoliteuomenōn*] but at the time [in 395 BCE] were subject to Thebes [*syntelountōn eis tas Thēbas*]” (*Hell. ox.* 19.3 Chambers). The opposition between their previous status as communities who conducted their affairs as independent parties and their new role as Theban subjects, betrays a shift in political conditions. For Plataia, such a shift is attested for the early years of the Peloponnesian War, when the Thebans annexed the city in 427 (see below, p. 145). With Plataia, Erythrai and the other settlements of the Parasopia came under Theban control too. Skolos, on the other hand, must have been associated with Thebes all along, but when the Thebans absorbed two additional districts, the village might have been assigned to the newly established *meros* in the Parasopia.³⁵ The evident conclusion is that the number of Theban districts was two, rather than four, in the years after Koroneia, putting Thebes on a par with Orchomenos. Such an arrangement must have been much more appreciated by the involved parties, reflecting the overall spirit of conciliation after the attack of the ‘Orchomenizers’. Nevertheless, the case of the Theban *merē* illustrates that the federal constitution was receptive to power shifts within the *koinon*, and that districts might be reshaped or their citizen bodies be reshuffled over time to keep the league’s arithmetic intact.³⁶

The *meros* structure provided the backbone for the integration of cities. Each district sent 60 councilmen and one *boiotarch* to the central

³⁴ See Beck 1997: 92–93, Corsten 1999: 27–31, and Cartledge 2000 on the geographic distribution. On Hyettos, which is variously identified with Hysiai, see Gonzales 2006: 39–43.

³⁵ Erythrai and other communities: *Hell. ox.* 20.3 Chambers. The lands of the Parasopia were leased out to Theban citizens, see Thuc. 3.68.3. Skolos: Hansen 2004: 452.

³⁶ In similar vein, Chaironeia was moved from the district of Orchomenos (with which it was associated in 424 BCE: Thuc. 4.76.3) to form a *meros* with Akraiphnion and Kopais. The threefold district along the northern and western shores of Lake Kopais might have been inaugurated only at that time.

government. In shared *merē*, such as the district of Haliartos, Lebadeia, and Koroneia, the total number of councilmen was divided amongst cities and a *boiotarch* was sent in turn. Koroneia thus provided 20 *bouleutai* each year and one *boiotarch* every three years, while Thebes delegated 240 councilors and 4 *boiotarchs* in any given year. Each division further sent 1,000 hoplites and 100 cavalry to the federal army, and an unspecified number of jurors. The daily expenses of *bouleutai* (and most likely, jurors) were dispersed directly by the cities. Fixed contributions and taxes were paid to the federal treasury per *meros*; the financial burden imposed on the district of Orchomenos, therefore, doubled that of Tanagra.³⁷

The integration of league members into the *koinon* was further strengthened through parallel political procedures at the local and the federal level. Within each city, the citizens were divided into four local councils (*boulai*), each of which met independently and deliberated about politics before the agenda was passed to the other three. A final decision was made only if the motion was approved by all four councils. In the federal government, the same principle of quadripartite councils was in place. The league council of 660 *bouleutai* was divided into 4 sub-councils of 165 members each.³⁸ According to Thucydides, those sub-councils embodied the “supreme authority” (5.38.2), which implies that, while in principle they operated independently from one another, the final approval of all four was necessary to pass a resolution. Again, the political arithmetic was key. The figure of 165 members per sub-council did not match with contingents of 60 *bouleutai* (or multiples thereof) as delegated per *meros*. What follows is that the councilors in each of the four federal *boulai* came from different cities and districts; hence, in the highest decision-making body of the league, the local background of councilors and, consequently, their hometown loyalties were outweighed by an arrangement that mingled citizens from all over the region and regrouped them into artificial units of 165. Some have conjectured that the 60 federal councilors that were assigned to each district were selected from their local citizenries by lot.³⁹ If such a sortition was indeed in place, it would be obvious to assume that the distribution of 660 federal *bouleutai* amongst four sub-councils was equally performed by the drawing of lots.

³⁷ The provisions are attested in *Hell. ox.* 19.4 Chambers. After Larsen’s chapter on the Boiotian League of that period (1968: 33–40), some of the more detailed contributions include the relevant sections in Salmon 1978; Demand 1982; Beck 1997; Corsten 1999; Cartledge 2000; Mafodda 2000; Bearzot 2009.

³⁸ For sub-councils in the cities: *Hell. ox.* 19.2 Chambers; in the league: Thuc. 5.38.2.

³⁹ See for example Swoboda 1910: 322; Salmon 1978: 170; Beck 1997: 91–92.

The final tool of political integration was provided by a robust federal citizenship. The composition of the federal council indicates that the *koinon* empowered all citizens to partake in league affairs and shape its policy, independently from their local background. At the same time, the very basic definition of citizenship, and the acquisition of full citizenship rights, were left to procedures that were in the hands of each *polis*. The Oxyrhynchos historian relates that a certain wealth qualification was in place to obtain active citizen status (*Hell. ox.* 19.2 Chambers). Other groups of individuals (artisans, merchants) were excluded from the conduct of politics by law.⁴⁰ All the while, the pay for federal councilors suggests that the minimum economic requirements were not too high. In Thucydides' words, the Boiotian constitution was an *oligarchia isonomos*, a well-governed "oligarchy under equal laws."⁴¹ In his concluding remarks on the Boiotian League, the Oxyrhynchos historian (*Hell. ox.* 19.4 Chambers) declares that the constitution enabled the "entire tribe" (*ethnos holon*) to come together in politics. The true value of the federal venture was that the *ethnos* and *koinon* had become one.

In everyday politics, Boiotian federalism stood the test of time. For five decades after 446, the league constitution provided the frame of reference that governed the political cooperation of the Boiotian communities. Much of that success resulted from the fact that federalism favored the larger cities of the region and their economies. It was already noted above that the leading *poleis* tended to dominate the smaller settlements and villages (*komai*) of their hinterland. The judgement from Olympia mentioned earlier states that the Thespians ruled over several dependent villages, and the literary sources offer corresponding documentation on a similar rule of Thebes and Orchomenos over their respective countryside.⁴² This specific form of dependency was labeled *synteleia*, which signaled a degree of economic subjugation of smaller villages and farmsteads under the leadership of the urban center.⁴³ When the federal *merē* were established after 446, the exercise of syntelic power was somewhat

⁴⁰ Arist. *Pol.* 1278a25.

⁴¹ Thuc. 3.62.3. A hoplite census for political participation is attested in *Hell. ox.* 19.2 Chambers; Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.9; see Busolt and Swoboda 1926: 1416. In analogy with (Arist.) *Ath. Pol.* 30.2, it is very likely that at the local level all citizens were distributed among the four city councils, see Larsen 1968: 33–34.

⁴² Thespians: *SEG* 31.358 = E&R no. 60 (above n. 26). Orchomenos: Thuc. 4.76.3. Thebes: Thuc. 4.93.4; 7.29.3–30.4; *Hell. ox.* 19.3 Chambers; Plin. *nat.* 4.8 with Bakhuizen 1994: Appendix 1; Beck 1997: 208–210.

⁴³ See Bakhuizen 1994; Gonzales 2006; see also Chapter 13 by Thomas Heine Nielsen below for the attestation of syntelic dominions in Arkadia.

formalized, with the main powers in each district showing little, if any, concern for the participation of their surrounding villages in politics, while at the same time drawing on their agricultural resources. The *meros* structure thus patronized the large urban centers. It acknowledged their desire to act as local leaders who ruled over an extended countryside.

But this tendency also brought with it the most immediate threat to federalism. Thebes had always played a prominent role in Boiotian affairs. Although its initial representation in the federal government was on par with Orchomenos, Thebes was the eminent party. The federal council met on the Kadmeia, which was also the seat of the federal treasury. The emission of a federal coinage in that period, too, was under the aegis of the Thebans.⁴⁴ To be sure, the mechanics of proportional representation curbed Thebes' domination of the league, since this protected the voicing of non-Theban interests at any time. But, in addition to its function as capital city, Thebes possessed the largest manpower and the strongest economy; and its citizens showed the most outspoken determination to lead the *koinon*.

In 427, after a five-year siege, the city of Plataia surrendered to the Thebans. The Plataians were slaughtered or enslaved and their *chōra* divided into land leases that were handed out to Theban citizens. Plataia had not been a member of the Boiotan League up to that point, but the annexation gave Thebes the opportunity to initiate a reshaping of the federal districts in the southeast.⁴⁵ As a result of this, Theban shares in the league doubled; for the first time since the league's inauguration, the parity between Thebes and Orchomenos was abandoned. Only four years later, in 423, the Thebans attacked Thespiiai and dismantled its city walls on the grounds of Thespiiai's alleged leanings towards Athens. Thespiiai continued to exercise control over two federal districts, but effectively the city had come under the leadership of Thebes. Thucydides (4.133.1) claims that the Thebans had always wanted to reduce Thespiiai; it is likely that the grudges between both cities continued to be fueled by their previous opposition in the Persian War. More importantly, the subjugation of Thespiiai implied that the Thebans, at that point, influenced the vote of six out of eleven federal districts, thus controlling the absolute majority in the affairs of the *koinon*.

⁴⁴ Council and treasury: *Hell. ox.* 19.4 Chambers. Coinage: Head 1881 and 1911: 349–350; Kraay 1976: 111; Psoma and Tsangari 2003: 113.

⁴⁵ The surrender of Plataia in 427 BCE, reported at 3.52, is a key moment in Book 3 of Thucydides' work. See Hornblower 1991–2008: 1.442–466.

During the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE), such a transformation of the league was covered by extraordinary circumstances; in a way, the persistent fighting made such a shift possible, and it silenced the growing disaffection in Boiotia with Thebes' heavy-handed leadership. If the confederacy survived the Peloponnesian War largely intact, this had to do with the many compromises and concessions that warfare extracted from everyone. All the same, by 404 it had become unmistakably clear that it was next to impossible to articulate a common voice that spoke for all Boiotians. Theban leadership ambitions notwithstanding, the most imminent threat to a compromise came from factional strife among different federal parties that favored different alliances in foreign policy. Immediately after the war, numerous cities in Boiotia were discontented with the concluding peace orchestrated by Sparta. In 395, the Thebans finally led the league into a military alliance with Corinth, Argos, and Athens, to fight against their former allies the Spartans. The stretch was too much for the other Boiotians. As a consequence, in the first year of the Corinthian War, Orchomenos took the opportunity to secede from the league and ally with Sparta. Once again, the front lines of war cut through Boiotia. With Orchomenos detached from the rest, and persistent pro-Spartan sentiments in other cities, the “rump league” gradually degenerated into a federal farce.⁴⁶ In 386 BCE, as a result of the King's Peace, the Boiotian League was disbanded. Outside of Thebes, the move was met with little resistance. Indeed, many Boiotians greeted the dissolution with joy.

The King's Peace stipulated that “the Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent” (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31). The call for *autonomia* became the new benchmark, or “life principle” (Jehne 1994), of a *polis*' political integrity as a state. In the following years, the demand for autonomy was directed against various forms of political alliances, including some federal leagues. Due to their opposition to Sparta, Thebes and the Boiotian League were naturally exposed to the workings of the King's Peace, and the power politics that came with it. Although the Spartans were not officially mandated by the Persian king to implement the terms of the peace, victory in the Corinthian War, along with the strong determination to exercise leadership, put them in the driver's seat. After the dissolution of the Boiotian League, the governance of Thebes was put into the hands of a college of three *polemarchoi* who oversaw the affairs of the city council, the *boulē*. But local affairs had been charged with factionalism and civic strife ever since the concluding years of the Peloponnesian War. As soon as the Boiotian League

⁴⁶ See Funke 1980; Cook 1988; Buck 1994: 27–43.

was gone, those party rivalries reached a new level. In 382, one of the leading parties formed around a certain Leontiades saw no other way to prevail other than to stage a coup. With the support of a Spartan contingent that was instrumental to their plan, Leontiades had his main opponents killed or exiled. Backed by a Spartan garrison that was stationed in the Kadmeia, his party then ruled over their fellow Thebans “like tyrants” (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.1). Although this might not be taken literally, it nevertheless highlights the idea that Thebes had moved towards a more rigid oligarchic regime which rested on marginal popular consent – and heavily on support from Sparta. In other Boiotian cities, similar regimes rose to power.⁴⁷

In the winter of 379, a band of exiles returned to Thebes to overthrow Leontiades’ junta. The conspirators entered the city in disguise and slaughtered the figureheads of the regime while they were feasting. Leontiades was struck down in his house. The rebels next called out their fellow Thebans from their homes to assemble them in a hastily convoked meeting at which four *boiotarchs* were elected. The *boiotarchs* led the final assault against the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia.⁴⁸ The message was unmistakable: the election of *boiotarchs* in a citizen assembly and the prompt strike against the Spartans made it clear that the rebels had conceived of their coup both as an attempt to re-launch the Boiotian League and as a war of independence from outside domination. Both these goals were pursued with remarkable force over the next years, and also met with unique success.

The great architects of this policy were Epameinondas and Pelopidas. Under their leadership, over the course of the next three years all Spartan garrisons were expelled from their fortresses in eastern Boiotia. In 376, the focus was shifted towards Orchomenos, which was stripped of its foreign protection after the Spartans were defeated in battle near the village of Tegyra (375). Meanwhile, the Thebans had joined the renascent Athenian League in 378 to back up their position vis-à-vis Sparta, a policy that paid off in full when Thebes’ Boiotian policy was recognized at the renewal conference of the King’s Peace at Athens in the fall of 375. But the Thebans did not leave it there. In 373, they razed the walls of Thespiiai and Tanagra; both cities were forced into the Theban syntely. Shortly thereafter, Plataia was destroyed and its inhabitants driven into exile.⁴⁹ When the Spartans

⁴⁷ For the situation in Thebes in the aftermath of the King’s Peace, see Roesch 1965a: 158–162; Beck 1997: 96–97; Buckler 2008: 71–78. In Tanagra, a certain Hypatodoros rose to power: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.49.

⁴⁸ See Buckler 1980: 16–17; Buck 1994: 72–80.

⁴⁹ See Buckler 1979/2008 and 1995/2008; Buck 1994 81–100; see Tuplin 1986 on Thespiiai, Tanagra and Plataia.

protested against this policy at the Common Peace conference in Sparta in 371, the diplomatic falling-out with the leading delegation from Thebes paved the way to another pitched battle. In July 371, the Theban army won a crushing victory over the Spartans and their allies at Leuktra, in the vicinity of Thespiiai. The campaign was so impressive, and Sparta's defeat so humiliating, that it soon gave rise to traditions of heroic deeds and all sorts of legendary stratagems. Whatever the long-term significance of Leuktra was, in the summer of 371 the road was clear for the Thebans to shape affairs in Boiotia the way they envisioned.⁵⁰

As mentioned before, the intention to re-launch the Boiotian League was stated as early as when the Theban rebels delivered the final blow against the Spartan garrison in the city citadel. When the league took shape over the next years in the war of Boiotian independence, this meant that much of its outlook was impacted by the military agenda of the day. The first implication of this was that the Theban primary assembly of citizens grew to become the ultimate decision-making body in Boiotian affairs. It is difficult to say how the local assembly at Thebes related to a Boiotian assembly held at Thebes; presumably, citizens from other cities were not excluded from the assembly when a Boiotian agenda arose. But the quest for a strict, legal separation between two assemblies is futile, if not counter-intuitive. The new league was exposed to a very different dynamic than the earlier *koinon*. Its engine was the primary assembly at Thebes, in which Theban citizens always held a majority. Equally, for as much as can be said, there was no federal *boulē*. The probouleutic functions of the Boiotian League were absorbed, and carried out by, the city council of Thebes.⁵¹

The second implication of the war with Sparta showed itself in the league's decidedly democratic character. The popular assembly was open to all citizens, including those of lower classes and those with little property. Decisions were made by a show of hands. In the same manner, the assembly elected an executive college of seven *boiotarchs*, who were now vested with greater authority.⁵² The question of the composition of their board has given rise to the speculation that the concept of territorial districts might have been revived in some way and the *boiotarchs* consequently represented federal *merē*. The idea builds on the observation that the names of two *boiotarchs* from Tanagra and Thespiiai survive in an inscription that dates from the second half of the fourth century BCE; hence, epigraphy attests to two non-Theban

⁵⁰ Road to Leuktra and campaign: Buckler 1980: 46–69; Buck 1994: 101–114.

⁵¹ For the organization of this league, see Larsen 1968: 175–180; Beck 1997: 100–106; Buckler 2000/2008.

⁵² The role of the *boiotarchs* is fleshed out by Larsen 1968: 177 and Beck 1997: 102.

officials at some point in the later history of the league.⁵³ If the document really belongs to this period of the confederacy, it clearly speaks to an exceptional context. For as much as can be said about the local origins of *boiotarchs* in the three decades after 379 BCE, all other leading league officials apparently came from Thebes. More importantly, the attestation of *boiotarchs* from a city other than Thebes does not automatically imply the existence of federal districts. The inclusion of those officials might have simply resulted from the need to make ad hoc concessions to communities such as Thespiiai and Tanagra at a time when Thebes' power had already begun to falter. With no further evidence at hand, the question of districts is hard to assess. But the energy the Thebans displayed in the war of independence, along with the dazzling degree of their success, points to a league concept that differed significantly from its predecessors. The *koinon* had started off as a Theban enterprise, and the Thebans, in their primary assembly, took a grip on steering the league through the hazards of war with Sparta.

During the successful campaigns against Spartan strongholds for most of the 370s, the Thebans managed to win popular support in each of the Boiotian cities that were liberated from foreign domination. After Leuktra, the Thebans established a new pan-Boiotian festival, the so-called Basileia, which fully captured the spirit of victory and unity under the aegis of Thebes. The games, over which the Thebans presided, quickly grew into an event that drew much attention and recognition throughout the region. Held in Lebadeia in close vicinity to the road to Delphi, they boasted of Theban success and prowess.⁵⁴ While the Basileia furthered Thebes' reputation among many fellow Boiotians, the festival must have also provoked Orchomenos, which remained the last stronghold of insubordination in Boiotia. In 364, when the quarrels with Orchomenos openly resurfaced, the Thebans destroyed the city and drove its inhabitants into exile, thereby also cementing Theban power in the northwest.⁵⁵

Towards the end of the decade and in the 360s, the policy of unification by force was complemented by a large-scale fortification program that included walls, coordinated defenses, and systems of communication to safeguard the region from foreign invasion. This program was also augmented by the attempt to fortify the Boiotian harbors and embark on an extensive naval project.⁵⁶ Survey archaeology reveals an unparalleled

⁵³ *SEG* 25.553; see Knoepfler 2000: 351–364. A later date has been proposed for the inscription, see *SEG* 32.476, 1 486).

⁵⁴ See Schachter 1994. ⁵⁵ Diod. 15.79.3–6; Paus. 9.15.3; Buckler 1980: 184.

⁵⁶ The principal literary source for the naval project is Diod. 15.79.1; see also Isok. 5.53; Plut. *Philopoim.* 14; Aischin. 2.105. A proxy decree for Epaminondas from Knidos casts further light on this, see

increase both in urban and rural population figures at around the mid-fourth century, which betrays the effectiveness of those fortification measures and their impact on agricultural productivity. Effectively, Boiotia was turned into a regional fortress, with a strong military, a large number of citizens, and extensive agricultural production.⁵⁷ Thebes was at the heart of this fortress, and the new *koinon* was designed as a compact league that united the region under its leadership. Yet despite the prevalence of direct politics and the league's seemingly monolithic character, the integration of Boiotia was laid out as a political endeavor that united the Boiotian *ethnos*, rather than simply subordinating it to Thebes. The revival of the *boio-tarchia* put the league in the tradition of earlier integration projects, and the pan-Boiotian sentiment also resonated in the federal citizenship, empowering all Boiotian citizens to participate in league affairs at Thebes. Federal decrees, usually issued by the "*damos* of the Boiotians," further attest to the creation of a federal *archōn* who exercised eponymous functions. The new Boiotian League thus amalgamated the workings of *ethnos*-integration and the ambition of a single *polis* to take the lead in this process. It was built both on the ideas of hegemonic leadership and of regional integration.

The Battle of Chaironeia (338 BCE) once again changed the direction of federalism in Boiotia. Although only a tight victory of Philip's forces on the battlefield, it impacted the development of Greek interstate affairs more deeply than its participants might have thought. In Boiotia, where the battle took place, it totally reconfigured the framework in which the federal *koinon* operated. On the one hand, it reset Theban power ambitions in Boiotia; no matter what Thebes' role was in the future, it became obvious very quickly that the city's leadership days were over. In terms of power politics, the league had lost its engine. On the other hand, the *koinon* was forced to position itself within a new global constellation, facing Makedonian and, soon, Roman hegemony, both of which wielded the power to screen and, if necessary, intervene in the affairs of any Greek

Blümel 1994 (*editio princeps*) and Buckler 1998/2008. Other decrees of the league document the intent to foster proxy ties with powers that supported the maritime enterprise, i.e., with Carthage (*IG* vii 2407), Byzantion (2408), and Makedon (*SEG* 34.355); see Cawkwell 1972; Gerolymatos 1985; Jehne 1999: 328–344. See also the proxy decree for Timeas from Lakonia (Mackil 2008), which most likely belongs here.

⁵⁷ See Buckler 1980: 15–45; Fossey 1988; Beck 1997: 198–202; Post 2012: 16–47; Gartland 2013, whose thoughtful analysis of the coinage complements this picture. In 366 BCE, Oropos was absorbed into Boiotia which once again increased the agricultural capacities of the league and extended its borders to match with the natural geography in the straits of Euboea: Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1; Aischin. 2.164; Diod. 15.76.1; see Hansen 2004: 448–9; Gonzales 2006: 43–7.

region. The league's response to both these challenges is difficult to assess because the historiographical tradition becomes notoriously sketchy after Chaironeia. The history of Boiotian federalism in the Hellenistic period needs to be extrapolated from the epigraphic record first and foremost, with all its assets and shortcomings.

Chaironeia put a sudden end to the Theban hegemony over Boiotia. The Makedonians stationed a garrison on the Kadmeia that oversaw city affairs in the months after the battle. Likewise, Philip set out to rebuild various cities that had fallen prey to Thebes' unification-by-force policy. Orchomenos and Plataia were reconstructed and also repopulated, the former apparently growing into a leading position from which it governed the interaction between the Boiotian *poleis* for some years.⁵⁸ Oropos, which had been so vital to Theban influence in Boiotia and across the Gulf of Euboia, was detached from Boiotia and put under Athenian control. These measures naturally cut deep into the political traditions at Thebes. In 335 BCE, upon a first glimpse of hope, the Thebans launched a revolt against Makedon. The penalty was ferocious: supported by Thespians, Orchomenians, and Plataians, whose actions were motivated by long-term grievances and a desire for revenge, Alexander destroyed the city of Thebes, enslaved the greatest part of the surviving population, and parceled out the Theban *chōra* to adjacent *poleis* in eastern Boiotia. Alexander might have ordered the dissolution of any remaining league in Boiotia in 324, but the implications of this move, if authentic, are hard to disentangle.⁵⁹ Various inscriptions from the period indicate the persistent use of the tribal ethnic *Boiōtoi*; as was demonstrated earlier, the occurrence of such ethnics might point to the existence of a federal league or citizenship, but it does not do so automatically.⁶⁰ In 316/15 BCE, Thebes was partially rebuilt by Kassandros and the *polis* participated in one way or another in the affairs of the *Boiōtoi*. But only by 288 did the Thebans regain the status of political self-governance within the confederacy. Fifty years after the battle of Chaironeia, after an extremely troubled period of defeat, turmoil, and destruction, Thebes had consolidated its stance as a genuine citizen community, with a mid-sized population and a much-reduced territory.⁶¹

⁵⁸ E.g., Gullath 1982: 7 and 15, contra, Roesch 1982: 267–275, who opts for Onchestos.

⁵⁹ See Gullath 1982 for an in-depth discussion of the events between 338 and 287 BCE.

⁶⁰ See the introduction to this volume. Accordingly, the appearance of Thebans, with or without their regional *ethnikon*, in inscriptions should not be interpreted as proof for the reintegration of the city into the *koinon*; see Roesch 1982: 413–501 and Gullath 1982: 7. 47. III with n. 5.

⁶¹ In 315 or at the very latest 308 BCE, see Gullath 1982: 107–113. For the reintegration in 288, see Knoepfler 2001c: 14–19, with further references.

How did Boiotian federalism adapt to the changes of the day? In Pausanias' *Periegesis* a fascinating account on the Daidala festival in honor of Hera at Plataia survives (9.3.5–8). Although many of the details of the Daidala (named after some wooden images that played an important role in the festival ritual) are opaque, Pausanias offers exciting insights into how the Boiotians came together to participate in the celebration. A more political reading of Pausanias' text provides valuable information on the condition of the Hellenistic *koinon*. According to Pausanias, the festival commemorated the reconciliation between Hera and Zeus. While the so-called Lesser Daidala were only of local importance and took place at least every six years, the Great Daidala were celebrated by cities from all over the region. Rooted in traditional Boiotian cults and associated with Zeus of the Summits, one of the main gods in Boiotia, the Daidala offered a vibrant stage for the expression of tribal togetherness and ethnic cohesion.⁶² Indeed, the festival's prevailing goal seems to have been to provide a stage for reconciliation. The ritual cycle of the Great Daidala was fifty-nine years, "for the festival lapsed for as long a time as the Plataians were in exile" (Paus. 9.3.5). Since the Thebans are said to have participated after the restoration of their city by Kassandros (see above), it is reasonable to assert that the Great Daidala were celebrated soon after 316/15.⁶³ In a festival cycle of fifty-nine years, the instauration of the Daidala was then geared towards the commemoration of the destruction of Plataia by Thebes in 373. The notion of a cycle further implies that the Daidala had been held at some point before 373. The addition of another fifty-nine years leads more or less to the events surrounding the destruction of Plataia in the early years of the Peloponnesian War. If this interpretation is correct, the Great Daidala of the late fourth century celebrated the union of Boiotian communities and the reconciliation between Thebes and Plataia in particular, after their falling apart at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and then again in 373.⁶⁴

Pausanias says (9.3.5–6) that the participation in the ritual was arranged according to a regional principle: "There are fourteen wooden images (*xoana*) ready from the . . . Little Daidala. Those were distributed by drawing lots between Plataians, Koroneians, Thespians, Tanagraians, Chaironeians, Orchomenians, Lebadaians, and Thebans . . . The towns of lesser account pool their funds for images (*synteleian hairountai*)." When the procession reached the summit of Mt. Kithairon, an altar was erected and the sacrifices

⁶² See Schachter 1981–1994: 1.245–250 and Chaniotis 2002 for general comments; Knoepfler 2001b and Müller 2011 for political readings. The festival cycle is reconstructed by Iversen 2007.

⁶³ See Paus. 9.3.5 with Knoepfler 2001b: 347.

⁶⁴ Paus. 9.3.5 with Knoepfler 2001b: 368–374, who fleshes out the motive of reconciliation.

were performed; Pausanias states that “the *poleis* and *telē* all sacrifice a cow to Hera and a bull to Zeus” (9.3.8). The notion of fourteen *xoana* has received much scholarly attention. In Pausanias’ account, each of the larger Boiotian cities contributed one such image – eight in total – whereas smaller towns provided the remaining six, dividing the costs of sponsorship among them. The pooling of funds in a *synteleia* may suggest that the old principle of syntelic cooperation somehow survived in the Hellenistic *koinon*. Yet the general notion of *telē*, referenced alongside *poleis*, implies that the pooling of funds was reminiscent of another time-honored practice, i.e., the organization of Boiotian affairs by federal districts.

The epigraphic evidence indicates that the college of *boiotarchs* and a board of magistrates called *aphedriateuontes*⁶⁵ usually comprised seven members. Such arithmetic is incongruent with Pausanias’ eight *xoana* from major cities and six from a syntely of lesser ones. It bears little fruit to attempt to harmonize those figures or engage in number games. The combined evidence from Pausanias and the inscriptions implies that the Boiotian League operated on seven subdivisions, or federal *telē*. Each district comprised one or more *poleis*, depending on their respective size, and each district, apparently, sponsored two *xoana*.⁶⁶ In the same style, the federal magistracies were staffed according to the arithmetic of *telē*. While some cities regularly delegated one *boiotarch* and *aphedriat* (Orchomenos, Tanagra, Thebes, Thespiiai, Plataiai), others shared in the remaining positions, either in rotation or according to a commonly agreed key. The organization required a high degree of coordination and compromise, as there were at least eight major cities but only seven districts.⁶⁷

The organizing principle of seven districts also resonated in the administration of other regional festivals, most notably the Pamboiotia held at Koroneia, and in the organization of the Boiotian federal army.⁶⁸ Inscriptions reveal that all leading federal magistrates – the *boiotarchs*, *archons*, *naopoioi*, *hipparchs*, *nauarchs* – were elected in the federal assembly *kata poleis*, i.e., from pools that were reserved for individual cities. Evidently, the experience from the days of the Theban Hegemony had taught the Boiotians that direct election through a primary assembly inevitably championed the candidates from the *polis* in which the assembly

⁶⁵ The *aphedriateuontes* probably had sacral responsibilities, but their exact function is unknown, see Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926: 1437; Corsten 1999: 40–41.

⁶⁶ Knoepfler 2001b: 347–362.

⁶⁷ Feyel 1942: 265–271; Roesch 1965a: 104; see also Gullath 1982: 35–43.

⁶⁸ Schachter 1981–1994: 1.124; Knoepfler 2001b: 356–361; for the organization of military districts also Roesch 1982: 307–354.

was held. The Hellenistic *koinon* thus returned to the idea of political representation of power, yet the league gave this a different twist than the Oxyrhynchos constitution had done. While higher magistrates were drawn from pools that were reserved for representatives from local communities, lower federal officials were elected within their own city, which once again enhanced their profile as citizen communities. In the same vein, the principle of proportional representation was weakened. The larger members of the league were represented in the federal government not in proportion to the size of their citizen body, but directly, with each member *polis* possessing the same vote.⁶⁹

Once again, it is telling to see how the political organization of the league drew on Boiotian or, more precisely, Theban foundation myths. The rising prominence of an arithmetic that was governed by the number seven suggests as much. Beginning with the Homeric tradition, Thebes was notorious as a seven-gated city.⁷⁰ In another piece of literary evidence from a much later period, Pausanias' description of Boiotia, the seven gates of Thebes serve as a structuring principle from which his seven itineraries through the region depart.⁷¹ The impact of such narratives on the social reality of the day is always hard to assess. Perhaps the number of seven *boiotarchs* after 379 BCE was already somehow inspired by references to Thebes' mythical tradition. But the interaction between both spheres, myth and politics, no matter how hazy it might have been, betrays the general idea that the politics of integration continued to be hardwired to the belief of tribal togetherness. Throughout the Hellenistic era, the defining devices of the tribe of the Boiotians – their shared legends and foundation myths, collective cults and religion, their sense of ethnic communality – all impacted its political engagement. It is revealing that, despite Thebes' decline as the region's leading power, one of the most vital heroic narratives of tribal identity and political integration in Boiotia continued to be a quintessentially Theban one.

⁶⁹ Boiotian institutions and officers of the Hellenistic *koinon* are treated by Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926: 1432–1442; Roesch 1965a; Larsen 1968: 178–180; Etienne and Knoepfler 1976: 263–350; Gullath 1982: 49–55. A concise summary is provided by Buck 1993. For the voting principle according to cities see Liv. 33.2.6, with Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926: 1435; Roesch 1965a: 126; Larsen 1968: 180; Müller 2011: 275–276. The high degree of member-states' participation is stressed by Roesch 1965a: 28 and Funke 2007a: 97–98. Müller 2011: 276 singles out the principle of proportionality.

⁷⁰ Hom. *Il.* 4.406 and *Od.* 11.263; Hesiod, *Shield of Herakles* 49; Pind. *Pyth.* 3.90; 8.39; 9.80; 11.11; *Nem.* 4.19; 9.18; *Isthm.* 1.66; 8.15; Pherekydes *FGrH* 3 F 41; Aisch. *Seven Against Thebes* 165; Soph. *Ant.* 101. 119. Cf. also Müller 2011: 266.

⁷¹ Only Plataia at the beginning of Book 9 and Orchomenos at the end are exempt from this narrative structure. See Frazer 1913: 1.xxiii–xxiv; Snodgrass 1987: 81–82; Hutton 1995: 105–125. 193.

All the while, the center of political power had long left the Kadmeia and shifted to the regional sanctuaries of Boiotia. A Boiotian-Aitolian proxeny decree from 301 BCE confirms that by the late fourth century the Itoneion near Koroneia and the Poseidonion at Onchestos were considered official federal sanctuaries.⁷² While the Itoneion was regarded as the religious heart of the confederacy,⁷³ Onchestos was the new administrative center.⁷⁴ Both sites absorbed the function of so-called “substitute centers”⁷⁵ or compromise capitals, in lieu of the charged political spaces of *poleis* such as Thebes or Orchomenos.

The history of the Boiotian *koinon* in the third and second centuries BCE has often been characterized as one of decline and downfall. Such a verdict usually draws on Polybius (20.4.1–3) who comments that

for many years Boiotia had been in a morbid condition very different from the former sound health and renown of that state. After the battle of Leuktra the Boiotians had attained great celebrity and power, but by some means or other during the period which followed they continued constantly to lose both the one and the other under the leadership of the *stratēgos* Abaiokritos, and in subsequent years not only did this diminishment go on, but there was an absolute change for the contrary, and they did all they could to obscure their ancient fame as well.⁷⁶

But Polybius might have been a little too quick to judge here.⁷⁷ In light of the changing conditions in Greek politics, it is remarkable how the Boiotian League managed to pursue its affairs in a generally independent manner that preserved the integrity of its member-states vis-à-vis the great superpowers of the day. In the wars of the Successors, Boiotia switched alliances several times and explored the advantages of allying with other confederacies, such as with the Aitolians in 301, as a way of preserving regional autonomy.⁷⁸ In the 260s, the Boiotians favored an Achaian alliance over the one with Aitolia, which threw the *koinon* into the Achaian-Aitolian controversies of the 240s. In 245, the league was

⁷² *IG IX 1*² 170 with Roesch 1982: 218, 270. ⁷³ Schachter 1980 and 1981–1994: I.123–7.

⁷⁴ Onchestos as the capital: Roesch 1982: 266–282. For discussions on Thebes as the re-emerging meeting place see Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926: 1433–1435; Hennig 1977: 126; Roesch 1982: 278–282; Müller 2011: 277–282.

⁷⁵ Freitag 2007a: 388 (“Ersatzzentren”). ⁷⁶ Trans. W. R. Paton.

⁷⁷ See Hennig 1977 and now Müller 2013 who situates the verdict of decline in the wider literary trope of the rise and fall of states in Polybius’ work. Herakleides Kritikos (*BNJ* 369A F I.6–25) draws an equally unflattering picture of Boiotia in the third century BCE. Apparently he relied on older prejudices against Boiotia that were already prevalent in the Classical era (see above); see also Liv. 36.6.1–3 with the comments by Hennig 1977: 119–122. Buck 1993: 100 and 106 points out the relative success of the league, as does Funke 2007a: 90.

⁷⁸ Cloché 1952: 201–210; Gullath 1982: 114–211; Gauger 2005: 202–203.

heavily defeated by the Aitolians, once again on the plain of Chaironeia. Consequently, the Boiotians were forced to join the Aitolian League and surrender much of their territory. The incident triggered the deep reorganization of the league's military and economic affairs. With it came an overhaul in the organization of the defenses of city territories, including a new system of watch guard units and mobile light armed troops. The military catalogs from Thespiiai further indicate that the army reform compensated for the decrease in manpower available to the league through the creation of elite regiments; their intensive training made them a viable alternative to the previously employed, large-scale infantry militias.⁷⁹ After 229 BCE, the *koinon* had recovered enough to position itself between Makedon, Achaia, and Aitolia, before joining the Hellenic League of Antigonos III Gonatas in 224 BCE. Around the same time, Megara and its satellite Aigosthena both joined the Boiotian League, which added additional weight to the battling *koinon*.⁸⁰

Federalism was not yet dead in Boiotia. While the challenges from Hellenistic monarchies and various middle powers were met with remarkable coherence and unity, the rise of Rome deeply divided the league. In 197 BCE, T. Quinctius Flamininus constrained the Boiotians to become *socii* of the Romans, but not everyone followed the order: some Boiotians remained in the Makedonian camp. Although Flamininus responded with deliberate mildness to gain support for the Roman faction, the Boiotian assembly reacted by electing a pro-Makedonian roster of candidates into the key positions of the league. When the *boiotarch* Brakchylles was killed by the Roman faction, the conflict devolved into civil war. In 172/1 BCE, Roman legates carried out the senatorial order to negotiate the terms of surrender with *poleis* separately. They thereby effectively dissolved the confederacy.⁸¹

Yet the idea of regional cooperation survived. Federalism had a *Nachleben*, of course with a different trajectory. A league under pro-Roman leadership persisted from 167 until 146 BCE, when the Romans ordered its dissolution. Shortly thereafter the confederacy was reinaugurated, although its character was altered in the context of the new political reality. In 27 BCE, Boiotia was absorbed into the Roman province of Achaia where its traces extend well into the third century CE. The purpose of its

⁷⁹ Feyel 1942: 187–262; Hennig 1977: 146–148.

⁸⁰ Busolt and Swoboda 1920–1926: 1445–1446; Cloché 1952: 211–232; Larsen 1968: 303–358; Gauger 2005: 203–204. Megara: Smith 2008: 106; Robu 2014: 100–102.

⁸¹ Cloché 1952: 233–260; Roesch 1965a: 69–71; Larsen 1968: 359–504; Deininger 1971: 54–58, 88–89, 153–159, 164–167; Buck 1993: 106; Gauger 2005: 204; Müller 2007; see Martin 1975: 179–229.

league was limited to cultic functions and ritual performance.⁸² But this did not root it any less in the lives of the Boiotians, nor did it drive the *koinon* into obsolescence. In a letter by Hadrian to the city of Naryx from 138 CE, one of the defining criteria by which Naryx was considered to be a *polis* was that it was a member of the Boiotian League and that it contributed a *boiotarch* to the *koinon*.⁸³ At the time of Hadrian's letter, both the league and its leading magistracy had a long history that extended from the world of late Archaic Greece through the Classical and Hellenistic periods well into the Roman Empire. In the course of this long history, federalism in Boiotia had manifested itself in a full array of political configurations and experiments. As Hadrian's letter indicates, the idea of the *koinon* was so closely associated with the conduct of Boiotian affairs that participation in it had actually become the defining moment of a Greek *polis* community.

⁸² Roesch 1965a: 71–73; Schachter 1994: 82–84; Buck 1993: 106; Gauger 2005: 204.

⁸³ SEG 51.641, lines 11–12.

The Euboian League – an ‘irregular’ koinon?

Denis Knoepfler

In spite of the various studies of which it has been the subject for over a half-century,¹ the Euboian League remains one of the most difficult *koina* of Greece proper to understand. This is largely because of its historical discontinuity, marked by long periods of erasure, if not complete disappearance. Scholars have long been able to doubt with some legitimacy the very existence of a league. On the international scale, at any rate, its political role was much less pronounced than that of the renowned “associations of free cities” which were highlighted by Montesquieu in his *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence* (1734), namely the Aitolian, the Boiotian, and the Achaian Leagues. Finally, in his grand treatise *L’Esprit des Lois* from 1748, Montesquieu selected only the rather exotic Lykian League as “the ideal of an admirable federative republic” (Book 9, Chapter 3).² No less significant, in this respect, is the manner in which Edward Freeman described the Euboians in his fundamental (albeit irreparably dated) study of ancient federalism entitled *History of Federal Government* (1863, 2nd edition 1893). Not only did the British historian (who liked, we know, to distribute praise and blame liberally) relegate the Euboian League to the ranks of federal states that were the least worthy of consideration – a great distance behind “the four famous commonwealths” on which he based his criteria, with the Achaians ranking at the top of his list³ – but he judged it to barely worthy of mention: “[I]t may seem almost ludicrous to quote a mere abortive scheme, or pretence at a scheme, our whole knowledge of which is contained in a single sentence of a hostile orator.”⁴ This was clearly an allusion to the

¹ Notably, Wallace 1956; Picard 1979; Knoepfler 1990a.

² For the origin of Montesquieu’s preference of the Lykians over the Achaians, see Knoepfler 2013a.

³ With the Confederation of the Swiss Cantons in the second place, the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands in the third, and the United States of America in the fourth place (because of the Civil War): Freeman 1893: 201; see Knoepfler 2013a: 139, with the bibliography.

⁴ Freeman 1893: 207. Cf. Wallace 1956: viii (without quoting Freeman there or elsewhere).

speech *Against Ktesiphon* given by Aischines in which the adversary of Demosthenes mentions, in a sarcastic and decidedly negative manner, the attempt made around 345 BCE by the politician Kallias of Chalkis to unify Euboia “under the pretext of summoning at Chalkis a Euboian council (*Euboikon synedrion*: 3.89)”, even though each and every one of the cities of Euboia remained at least in principle a separate member of the Athenian League (see below, p. 166).

Freeman certainly had his reasons for not lingering on the Euboian federation, and indeed he did not wish to search for either its origins or the causes of its disintegration. This is because he did not have any documentary proof available that a political community called *Euboeis* had ever existed.⁵ Everything instead seemed to indicate the contrary: that the endeavor of Kallias had been nothing more than an improvisation without any hope of a future, swept away after Chaironeia (338 BCE) by Makedonian dominance over mainland Greece. Nevertheless, had Freeman taken seriously the concern of the Euboians to unify themselves in a federation after the fourth century BCE, he certainly would not have neglected to make use of the information provided by Livy (who doubtless follows in the footsteps of Polybius), according to whom a “meeting of Euboian cities” (*conventus Euboicarum civitatum*: 34.51.1–2) took place in Chalkis in 194 at the summons of the proconsul T. Quinctius Flamininus. The use of this expression in a context vastly different from that of the fourth century would seem to be a clue to a certain permanence or endurance of a concept of federalism among the inhabitants of Euboia,⁶ or at least among those who concerned themselves with the political future of this large island which, admittedly, did not lend itself naturally to a federal union.

What worked against the unification of the region was first and foremost its highly pronounced geographical compartmentalization. The island is composed of three very distinct natural regions;⁷ a division which did not exactly match the distribution of territory among the region’s cities in antiquity (which numbered four from the beginning of the fourth

⁵ The first epigraphic attestations of the *Euboeis* were discovered only at the end of the nineteenth century.

⁶ The meeting of this *conventus* (instead of the *conventum* as written by Picard 1979: 288) does, however, not indicate that a Euboian *koinon* was immediately re-established under Roman leadership (see Ferrary 1988: 105–106 and n. 196).

⁷ See, for instance, Geyer 1924: 431–432 (population); Philippson 1951: 561–634 (and 645–685 for E. Kirsten’s observations on this subject); Wallace 1956: 6; Meyer: 1965: 398; Larsen 1968: 97–98; Picard 1979: 209–210.

century⁸) but rather appears later during the period of Frankish and Venetian rule. The island, in these periods, was defined by the existence of three *seigneuries* (the Tercier Barons of Euboia)⁹ which persist today in the administrative subdivision of the province (*nomos*) into three districts (*eparchiai*). Another source of disunity in the region whose importance should not be overestimated was its diversity of ethnic origins. Indeed, even if all of the Euboians of the Classical period seem to have been linguistically unified in the use of a common Ionian dialect (with regional variants that remain largely unknown, save for Eretria), they nevertheless remained ethnically heterogeneous. The epic tradition presents the Euboians as comprising one sole *ethnos* during the period of the Trojan War: the Abantes, a proto-Hellenic group whose origins and history remain a topic of scholarly debate.¹⁰ The great cities of central Euboia, Chalkis and Eretria, were supposed to have been colonized by the neighboring region of Phokis (the provisional homeland of the Abantes), Boiotia, and finally Attica.¹¹ Elsewhere the Perrhaibes and Ellopes, having arrived from Thessaly, occupied the north of the island and founded the city of Histiaia – whose external relations were more oriented towards Phthiotid Achaia and Thessaly than towards the rest of Euboia. The southern portion of the island, which already exhibits all the traits of a typical Cycladic island, had by then already formed its own distinct identity, because at the end of the fifth century the people of Karystos – except for its little neighbor Styra – were considered to be Dryopes, not Ionians (Thuc. 7.57.4; cf. Hdt. 8.46.4).¹²

In this island that was geographically, ethnically, and politically fragmented, there were nevertheless some incontestable sources of unity that have been justifiably emphasized by recent scholars.¹³ First among these is the ease of maritime links on either side of Chalkidian Euripos leading from the

⁸ After the final annexation of Dion and Athenai Diades by Histiaia-Oreos about 360 BCE, there were no more than four *poleis* in the island, see Knoepfler 1971: 236–7; Picard 1979: 211–212; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 644 (in a chapter composed by K. Reber, M. H. Hansen and P. Ducrey).

⁹ See Koder 1973: 37 and passim for the respective domains of each of the barons.

¹⁰ Hom. *Il.* 2.536–545, the gist of which was repeated by Nonnos, *Dionysiaka* 13.158–168. See also Statius, *Theb.* 7.368–371. For the Abantes, see Sakellariou 2009: 73–86 who provides a critical review of the sources and an up-to-date bibliography.

¹¹ The movement of populations was not a one-way street, as indicated by the case of the Eretrians transplanted to Oropos in the eighth century BCE. On the origin of the toponym Graia, see Sakellariou 2009: 460–462; for its location in the light of recent excavations conducted by A. Mazarakis-Ainian, see Knoepfler 2010: 81–90.

¹² We may wonder whether Karystos was able to take part in the Delphic Amphiktyony straightaway as a full-fledged member of the Ionian *ethnos* (for a summary of the discussion, see Lefèvre 1998a: 59, n. 251).

¹³ Notably Picard 1979, Chapter 3: “Aux origines du fédéralisme eubéen.”

southern mouth of the Euboian Gulf to its northern outlet past the Kenaion headland. As we shall discuss further below, there is also the presence of a few cults that were worshipped by all the Euboians in common, be it all together in one distinct location – such as at Amarynthos for the cult of Artemis Amarysia – or individually in each of the region’s cities but in a coordinated manner (particularly Dionysos), or even outside the island in a sanctuary that was commonly administered by an association of nearby peoples. Such was certainly the case with the sanctuaries of Apollo at Delphi and Demeter at Anthela. The Euboians themselves also fell under the generic appellation of Ionians and, by sharing the two votes allotted to this *ethnos* with the Athenians, counted themselves among the twelve founding peoples of the Pylaio-Delphic Amphiktyony.¹⁴ Even outside of any sort of federal organization the Euboians must also have had more than one occasion on which to meet and deliberate their communal concerns, designate their representatives to the amphiktyonic authorities, or even, if need be, combine forces towards some kind of communal action. Such an action could take the form of resistance to an invasion or occupying force, be it the Persians in 480 or, later, the Athenians, the Boiotians, the Makedonians, or even the Romans. In the end it is not overly surprising to note that after the more or less half-century of Athenian domination over Euboia (from 446 to 411, or even only 404 in the case of Histiaia) a slow process of political rapprochement was triggered, the echo of which is still perceptible in certain texts, coins, and inscriptions.

An attempt today to retrace the first steps of the federal movement in Euboia is therefore not quite as “ludicrous” an enterprise as we might have once been inclined to think. In fact, when Jakob Larsen, writing more than a century after Freeman, edited and published his groundbreaking survey of *Greek Federal States* (1968), our understanding of the region had already progressed noticeably. By this point the existence of a *koinon tōn Euboeōn* during certain times could no longer be doubted, especially not in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Indeed, around 1900 two decrees which formally mention the existence of this political union of Euboian cities¹⁵ were discovered by chance at Chalkis, while at roughly the same time the excavations of the Archaeological Society unearthed a very important epigraphical document in Eretria. Primitively erected in the theater (as

¹⁴ See the recent works of Lefèvre 1998a: 59–63 and Sánchez 2001: 37–41. See also Wallace 1956: 22–24 and 29–34, and above all Picard 1979: 221–224. The city of Priene, mentioned by Aischines (2.116) along with Eretria in an amphiktyonic context, was of course not a Euboian settlement (Roux 1979: 9–10), but the celebrated Ionian city of this name.

¹⁵ IG xii.9, 898 and 899. Only the first of the two is a decree issued by the *koinon* itself, see Robert 1969: 45 (= Robert 1990: 751).

had also been the case at Chalkis, Histiaia, and Karystos as indicated in the inscription itself), the inscription chronicled the efforts undertaken by the four *poleis* of the island a little after 300 BCE to organize a musical contest that was to be celebrated in a coordinated manner in all of the cities during their two most important civic festivals, the *Dionysia* and the *Demetrieia*.¹⁶ Even before their inclusion in the *IG* corpus of Berlin (1915), these inscriptions – above all the two Chalkidian decrees – allowed Heinrich Swoboda to take a first glance at what had been the shape and appearance of the Euboian *koinon* at the beginning of the second century BCE.¹⁷ By citing the evidence of other documents discovered outside Euboia, the same scholar was, moreover, able to show that the Euboians comprised a regional *koinon* that endured until the Imperial period.¹⁸

Furthermore, on the basis of numismatic evidence, it had already been established that the community of the Euboians over time produced several coin emissions in silver and in bronze with different types on the obverse and reverse. The earliest specimens date from the beginning of the fourth century, and the latest ones to the period of the Roman conquest. According to the epigraphist Erich Ziebarth (to whom we owe the first classification of these emissions) the authority of the *koinon* at the time would have been weakened in relation to its constituent cities, as it is these cities alone which were capable of striking money.¹⁹ In 1956 this federal coinage was the subject of a systematic study by William P. Wallace entitled *The Euboian League and its Coinage*, a work which Larsen was thus perfectly capable of employing and did so by following it fairly closely in his discussion of the Euboian Confederation.²⁰ Nevertheless it ought to be noted that this recourse to numismatic data was something of a double-edged sword for Larsen. On the one hand, thanks to Wallace's well-informed study, the American scholar certainly found himself much better equipped to consider the history of Euboia than his predecessors.²¹ But on the other hand it was a risky endeavor, because in following in the footsteps of a numismatist and in adopting a

¹⁶ *IG* XII.9, 207 and addenda; see below, n. 41.

¹⁷ Swoboda and Hermann 1913: 442–443, who also cites the evidence of some coin issues (cf. Wallace 1956: 2, n. 5 and 40, n. 82).

¹⁸ Swoboda and Hermann 1913: 443, with notes 1–2. Swoboda was wrong to believe that the inscription of Chalkis *SIG*² 607 (= *IG* XII 9, 906) proved the existence of a Euboian *koinon* until the late empire because of its reference to a *hégēmōn*: this eponymous magistrate was certainly not, then, a federal magistrate (see pp. 173–174).

¹⁹ See the notice of Ziebarth 1915: 172. See also Wallace 1956: 2, n. 5; Picard 1979: 207, n. 1.

²⁰ Larsen 1968: 97–103. See also Meyer 1965: 399.

²¹ Before Wallace's study only summary discussions were available, such as Swoboda and Hermann 1913: 442–443; Ziebarth 1915: 172–173; Geyer 1924: 439–440.

chronological structure that was shaky at best, ultimately Larsen was led only to write the history of a largely fictive confederation whose historical origins he fundamentally misunderstood. At any rate, his presentation gives the impression that he was able to claim a place for this confederation among the ten federal states that are attested before the Peace of Antalkidas (386 BCE). However this date, which is certainly important in several other contexts, does not have the slightest relevance to the history of Euboian federalism (as I shall show subsequently). On the contrary, Larsen has nearly nothing to say regarding the subsequent history of the *koinon*, and thereby sidesteps the period of its full-fledged foundation while only superficially discussing its Hellenistic and Roman phases, almost as if everything had been neatly put in place since the beginning of the fourth century and before the Peace of Antalkidas.

Wallace’s position – which had resulted from the prevailing opinion of the wider numismatic community – was that the Euboian League had formed in the immediate aftermath of Euboia’s liberation from Athenian control in autumn of 411 BCE.²² In his reconstruction, the league’s first coinage (which was the Aiginetan standard and bore the abbreviated legend EYB²³) clearly indicated a break with Athens. Larsen subscribed to this opinion, all the while showing himself to be much more circumspect regarding the solid conclusions that ought to be drawn from his sequence of events. He did not at all think it certain that the coinage in question was proof positive that a full-fledged confederation had existed on the island since the end of the fifth century, because, among other reasons, each of the Euboian cities negotiated their own return to the Athenian fold separately – in particular Eretria since 394 BCE.²⁴ Larsen, taking the opposite position of Wallace, thought it “very unlikely” that the treaty between Eretria and Histiaia could have been concluded when the confederation already existed.²⁵ But it is certain that it was struck only shortly after 404 BCE, which at the very least suggests a late entry of the Histiaians into the confederation; besides, the same was true in the case of Karystos.²⁶

²² Wallace 1956: 1, based on a publication by Imhoof-Blumer in 1883 of the first known example of an Aiginetic-weight didrachm. See Larsen 1968: 97.

²³ Wallace 1956: 72–74. ²⁴ SVA 229, on which see Knoepfler 1995: 314–319.

²⁵ Larsen 1968: 101 and n. 1. The treaty is SVA 205.

²⁶ Wallace 1956: 5–7 believed that he was able to explain by this situation that, in the monument of the *nauarchos* of Aigos Potamoi at Delphi (Paus. 10.9.10) there were, for Euboia, two admirals: one Eretrian who would have represented the *koinon*, and a Karystian. See also Larsen 1968: 100, n. 2. But following the discovery at Delphi of a stone bearing the ethnic of a Chalkidian *nauarchos*, this position has become untenable. See Knoepfler 1971: 240–242; Picard 1979: 232–233 and n. 8.; on the monument see now Bommelaer 2011, esp. 204 fig. 2 (without the Chalkidian) and 214.

In other words, Larsen found himself obliged to admit – while otherwise agreeing with Wallace – that at its very beginning the *koinon* would have only brought together the two principal cities of central Euboia: Chalkis and Eretria.²⁷ It was without the slightest reservation that he adhered to Wallace's opinion regarding which of the two cities was the capital of the *koinon*.²⁸ Like his predecessors, the Canadian numismatist judged that Eretria – the best known of the island's *poleis* thanks to the abundance of available archaeological and epigraphical data – must have housed the mint, because even according to Thucydides, the Eretrians had been the principal agitators in the Euboian revolt against Athens.²⁹ Thus it is at the instigation of the Eretrians that a minority of (doubtless liberated) Euboians would have federally unified themselves and struck the first series of didrachms. From this reconstruction, it was only a short logical step to think that this 'federal' coinage would have been little more, at least at the very beginning, than a clever way for the Eretrians to demonstrate their claim to hegemony over the island or even to celebrate their Euboian patriotism (given the depiction of the nymph Euboia and the figure of the cow, symbol of the city). This conclusion was even easier to grasp precisely because we do not currently have any record of specifically Eretrian coinage during the fourth and third centuries.³⁰

Yet it was precisely the justification of this reconstruction, proposed with a fair degree of certainty by Wallace and adopted by Larsen, which Olivier Picard disputed in his thesis on *Chalcis et la Confédération eubéenne* (1979)³¹ – all the while avoiding a direct critique of Larsen and his *Greek Federal States*.³² On the basis of coin hoards which can be dated to the middle of the fourth century, the French historian and numismatist demonstrated beyond any doubt that the two series of Euboian didrachms could not be dated as early as *c.* 410–400. Because the possibility of dating the coinage of the Aiginetic standard to between 394–386 had been excluded (when at least some of the cities of Euboia – including

²⁷ Larsen 1968: 98. After the second Persian invasion, the people of Karystos, who do not appear on the inscription of the Serpent Column (M&L no. 27; see Plut. *Them.* 20.3) nor in Pausanias' list of offerings at Olympia (5.23), were accused of medism and attacked by the Athenians "without participation of the other Euboians" (Thuc. 1.98.3). During the Lamian War, the Karystians again dissociated themselves from Eretria and Chalkis (Diod. 18. 5–1; Paus. 1. 25.4).

²⁸ See Larsen 1968: 100: "the city (of Eretria) became something like the capital where federal coins apparently were minted."

²⁹ See Thuc. 8.60.1–2. The decisive battle took place in front of the port of Eretria (Thuc. 8.95); for an explanation of the account of Thucydides, see Knoepfler 2013b.

³⁰ Wallace 1956: 18; cf. Larsen 1968: 101.

³¹ Picard 1979: esp. 166–167 (coins of the Aiginetic standard), and 235–237.

³² If not in a brief manner, see Picard 1979: 205, n. 1.

Eretria – had renewed an alliance with Athens), and because nor could they *a fortiori* be placed during the first phases of the Second Athenian League (377–371), the chronology thus necessarily had to be lowered to the period after the Battle of Leuktra in 371. In fact, we know that all of the Euboians, voluntarily or involuntarily, sided with Thebes.³³ It was only then that they were able to even consider the idea of a federation among themselves, and, shortly thereafter, to strike their first common federal coinage. Such a conclusion seems inevitable, given the current state of our understanding. Thanks to Picard, we can thus happily admit that the city of Chalkis – the natural capital of Euboia, due to its strategic position and its economic prominence – was chosen from the very outset to house the federal mint,³⁴ a decision that came with important consequences. Along with this hypothesis, we must also accept the historically plausible notion that the coinage of the Chalkidians and the series of the Euboians cannot possibly have been struck at the same time. The chronology of the two series is thus closely interdependent (which was not the case in Wallace’s reconstruction).

One might also reconsider the role which was attributed to the Thebans at the very beginnings of the Euboian federal movement. Given that the Boiotian *koinon* was, since its re-establishment in and after 379 BCE, more of a pseudo-federal state dominated by Thebes,³⁵ how then would a centralized *sympoliteia* been able to serve as a model in an island in which no single city had ever been able to achieve hegemony over its neighbors? In addition – and most importantly – one could doubt that a strong federal structure had been put in place during this period. At any rate, there is no perceptible trace of this Euboian *koinon* in the ancient historiographical record between the years 371 and 362, and in particular it is absent from texts relating to the episode of Theban-Eretrian dominance over Oropos in 366. In fact we can hardly see what place the leaders of the pro-Theban oligarchs (if not outright tyrants, as we are, no doubt, too easily led to consider them, following the Athenian sources), then holding power in Eretria, would have been able to occupy at the federal level. In spite of the numismatic evidence, the first phase of Euboia’s federal history thus

³³ Xen. Hell. 6.5.23. For this alliance see Knoepfler 1995, 331 with bibliography.

³⁴ The city was described as the Euboian capital, yet only during the Hellenistic Period: Strabo 10.1.10; Liv. 35.51.9 (*id quod caput erat Euboeae*).

³⁵ We can also call into question the affirmation according to which, from 377 onwards, “les cités eubéennes ne s’allient à Athènes que par fidélité à l’alliance béotienne” (Picard 1979: 235). See Knoepfler 1995: 320–324. For the Boiotian League during the time of Epameinondas and Pelopidas, see Chapter 7 by Hans Beck and Angela Ganter above.

remains enshrouded in mystery, because the status and inner-workings of this island league remain so elusive.

What does seem certain, however, is that the league came tumbling down by 357 at the latest, when civil war split the island of Euboia between the partisans of Thebes and those who favored a return to the Athenian alliance. There ought to be scholarly consensus on the issue because there is no mention whatsoever of the *koinon* in the treaties between Athens and the Euboian cities which were concluded as early as the following years. The surviving fragment of the treaty with Karystos, firmly dated to the summer of 356, essentially demonstrates that Athens entered into simultaneous negotiations with Histiaia, Chalkis, and Eretria – and not with a federal authority or body.³⁶ Yet there is also another Athenian inscription which could be cited in support of the idea that the *koinon* was not only maintained after 356, but indeed was recognized by Athens – such was Picard's thesis (1979: 239–240). The inscription itself is a decree that is not dated with any precision but can be attributed with little hesitation to the middle of the fourth century. Following other stipulations which are otherwise lost, the decree records the desire of seeing the “perpetuation of the friendship (*philia*) and the alliance (*symmachia*) between the Athenian people with the Euboians.” This clause would prove that at the date of the document the *koinon* was the political authority responsible for the foreign policy of Euboian cities at the highest level. Larsen, in essence, felt that reference to this document was a fitting means of concluding his discussion of the confederation.³⁷ This also gives some insight into why historians have recurrently sought to lower the date of the inscription as much as possible so as to view it in relation to the events of 348–340, when Kallias of Chalkis attempted to re-establish the *Euboikon synedrion*.³⁸

Nonetheless, for some time it has seemed evident that, in the aforementioned inscription (which must concern first and foremost the city of Histiaia and two of its citizens rather than the entirety of Euboia), the Athenians did not think to make reference to a single treaty of alliance which would have united them with the Euboians as an *ethnos* (Knoepfler 1995: 324–331). If this had been the case, it would have had to refer to this state as the *koinon tōn Euboeōn*. Rather, Athens was concerned only with ensuring the continuation of its alliances with each of the four cities of the island. Only if it was the case that the inscription was a document issued by

³⁶ SVA 304; see Knoepfler 1995: 331–337 for various suggestions of corrections to the text.

³⁷ Larsen 1968: 103, with reference to the *terminus post quem* of IG II² 149. On this episode, see also Beck 1997, 28.

³⁸ E.g., the editor of IG II³ I, 2 (2012), St. Lambert, returns to a date a little before 340 BCE (no. 398).

a Euboian authority would it be justifiable to infer the existence of a *koinon*. Consequently, nothing hinders – and indeed when we bear in mind certain particularities of the epigraphic formulary everything begins to support – dating this inscription as high as possible,³⁹ and thus placing it in the context of the negotiations undertaken in 357/6 BCE; it was then that the entirety of the Euboian cities were concerned with the political outcome of the text.

The deterioration of relations between Athens and Euboia after the disastrous expedition against the territory of Eretria in 348 (the battle of Tamynai) consequently produced conditions that were conducive to the re-establishment of a Euboian *koinon*, but not before the aftermath of the Peace of Philokrates in 346. The efforts of Kallias of Chalkis to this end are known by the famous testimony of Aischines, already cited by Freeman (above, p. 159). The highly polemic character of such a text does not allow us to deny the resurgence of Euboian federalism; even less so because from this point forward we can attribute (not certainly but probably) two series of tetradrachms and drachms of the Attic standard, and also one series of underweight drachmas struck in the name of the Euboians and bearing the effigy of Euboia and the bovine head – a coin series which could have persisted until 338 BCE.⁴⁰ But we must note that this new *koinon* left behind no epigraphic trace whatsoever of its existence, given that we should reject the Attic inscription discussed above and the fact that this *koinon* certainly never deprived its constituent cities of their sovereignty with regards to foreign policy. At any rate it was with the Eretrians and not with the authorities of the confederation based in Chalkis, that the Athenians renewed their alliance with the city’s popular faction after the elimination of its tyrant in 341. Also we must note that the almost certain disappearance of the *koinon* in the wake of the Battle of Chaironeia went unnoticed by the historiographical sources. We lose every trace – including numismatic – of the *koinon* during the three closing decades of the fourth century. The so-called Lamian War (323–322 BCE) also reveals a complete lack of agreement or unity among the Euboian cities in response to the revolt of the Athenians against Makedonian hegemony. Only Karystos (noted above, n. 27) aligned itself with the insurgents.

The idea of a Euboian federation, or at the very least increased cooperation between the island’s cities, nevertheless continued to run its course. According

³⁹ After c. 360–350 we can hardly account for formula *deka hēmerōn*, characteristic of this period according to experts in Athenian epigraphy. See Knoepfler 1995: 324–331, esp. 329.

⁴⁰ See Picard 1979, table *in fine*, with a wide chronological window of 357–338, based on the conviction that the *koinon* would have resumed minted coins after the crisis of 357.

to the testimony of the law governing the Dionysian *technitai*,⁴¹ it is certain that an important step was made in this federalist direction under the aegis of the Antigonids shortly after 300. But numerous questions arise on the subject of this new *koinon*, beginning with the date of its foundation. Should we concede, as Picard was inclined to do, that Demetrios Poliorketes favored the re-establishment of a federal sort of union after Chalkis and the rest of Euboia were submitted to his authority in 304 BCE? The aforementioned law in and of itself does not necessitate such a high chronology, and neither does the small group of ten federal coins attributable to this period of Euboian history.⁴² In addition to this, the decrees of Eretria, which are fairly numerous at the end of the fourth century, make no reference whatsoever to the existence of a federal structure.⁴³ some of them (doubtless slightly prior to 304) even seem to exclude the possibility.⁴⁴ If the king had been able at the time to benefit from the presence of a federal conduit for his relations with the Euboian cities, then it is quite surprising that the decree documenting the participation of an Eretrian contingent in Demetrios' naval campaign in Asia Minor in 302–301 does not make any mention of other Euboians being involved in the military venture.⁴⁵ In short, it seems doubtful that the new *koinon* had seen the light of day before the Battle of Ipsos in 301. But in the aftermath of this battle Antigonid dominion over the island was quite probably interrupted for a period of a few years. It is thus only after around 297 or 296, slightly before the siege of Athens in 295, that Demetrios was able to re-establish his control over all of Euboia. We are thus inclined to date the series of nine or ten federal coins mentioned above to between roughly 296 and 287. Regardless, 286 constitutes a solid *terminus ante quem* because all indications point towards that year as being when the Eretrians briefly joined the Boiotian League, and not as early as 308 according to the *communis opinio*.⁴⁶

Yet this inscription regarding the celebration of both *Dionysia* and *Demetrieia* festivals in the four cities of the island holds yet more interest with regards to the history of Euboian federalism on the institutional level.

⁴¹ See *IG* XII 9, 207 + *SEG* 34.896 (following Stephanis' new study of the stone) and more recently Le Guen 2001: 41–56 no. 1 ("Loi d'Eubée"); see *BE* 2011: 315.

⁴² Picard 1979: 168–170, no. 13–21 and 261; Picard 1993: 150, no. 3; also Wallace 1956: 127–128 and plate XIV 9–11.

⁴³ The fact that Karystos preferred Athens in 323 (above, n. 27) is in no way an indication that a confederation uniting the three other cities of the island would have existed (almost) continuously between 340 and 280, as thought by Wallace 1956: 42.

⁴⁴ See my discussion of a decree honoring a Karystian, and another likely concerning two citizens of Histiaia: Knoepfler 2001a: 118–122, no. 6 and 218–122, no. XII, esp. 121 and 218.

⁴⁵ *IG* XII.9, 210, with commentary in Knoepfler 2001a: 232–236, no. XIV.

⁴⁶ This membership follows from the decree *IG* XII.9, 192; see also Knoepfler 2001a: 116 and n. 55, with Knoepfler 2014: 68–94.

According to the evidence, this was not a true federal state, if only because of the fact that the document does not mention any magistrate or college of magistrates that we would consider to be federal in the strict sense of the term. This is because the task of negotiating with the *technitai* in contractual engagements was entrusted to an ad hoc commission comprised of representatives from each of the cities. Even more remarkable is the lack of a common calendar, which marks a significant difference between this and other contemporary *koina*.⁴⁷ The existence of common council, however – a *Euboïkon synedrion* in which sat the representatives of the four cities – seems to be implied by the reference to a joint Euboian law-making process. Nevertheless we must bear in mind that when the text stipulates that the *technitai* will ensure that they will do nothing which may be against the relevant laws established by the Euboians (lines 68–69), the formulation could just as easily refer to the *nomoi* extant in each of the Euboian cities and not necessarily at a federal level. The phrase *kata ton Euboïkon nomon* mentioned elsewhere (line 20) does not relate – regardless of what we just discussed – to a “law” (*nomos*) that was established by the Euboians, but rather to the established “practice” of the Euboians. It is ultimately the ancestral habits, the established practices, the *patrios nomos*, which must be respected in the religious arena. Nevertheless, we are certain that the Euboian community had the power to make decisions that had the force of law throughout the entire island. The document effectively presents itself as a *nomos* because it is a matter of the artists having been punished “before the law had been validated” (line 62), without the text stipulating by what procedure these “laws established by the Euboians” were put in place.

So by the beginning of the third century there was undoubtedly some form of confederation extant in Euboia, but at best it was no more than an association of sovereign *poleis* and certainly not a federal association in the technical sense of the word. The absence of citizenship common to all Euboians is a sign that points in this direction. In fact, those Euboians who are mentioned abroad are never described as *Euboeis*.⁴⁸ Nothing

⁴⁷ For the festival calendar see Knoepfler 1989 (cf. *BE* 2010: 266). Nevertheless, the Euboians succeeded in establishing a calendar rule, according to which all of the intercalary days were to be introduced at the same time, thereby facilitating the coordinated organization of both festivals in the four cities.

⁴⁸ The mention of a representative of the *Euboeis* in certain amphiktyonic lists is unrelated to the existence of a Euboian *koinon*. From a list from Chios (considered at one point as a catalog of mercenaries: see Launey 1949–1950: 1129) it had been concluded that a Euboian *Koinon* must have existed at the time of the inscription without Karystos then being a member (thus, in the wake of Wilamowitz, Ziebarth 1915: 153, lines 96–111; see Geyer 1924: 939). However, such a conclusion is epigraphically ill-founded: see Vanseveren 1937: 329–330, who has showned that “l’ethnique *Euboeis* n’est pas du tout assurée”; see Picard 1979: 273 n. 3.

demonstrates this difference better than the epigraphic catalogs of mercenaries which date to the period. One of the most striking examples is provided by a Samian list which was published by Louis Robert.⁴⁹ In it, among federal ethnics we see the terms *Achaios*, *Boiotios*, *Aitolos*, *Akarnan*, etc., and there are also several city-ethnics listed, notably a *Hestiaieus*, that is to say a citizen of the city of Hestiaia-Oreos in the north of Eubolia; and also two other Cretans are listed, one a *Knosios* and the other a *Rhitymnios*. In other words, the political situation in Eubolia around 250 – even when federal coin series (the dating of which is still contested⁵⁰) might in a pinch attest to a political union under Makedonian oversight – appeared to be comparable to the situation on Crete.⁵¹ When the cities of Eubolia were asked to accept the creation of a new Panhellenic festival around the mid-third century, they did so by appeal to the same *theōria*, but separately, each one for itself. For lack of definitive proof for the *Asklepieia* games of Kos around 240 or for the *Dionysia* of Teos shortly thereafter, we have long been able to support our supposition by the case of the *Leukophryena* of Magnesia-on-the-Meander in 208/7 BCE:⁵² there are no decrees coming from the people of Eubolia at this time, even for a decision of such limited political scope. In spite of the general weakness of this *argumentum ex silentio*, this absence is conspicuous.

The state of affairs must have changed immediately thereafter, with the outbreak of the Makedonian Wars and subsequent conquest by the Romans. The literary sources attest that the victory of Rome brought with it important repercussions for the legal status of the island's cities. It is true that using such texts is a hazardous endeavor. For instance, the famous declaration at the *Isthmia* of Corinth in 196, in which T. Quinctius Flaminius announced the freedom of all those who had previously been subjects of the Makedonian king. This announcement is known to us by three authors, first Polybius (18.46.5), then Livy (33.32.5), and finally Plutarch (*Flam.* 10.5). The three versions relate more or less the same

⁴⁹ Robert 1938: 113–115 and plate VIII (= *IG* XII.6, 217).

⁵⁰ This is also true for a series of federal bronzes that Picard 1979: 171–172, no. 22–26, proposed first to attribute to a period in which Alexander son of Krateros removed Eubolia from the possessions of Antigonos Gonatas. Based on the excavation of the 'House of the Mosaics' at Eretria, he more recently suggested dating the series to the late 270s BCE (Picard 1993: 150, no. 7–20; cf. Picard 1998: 191); but this archaeological chronology must be now considered with greater caution.

⁵¹ This analogy between the Eubolian and Cretan *koina* was already made by Giovannini 1971: 42 (see Knoepfler 2001a: 122, n. 97). For affairs on Crete, see also Chapter 20 by Angelos Chaniotis below.

⁵² We have a decree issued by Chalkis and another by Eretria (Rigsby 1994: nos. 97–98). For the difference between the status of these two cities vis-à-vis royal power as revealed by the decrees, see Knoepfler 2001a: 362–363.

names – the Corinthians, Phokians, Lokrians, Phthiotid Achaians, the Magnetes, and the Perrhaibians – and the Euboians are listed too.⁵³ There can thus be no doubt that the Euboians were among the various peoples declared free in 196. But it is clear that the ethnic *Euboeis* used here by both Polybius and by Plutarch does not refer to the citizens of a federal state; they are simply the inhabitants of the four cities of Euboia who had up to that point been subjects of Makedon. Livy for his part did not know how to translate this ethnic name into Latin – so he fell back on the name of the island (*Euboeam insulam*), something which he did not do for any other group in his list.

Furthermore, the fate of Euboia had not yet been decided by the time of the Isthmian proclamation. The new king of Pergamon, Eumenes II, demanded the cities of Histiaia-Oreos and Eretria as the price of services rendered by his father, King Attalos, when they had been captured two years earlier. But this gift of half the island to the Attalids would have been catastrophic, jeopardizing the possibility of creating a new confederation in Euboia – something which Flamininus apparently was considering at the time. Thanks to his intervention, these two cities along with Karystos were declared free (Polyb. 18.47.10–11; Liv. 33.34.10). With regard to Chalkis, considering its exceptionally important strategic position, the risk seemed great that it would be occupied by Roman troops or by those hired from Rome. But, here again, Flamininus achieved his own aim, which was to leave Greece without any garrison – *aphrourētos*. At the moment of his return to Rome in 194, the conqueror of Philip V was able to boast to the Euboians that he was indeed their liberator: he himself called together this meeting of the cities of the island at Chalkis (Liv. 34.51.1–2), as discussed above (p. 159). Before the end of the session, the proconsul reminded the representatives of the city “in what condition he had found them and in what condition he left them” (Liv. 34.51.3). This statement, probably borrowed almost entirely from Polybius, is powerful but not without its obscurities: was Flamininus ordering the Euboians to come together in a federal-type union? The word employed by Livy here, *conventus* (and not *conventum*, “agreement” or “treaty” as it was once thought⁵⁴), is certainly not synonymous with the word *commune* which was ordinarily used to translate the Greek *koinon* into Latin.

⁵³ See Ferrary 1988: 83. It ought to be noted that the name of the Euboians has unfortunately disappeared by simple error from the French translation of the *Histories* (38.46.5) of Polybius (D. Roussel, Paris, 1970 and 2003).

⁵⁴ See above, n. 6.

With this limitation in mind, rebuilding the Euboian confederation after it had lapsed (or at least been side-lined) for decades indeed seems to have been the direct if not immediate consequence of the *conventus* of 194. We can also note that this is precisely the same manner in which Flamininus also re-established the confederation of the Magnetes during the same year.⁵⁵ Further, an interesting bit of numismatic evidence also argues for 194 as the foundation date of the new Euboian *koinon*, since one is tempted to follow the study of Picard in placing three bronze federal types between 194 and 192.⁵⁶ The coins form part of a short series whose early interruption can easily be explained by considering contemporary political context: in 192, as we know, great turmoil engulfed Euboea as a result of the hostility of the Aitolians towards the Roman protectorate, and, above all, the arrival in Chalkis of Antiochos III, king of Syria.⁵⁷ A third argument in favor of the existence of a Euboian confederation during these years is that the supporters of Rome at Chalkis appealed to other Euboians. In a passage that was by all accounts borrowed from Polybius, Livy reports that by chance the annual festival of Artemis Amarynthis was being celebrated at the same time just outside of Eretria.⁵⁸ Also participating in the festival were the people of Karystos and, in normal times, the Chalkidians themselves. The participation of the Histiaians is less certain given the geographical distance of the city – in 192 they were prevented from coming to Amarynthos. The meeting around the great Artemis Amarysia – whose sanctuary was around eleven kilometers east of Eretria⁵⁹ – allowed the Euboians to focus their energies much more easily. Obviously the existence of this ancient religious celebration is not proof that Euboea was organized into a confederation at the time, because even in the absence of any kind of federal structure the Euboians nevertheless had to meet periodically in order to worship the patron deity of the entire island. But what is striking is the reasoning used by the Chalkidians to convince their fellow Euboians to intervene as quickly as possible. They appealed to the need to honor the alliance with Rome; a treaty which must have been concluded between the Romans and all of the Euboian cities united through a federal organization. Of

⁵⁵ As observed by Niese 1893–1903: 2.653. See also Holleaux 1930: 380 (= *Cambridge Ancient History* VIII 192); Picard 1979: 288; Ferrary 1988: 105; Knoepfler 1990a: 479; Tziafalias and Helly 2005: 414–415.

⁵⁶ Picard 1979: 183, 192–194, nos. 27–28, and 288, criticizing the classification established by Wallace 1956: 119–120; cf. Picard 1993: 150, nos. 23–24.

⁵⁷ See especially Liv. 35.37.4 – 39 and App. *Syr.* 12. Polybius' account of these events is lost.

⁵⁸ Liv. 35.38.3. See Holleaux 1930: 393–395 (= *Cambridge Ancient History* VIII 205–207); Picard 1979: 219 and Knoepfler 1990a: 485, n. 57 on the regular participation of the Eretrians.

⁵⁹ For this, see Chapter 5 in Knoepfler 2010.

course, in the end none of this prevented the Chalkidians from having to open the gates of their city to King Antiochos. For better or worse, they were forced to break their alliance with Rome. After the defeat of Antiochos and the Aitolians at Thermopylai in the following year, they seemed to be wrapped up in a terrible catastrophe, especially since the victorious consul, M'. Acilius Glabrio, was particularly irritated with them. It took all the prestige of Flamininus, who been brought back into service in Greece as a legate, to win them pardon. This earned him, as recounted by Plutarch (*Flamininus* 16), great demonstrations of appreciation on the part of the Chalkidians and potentially from the other Euboians as well.⁶⁰

The Euboian *koinon* seems to have been almost immediately re-established by Rome, or at the very least was permitted to restructure itself shortly after the adventure with Antiochos III; a fairly long series of federal coins from the beginning of the second century points in this direction, too.⁶¹ We thus have every reason to believe that from the end of the war of Antiochos in Europe up until the beginning of the third Makedonian war (from around 190 to 174), there existed a Euboian federation which united the four cities of the island. At this point we ought to relate two decrees issued by the *koinon tōn Euboiōn* to precisely this period, documents which, despite their apparent banality, prove to be extremely revealing of the character of the confederation in question. The first (*IG* XII.9, 898), as we have seen, has long been cited regularly by historians of the *koinon*. However this inscription is most often dated incorrectly to the second half of the second century. Even Picard (1979: 301) is curiously mistaken in considering it to be from after 169 BCE because it makes mention of certain *synedroi* (in place of the *boulē*). In reality, however, it is not this decree of federal *proxenia* but rather the decree of Chalkis (*IG* XII.9, 899) in honor of the benefactor Archenous which attests the replacement of the *boulē* with a *synedrion*. What misled Picard was that Wallace, believing that in both cases he was dealing with acts of the *koinon*, described the league's federal institutions of the late Hellenistic period in the following manner: “there was an eponymous *hēgemōn* at the head of the league, there was the *boulē* (the *synedroi*) and an *ekklēsia*, and there was a *tamias*” (Wallace 1956: 40). Larsen (1968: 405) adopted this without any

⁶⁰ We have an echo of this in a private document *IG* XII.9, 931. But it would be incorrect to attribute *IG* XII.9, 233 (sacred law of Eretria fund at Amarnthos) to Flamininus: see Knoepfler 1991: 257.

⁶¹ See Picard 1979: 192–196. Wallace 1956: 43, provides the following summary of this state of affairs: “The League, under Roman patronage, included all the cities of the island, with, doubtless, many periods of quiescence and none of real activity. It issued coins only for a few years from 194 to about 180, and again, briefly, towards the middle of the century.”

doubt (to the point of copying it word-for-word), but the description is still somewhat misleading.⁶² Louis Robert observed that “we must remove from this reconstruction the treasurer, which is the treasurer of the city, and also the *synedroi*.”⁶³ There is thus no reason to place this decree after 169.⁶⁴ In fact, the only reliable *terminus post quem* is provided by the reference to the Romans made in the *prosodos* clause,⁶⁵ a formula which, in Euboia, cannot be prior to 194. Instead we can place this indispensable document with great certainty in the window of 190–175, at any rate before Pydna (167) from which point on we are able to show that the term *boulē* – still in use here – was systematically replaced by the term *synedrion* to designate the council in Euboian and Boiotian cities.⁶⁶

The same applies to another federal decree which long remained unpublished despite its discovery in 1914.⁶⁷ As mutilated as it may be, the document, which is almost certainly contemporaneous with the preceding, is nonetheless of considerable interest to the study of these federal institutions. The inscription was carved on a block of marble whose other side bears the decree of Chalkis (*IG XII Suppl.*, 645).⁶⁸ One single stone could thus bear both federal and municipal laws. This is not altogether uninteresting: in essence, the principal federal sanctuaries – as with those in neighboring Boiotia which were extra-urban (the Itonion, the Poseidonion at Onchestos, the Alalkomenion) – as a general rule did not house any municipal documents, while intramural sanctuaries were not intended to display federal decrees. Yet many cases similar to our Chalkidian stone occur elsewhere, specifically at Demetrias, where we find stones bearing decrees of the city and those of the Confederation of the Magnetes back-to-back on opposite sides.⁶⁹ This equivalence is not without significance for our understanding of the Euboian *koinon*. In the *koinon* of the Magnetes,

⁶² Larsen 1968: 405; for the refutation, see Knoepfler 1990a: 475, n. 1.

⁶³ Robert 1969: 46 (= Robert 1990, 752).

⁶⁴ This *terminus post quem* comes from a confusion with the decree of Chalkis *IG XII 900B*, which is the only decree which can be dated with any precision to the aftermath of 169 BCE, thanks to its mention of a gift of wheat made to the Romans by Ptolemy VI (see Knoepfler 1990a: 484–486 and 490–491; cf. *BE* 2009, 751).

⁶⁵ See Robert 1969: 45 (= Robert 1990: 750–755). For the date of its appearance, see Knoepfler 1990a: 483–484.

⁶⁶ See Knoepfler 1990a: 497–498 and Knoepfler 2001a: 416 (cf. *BE* 2013, 183). The reform of the council was not restricted to Euboia alone, but it occurred in the Boiotian cities too, see Müller 2005: 114–116 (cf. *BE* 2008, 228; 2010, 276).

⁶⁷ Knoepfler 1990a: 473–486 (cf. *BE* 1991: 439; *SEG* 40, 752).

⁶⁸ Re-edited by Knoepfler 1990a: 487–498 (cf. *BE* 1991: 440; *SEG* 40, 754).

⁶⁹ Examples in Knoepfler 1990a: 479, n. 29. For the similarities between Demetrias and Chalkis see also Tziafalias and Helly 2005: 65 and n. 403, on the subject of a new decree of Larissa for some citizens of Chalkis (cf. *BE* 2007, 332 and 356; *SEG* 55, 689).

in fact, the Demetrians (people of the city) were in a position of complete predominance.⁷⁰ This in turn indicates that in the Euboian confederation as well, there was one city which identified itself, so to speak, with the *koinon*, to the point that publicly displaying federal acts in any other place but this city was considered unnecessary. During this period Chalkis was indeed the federal capital, as it must have become the seat of the athletic competition organized by the *koinon*, the *Romaia en Khalkidi* (Robert 1969: 44–49 = 1990: 750–755).

This also allows us to put forward another critical observation. Both these federal and municipal acts are dated according to the same eponymous magistrate, the *hēgemôn*. The majority of documents which attest to that magistrate come from Chalkis itself, and not from the *koinon*. Strictly speaking, the office was, then, not a federal magistracy⁷¹ but rather an eponymous appointment at Chalkis itself.⁷² To elucidate this, I advanced the following hypothesis in 1990: Flamininus himself would have received the title as the conqueror of the king of Makedon and as the new founder of the *koinon* (very likely in 194). The Euboian magistrates who succeeded him at the head of the federal state would then also have inherited the title, so that even after the dissolution of the *koinon* around 175 the Chalkidians would have continued to make exclusive use of this prestigious magistracy which by this point they would have long monopolized. And so it is that the *hēgemôn* would gradually have devolved from what was once a federal magistracy into a simply eponymous civic official, filling the role of an ordinary magistrate.⁷³ In any case, there was a certain interweaving of federal and municipal magistracies in Chalkis in the second century.

For a period of several years, then, a state which was unquestionably federal in nature established itself in Euboia under the Roman aegis. It was only then that we see the presence of a common citizenship: there were Euboians who, meeting in an assembly called the *ekklēsia* (distinct from the Chalkidian *dēmos*) voted on resolutions that had been prepared by a council, or *boulē*. This indicates that by this point in time one could belong to a large unitary state whose old prominent cities were now nothing more than large circumscriptions that were themselves divided into demes. But this process of integration and unification faced substantial difficulties.

⁷⁰ See Knoepfler 1990a: 481, with reference to many documents from Demetrias, notably the decree for the judges of Herakleia that was re-published with commentary by Helly 1971: 554–559.

⁷¹ As claimed by Wallace 1956: 40; Larsen 1968: 405. Swoboda and Hermann 1913: 442 is more nuanced.

⁷² As noticed by Picard 1979: 298 and n. 1; see Knoepfler 1990a: 481 and n. 35.

⁷³ Knoepfler 1990a: 481–483; on Flamininus as *hēgemôn* of the Greeks, see Ferrary 1998: 93–95.

The *koinon* seems to have been on life-support since before 170 BCE, because the two cities which constituted the federal core – Chalkis and Eretria – again returned to minting their own municipal coinage (in direct response to the outbreak of the Third Makedonian War in 174, it would seem⁷⁴). Both cities then produced splendid tetradrachms – *stephanēphoroi* as at Athens, with the image of Hera and Artemis among the Chalkidians and the Eretrians, respectively. This silver coinage, regardless of its specific date of production, can hardly be reconciled with the existence of a federal state.

In fact we have no mention of any communal actions taken by the Euboians between the fall of the Makedonian kingdom in 167 and the Achaian War of 146. While Pausanias mentions the *Euboieis* twice during his fairly problematic account of the war's prelude, (7.14.7 and 7.16.10), we have already demonstrated that this generic appellation should not be misconstrued. In its first appearance, it refers only to the Eretrians who in around 147 were the victims of a Theban raid launched from either around Tanagra or the Oropia. In the second, Pausanias uses the term to refer exclusively to the Chalkidians, who were allies of the same Thebans in the Achaian revolt against Rome.⁷⁵ We can say this with some certainty because it turns out it was only the Chalkidians who took part in the battle of Skarpheia, for which (among other things) they were severely chastised by Rome.⁷⁶ On the other side, the Eretrians were among the few Greeks to take the side of Lucius Mummius, who must have rewarded them handsomely judging by the cultic honors they granted him in a recently discovered inscription. At Amarynthos, which we have seen had thus far been the focal point of hopes for Euboian unity and home in which pacts of friendship and cooperation were put on display, the Roman consul – who had been able to benefit from the ancient rivalry between Chalkis and Eretria – was worshipped as a saviour god.⁷⁷

Nothing leads us to think that the Euboian *koinon* was dissolved in 146, because this confederation had already long since ceased to function. Regarding the other leagues, we know that the famous declaration by Pausanias of the dissolution of the Greek *koina* (7.16.9) ought to be approached with caution. But the turning point of the Achaian War was

⁷⁴ For the chronology of this coinage in relation to the beginning of the production of Athenian *stephanēphoroi*, see most recently Picard 2010: 165–166 with fig. 2.

⁷⁵ Knoepfler 1991: 263–264; on Pausanias' text see the observations of Picard 1979: 293.

⁷⁶ According to Polyb. 39.6.4–5; see Liv. *Per.* 52 for the participation of the Chalkidians in the expedition of Herakleia, along with the Boiotians. Cf. *BE* 2014: 225.

⁷⁷ See Knoepfler 1991: 252–280 based on a new inscription from Eretria (*SEG* 28.722).

of no less importance to the Euboians, because shortly after 146 their *koinon* had to be resurrected, as the Chalkidian decree honoring Archenous (*IG* XII.9, 899) reveals beyond doubt.⁷⁸ Although the document itself was not issued by the *koinon* (contrary to a long-established view), it makes mention of the games of the *Romaia* “which the Euboian *koinon* celebrates” (see below). It would seem quite likely that it was only then that these *Romaia en Khalkidi* – as the inscriptions for victorious athletes name them – were created. Of course it has always been thought that this cult of Roma in Chalkis must date if not to the first foundation of the *koinon* in 194, then at least to the aftermath of the Aitolio-Syrian debacle of 191 BCE, when the Chalcidians had much to do to win the pardon of the Romans.⁷⁹ If a large festival had been initiated then, would it necessarily have borne the name *Romaia*? Would it not more likely have been called the *Titeia* as in Argos or the *Eleutheria* at Larissa? There are certainly other instances elsewhere in the Greek world in which the *Romaia* appear fairly early in the second century, but we must bear in mind that most of these festivals of this name are not present prior to 167. Such was the case in Lykia, for instance; or also in a city in the vicinity of Eubolia, as an inscription discovered in Thebes informs us that the *Romaia* were introduced in 146.⁸⁰ Above all it must be noted that the *Romaia* of Chalkis are not attested in any of the agonistic records before the 130s.⁸¹ It also seems ever more tempting to place the creation of the *Romaia en Khalkidi* in concert with the Roman pardon of the Chalcidians after the catastrophe of 146, whose echo can elsewhere be heard in the aforementioned decree honoring Archenous which we have dated to around 140. The existence of a Euboian *koinon* at this time also follows from a decree of Geronthrai in Lakonia in honor of a tribunal consisting of judges from three cities of the island.⁸²

From the end of the Republican period and under the Roman Empire, the Euboians again formed a unit but one which our documents show was associated with other peoples, first and foremost those hailing exclusively

⁷⁸ Inscription revised by Canali De Rossi 2006: no. 144, along with our observations on the text and its date in *BE* 2008, 271.

⁷⁹ See Picard 1979, in the wake of the excellent study of Robert 1969: 44–49 (= Robert 1990: 750–755) and the work of Mellor 1975 on the cult of Roma. Also Knoepfler 1990a: 485; Tziafalias and Helly 2005: 415, regarding the *Eleutheria* of Larissa which were initiated in 196 BCE.

⁸⁰ See the recently published inscription in Knoepfler 2004, now *SEG* 54. 516. For the *Romaia* of Xanthos and Asia Minor more generally, see Errington 1987 and most recently Knoepfler 2013a: 149.

⁸¹ The appearance of new evidence at Messene (*SEG* 59.411; cf. *BE* 2012, 212 *in fine*) does not seem to change the substance of the issue, because the document is from the Augustan period.

⁸² *IG* V.1, 1111; cf. Ziebarth 1915: 157; Picard 1979: 301 and n. 4 (for the post-146 date); Knoepfler 1990a: 485, n. 59; Knoepfler 2001a: 413.

from Central Greece (Boiotians, Lokrians, Phokians, and Dorians⁸³) and then the province Achaia with the reformed Achaian *koinon* at the top of the list.⁸⁴ Until quite recently it was believed that this regional *koinon* had ceased all political activity after the Julio-Claudian period.⁸⁵ We now know that in reality it still survived under at least the first Antonine emperors. A well-known imperial statue base from the Itonion in Koroneia (*IG* vii 2878) can be associated with a little-known fragment of the same origin which allows us to date the monument to the early reign of Trajan, and not to the reigns of Caligula or Claudius as had previously been supposed.⁸⁶ In fact, everything leads us to conclude that some form of a *koinon tôn Euboion* must have survived until at least the end of the Severan dynasty. But the question of whether the Euboians were integrated in the great Boiotian (and Lokrido-Megarian) *koinon* under the reign of Hadrian remains open, because the recently published letter of the same emperor to the small city of Naryx in Eastern Lokris attests that the Epiknemidian Lokrians had at the time joined the Boiotian League, without forfeiting their Lokrian identity in the Delphic Amphiktyony.⁸⁷ A similar status could thus in principle be conceded to the Euboians as well, whose relationship with neighboring Boiotia had been so consistently close throughout all of antiquity.⁸⁸

⁸³ Base found at Athens in honour of the proquaestor M. Iunius Syllanus, c. 33 BCE (*IG* iii 568; *SIG*³ 767, re-published in *IG* ii-iii² 4114; bibliography in Deininger 1965: 89).

⁸⁴ See the inscriptions *IG* vii 2711 (decree of Akraiphia in honour of the local benefactor Epameinondas) and the imperial statue base *IG* vii 2878 (to be completed: see below n. 86). The *Euboeis* also appear in an honorific inscription from Epidauros for T. Statilius Timokrates (*IG* iv.1², 80; *SIG*³ 796A; cf. *SEG* 35.304 for a date after 67 BCE).

⁸⁵ On this, see Spawforth 1994: 223 and Kantirea 2007: 192.

⁸⁶ See Knoepfler 2012: 240–244. The fragment (which until then was hardly known) was published by Pritchett 1969: 87 and pl. 62–63.

⁸⁷ For this document, which was published in 2006, see the bibliography in *SEG* 51.641 and especially 56.565; cf. also *L'Année Épigraphique* 2006: 1369.

⁸⁸ There is not the slightest mention of the Euboian *koinon* in the most recent paper on what defines a Greek federal state by Lasagni 2009–2010.

*The Lokrians and their federal leagues**Giovanna Daverio Rocchi*

From their earliest history, the Lokrians were an *ethnos* distributed geographically and sociopolitically across two separate territories in the western and eastern parts of Central Greece. The literary and epigraphic sources most frequently named the East Lokrians according to their geographical position as *Hypoknēmidioi* or *Epiknēmidioi* (“those who reside beneath” or “at the foot of Mt. Knemis”). They are also known as *Opontioi* from the name of the city of Opus, the main urban center in the plain that comprises the largest part of Hypoknemidian Lokris. The region overlooked the Gulf of Euboia, while the Kallidromon mountain chain marked the border separating East Lokris from Phokis. The Western Lokrians, or *Hesperioi*, also known as Ozolian Lokrians, occupied the plain at the foot of Mt. Parnassos and the coastal strip that extended as far as Antirrhion.¹ Regarding the division between the western and eastern regions, the scholarly consensus now favors the idea that the Lokrians spread out from their original East Lokrian region around Opus and expanded westwards, which effected the rise of two separate yet related Lokris.

Religious traditions, cults, and rituals provide ample evidence for the Lokrians’ ethnic identity. In their foundation myths, the Lokrians traced their ethnonym back to the founder-hero (*archēgetēs*) Lokros, the son of Physkos and father of Opus, the eponym of the principal urban center in East Lokris. This created a genealogy that functioned both as a myth of space and territory, demarcating the boundaries within which the Lokrians settled, and also as a means of charting the various stages in the development of their settlements.² The expansion westward was portrayed as a colonization movement led by Lokros, who, having handed over the kingship to his son Opus, then moved to the region west of Parnassos

¹ Complete descriptions in Oldfather 1926: 1135–1288; Klaffenbach 1926: 68–88; Lérat 1952: 1.5–72; Fossey 1990; Szemler 1991: 74–104; Daverio 1999: 416–422; Nielsen 2000; Pascual-Papakonstantinou 2013.

² The sources are assembled in Oldfather 1926: 1175–1181.

where he founded the cities of Physkeis and Oiantheia. This mythical ancestry indicates that Lokrian ethnogenesis was a gradual process that proceeded apace with the emergence of spatial perceptions and urban centers. It also contextualizes the Lokrians' perception of their *ethnos* and *poleis* as two complementary – though nonetheless distinct – entities, which effectively served as a point of origin for the division of an Eastern and Western branch of their *ethnos*. According to one variant in the mythological tradition, Physkos was the son of Amphiktyon, the king who was responsible for the union of the *perioikoi* of Thermopylai. This union most likely reflects the transformation of a loosely populated region with politically and geographically scattered settlements into one that was marked by coherent urban centers and a stronger degree of political centralization.³ Amphiktyon was accordingly the founder and the eponym of the Pylaian-Delphic Amphiktyony, and thus such an ethnic narrative also tied off a genealogical loose end by connecting the founder of the *ethnos* to the founder of Amphiktyony. In particular this supported the claim of the Lokrians to inclusion in the community of Hellenes, among whose principal centers was the Delphic sanctuary of Apollo, which welcomed the Lokrians as one of the Amphiktyonic *ethnē* during the historical period.

It was the figure of Aias and his role in the cult of Athena Ilias, however, which provided the ritual means of uniting these otherwise disconnected ethnic and political identities. It was said that for a thousand years the Lokrians were obliged to send two virgins, chosen from among the girls of the so-called One Hundred Houses (see below), to the temple of Athena at Ilion to expiate the outrage perpetrated by their king Aias when he raped the priestess Cassandra on the altar of the goddess.⁴ This tradition helped foster a sense of common group membership and solidarity among the East Lokrians, as they commonly shared in the ethnic responsibility to expiate the crimes of their ancestral king. It is precisely this translation of the king's penance into the people's ritual responsibility that may explain why the East Lokrians made Aias their national hero, rejecting the violent, sacrilegious figure depicted in the literary and iconographical tradition.⁵ Instead they choose to embrace him as any other heroic *ktistēs*, and depict him accordingly. An altar dedicated to him, the Aianteion, was erected at Opus, where the pan-Lokrian festival of the *Aianteia* was celebrated, and his effigy

³ Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 63; *Marm. Par.* = *FGrH* 239 F 5. See Daverio 2013: 138–161.

⁴ From the rich bibliography on this episode I limit myself to Vidal Naquet 1981: 249–266; Bonnechère 1994: 150–163; Redfield 2003.

⁵ See Daverio 2013.

appeared on coins of the fourth century BCE.⁶ The *Aianteia* was still celebrated in the third century in the Epiknemidian city of Naryx, the ancient seat of the royal house of Aias.⁷ Meanwhile in the West there was a site for the cult of Athena Ilias in Ozolian Lokris at Physkeis, which was adopted as a federal sanctuary after the Western Lokrians formed a *koinon* in the first half of the fourth century.⁸ This in turn demonstrates the religious link between East and West Lokrians, and the complementarity of the hero and the goddess in a common religious heritage which arose just before the middle of the fourth century BCE. Such religious concordance was simultaneous with changes in the structure and political organization of the state, which effectively defined two separate federal states of the Lokrians. What held them together was the strength of the sense of solidarity that emerged from three factors: first, the shared responsibility for expiating the crime of the Lokrian *basileus*, Aias, by sending girls to the sanctuary of Athena at Ilion; second, reconciliation with the offended goddess by means of the Lokrian cult of Athena Ilias, which led to its elevation as a federal cult in the sanctuary at Physkeis from the fourth century BCE onwards; and third, the veneration of the national hero in the form of the warrior Aias in the western *koinon* more or less in the same time period.⁹ The presence of both Athena and Aias in the pantheon of Lokroi Epizephyrioi, the colony founded in southern Italy in the seventh century BCE, as well as the role of the One Hundred Houses, whose women were instrumental in its foundation,¹⁰ offer a glimpse at the natural and self-conscious congruence of these two cults from the Archaic Age onwards. The goddess and the hero were the representative figures of an identity common to the East and West Lokrians as well as to southern Italy.¹¹ Whereas the sharing of this cult seems to demonstrate the participation of Lokrians from both East and West in the westward colonization movement,¹² the foundation of Lokroi Epizephyrioi provides a date after which the pan-Lokrian *aition* began to be constructed.

If we examine the significance of Lokros and the cults of Aias and Athena Ilias for the pattern of ethnic belonging in the region, it is possible to identify two separate but converging traditions. Lokros was the figure at the center of Lokrian ethnic traditions: the foundation legends of the

⁶ Pind. *Ol.* 9.112–113, with schol.; Head 1991: 336–337. ⁷ *IG IX.1*² 3.706 A, lines 23–24.

⁸ See below. ⁹ See Daverio 2013.

¹⁰ Polyb. 12.5.5–11; 7.2, 4. Among the most recent works on this subject, see Domínguez 2013a: 405–433, with an exhaustive critical discussion.

¹¹ For the temple of Athena Ilias and its location see Torelli 1977: 179–183. For Aias, see Paus. 3.19.11–13.

¹² See Musti 1977: 213–146; Musti 1999: 421–425.

eastern and western territorialization of the tribe, and their connection to the emergence of the Pylaian-Delphic Amphiktyony clustered around Lokros. Aias and Athena Ilias, on the other hand, gave shape to a pan-Lokrian cultic tradition, which created a religious heritage that can be considered political in that it shaped and reinforced ethnic consciousness while the federal states of East and West grew. It is worth bearing in mind, though, that the Amphisians, who remained abstinent from the Western Lokrian *koinon*, preserved religious bonds with the Lokrian *ethnos*. The temple to Athena erected on the acropolis of Amphissa held a bronze statue of the goddess which the inhabitants asserted had been brought from Ilion.¹³ Pausanias, reporting this tradition (10.38.5–6), however, is careful to note the fictitiousness of what he considers to be an unreliable account.

The *Catalog of Ships* is the oldest literary document bearing witness to the Lokrians¹⁴ as an *ethnos* whose highest authority lay in the kingship, who dwelt in *poleis*, and as a group endowed with a fairly advanced level of common rules and duties – at least in the field of military action. Since the eight *poleis* listed all lay in Eastern Lokris, it might be concluded that for a long time only this area constituted Lokris in the Homeric Age. The Trojan War was a landmark event in the formation of Greek identities, of course: as Agamemnon established concord among the Greeks, collected them into an army, and led forth a military expedition against the barbarians, he became a driving force in the first moment of Panhellenic unity.¹⁵ Participation in the enterprise therefore further added to the notion of Lokrian *ethnos* identity.

Sea and mountains dominate the landscape both to the east and to the west of the two Lokreis. This vista is only partially interrupted by the presence of the plain of Opus, over which the Knemis and Chlomon massifs loom by the narrow coastal plain of Alponos at the mouth of Thermopylai to the east, and to the west by the plain at the foot of Mts. Parnassos and Giona, which separated the city of Amphissa from the sacred lands of Apollo at Delphi. This geographical configuration defined how resources were exploited, how life was lived, and how settlement systems were structured, and it ultimately nurtured a society of seamen and shepherds. The Ozolian Lokrians figure prominently in the list Thucydides drew up of raiders and pirates, which the historian quotes as examples of a plundering culture which in his time was still widespread.¹⁶

¹³ For the initiative of Thoas, chief of the Aitolians at Troy, see Hom. *Il.* 2.638–644.

¹⁴ Hom. *Il.* 2.527–534. ¹⁵ See Isok. 12.77–78.

¹⁶ Thuc. 1.5, 1–3; 2.32.1; cf. 3.89.3. For Lokrians and the sea, see Arjona 2013: 361–90.

The western Lokrians were also among the first peoples to establish rules regulating the right of reprisal at sea; however, they introduced the protection of the law to replace the right to seize people and goods by force. Such was the purpose of the treaty stipulated between the coastal Ozolian Lokrian cities of Oiantheia and Chaleion at a date between *c.* 475 and 450 BCE.¹⁷ Maritime interests are also manifest in the cenotaph of the *proxenos* Menekrates of Oiantheia (mid-sixth century BCE)¹⁸ at Korkyra, an island which was central to communications between Greece and the West along the Ionian and Adriatic sailing routes. Imported artefacts discovered in Lokrian burials shed light on their involvement in maritime trade during the Geometric Age, presenting a picture of two regions characterized culturally by open relations within a network of regional contacts stretching from Euboia in the east to the Gulf of Corinth in the west.¹⁹

The presence of mountains in the geography of Lokris further made for an economy based on the forest, succinctly defined in the *Suda* as “works of the forest”²⁰; i.e., the exploitation of uncultivated natural resources from woods was quintessential for the Lokrians, and it steered the volatile relations between their communities. Such an environment created both conflict and solidarity, especially when the territories involved were contiguous. Livestock raiding between the Lokrians and the Phokians on the slopes of Mt. Parnassos was a recurrent theme; the installation of 200 armed settlers (*axiomachoi*) in two frontier districts of a Western Lokrian city near the end of the sixth century gives clear proof of how precarious and valuable those liminal regions were.²¹ Evidence for generally unstable conditions is further provided by the formal establishment of armed surveillance corps. Mount Parnassos itself attests to this, as does the *chora* of the state entity that resulted from the *sympoliteia* of the Ozolian Lokrian cities of Myania and Hypnia in *c.* 167 BCE. It is noteworthy that one of the statutes of this sympolity aimed at regulating shepherding (*ta probata*) and protecting flocks by posting armed guards (*chorophylakeontes*) and permanent overseers (*skopiai*) in the countryside.²² The frontier between some cities of Hesperian Lokris and the *hiera chora* of Apollo notoriously gave rise to territorial disputes which were of fundamentally local dimension but

¹⁷ E&R 1, no. 53. ¹⁸ E&R 1, no. 34.

¹⁹ See Dakoronia 2006: 483–504; Papakonstantinou-Karantzali 2013: 225–261.

²⁰ *Sud.* s.v. *hyleoroi*.

²¹ For the Parnassos region: *Hell. ox.* 13.3 Chambers; *Xen. Hell.* 3.5.3. See Daverio 2011: 21–37, 39–50, 61–70. Colonist *axiomachoi*: E&R 1, no. 44 (the so-called Pappadakis Bronze, see below).

²² Evidence for *symperipoloi* on the Parnassos in Daverio 1988: 84–91. The *sympoliteia* of Myania and Hypnia: Ager 1996: 248–258, no. 89, lines 34–37, 40–64; see also below.

dragged on long enough to take on ‘international’ significance by involving the Amphiktyonic Council, the Roman Senate, and later the Emperor himself.²³ With recourse to the legal practice of arbitration, common peaceful resolutions could often be reached, such as in the case of the dispute between Thronion and Skarpheia over possession of the district of Chonneia. Otherwise, boundary lines were drawn up, such as the unusual border between Halai and Boumelitai marked by a double line of stones which represented the limits of each *polis*’ hinterland.²⁴ We must not, however, think that the goal was merely to provide pasture, farmland, or ports for strengthening sea trade. The fortifications of Thronion and Skarpheia must be considered primarily in light of their military function, placed as they were at the mouth of Thermopylai along the main north–south communication axis of Greece, the route taken by all major invaders of south Central Greece.

Material evidence makes it clear that from the early Archaic period onward, East and West Lokris began to be defined by differences in the character of their social organization as well as by their political and governmental power structures between central and local authorities. *Poleis* came to be distributed across Lokrian territory according to those criteria which remained constant in the geopolitical landscape of the two Lokreis, creating a more thickly woven web of cities in East Lokris than in the West.²⁵ Archaeological remains date the growth of fairly developed agglomerations in the East back to the Geometric Age, whereas in the West there are no traces of settlement agglomerations before the ninth century BCE.²⁶ As Lokrian society became diversified it produced an elite represented in the One Hundred Houses (*hekatōn oikiaī*) of East Lokris; members of these noble clans competed and won splendid victories in the Panhellenic Games, some of which were celebrated by Pindar.²⁷ The use of the ethnic Opuntian for athletes known for roughly a century after 550 BCE shows the primacy of that city and of its environment, as well as its role as a center for elites and a point of reference for initiatives of social

²³ Ager 1996: 238–247, no. 88; Daverio 2011: 61–70.

²⁴ Disputes over the possession of Chonneia, c. second century BCE: *FdD* III 4.38–42; Ager 1996: 482–490, no. 167. See *IG* IX.1² 5, Fasti, no. 250; Moreno-Pascual Valderrama 2013; Zachos 2013. For Thronion and Skarpheia, see Daverio 2001: 610; Daverio 2002: 503. Pascual 2013: 501–3; Halai-Boumelitai boundary, c. second century BCE: Daverio 1988: no. 10, 123–125.

²⁵ Apart from the *Catalog of Ships*, Hom. *Il.* 2.527–534, the cities of East Lokris are listed in Lykoph. *Alex.* 1141–1154; Plin. *nat.* 4.7.27; Strabo 9.4.2–5. Ozolian Lokris: Thuc. 3.100–102; Aischin. 2.132; Paus. 10.38.4, 8–11.

²⁶ See Dakoronia 2006: 483–504; Domínguez 2013a.

²⁷ Pind. *Ol.* 9, for Epharmostos. See *Ol.* 10, 11 for Hagesidamos of Lokroi Epizephyrioi.

prestige.²⁸ The athletes' successes spread the fame of the Lokrians well beyond their regional boundaries; thanks to them, links with other peoples subscribing to the emerging sentiment of Panhellenism were maintained. The aristocracy of the One Hundred Houses was not very different from the elite visible in the necropoleis of the Geometric Age. The luxury goods that have come to light from burials – some of oriental manufacture – provide a glimpse of an aristocratic society open to foreign contacts, which were then indicative of their own prosperity. This was an elite of wealth as well as rank; social primacy was rooted in the ability to take on official roles and duties that gave the *hekaton oikia* the responsibility to handle their power well.²⁹ According to Polybius,³⁰ Lokroi Epizephyrioi was founded by the illegitimate sons born of the adultery of women from the One Hundred Houses whose husbands had been away fighting alongside the Spartans in the Messenian Wars. The Lokrian nobility were thus also part of the system of military alliances that operated in Greece as early as the seventh century. A local aristocracy which produced the class of political potentates is attested in the cities of West Lokris between the end of the sixth and the first half of the fifth century.³¹ Nevertheless, it seems likely that in the societies of Chaleion and Oiantheia which were connected to the world of overseas trade, this local aristocracy was distinguished from the traditional *aristoi* of the mid-fifth century in their lifestyles, values, and means of attaining wealth. The decisive role of women from the One Hundred Houses in the foundation of Lokroi Epizephyrioi and the cult of Athena Ilias seems to show that the female members of the aristocracy held a prestigious position in Lokrian society and developed an important function in transmitting aristocratic values to that colony. The cultic prerogatives of the noble girls, by virtue of their young age and virginity, are reflected in the cult of Eukleia: at the foot of the statue of the goddess set up in every Lokrian city, engaged couples performed sacrifices before marriage.³²

In the Hellenistic and Roman periods epigraphic evidence demonstrates that city elites relished representing themselves as an educated class.

²⁸ *IG* IX.1² 5, Fasti, nos. 12, 13, 25, 26, 27. From Opus: Epharmostos and Lampromachos, his *syngenēs*, Rexibios, Nikeas, Menalkes.

²⁹ The aristocracy of Lokroi Epizephyrioi was also made up of descendants from the One Hundred Houses (Polyb. 12.5.4). In 457 BCE after the battle of Oinophyta the Athenians took a hundred of the richest Opuntian Lokrian men hostage (Thuc. 1.108.3).

³⁰ Polyb. 12.5.5–11, quoting Aristotle as his source.

³¹ Evidence from the law known as Pappadakis Bronze, c. 525–500 (E&R 1, no. 44) and from the treaty between Chaleion and Oiantheia, 475–450 BCE (E&R 1, no. 53).

³² See Plut. *Aristid.* 20.6. Eukleia was the sister of Patroklos.

Accordingly, it seems well-founded to account for the *carmina elegiaca* engraved on two gravestones at Larymna and Halai in this social context, as well as the epigram (perhaps of Poseidippos) for Nichasichoros at Opus.³³ In the latter city, the *philogymnastai* (likely an athletic association) honored their fellow citizen who bears the name Epharmostos – presumably after the famous *olympionikēs* celebrated by Pindar.³⁴ These examples represent means by which the upper crust of Lokrian society anchored themselves in the heritage of Lokrian tradition, but at the same time placed themselves in the midst of wider circulating patterns of Hellenistic and Roman culture.

A law code inscribed on a bronze plaque found at the site of the ancient city of Chaleion contains regulations for the foundation of a colony (*epoikia*) at Naupaktos by a contingent of men from East Lokris. The statute for the Hypoknemidian Lokrians was to apply also to Chaleian settlers,³⁵ which meant that a West Lokrian community shared in this venture. While the document addresses a specific issue, it actually opens up a wider horizon because of the information it provides about the political, administrative, and legal institutions of the East Lokrians – in particular their competence and their division into central and local systems. The code uniquely confirms that before the mid-fifth century, the East Lokrians who drafted this law qualified themselves as *Hypoknēmidioi* (though in two cases it makes reference to *Opontioi*), and they were organized into a federal state according to criteria proper to a *koinon*.³⁶

The Hypoknemidian Lokrians were the authority promulgating the law. The departing people whom the statutes are intended to govern are explicitly designated as their colonists (*epoikoi Lokrōn tōn Hypoknamidiōn*),³⁷ while the city of Naupaktos played only a passive role in integrating the new colonists into its citizen body. The status of the colonists is clearly outlined through civic, religious, legal, and economic regulations: the *epoikoi* acquired new citizenship, but at the same time the law provided norms for keeping contact with their mother city and assuring its constant control over these colonists. The bond with the *mētropolis* was maintained by an oath of loyalty which the colonists were sworn to respect, and according to it they were in no way to detach themselves from the Opuntians; this pact was renewable upon its expiry every thirty years.³⁸ The code opens with stipulations defining their obligations towards the mother city and the community receiving the colonists,

³³ IG IX.1² 5, 1821 (Larymna), 1886 (Halai), 1911 (Opus). ³⁴ IG IX.1² 5, 1934.

³⁵ E&R I, no. 43, lines 46–47.

³⁶ E&R I, no. 43, *Hypoknēmidioi*: lines 5, 8–10, 20–21, 24, 25, 30, 33–34, 46–47; *Opontioi*: lines 11, 39.

³⁷ E&R I, no. 43, line 5, C lines 15–16. ³⁸ E&R I, no. 43, A lines 11–14.

the former dealing with how to take part in the religious ceremonies with the Hypoknemidian Lokrians, the latter concerning the tribute to be paid to the new city.³⁹ The acquisition of the status of *politēs* in Naupaktos did not entirely dissolve the legal rights these colonists enjoyed in their *metropolis*:⁴⁰ some of the functions of administering justice to the colonists were under the authority of judicial organizations in the mother city,⁴¹ and they still held some hereditary and property rights there according to the laws of the Hypoknemidian Lokrians.⁴² The obligations of the colonists towards the Naupaktians were primarily fiscal. There were sanctions against colonists leaving Naupaktos without having complied with these obligations, which included the exclusion from the community of all Lokrians until lawful debts had been paid to the Naupaktians.⁴³ The statutes of this document also took into account other parties involved, namely the people (*damos*) and the institutions (indicated as *koinanes*) that linked the noble families of the motherland.⁴⁴ The fact that colonists were allowed to attend their ceremonies and rituals shows just how important the place of origin was by virtue of the social links and cultic belonging it entailed. Nonetheless their guest status (*xenos*) which gave them access to said cults as new citizens of Naupaktos also limited their enjoyment of the prerogatives inherent in their previous civic status. A clause inserted at the start of the document⁴⁵ reveals that the *damos* and *koinanes* played an active role in perpetuating the religious heritage of the Lokrians and preserving the colonists' ties of identity with their mother city. Two groups are mentioned, the Perchotaries and Mysakeis, for whom some provisions were explicitly reserved, marking these as prestige groups, probably from noble or sacerdotal clans.⁴⁶ According to the regulations of the law, the settlers from Chaleion had to obey the same rules as the Hypoknemidian colonists, without specifying whether this referred to their relations with the institutions and the public administration of Chaleion (which are not mentioned) or whether they were to be subject to the authority of the Hypoknemidian Lokrians, even if Chaleion was situated on Ozolian Lokrian territory.

The law code refers to the Hypoknemidian Lokrians⁴⁷ as a lawful citizen body as well as to political, administrative, and judicial institutions to enforce its statutes. At the head of the federal government was the assembly

³⁹ E&R 1, no. 43, lines 2–11. ⁴⁰ E&R 1, no. 43, D lines 19–22.

⁴¹ E&R 1, no. 43, G lines 32–35.

⁴² E&R 1, no. 43, C lines 16–19; F lines 29–31; H lines 35–37.

⁴³ E&R 1, no. 43, B lines 16–17.

⁴⁴ For this interpretation of *koinanes* see Beck 1999: 53–62.

⁴⁵ E&R 1, no. 43, lines 2–5.

⁴⁶ E&R 1, no. 43, E lines 24–28.

⁴⁷ E&R 1, no. 43, lines 5, 8–10, 20–21, 24, 25, 30, 33–34, 46–47.

of the Thousand Opuntians.⁴⁸ These two terms (*Opontion te Xilion*) form an inseparable binomial, expressing the formalization of the primary assembly's institutions into a federal organization.⁴⁹ The name *Opontioi* can be explained by the fact that the assembly met in the city of Opus, the chief political center of East Lokris, and thus the city which considered itself representative of all the Hypoknemidian Lokrians. It was in reference to Opus as a federal political space that the colonists were forbidden to break off from the mother city. This ban was formulated in terms of a split "from the Opuntians," which probably to be equated with the assembly of the Thousand – and the hundred delegates who had to swear the oath of fidelity in the name of the inhabitants of the motherland are referred to in the same way.⁵⁰ The One Hundred Houses were undoubtedly influential in the composition of the Thousand Opuntians, but they were not alone: in the fifth century, citizens of the Hypoknemidian *ethnos* who were qualified on the basis of the hoplite census (the *damos* figuring in the Naupaktos law code), also took part in this assembly.⁵¹ At the local level every *polis* had an assembly (labelled *agora*) which interacted with the central political and administrative bodies and was able to competently judge questions of citizenship. According to the law code of Naupaktos, it was the *agorai* of the *poleis* that addressed colonists' requests to return to the motherland.⁵² In the case of Perchotaries and Mysakeis who returned individually, they were obliged to submit to the laws of their own city.⁵³ Their residence distributed throughout the *poleis* confirms the prevalence of political–territorial rather than family allotment. Kinship bonds and cult solidarity were reinforced on those religious occasions which upheld ancestral customs, whereas in the provisions regarding administration, the official partners of the central authority were the *poleis*. As for administering justice, there was a federal court in Opus.⁵⁴

Opus was thus the most powerful and influential city in East Lokris; it was the seat of the federal institutions, and this fact may explain why the literary sources define Opuntian Lokrians as synonymous with Hypoknemidians.⁵⁵ Their relations with other cities and how autonomous from or dependent on the main city they were cannot be defined with

⁴⁸ E&R 1, no. 43, I lines 39–40

⁴⁹ As in Beck 1999. For *Opontioi* as a synonym of *Hypoknemidioi* more generally, see Larsen 1968: 50–51.

⁵⁰ E&R 1, no. 43, A lines 11–14. For the *Hypoknemidioi*/*Opontioi* dichotomy see Beck 1999: 56–61.

⁵¹ A thousand is too big a number for only the citizens of Opus. See Beck 1999: 59–60.

⁵² See E&R 1, no. 43, D lines 19–22. For the literary lists of Lokrian *poleis* see above; cf. also Fossey 1990.

⁵³ E&R 1, no. 43, E lines 26–28 ⁵⁴ E&R 1, no. 43, G lines 31–33.

⁵⁵ Analysis and discussion of sources in Nielsen 2000.

certainty. According to Pausanias, Larymna depended on Opus on the ground of ties of *synteleia*, and it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that Kynos, the port of the *mētropolis*, had a similar relationship.⁵⁶ On the other hand, the distribution of competencies between the two spheres of politics – the federal assembly (the Thousand Opuntians) and the local assemblies (the *agorai*) – according to the law code of Naupaktos reveals a simultaneous system of a federal power and local communities that had a definite political and social structure which the sources refer to as *poleis*. All these factors therefore configured the *koinon* in the form of a *sympoliteia*.⁵⁷ The term *koinon* does not appear in the text but is explicitly used in a treaty with the Thessalians at a later date.⁵⁸ Federal citizenship therefore refers to Hypoknemidian Lokrians, defined ethnically, as well as to Opuntian Lokrians.

Precisely what the Hypoknemidian Lokrians expected from transferring colonists is evident from the control exercised by the federal government over its emigrant citizens. This control was effected through the system of institutions and political, fiscal, and judicial mechanisms established for this purpose, as well as the religious links with the *damos* and *koinanes* which strengthened the bonds with those who left the motherland. Consciousness of ethnic unity was maintained by creating specifically binding duties. An important element in qualifying for the status of *politēs* vis-à-vis the mother city and the city of adoption was fiscal. As mentioned above, the colonists had to pay tribute to the Naupaktians, and if any of the colonists left Naupaktos without paying his taxes he was expelled from the community of the Lokrians until he had paid his lawful debts to the Naupaktians.⁵⁹ At the same time, the Hypoknemidian Lokrians established a series of guarantees in favor of the colonists, of prime importance among which was a regulation protecting the legal status of citizens. By imposing on the settlers the same fiscal regime as on the Hesperian Lokrians, to which also the Naupaktians were subjected, the law guaranteed that they were not treated as metics and did not have to pay residence tax, as foreigners had to.⁶⁰ Colonists were guaranteed the same citizenship rights that they had held in their own motherland, which would have continued to be valid should they have chosen to return home.⁶¹ In spite of their severity, we can recognize in the statutes of the law code how

⁵⁶ Paus. 9.23.7.

⁵⁷ *Koinon* according to Larsen 1968: 48–58; Beck 1999: 53–62; more problematic conclusions in Nielsen 2000: 91–120.

⁵⁸ *IG IX.1*² 5.1920, line 4 (c. second century BCE). ⁵⁹ E&R I, no. 43, B lines 16–17

⁶⁰ E&R I, no. 43, lines 10–11. ⁶¹ E&R I, no. 43, D lines 20–22.

profoundly conscious the Lokrians were of a common identity and to what extent they supported the reciprocity of rights and duties that were derived from it. The Naupaktos colonization statute provides concrete evidence for the links between the regulation of federal citizenship and ethnic identity. The dating of the document is controversial, usually ranging from the 490s to the 460s BCE, and so further from or closer to the land tenure and exploitation reform of the unknown West Lokrian city mentioned in the *tethmos* of the so-called Pappadakis Bronze (c. 525–500), and further from or closer to the time when the Messenians from Ithome settled at Naupaktos on Athenian initiative in 457 BCE.⁶²

There is scanty evidence testifying to how, if at all, the Epiknemidian Lokrians benefitted from some form of federal union in the Classical period, and on what basis in the East Lokrian context. The limited population of this region, though, leads one to suggest that in this period the Epiknemidian *poleis* were part of the *Hypoknēmidioi*'s federal league.⁶³ In other words, there is good reason to believe that all the East Lokrians were part of a single state. This can be inferred from the fact that in the literary and epigraphic sources the terms “Opuntian” or “Hypoknemidian” were synonymous with federal status, whereas the adjective “Epiknemidian” held probably only geographic significance in this period.⁶⁴ In particular, there is a lack of evidence as to the exact legal status of the cities of the *Epiknēmidioi*, especially their two main *poleis*, Thronion and Skarpheia, in their relations with the *mētropolis*. Evidence for integration is provided by a series of coin emissions from the fourth century, depicting Aias as a warrior on the reverse and surrounded by the legends ΛΟΚΡ, ΛΟΚΡΩΝ ΗΥΠΟ, ΟΠΟΝΤ, and ΣΚΑΡ. It is not clear, however, whether the integration was limited to coinage, or rather extended to a wider unified system of state.⁶⁵ It is worth noting that Naryx, the homeland and mythical seat of the royal house of Aias,⁶⁶ was situated in Epiknemidian Lokris, and according to the inscription known as the *Mädcheninschrift* (“Maidens Inscription”) from the years between 300–270 BCE, the city joined with the clan of *Aianteioi* in order to fulfil their obligations to Athena Ilias.⁶⁷ When Aitolian domination of Central

⁶² E&R 1, no. 44. Sources for the Messenians settling at Naupaktos collected in Daverio 2000: 752–754.

⁶³ Beck 1999: 53–62; Nielsen 2000: 118–119. ⁶⁴ See Nielsen 2000: 118; Domínguez 2013a.

⁶⁵ See Head 1991: 336–337.

⁶⁶ Naryx is remembered as the home of Aias in Strabo 9.4.2; Diod. 14.82.8; Steph. Byz. s.v. Naryx; Hyg. *Fab.* 14.7. Yet Kallimachos, in the citation of an Iliadic scholion, says the hero was from Opus: *Schol. in Il.* 13.6.

⁶⁷ See Wilhelm 1911: 163–256.

Greece ended, the *Epiknēmidioi* had their very own form of state. Nonetheless, it seems that federal unity was compromised by internal tensions, as an epigraphical dossier records quarrels between Thronion and Skarpheia over their frontier, as well as over-representation at the Pylaian-Delphic Amphiktyony, a privilege that both cities claimed.⁶⁸

Thronion was the principal center of Epiknemidian Lokris during the Archaic period, and continued to play a leading role in the centuries that followed. Numismatic evidence however, along the quarrels recorded epigraphically, indicates that from at least the middle of the fourth century BCE Skarpheia came to challenge Thronion's primacy. This dualism in the region suggests that its federal organization was loose at best.

In inscriptions from the second century BCE the formula "the Opuntians and the Lokrians with the Opuntians" began to appear. The similarity of form with the titulary of the fifth and fourth century hegemonic alliances suggests a twofold decision-making process, with one group (*hoi Opontioi*) pre-eminent, while the other (*hoi meta Opontiōn*) remains in a subordinate position but is still officially recognized as being involved in the process.⁶⁹ Yet the distribution of power and official competences between the Opuntians and their partners remain unknown to us, and we remain unsure whether the "*Lokroi hoi meta Opontiōn*" represent all of the Lokrian cities and communities, or only a portion thereof. The treaty struck with the Thessalians during the same century, however, makes reference to a Lokrian *koinon*,⁷⁰ and accordingly it is not entirely beyond the realm of possibility that there were two different systems at work in the region simultaneously. The general morass that was second-century BCE politics in Lokris gave rise to intermittent unions, though not structures that can be considered full-fledged federations.⁷¹ Consequently, one must be cautious when considering the formula *Opontioi kai Lokroi hoi meta Opontiōn* as being synonymous with a *koinon*.

All in all, then, while the Lokrians' ethnic affiliation seems to have been homogenous and constant, its political membership was more flexible and was thus re-negotiated from time to time according to relations between the local communities and/or contingent circumstances.

Thus, we may conclude that the formalization of official state organs in East Lokris began in the Archaic period. The One Hundred Houses played

⁶⁸ For the border dispute, see also above. Amphiktyonic quarrel: *FdD* III 4.38–42; Ager 1996: nos. 133, 167; *IG* IX.1⁵ 5, Fasti, nos. 249–250.

⁶⁹ *IG* IX.1² 5, 1909, 1910, 1912, 1913, 1916, 1917. ⁷⁰ *IG* IX.1² 5, 1920, lines 4–5.

⁷¹ For the history of Eastern Lokris in the second century BCE, cf. Klaffenbach 1926: 68–88; Oldfather 1926: 1205–1236; Moreno-Pascual Valderrama 2013: 507–535.

a primary role in this process, making use of ties of solidarity based on what the Naupaktos law code called *koinanes*, most probably hetairic organizations or *phratriai*, which continued, thanks to kinship bonds, to exert social, political and religious primacy over the whole of East Lokris in the Classical period.⁷² In step with this, the East Lokrians continued to consolidate the constituent elements of the *polis*, namely civic rules, public institutions, and common citizenship. These two phenomena should be considered as the roots from which the *koinon* of the Hypoknemidian/Opuntian Lokrians grew in the fifth century and which ultimately left their mark in the oligarchic nature of the political system: Aristotle referred to the *politeia* of the Opuntian Lokrians as an example of aristocratic constitution.⁷³

As for the Hesperian Lokrians, their *koinon* is attested from the second or third decade of the fourth century BCE onwards. The sanctioning formula for a decree found at Malandrino (the site of ancient Physkeis), dated 360 to 357 BCE, was inscribed “It has been deliberated by the *koinon* of the Hesperian Lokrians”⁷⁴. This is the first formal attestation of a West Lokrian federal organization,⁷⁵ but the *Hesperioi Lokroi* do appear at a slightly earlier date in the official list of states subscribing to the reconstruction of the temple of Apollo at Delphi.⁷⁶ The tax system operating in West Lokris for all the Hesperian Lokrians to which the colonial law of Naupaktos referred,⁷⁷ might attest to some form of collective responsibility, such as a sort of fiscal federalism. The first half of the fifth century appears to have been a period of change in the territorial orientation and social structure of West Lokris, with a rise of population figures, especially in the region of Naupaktos, which is well attested by the local establishment of colonies, first of East Lokrians and later of Messenians. There are also reasons to think that the districts of Hyle and Lyskara, in which a group of colonists settled with their families, according to the Pappadakis Bronze’s law, constituted the fringes of Naupaktos’ hinterland.⁷⁸

Physkeis functioned as West Lokris’ capital, where the federal magistrates were stationed, most eminently the *agōnothetai*. It was also the seat of the *ennomos ekklēsia* (“lawful assembly”),⁷⁹ which became increasingly

⁷² See Beck 1999: 59–62.

⁷³ Arist. *Pol.* 3.1287a. His school also composed a *politeia* of the *Opontioi* (fr. 568–577 Gigon).

⁷⁴ *IG* ix.1² 3.665, line 1. ⁷⁵ See Lérat 1952: 2.55–60; Daverio 2013. ⁷⁶ *FdD* III 5.4, lines 46–49.

⁷⁷ E&R I, no. 43, lines 10–11: the colonists have to pay the same taxes as the Western Lokrians.

⁷⁸ The hypothesis to identify the *polis* of the Pappadakis Bronze with Naupaktos was first put forward by L. H. Jeffery, see *LSAG* 105–106.

⁷⁹ *IG* ix.1² 3.351.

important in the third and second centuries. It is a well-founded opinion that the choice of Physkeis as the capital was influenced by the presence of the sanctuary of Athena Ilias, which Lucien Lérat recognizes as the federal religious center of the *koinon*.⁸⁰ This is supported by the numerous manumission inscriptions discovered there which date to the third and second centuries, as we know that only religious centers of great importance were allowed to enfranchise slaves. The hosting of festivals accompanied by athletic competitions, presided over by the *agōnothetai*, further lends credence to the argument. Up to this time, governmental systems and centralized institutions with authority over all the regional centers were not consolidated, while the *poleis* maintained decision-making powers in wide sectors of public life. The law engraved on the Pappadakis Bronze bears witness to the fact that the city had the authority to make laws and the civic administration enjoyed considerable decision-making and judiciary power.⁸¹ The law in question is concerned with the allotment of land in the plain of Hyle and Liskara.⁸² A body of 101 members was chosen from the best citizens (*aristindēn*, i.e., according to birth) and authorized to propose settling 200 fighting men in Hyle and Liskara as additional settlers due to the threat of war.⁸³ Reference is made to inheritance laws and to a law about murder: anyone breaking the decisions of the *tethmos* would have his property confiscated, his house demolished,⁸⁴ and a perpetual curse placed himself and his family.⁸⁵

Indeed, Chaleion and Oiantheia mutually agreed on regulations for law cases involving foreigners (*xenoi*). These regulations also defined the legal status of their respective citizens and established that the citizens of Oiantheia transferring to Chaleion, and vice versa, would be metics⁸⁶ – the very status the Hypoknemidian Lokrians ensured their colonists would not receive. The *symbolē* was a step in favor of the initiatives shared by the two communities which, although related ethnically, were still strangers to forms of political integration in the years between 475 and 450 BCE. Magistrates bore the title of *xenodikai*, judges of foreigners, and it was in the context of relations with autonomous *poleis* that there was a *proxenos* in both cities.⁸⁷ The legal status of citizens prevailed over ethnic belonging;

⁸⁰ Lérat 1952: 2.118–121, 156–158.

⁸¹ There are disagreements between scholars over the general reading of the text because of the controversial interpretation of key words in the text.

⁸² E&R 1, no. 44, lines 1–3. ⁸³ E&R 1, no. 44, lines 7–9. ⁸⁴ E&R 1, no. 44, lines 3–6.

⁸⁵ E&R 1, no. 44, lines 11–14.

⁸⁶ E&R 1, no. 53, lines 1, 6–8, 11–12. According to Larsen (1968: 54–55) the *xenodikai* were a special court or courts appointed to deal with lawsuits involving non-citizens.

⁸⁷ E&R 1, no. 53, lines 8, 9. The treaty specifies the fine for a *proxenos* who bears false witness.

unlike the Naupaktos law code, therefore, the *symbolē* excluded integration in the civic community, thus avoiding changes in the demographic stability of the citizen body and their consequences for its social and political framework. From the treaty emerged a network of regular, constant relations between the contracting parties. The most significant result was that it did away with recourse to sequestering citizens from these cities and their property as punishment for offenses (such as failure to pay a debt) which could be dealt with by appealing to the courts: when the treaty was signed, private justice made way for the regular administration of justice by the *polis*. It is in this context that the *symbolē* can be accepted as one of the first forms of inter-*polis* agreements, demonstrating developments on the level of civic, political and judicial institutions. This system of institutions certified a great freedom of action which can be explained only if Chaleion and Oiantheia possessed a significant degree of independence.⁸⁸

Such a relatively high degree of local autonomy is attested by the *sympoliteia* between Myania and Hypnia.⁸⁹ The agreement aimed to give legal shape to the process of political union between the contracting parties, an act which can be explained by political and military events connected with the end of Aitolian domination (167 BCE) and its repercussions in West Lokris. There was no federal system in place, making it necessary to create a network of cooperation officialized in the legal and institutional formalization of the *sympoliteia*.

Polyadic institutions spread competencies throughout a well-structured system of government. There are three distinct *polis* bodies referenced in the Pappadakis Bronze, the assembly (*polis*), the council of elders (*preiga*), and the *apoklēsia*, a *hapax legomenon* that is variously interpreted as a popular council, the council of magistrates, or a delegation of colonists.⁹⁰ As public officials, the archon and a college of *damiorgoi* is listed. The treaty between Chaleion and Oiantheia assigned the settlement of disputes to *xenodikai*, while a certain number of other competencies were entrusted to *damiorgoi*.⁹¹ In both texts, the requirement that the members of some institutions be selected *aristindēn*⁹² indicates that political control was restricted to the members of the aristocracy. With time, in the West as well as in the East, local institutions seem to have survived if not multiplied, as one can deduce from inscriptions of the third and second centuries, when fluctuating phases of subjection to external powers prevented

⁸⁸ *Contra* Domínguez 2008: 326. ⁸⁹ See Ager 1996: no. 89.

⁹⁰ E&R 1, no. 44, lines 10–11, 20–22. The *apoklesia* was the popular council according to Larsen 1968: 54; the other theories on this subject are laid out in E&R 1, no. 44, 189–192.

⁹¹ E&R 1, no. 53, lines 9, 13–14. ⁹² E&R 1, no. 44, lines 7–8; 53.

the functioning of the federal system. In the Hellenistic period both West and East Lokrians were subjected to a long period of Aitolian domination (292–167 BCE), which in the East was interrupted by phases of Makedonian hegemony and the attachment of the south of the region to Boiotia.

Because its frontier was contiguous with the sacred lands of Apollo, Amphissa, which Pausanias named as the biggest and most famous of the Lokrian *poleis*, had a political and military history all of its own.⁹³ Its *Sonderstellung* is reflected in the expression in the literary sources as *hoi Lokroi hoi Amphisseis*.⁹⁴ The distinction and separation arising from relations with the other Lokrian *poleis* (particularly in Hesperian Lokris) were outweighed, however, by the incorporation of Amphissa into the *ethnos* religion of the Lokrians; the city was firmly anchored in Lokris' cultic traditions, so much so that, in Lokrian perceptions, Amphissa must have been regarded as an integral part of their *ethnos*.

Both in the West and in the East, in the specificity of local dynamics as well as in the different distribution of central powers and local autonomy, the Lokrians had an advanced system of legislation from early in their history.⁹⁵ We cannot help but recall that the first written laws were promulgated at Lokroi Epizephyrioi thanks to Zaleukos. The fame of Opuntian *eunomia* ("good governance", i.e., by law) seems firmly rooted in ancient tradition, receiving praise from Pindar, and Opus was mentioned in the inscription on the first of the five stelai erected over the common burial place for the fallen Greeks at Thermopylai as the Lokrian "*mētropolis* with just laws"⁹⁶. This reputation lasted for centuries. An inscription dating to 230 BCE refers to the good legislation of Opus (*thesmia tēs eunomias*), while in the second century CE, at the request of its inhabitants, the Emperor Hadrian awarded the status of *polis* to Naryx in consideration of various merits, among which were the laws of the Opuntians.⁹⁷ The text relating to the colony at Naupaktos mentions the *nomia* issued from the *poleis* of the Hypoknemidian Lokrians, whereas the statute pertaining to colonists, binding also for the contingent from Chaleion, is called a *tethmion*. It seems certain that both were to be considered binding laws, but of different levels: one local, and the other

⁹³ See Thuc. 3.101.2; Paus. 10.38.8.

⁹⁴ E.g. Aischin. 2.113, 123; Dem. 18.140; Diod. 18.38.2; Paus. 2.8.4; 3.9.9. The term *Sonderstellung* was coined by Bauer 1907: 41 and taken up by Lérat 1952: 2.57. Cf. Nielsen 2000: 99, n. 59.

⁹⁵ See Larsen: 55–58.

⁹⁶ Strabo 9.4.2; Pind. *Ol.* 9.16. See Ael. *VH* 2.22 who includes the Lokrians in the list of peoples with excellent laws, along with the Mantineians, Cretans, Lakedaemonians, and Athenians.

⁹⁷ *IG* IX.1² 5.1911, an epigram in honour of Opuntian Nikasichoros, line 8; 2018, a rescript of Hadrian, line 15.

federal.⁹⁸ The laws engraved on the Pappadakis Bronze and the *symbolē* of Chaleion and Oiantheia reveal regulations regarding land tenure and maritime law that are discreetly progressive. The former is qualified as a *tethmos*, with precise indications as to how binding it is to be (*bebaios estō*), reinforced by consecration to Pythian Apollo.⁹⁹ The *symbolē*, on the other hand, forbids *sylan* (the right of seizure) from the port. It thus seems that the West Lokrians had a lawful conception of maritime space, as they gave specific coordinates for a strip of coastal water subject to the city's legislation.¹⁰⁰ It was also a very significant step towards norms replacing private reprisals with continued, regular relations between *poleis*.¹⁰¹ This evidence allows us to correct the impression, fixed in the literary tradition starting with the *polis*-centric judgement of historians like Thucydides, about the primitive customs of the Ozolian Lokrians.¹⁰²

In the Greek world, *proxenia* was the officially recognized institution for upholding stable, continuing interstate relationships. This institution thus presupposes the existence of state systems, and by looking at the distribution of *proxenoi* in the localities where they carried out their functions, it is possible to reconstruct the network of contacts maintained by a city-state. Given that Menekrates of Oiantheia in Ozolian Lokris is actually the first epigraphically attested *proxenos*, dating to around the middle of the sixth century BCE,¹⁰³ it is reasonable to believe that this city of the Ozolian Lokris was among the earliest *poleis* to partake in this system of relationships. The existence of *proxenia* in West Lokris seems to be confirmed by the *symbolē* between Chaleion and Oiantheia in which *proxenoi* are mentioned as being active in both cities.¹⁰⁴ Thus, the institution of the *proxenia* gives further proof for the autonomy of the *poleis* in Ozolian Lokris. There is also evidence for *proxenoi*, referred to as *Opontioi*,¹⁰⁵ in East Lokris in the fifth and fourth centuries. We cannot conclude with certainty whether the term *Opontios* refers to the city of Opus, or whether it was a title that enabled them to act on behalf of all Hypoknemidian Lokrians, a sort of federal *proxenos*. Even if this term did refer to that status, it is uncertain whether this is because of semantic assimilation between *Opontioi* and *Hypoknemidioi* or by virtue of an official formalized qualification, like that used in defining the Assembly of the Thousand. In subsequent centuries

⁹⁸ E&R I, no. 43, E lines 25–28, G lines 29–31: *nomia*; I line 46: *to thethmion*.

⁹⁹ E&R I, no. 44, lines 1. 14. ¹⁰⁰ E&R I, no. 53, lines 3–4. ¹⁰¹ See Cataldi 1983: 53–86.

¹⁰² Thuc. 1.5.3, 3.95.3; Paus. 10.38.1–3; Plut. *Quaest. Graec.* 15 = *Mor.* 294e–f.

¹⁰³ E&R I, no. 34. His memory is preserved in the inscription engraved on the cenotaph which the Korkyraians dedicated to him after he disappeared at sea.

¹⁰⁴ E&R I, no. 53, lines 8, 10–11. ¹⁰⁵ *IG IX.1*² 5, Fasti, nos. 27, 29, 104, 127.

we find *proxenoi* who were designated according to the ethnics of other cities in East Lokris, one even with the ethnic *Lokros*,¹⁰⁶ but the ever-changing political situation in the third and second centuries prevents us from comparing them with those of the *koinon* that operated before. That among the *proxenoi* there was the Olympic champion Lampromachos (the *proxenos* of Thebes) speaks in favor of their belonging to the elite of society, as was customary in Greece. The aristocracy maintained its social primacy by providing a managing class of politicians able to take on official roles that helped to fit the *koinon* into the larger network of interstate relations. The *proxenoi Opontioi*, like the Lokrian athletes at the games, were members of the nobility open to contact with the outside world representing their society in an international setting; these contacts were made thanks to private initiatives, like participation in the Panhellenic Games, or institutionalized channels of public hospitality. The extent and direction of cities granted *proxenia* differed between East and West Lokris. In the East, regional relations with neighboring states, such as Thebes, Eretria, and Pherai in Thessaly, prevailed; in the West, the evidence points to maritime routes in the direction of the Ionian Sea and the Adriatic. From the decrees enacted in the name of “the Opuntians and the Lokrians together with the Opuntians” we know that in the second century BCE there was an official Lokrian *proxenia* granted by an institution that was, at least for that moment, the highest authority among the Opuntians and their partners.¹⁰⁷

Ethnos, *polis*, and *koinon* were the pillars to which the consciousness of belonging to a cohesive political and social system were anchored, but they were not the only aspects. The east–west geographical divide and the different degree of political integration between the *poleis* and the central government in both regions complicated the sense of belonging. Other forms of belonging were stimulated by the various instances of solidarity that united the members of aristocratic families, and also by local particularism, liable to cause both regional unions and conflicts. All of these relationships were geared towards fragmentation, and thus, shared ethnic identity was the result of conscious constructive effort to appear as a homogeneous *ethnos*. We can follow how the Lokrians created their own self-representation through foundation myths and religious traditions which made awareness of unity prevalent despite territorial and political discontinuity. Common participation in the foundation of Lokroi Epizephyrioi and the intent of the law code pertaining to the colony at Naupaktos testify that the two separate regions were capable of moments of

¹⁰⁶ IG IX.1² 5, Fasti, nos. 128, 129, 130, 164.

¹⁰⁷ IG IX.1² 5, 1909, 1910, 1912, 1913, 1916, 1917.

concrete co-operation. The Lokrians also felt themselves to be part of the wider Hellenic ethnicity, because they shared the religious traditions, values, and models of behavior that formed the very fabric of Panhellenism, a phenomenon in which they took part since the earlier days of its emergence in the eighth century. The openness of Lokrian *aristoi* to external contacts through the personal relationships, trade exchange, and *proxenia* signaled their Panhellenic values. Ethnicity was continually negotiated within a constellation of identities belonging to different networks and social and institutional contexts, according to times and circumstances, and based on conscious goals. In the Lokrian world, ethnicity was a constant condition, adaptable to whatever situation cropped up from time to time, and this explains why the Lokrians were firmly conscious of their shared identity. The federal state provided the political structure for the flexible network of relations, which created a framework of institutions and regulations for the Lokrian Leagues.

CHAPTER 10

Phokis

Jeremy McInerney

Located in Central Greece, Phokis is a region comprised of rapidly changing landscapes.¹ Mountains alternate with fertile plains and coastal zones, so that although it is a geographically small area (approximately 1,600 square kilometers) it experiences a great variety of climatic and environmental conditions. At its heart is Mt. Parnassos, whose twin peaks reach over 2,300 meters, are snow-capped for much of the year, and whose wilderness was the haunt of hunters and mainads. The divinely inspired treks across Parnassos by the Bacchic worshippers known as *thyiades* expressed the powerful association of mountain with wild(er)ness.² The mountain was sacred to Apollo and, to a lesser extent, Dionysos. A high proportion of red deer bones identified in the excavations at the Korykian Cave on the mountain also shows that the region was popular with hunters.³ It was while hunting here that Odysseus received a leg wound, which would leave him with the tell-tale scar. North of Parnassos is the valley of the Kephisos River, beyond which lies another mountain ridge, Kallidromon. The plain of the Kephisos, which runs broadly west to east, supplies excellent land for a mixed agricultural regime of grain and olive cultivation and grazing. The plain is neatly divided between settlements located at regular intervals north and south of the river, creating a patchwork of communities each with access both to the fertile bottom-land watered by the river and to the resources of the mountain behind: summer pasture, wood, charcoal, and wild game. It is not a coincidence that most of the Phokian settlements of the Classical period were located at an elevation of around 400 meters, since this marks the shift from the Mesomediterranean environmental zone to the Supramediterranean zone.

¹ Philippson 1951: 464; Ruschenbusch 1991: 303. ² McInerney 1999a: 263–283.

³ Amandry 1984.

Distributed across this region of rapidly changing environmental niches, the communities of the Parnassos region displayed remarkable similarities. This quality, sometimes referred to as homeosis, is a characteristic of nodes within a network, and it is as a network of peer-polities that we may best understand the development of the Phokian *koinon*.⁴ Such an approach, with an emphasis on historical process rather than the search for origins, allows us to recognize the dynamic quality of state formation in Archaic Greece. To use a modern parallel: if one moderately sized city successfully introduces recycling or builds a community center, other neighboring communities are likely to follow suit. Communities watch and copy each other, but this process also results, paradoxically, in a pressure to assert difference with other communities either farther away or in some other way identifiably different. Language and religion are helpful markers, easy to latch onto. Communities look for those lines of fissure along which difference can be asserted. In this way, similarity is contained within a meaningful frame of reference that allows one community to recognize the similarity of another (also men of the mountain, also fisherfolk, also farmers) while also recognizing otherness (they speak oddly; their dress is curious; they are boorish, and so forth.) Such patterns of similarity and otherness are then inscribed on the landscape in often quite simple fashion. Within the confines of the Upper Kephisos Valley, for example, the similarities of size, location and eventually even fortifications are striking, making the assertion of similarity straightforward.

At the edges of the Parnassos district, on the other hand, difference replaced sameness as the key concern of local communities. In zones where the movement of people and the intersection of trade routes occurred, the lines of fissure between communities were stronger. Difference prevailed over likeness. The area of the headwaters of the Kephisos, for example, saw a cluster of towns identified as Dorian, and the exact boundary between these communities and their Phokian neighbors is all but impossible to identify with certainty. Across these permeable borders there was constant movement of people and goods from even further north, from Thessaly and beyond, all the way down this western side of Phokis by means of a natural corridor running from the Malian Gulf to the Corinthian Gulf, hugging the western side of Parnassos.⁵ At the southern end of this corridor lay Delphi, which at various points was controlled by the Phokians but was, for much of its history, treated as a neutral territory administered by

⁴ Renfrew and Cherry 1986; for details of the towns of Phokis see Oulhen 2004: 399–430.

⁵ Kase et al. 1991.

the Amphiktyonic council.⁶ As the sanctuary grew in wealth and importance, it became too rich a prize to be left to local control. So, in an area of high traffic, so to speak, and with connections reaching from northern Greece to the Peloponnese, the communities up and down the corridor asserted a variety of identities: Malian, Dorian, Phokian, West Lokrian and, finally, Delphian. Another fracture zone lay at the eastern edge of Phokis, in the narrow corridor running through to the Euboian Gulf, where Lokrians, Phokians and Boiotians all contested control of the topography. So, where resources could be apportioned without stress, similarity prevailed and communities aggregated, if not physically, as at Athens, at least at the level of recognizing common interest. But where trade and movement predominated, contestation followed, and difference trumped similarity.

This can be seen at the eastern edges of Phokis, in the region that bordered parts of Boiotia, including both the western reaches of the Boiotian plain and, further south, the foothills of Mt. Helikon. Here there is a swift transition from coast to plain or mountain. A short journey of 35 kilometers will take the traveller from Antikyra to pastures on the lower slopes of Mt. Parnassos at Kalyvia Livadhiou, a region where, according to the Oxyrhynchos historian, the Phokians and Lokrians came to blows, raiding each other's flocks (*Hell. ox.* 21.3 Chambers). In the northeast edge of their territory the Phokians also bordered Opuntian Lokris, which lay on the coast of the Euboian Gulf. In many of these borderlands the border was 'soft' and only became apparent as one travelled from one community to the next, as, for example, when one walked from Phokian Panopeus to the next town east, Chaironeia, which lay in Boiotia. These fuzzy boundaries and the configuration of territory as zones of competing affiliation were vital for the formation of regional identities, including that of the Phokians.

Partly as a result of the constant and dramatic changes of elevation, the landscape naturally fractures into clearly defined routes for communication and movement, usually along valleys or by routes between points involving the least fluctuation in elevation. The Sacred Way, which entered Phokis by Daulis and ran south before turning west to Delphi, is a good example, taking the most level track possible through the rolling hills on the eastern slopes of Parnassos. It is important to understand these natural conditions because it was not a passive landscape into which the Phokians moved or in which the Phokians lived. The territory profoundly influenced the

⁶ Sánchez 2001; Morgan 1990.

formation of the Phokians. In fact, the unity of Phokis was not the result of a pre-existing tribal identity that occupied the territory, but was a negotiated response to the fluctuating environmental and historical conditions found within the landscape.⁷ For example, when in the fourth century BCE the Phokians built fortifications throughout their territory, they were able to communicate between all Phokians towns by means of sight-lines. As a result of this web of communication, towns as far away from each other as Stiris, beneath Mt. Helikon, and Drymaia, located close to the Gravia Pass leading to Thessaly, although 60 kilometers apart and separated by a mountain over 2,000 meters high, were integrated into the same network, one that included dozens of similar towns scattered over a largely decentralized region.

Approaching the Phokians with this understanding of the terrain in mind means explicitly rejecting older models of interpreting tribal groups in ancient Greece. Even well towards the end of the twentieth century many historians were still approaching *ethnē* as if they were distinct and clearly bounded groups whose communal identities were based on common ancestry and customs. These primordial groups retained their separate identities during a period of mass migration, in the tenth and ninth centuries, it was supposed, when they settled in fixed geographic areas that then bore their names: Phokis, Lokris and Boiotia, for example, were the toponyms applied to the places inhabited by the Phokians, Lokrians and Boiotians. This seems to be how ancient thinkers understood these ethnic labels, and it was a model that fit with nineteenth and twentieth century ways of analyzing the various dialects of Greek, which could be classified as variations appropriate to the position of the speakers within a family tree of dialects. For a variety of reasons, outlined in the opening chapters to this volume, this primordial model is now generally rejected. Infinite minute varieties of dialectical difference are a poor indication of distinct ethnic difference, and recent examples of ethnic conflict, notably in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, have demonstrated that language can itself become a locus for conflict rather than a proof of underlying difference. Comparative studies have shown that, in better documented societies certainly, ethnic identity is fluid and situational. Although many wars of the last generation were reported as the renewal of existing ethnic conflicts, this 'everlasting' quality is often illusory, and certainly less important than the circumstances and contingencies that cause people to assert the claim of an ethnic identity.

⁷ On the contingency found in identity formation see Morgan 1997: 96 and Morgan 2009: 25.

Newer approaches have tended to cast about for theoretical models to help explain how and why people think of themselves as Greek or Phokian. We have already seen how peer-polity helps to explain the homeotic quality of many Phokian (and other central Greek) communities. Central Place Theory also provides a helpful way of interpreting settlement patterns, emphasizing the fact that communities can often be ranked according to a hierarchy of increasing complexity, with smaller, simpler communities arrayed like satellites around larger, more complex communities. Across Central Greece, particular towns like Elateia, Orchomenos and Thebes emerged at different times as more powerful than the towns around them, although none of them exercised hegemony for very long and none dominated its surrounding territory as completely as did Athens, whose control of Attica was exceptional. Instead, in Central Greece, hegemonial power tended to ebb and flow. In this approach to the federal states of Central Greece, where the emphasis lies on the processes of incorporation and resistance, sometimes referred to as centripetality and centrifugality, it is apparent that evolutionary models of 'primitive' tribal formations being superseded by the more 'advanced' form of the *polis* are inappropriate. It is now generally agreed that *ethnē* and *koina* were not vestiges of some more primitive form of state formation. Accordingly, the key questions become: what were the conditions and the mechanisms under and by which a veritable hodge-podge of communities took on the coherence of an ethnic state? Even allowing for the undeniable fact that the apparent unity of a single ethnic group might often be little more than a shared fiction, these labels were surprisingly durable. Herodotus, for example, debunks many of the myths surrounding Ionian identity, but it is clear from his and Thucydides' work that their contemporaries treated these as meaningful distinctions.⁸ Similarly, in the second century CE, Pausanias (10.4.1) describes Panopeus in Phokis as little more than a shanty town: it had no agora, no town hall and virtually nothing to manifest its community's identity, but it was evidently proud to send a representative to the Phokian *koinon*, thereby asserting its Phokian identity. In such instances, being Phokian might be little more than claiming a place in the Phokian federal body, but it was a claim that was maintained nonetheless.

If the attachment of small communities like Panopeus to Phokis is not a vestige of a veritable, ancient ethnic identity, how then are we to explain the attraction of the Phokian *koinon*? In part, as we have seen, the impetus

⁸ Hdt. 1.146 on Ionian ethnicity. On Thucydides, see Alty 1982.

to aggregate as a federal body was helped by the existence of fracture zones in border areas, where the flow of goods and people created networks of trade and communication quite unlike the static repetition of simple agricultural communities in the interior. The local myths told by the Phokians can also serve to show how unification unfolded.⁹ The Phokians' epichoric traditions reflect a complicated process as local communities fashioned ties through genealogical claims. Common descent amounted to an assertion of a blood relationship, a tie that bound communities more effectively than political union. But the details of the Phokians' foundation stories show how messy and complicated such claims of blood kinship were. To start with, the Phokians enjoyed the dubious distinction of having not one eponymous hero, Phokos, but two Phokoi. One of these carried a Corinthian pedigree and was the son of Sisypheos, no doubt a reflection of the strong material ties binding Phokian sites such as Medeon, Delphi and Krisa to Corinth on the other side of the Gulf. The second Phokos was the son of Aiakos and half-brother of Peleus. His family was associated with two regions, Thessaly and Aigina. Although it is unclear whether the Aiakids originated in the north or were borrowed from Aigina, the notability of the clan in two regions reflects the ways in which connections with a family prominent in myth conferred respectability on emerging communities. The existence of two 'Phokoses', Corinthian Phokos from the south and Aiakid Phokos from the north, suggests that there were competing networks of affiliation.

Perhaps of greater importance than their different orientations, however, is the fact that traditions about both heroes consistently highlight the importance of conflict between neighboring communities and the resolution of these regional tensions. In this respect Phokis may be seen as a single contact zone, defined by the collision of a variety of groups each seeking to establish their own autonomy and regional hegemony. The Corinthian Phokos was supposed to have moved to the northeastern edge of Phokian territory to aid the people of Hyampolis in their struggles with the Lokrians. He was also adopted by another local community, Tithorea, where he was reportedly buried and given heroic honors. In effect, two communities fashioned an alliance against their common neighbor by asserting an affiliation to Phokos. They became Phokian by ascription, and the process would be replicated elsewhere: Drymaia would acknowledge Phokos as their *ktistēs*, thereby joining the burgeoning network of Phokian communities north of Parnassos. And just as adopting Phokos

⁹ McInerney 1999b: 127–149.

made a community Phokian, so too the narrative potential of hero saga made it a suitable medium for conveying powerful regional opposition: according to Pausanias (9.17.4) the (Boiotian) Thebans and (Phokian) Tithoreans competed symbolically for control of the fertility of the plain fed by the Kephisos river by stealing soil (or preventing this) from the tomb of Amphion and Zethus and dedicating it at the tomb of Phokos and Antiope. In this way, ritual and myth together supplied a way of conceptualizing competing territorial claims.

An even more direct example of the mapping of myth onto terrain was the claim that Schedios, a Phokian hero named in the *Catalog of Ships*, was buried at Daphnus on the coast of the Euboian Gulf.¹⁰ The site of Daphnus, today Aghios Konstantinos, is at the head of the one corridor that runs from the upper Kephisos valley through to the coast without passing over Mt. Kallidromon. Placing the tomb of a Phokian hero at Daphnus staked a claim to the territory (even if only for a short period) as Phokian. Regional differences also figure strongly in Hesiod's poem *The Shield of Herakles*. Early in the poem, Amphytryon of Thebes leads a coalition of Boiotians, Phokians and Lokrians against Taphian and Teleboan brigands, and the subsequent battle between Herakles and Kyknos, another version of which is recounted by Stesichoros, also seems to pit a Theban hero against a regional rival, this time from Thessaly.¹¹ At stake in many of these myths was the battle over Delphi and its riches, recalled in episodes such as the struggle between Apollo and Herakles over the tripod or in the many stories of lawless brigands either attacking pilgrims or imposing taxes on them, and Delphi's emergence as a site of such wealthy dedications certainly stimulated local rivalries. Homer, for example, speaks of a Phokian giant, Tityos, pinned over nine plethra in the underworld, his guts forever torn out by vultures, for the crime of having assaulted Leto as she made her way to Delphi (Hom. *Od.* 11.576). These episodes, scattered across various epichoric myths, combine to tell an interesting story: Phokis was not simply the land occupied by the Phokians; it was a landscape made Phokian as the Phokians constructed their ethnic identity. To that end, local and regional rivalries were played out over the landscape along routes and lines of communication in a series of encounters that generated competing identities: Lokrian, Dorian, Phokian and Boiotian.

Two further features deserve note: whether Phokis is understood as a contact zone in which competing outside forces came into conflict or as a

¹⁰ Strabo 9.3.17. ¹¹ Hesiod, *The Shield of Herakles* 24–25, 380–381.

network of nodes (towns and villages) connected by ties (myth, genealogy, ritual), it is also an area where the centralizing forces of Mycenaean culture were more weakly manifested than in southern Greece. Boiotia has evidence of powerful Mycenaean control, displayed in fortresses, palaces and tombs at sites like Orchomenos, Thebes and Gla, as well as in massive earth and water works, like the canalization of Lake Kopais to reclaim a vast area of cultivatable land. But the situation in Bronze Age Phokis is quite different. To be sure, the region was not a complete void in the Bronze Age: one can still see fragments of Mycenaean *kylikes* in the Zimeno Pass, leading from Distomo (Ambryssos) to Arachova (Anemoria), and excavations at the Alonaki cemetery at Elateia show that luxury goods favored by the Mycenaean elite were circulated throughout the area in the late Bronze Age.¹² Compared to the situation in Boiotia and the Argolid, however, Mycenaean impact in the area was, if not modest, at least of a different calibre. So far no Mycenaean palace has been identified, and nothing comparable to Nestor's palace at Pylos has emerged. The most impressive Mycenaean remains are located at Kalapodi, probably now to be identified as the site of Apollo's cult at Abai, but the remains here, though impressive, are entirely of a religious nature: a structure dated to LH III C sits atop a spot where religious activity can be attested back to the Middle Helladic period, and the very same location remained a focal point for cult activity until the time of Hadrian.¹³ In other words, while the site served as a gathering place sanctified by cult practice, and while the material here points to a vigorous trade in goods from Thessaly and the islands, there is no corresponding evidence of centralized Mycenaean control. No Pylos, and so no Nestor; no Mycenae, and so no Agamemnon.

The qualitative difference between Phokis and more centralized Mycenaean regions is reflected in the great heroic genealogies preserved in Homer. The Phokians can only boast of a commander in the *Catalog of Ships*, Schedios, who has the dubious honor of being slain by Hector twice. The other Phokian commanders are no more than names attested once or twice. This lack of a fully articulated Mycenaean 'history' or golden age, connected to a well-known hero, like Ajax, Menelaos or Odysseus, all of whom have powerful local associations, may have spurred the region's inhabitants to exploit the openness of myth for opportunities to assert connections to the broader cycles of Hellenic myth in ways that on

¹² On the Mycenaean presence in Central Greece see Phialon 2011. See also Deger-Jalkotzy and Dakoronia 1990 and 1992.

¹³ For Kalapodi see Felsch 1996 and 2007; Niemeier 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010.

occasion look, frankly, silly. One of the few Phokians to figure in the epic cycle was Epeios, for example, who was associated with Panopeus and was identified as the designer of the Trojan Horse, a kind of Odysseus *manqué*.

The second notable feature of Phokian ethnogenesis is that it was actively shaped by the emergence in the sixth century of one regional power, Thessaly, whose territorial and hegemonial aspirations were a direct threat to the small communities on the north side of Parnassos. In her definition of contact zones Louise Pratt speaks of them as “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power”¹⁴. In key respects, this well describes the situation in Central Greece in the sixth century BCE. Having united the broad Thessalian plain and the four districts into which it was subdivided, the Aleuadaei turned their attention south and in doing so set their sights first on the coastal strip of Lokris and then on the region inland. To what extent a common sense of Phokian identity had already emerged in this interior zone by this time is difficult to say, and our best indication is found in the political geography lying behind the *Catalog of Ships*. This would suggest that a loose coalition of communities in the Upper Kephisos had emerged by the sixth century, but as Pierre Ellinger has shown, the various traditions preserved in Herodotus concerning the confrontation of the Phokians and the Thessalians just prior to the Persian Wars point to the emergence of a national myth.¹⁵ The Thessalian conflict would create Phokis.

The Phokians, according to Herodotus, fought a series of desperate battles with their northern foe. The so-called Gypsum Battle was fought when the Phokians rubbed themselves and their equipment with white chalk, attacked the Thessalians at night and not only were able to identify their own forces but terrified the Thessalians as well, killing four thousand of them (Hdt. 8.27). The Battle of the Amphorai involved the Phokians burying jars on the battle field and luring the Thessalian cavalry to charge, causing them to stumble and break their legs (Hdt 8.28). The culmination of these regional fights came when the Phokians, driven to desperation, voted to put their women and children on a funeral pyre and left orders for them to be burned alive if the men lost the final confrontation with the Thessalians. They were victorious. But in an even more glorious twist of the story, the woman and children held their own assemblies to ratify the men’s decision to leave them on the pyre, facing the threat of total immolation. The significance of this ‘Phokian desperation’, as it was

¹⁴ Pratt 1992: 4. ¹⁵ Ellinger 1993.

proverbially known, is that it points to the moment when a common hatred of all things Thessalian became the defining feature of a Phokian character. Celebrated in story and commemorated at the festival of Artemis Elaphebolos, it underscores dramatically the powerful role of memory in shaping identity. And it was an enmity very much alive in Herodotus' day. The Thessalians led the Persians through the Kephisos valley, raping, pillaging and burning as they went, rather than guiding them along the coastal plain of Lokris. So bitter was the enmity between them that Herodotus bluntly asserts that, "if the Thessalians had supported the Greek cause, the Phokians would, I am sure, have collaborated with the Persians" (8.30). The victory over the Thessalians united the various towns and communities which had joined the Phokian network.

A second consequence of the victory was to settle the fate of the contested zone in northeastern Phokis in the borderland between Lokris, Phokis and Boiotia. Across the landscape in this region of low rolling hills, a corridor led from the inland to the coast. At the western end sat Elateia, a town where a Mycenaean necropolis has revealed evidence of trade in the Bronze Age reaching as far as Crete. At the eastern end lay Opus, as well as other smaller sites, like Kyrnos Livenaton and Mitrou, whose prosperity in the early Iron Age also attests to a flourishing trade network reaching north to Thessaly and out into the islands.¹⁶ Possibly in response to the wealth of the trade passing through this area and the potential for competing territorial claims, it was also an area with an unusually high degree of sacred land set aside for the gods. In the immediate vicinity lay Abai, a famous oracle of Apollo, probably now to be identified with the sanctuary today located at Kalapodi, as well as the temple of Artemis Elaphebolos, plausibly identified with the nearby village of Smixi.¹⁷ In addition, a sanctuary of Athena Kranaia sat in the hills between Elateia and Kalapodi.¹⁸ The reasons the area was so hotly contested and why Thessalian ambitions reached so far southeast have become dramatically evident thanks to excavations by the German Archaeological Institute at Kalapodi, first under Rainer Felsch (1996 and 2007), and more recently under Wolf-Dietrich Niemeier (2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010). In continuous use throughout the late Mycenaean and Geometric periods, the sanctuary complex blossomed in the Archaic period to rival Delphi and Olympia as a site for elite dedications, sacrifices, and sympotic activity. From the tenth century on, ceramic vessels from Kalapodi are similar in

¹⁶ Van de Moortel and Zahou 2005: 48.

¹⁷ Niemeier 2008: 99.

¹⁸ Paris 1892; Demake 2009: 446–447.

style and fabric to pottery from Thessaly and the Aegean islands, while the sanctuary has also brought to light an astonishing number of metal items from the Geometric and Archaic periods: 104 tripods; approximately 2,000 each of helmets, greaves and shields; and close to 500 swords, daggers and spear heads. Felsch has argued persuasively that a number of bronze attachments formerly thought to have been manufactured at Pherai actually originate at Kalapodi. The sanctuary was a focal point for manufacturing, for trade in goods of regions as far away as Crete and Syria, and for dedications by members of a warrior elite. It was the very model of Pratt's contact zone, and the defeat of Thessaly firmly placed it within a Phokian sphere of influence.

If one compares this area with its opposite in the southwest of Phokis, namely Delphi and its environs, one finds that the two areas reflect different lines of development. While Delphi stayed out of the Phokian network and assumed an international significance in the Archaic period, Abai (Kalapodi) and the Artemis sanctuary (Smixi) became wholly Phokian, pushing out competition from other communities east and north, and in the process hardening what had been the fuzzy boundaries between Phokis and its neighbors, Lokris and Boiotia. By the time of the Persian Wars, then, a Phokian identity had clearly taken shape. Around this time the Phokians also began to develop the institutions that would characterize their federal body of the Classical period and beyond: the Phokian *koinon*.

Like other regional *koina*, the federal union of the Phokians is sometimes seen as the political expression of a pre-existing ethnic group. Since, however, we have been able to see that the *ethnos* of the Phokians is not a primordial ethnic identity but a continuously changing network of communities that grew by expanding ties of affiliation, there is no need to see the *koinon*, teleologically, as the natural outgrowth of Phokian ethnicity. Instead, we should see it as a political structure well suited to meeting the needs of small and moderately sized communities in the late Archaic world of Central Greece. Unlike a region like Attica, where Athens essentially became coterminous with the region around it, or Boiotia, where Thebes would very much have liked to enjoy similar supremacy, the Phokians opted for a political union that allowed the benefits of federation while still guaranteeing the fruits of autonomy. The Phokian *koinon* was always primarily a compromise between communities. The external pressures driving this process of loose federal state formation were the growth of Delphi's international status on the southwestern edge of Phokis, the encroachment of Thessalian power from the north, the ambition of

Thebes to the east and the attention paid by local elites to the sacral landscape at the northeast edge of Phokis. Pressured from without, Phokis responded by creating the Phokians.

The specific steps towards forming a *koinon* remain somewhat opaque, but the chronology of the Phokians' federal coinage fits with Herodotus' account of Phokian resistance to the Thessalians and suggests that the *koinon*'s origins should be placed not long before the Persian Wars. The earliest phase of Phokian federal coins has been dated by Williams to the last years of the sixth century and runs down to the time of the Persian invasions.¹⁹ The coins fit with a scenario according to which the final liberation of Phokis from Thessalian control occurred around 510, and the iconography of the coins seems to tell the same story. The earliest half drachmas and obols, struck on the Aiginetan standard, show the head of a bull on the obverse and the head of a goddess on the reverse. If the bull has a specific referent it may stand for the hecatombs offered at the shrine of the hero *archēgetēs*, Phokos, mentioned by Pausanias, or it may be a personification of the Kephisos river. More likely, the bull, which is sometimes garlanded, simply represents a sacrificial animal and serves to advertise the piety of the Phokians, who are recalled on the coins by the letters Φ and Ο, and, on some coins, by the head of a seal (*phōkē*). The head on the reverse is usually identified as Artemis, and given the goddess' popularity, since her festival was the occasion on which the Phokians' liberation was commemorated, it would seem that the coins should be read as evocations of that victory, and the role of religion in bringing together the town of Phokis into a more permanent union. Williams also suggests that the coins were minted at the Phokikon, a structure located near Daulis, on the Sacred Way to Delphi.

It is worth noting, however, that the coins also demonstrate the contingent or even ambiguous quality of the Phokian *koinon*. At different times in the Classical period and later, various communities of Phokis continued to mint their own coins, or more precisely, to mint coins that advertised both their Phokian affiliation and their local identity. The people of Antikyra used bronze coins labelled both ΦΟΚΕΩΝ and ΑΝΤΙΚΥΡΕΩΝ, and the same double identity is attested in the coinage of Elateia, a town that in the Hellenistic period would come closer to hegemonial control of Phokis than any other town. But small towns too, such as Lilaia, Ledon, and Neon all produced coins that were labelled with the names of both the town and federation, a testament to the power of local identity and the fluctuating hold of its federal counterpart.

¹⁹ Williams 1972: 11.

This fluctuation, a key feature of the Phokian *koinon*, which at times appears to have been centralized but at other times weaker than its constituent members, is reflected in the changing fortunes of the federal building in which the *koinon* met to deliberate. This building, known as the Phokikon, lay not in the Kephisos valley, but in a valley on the eastern edge of Phokis, midway between Daulis and Panopeus, close to the route taken by the Sacred Way shortly after it entered Phokis from Boiotian Chaironeia.²⁰ Pausanias' description (10.5.1) of the building's internal arrangements offers valuable details:

With respect to size the building is a large one, and within it there are columns standing along its length; steps ascend from the columns to each wall, and on these steps the delegates of the Phokians sit. At the far end there are neither columns nor steps, but a statue group of Zeus, Athena, and Hera; the statue of Zeus is enthroned, flanked by the goddesses, with the statue of Athena standing on the left.

A number of grooved blocks found in the adjacent fields resemble those of the Anaktoron on Samothrace, another building that housed large assemblies, and the grooves probably served to carry wooden beams to which were attached the benches or bleachers, the steps to which Pausanias refers. From this account it is apparent that the federal body consisted of representatives sent by the Phokian communities, a detail consistent with Pausanias' famous description of Panopeus in decline. The city had been reduced to a hamlet of shanties without even running water, but the community prided itself on sending representatives to the Phokian *koinon*, thereby asserting, paradoxically, both its autonomy and its right to be considered a legitimate part of the larger Phokian federation. Both of Pausanias' comments, however, apply to the Phokian *koinon* with which he was familiar in the second century CE, and it would be a mistake to infer the earlier history of the Phokians' *koinon* from his reports. In fact, the shifting fortunes of the Phokian *koinon* can be inferred from the different phases of the Phokikon. The earliest evidence from the site consists of roughly cut Archaic headstones from a cemetery close to the small river running down the Tseresi valley, but these probably predate any actual building. When Herodotus describes the advance of the Persians towards Delphi, he brings them right past here – “keeping Parnassos on their right” – and he lists seventeen Phokian towns and sanctuaries destroyed by the Persians.²¹ Accordingly, one might have expected some mention of the destruction of the Phokikon, had it occurred. His silence strongly suggests

²⁰ McNerney 1997: 193–207. ²¹ Hdt. 8.33–35.

that the first federal building was erected after the Persian Wars. Prior to this, since the numismatic record suggests there was a *koinon* of some sort, it may have met at Elateia, the city which would again serve as a *de facto* capitol of Phokis in the Hellenistic period, but this is no more than plausible conjecture.

Once the *koinon* did build a permanent structure, it chose a low rise in the same valley as the Archaic burial ground. The location represents a good compromise between the communities of the Upper Kephisos Valley, the route to Delphi and the charged religious sector in the vicinity of Abai. The remains of the building constructed on this hill are still to be seen. It is rectangular, measuring 24 by 11.5 meters. At the eastern end of the building, which has never been systematically excavated, lies a monumental altar. Although some have identified this entire complex as a heroon, it is more likely to be the remains of the early Classical federal building, erected in the aftermath of the Persian Wars. The few datable pottery fragments and architectural elements, which include a lion's-head water spout, are consistent with a fifth century BCE date. This building will have resembled other early *bouleutēria*, or meeting houses, examples of which are known at Olympia, Delos, and Arkadian Orchomenos. Dinsmoor described this early style as "an elongated temple-like structure with a central line of columns"²². The confusion between a federal meeting place and a temple is understandable, since many federal bodies blended political federalism with religious practice. The Panionion at Mykale, federal meeting place of the Ionians, according to Herodotus, was a sanctuary of Poseidon. So too the sanctuaries of Poseidon at Kalauria and Helikon served as meeting places for the Kalaurian and Achaian Leagues. When Strabo describes the Karian *koinon* meeting at the sanctuary of Zeus Khrysaoreus "both to offer sacrifice and to deliberate in their common interests", he is describing the standard practice of his day, according to which *koina* were understood to be religious as well as political unions.²³

The Phokians cast their *koinon* as a religious body not only by placing statues of the gods in their meeting chamber and conducting sacrifices to guarantee the efficacy of their deliberations, but also by developing a cult of the founder, who was worshipped by daily sacrifices at his shrine in a location in the same general vicinity as the Phokikon, at a place called Tronis. Here the Phokians poured a blood offering into the hero's tomb.²⁴ Our evidence for this cult is from Pausanias, so once again it is possible that he is describing a

²² Dinsmoor 1949: 206. ²³ Strabo 14.2.25. ²⁴ Paus. 10.4.10.

practice that dates only to the Hellenistic or Roman periods, but founder cults are ubiquitous throughout the Greek world, and it is probable that the worship of Phokos as a founder-hero goes back to the late Archaic period. Pausanias' description of the cult is revealing. Even though Phokian myth recalls two eponymous heroes named Phokos, Pausanias does not use that name but instead speaks of the cult of the *Archēgetēs*. This title became widely used in the Greek world as both an epithet of Apollo, the god who successfully guided colonists to their new location, and as a generic title for the human founders of colonies. Battos, for example, who had been guided to Cyrene by Apollo's oracle at Delphi, was worshipped in the agora of that city in a shrine of the *Archēgetēs*. It is highly likely that the experience of the Greeks, who founded over one hundred colonies between the seventh and fifth centuries, had a powerful impact on state formation on the mainland, such as the development of federal *koina*, and provided models for the institutions, like the cult of the founder, that bound federations more tightly together.

It is also clear from Pausanias that the identity of the hero worshipped by the community was much less important than the act itself of worshipping as a community. In Pausanias' time some people thought the hero worshipped at Tronis was not Phokos at all, but a Hellenistic general named Xanthippos, who had led Phokian forces against the Makedonians. Furthermore, another shrine of Phokos was located at Tithorea, in the Kephisos Valley, where the locals also worshipped another *archēgetēs*, namely Asklepios. As in their myths, so too in their cult practices the Phokians could assert local distinctions and variations even as they participated in federation. The desire to assert local distinction was immensely powerful: the Panopeans, for example, claimed to be the home of Herakles' wrestling teacher, a claim unlikely to be challenged by anyone else since it did not amount to anything especially grand, but it did distinguish Panopeus from everywhere else. At Charadra the Dioskouroi may have been worshipped, but some thought the deities receiving cult were not the Panhellenic twins but some unnamed local gods. As if encapsulating the resistance to a single, united Phokian religious identity, the people of Abai, site of a venerable Phokian shrine to Apollo, even maintained that they were not in any way connected to Phokos but were descended from Homer's long-haired Abantes, from Euboia. Similarly, the people of Hyampolis, close to the one really important federal shrine – that of Artemis Elaphebolos, where the victory of the Phokians over the Thessalians was commemorated – maintained that they were originally Boiotian Hyantes. Accordingly, the configuration of sacred space through

sanctuaries, cults, and festivals only superficially attests to the crystalization of a Phokian identity, and in fact shows how the Phokian *koinon*, even as a religious union, always remained a malleable fiction. Through myth and cult, genealogy, and stories of exogenous origins, the various communities of Phokis were able to parse their participation in the Phokian *koinon*, advertising their various claims to autonomy and difference even as they elected to be Phokian.

How long the processes of federal state formation and the urge to unification remained stronger than the impulse to remain separate we cannot say definitely. It is unclear, for example, how long the building at the site of the Phokikon remained in use, nor can we say for certain whether the cult of the *Archēgetēs* continued uninterrupted. In the middle of the fifth century, however, there are signs that the Phokians were unified, so much so that the Phokians appear to have entertained aspirations to regional hegemony. Around 458 BCE they invaded Doris at the western end of the Kephisos plain, and were only forced to give up the captured territory by the arrival of a Spartan army. The following year, the Spartan army returned to Central Greece to liberate Delphi from Phokian control. Our source for these events is Plutarch, who wrote over five hundred years later, and it is not certain that his account can be trusted, but from Thucydides, a fifth century source, we learn of a (second) Phokian attack on Delphi in 448 BCE. It is apparent then that by the middle of the fifth century, the Phokians had developed the confidence (some would say arrogance) to claim Delphi as properly the property of the Phokians. This was a bold claim, and one that confirms that unification had proceeded to a point where federation was, for the moment, more powerful than autonomy. At the same time, however, these events also show that regional affairs would be shaped by the great powers, Athens and Sparta, and that the fortunes of the Phokians depended on factors beyond their control. The battles of Tanagra and Oinophyta, fought in Boiotia in 457 BCE between the Athenians and the Spartans, resulted in the Phokians being conquered by the Athenians and forced to give up hostages. Yet ten years later, during the Second Sacred War, when the Phokians were expelled from Delphi by the Spartans, who returned the sanctuary to the control of the Delphians, we learn from Thucydides that the Athenians “shortly after the departure of the Spartans sent an expedition which recovered Delphi and handed it over to the Phokians”²⁵. A fragmentary

²⁵ Thuc. 1.112.

inscription from this period, *IG* 1³ 9, may preserve the terms of an alliance offered to members of the Amphiktyony while Delphi was under Phokian control. Its erection at Athens would have amounted to signalling Athens' acceptance of the Phokian claim.

For both sides, the alliance brought advantages. If the Phokians controlled Delphi and were well disposed to Athens, the Athenians could expect a favorable position at the most significant oracular shrine in Greece, a useful counterbalance to the traditional influence of Sparta at Olympia. For the Phokians, closer ties to Athens brought an alliance with the traditional enemy of their own neighbor and rival, the Thebans. The alliance was bolstered by assertions of blood connections. The people of Stiris, in the Phokian foothills of Mt. Helikon, claimed that they were from the Attic deme of Steiria, and the tie between the Athenians and Phokians was articulated widely enough for Polemon in the second century BCE to produce a scholarly treatise entitled *On the Foundations of the Phokian Cities and their Kinship with the Athenians*. The alliance left other traces behind as well. Thucydides, for example, distinguishes between the Tereus who was father of the Thracian king Sitalkes, an Athenian ally at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and the Tereus of the tragic tale of Prokne and Philomela. This Tereus, who raped his sister-in-law in the grisly myth, ruled, according to Thucydides, in Phokian Daulis. It was this king with whom the legendary Athenian king, Pandion, contracted a marriage alliance, as Thucydides says, "with a view to mutual protection"²⁶. Whether this was a new addition to the myth or not is impossible to say, but the idea of an alliance between Phokis and Athens certainly fits the conditions of the fifth century, when an Athenian would well have seen Phokis as a natural ally, with Boiotia their common enemy. Although Athens' hegemony in Central Greece would prove short-lived, and the Phokians would appear once again in the roster of Spartan allies during the Peloponnesian War, it is worth noting that the Phokian prince Pylades figures prominently as Orestes' loyal friend in three plays produced in the fraught years after the failure of the Sicilian expedition (especially in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*, c. 412 BCE). On the Athenian stage, at least, the Phokian was a dependable ally. The Athenians would come to thank the gods for maintaining this benign attitude towards their some-time ally, for despite the presence of Phokian contingents in the Peloponnesian

²⁶ Thuc. 2.29.

army and navy throughout the rest of the war, it was a Phokian who, in the deliberations over how to punish the Athenians after their defeat in 404 BCE, sang an ode from Euripides' *Elektra* to make the point that no city that had produced such art deserved to be destroyed. The Phokians may have been particularly sensitive to the question of destruction: the region had been struck by a powerful earthquake in 426 BCE, and Giovanna Daverio Rocchi has recently argued that the impact on Phokis was more considerable than has been previously recognized.²⁷

In the fourth century, as Athenian influence in Central Greece waned, the Phokian *koinon* continued to operate in the shadow of other, more powerful players. Aischines reports a certain Kleochares of Chalkis saying, "the citizens of small states fear the secret diplomacy of the greater states."²⁸ Well, they might. Miscalculation could be costly. Indeed, the combination of territorial ambition coupled with the shifting balance of power among the great powers would prove disastrous to the Phokians, who once again asserted a claim to the control of Delphi in the middle of the fourth century. The major differences between this episode and earlier attempts are that, for once, we can name the actors and get some sense of the distribution of power within Phokis at the time, and the second is that the Phokians actually succeeded in keeping hold of Delphi for a full decade. That campaign, the Third Sacred War, lasting from 356–346 BCE, was precipitated by Theban charges that the Phokians were cultivating sacred land. Aside from the continuing rivalry between the Phokians and Thebans, the war may also have been inspired by recent similar events in the Peloponnese, where the people of Pisa had briefly asserted control over Olympia. Tensions quickly escalated; the Phokians refused to pay the fine imposed by the Amphiktyony, instead choosing to elect Philomelos as *stratēgos autokratōr*. The Phokians immediately occupied Delphi, executed or exiled those who opposed them, and over the next decade melted down 10,000 talents' worth of the sanctuary's dedications, which they used to pay for a mercenary army.²⁹ Philomelos was killed after the first major battle against the Amphiktyonic forces in 355 BCE, but, supported by their massive war chest, the Phokians fought on, sustaining another crushing defeat in 353 BCE, when once again their general, Onomarchos, was killed. This engagement, the battle

²⁷ Daverio Rocchi 2011: 85–100. ²⁸ Aischin. 2.120.

²⁹ On the Sacred War see Diod. 16.56–60; Buckler 1989; McInerney 1999b: 202–226.

of the Crocus Field, represented an ominous development, since the general commanding the Amphiktyonic forces was none other than Philip of Makedon. When the Makedonians withdrew, the Phokians transferred command to Onomarchos' brother, Phayllos, who was in turn succeeded by his nephew Phalaikos.

The existence of a narrow clique of related aristocrats who shared power and dominated Phokian policy throughout the Sacred War strongly suggests that the Phokian *koinon* as it existed at this time was weak. It seems to have acted as little more than a rubber stamp for the policies of the *stratēgos autokratōr*. At the same time, the appearance of "the Phokian tyrants" (as they came to be known later) also hints, for the first time, at a degree of social stratification in Phokis. Prior to this we have no sense of who exercised power or what institutions existed within the *koinon*, leading some scholars to think of fifth century Phokis as entirely homogenous. This would correspond to a society with a weak center and underdeveloped judicial and legislative mechanisms. We do not possess, for example, a Phokian equivalent to the constitution of the Boiotian League of the fourth century, preserved by the Oxyrhynchos historian. In the case of Boiotia we know that there were eleven districts represented in the federal body, with taxes, expenditures and judicial representation all divided accordingly, but there is no evidence such an arrangement had yet been worked out in Phokis, nor is it likely. In the accounts of earlier Phokian campaigns we hear of prominent individuals such as Gelon, Roios and Diaphantes, but we know nothing of their family backgrounds or their cities of origin. Indeed, during the campaigns against the Thessalians, the most notable leader on the Phokian side is a seer named Tellias of Elis. The Sacred War, however, appears to have hastened the emergence of a cluster of aristocratic families from Elateia who would effectively rule Phokis. When Phayllos was succeeded by his nephew, Phalaikos, the son of Onomarchos, this amounted to a dynastic succession. Another member of the Elateian elite, Mnaseas, was appointed his guardian. Mnaseas was a friend of Aristotle, his son Mnason a student of the philosopher. Father and son alike were referred to by later sources as "tyrants of Elateia."

By the time of negotiations for the Peace of Philokrates (346 BCE), the disastrous treaty that ended the Sacred War, sealing the fate of Phokis and leaving Philip in control of territory as far south as Thermopylai, the Phokian *koinon* had no practical impact on any of the decisions being made in and for Phokis.³⁰ Thermopylai was handed over to

³⁰ Unte 1987: 411–429.

Philip by Phalaikos, who exchanged the strategic fort for free passage for himself and his men. The Phokians had no say in this, and were notably excluded from the terms of the peace, signed by Athens and its allies with Philip, leaving the Phokians vulnerable and isolated. Philip did not take long to punish the temple desecrators: the Amphiktyony voted to tear down the walls of the Phokian cities and imposed a crushing indemnity. As Makedon emerged as the first superpower of the Hellenistic Age, the Phokian *koinon* was at the nadir of its fortunes.

In the last years of the fourth century the Phokians experienced dramatic change. On the one hand, the punishment imposed by the Amphiktyony for Phokian sacrilege involved disbanding the *poleis* of Phokis into villages of no more than fifty households scattered over the region, as well as the tearing down of their walls. The *koinon* was disbanded and the Phokikon abandoned. Yet, the imposition of a massive indemnity of ten thousand talents necessitated mechanisms for collecting and paying over the fines on a regular basis. Between 343 and 329/8 BCE, the Phokians made payments, first every six months, then later on an annual basis. The rate was also adjusted from sixty talents per year to thirty. Ironically, the need to organize a regular collection and transfer of the indemnity payments actually reconfirmed the need for a centralized Phokian administration.

We possess the details of how the indemnity affected the Phokians thanks to the records of the repayments inscribed at Elateia.³¹ With the abandonment of the Phokikon, Elateia now emerged as the functional capitol of Phokis. As an administrative center, the city served as the meeting place for the “magistrates of the Phokians”, as they are called in some inscriptions, and as the repository for the financial records involving all of Phokis. At the same time, the inscriptions reveal inconsistencies at the administrative level: in some years a single archon is named, while in others a board will be listed, or the magistrate will be called a treasurer. The irregularity reflects the conundrum facing the Phokians: they were expected regularly to hand over large payments to the Amphiktyonic Council without possessing any federal apparatus for collecting revenues. As a result, Elateia became the equivalent of the federal seat, even as it continued to enjoy its own status as the major city of Phokis. This ambiguous position is reflected in monuments from third century Elateia, which contain both federal and local decrees side by side. For

³¹ On the terms imposed on the Phokians and their subsequent travails, see McInerney 1999b: 233–246.

instance, *IG* x.1, 99 is a proxeny decree that refers to the *Phokarcheontes* ("magistrates of the Phokians"); carved next to this federal decree is another proxeny decree, conferred by the city of Elateia.

With the death of Philip and the reshaping of the Greek world first by Alexander and later by the Romans, the position of small federal bodies such as the Phokian *koinon* would prove by turns tenuous yet tenacious. The federal body, which had originally served as compromise between the need to unite and the urge to separate, now became the mechanism for asserting a place in the increasingly complex political terrain of the Hellenistic World. In the third century, the *koinon* came back into being and was formally reconstituted. This can be seen in a decree of the Phokian *koinon* recognizing the inviolability of the sanctuary of Poseidon and Amphitrite on Tenos. The decree reads (*IG* ix.1, 97):

It was decided by the *koinon* of the Phokians that the temple of Poseidon and Amphitrite on Tenos and the island itself are to be inviolate, and for the construction of the god's temple the *koinon* shall give 5 *mnas* for the present, and later, once the Phokians have the means (*gegonotōn tois Phokeusi tōn pragmatōn*), the *koinon* shall send an amount proportionate to the war-indemnity (*tou polemou kata logon*) as befits the gods and the relationship which exists between the Phokians and the Tenians. Praise the city of the Tenians for undertaking the guardianship of the temple and renewing their relationship with the Phokians, and let the Tenians enjoy the same *isopoliteia* that has been given to everyone in Phokis. Give a *mna* to Thestias, the son of Diaitas, the envoy, and let the *phokarchai* invite him to a state banquet. Inscribe this decree on three stelai, and erect one in the temple of Athena Kranaia, the second in the agora at Elateia, the third at Delphi. Let the *phokarchai* pay the expenses and let the *artisteres* see to the installation.

The decree, probably dating to the early third century, shows a Phokian *koinon* existing in name and in function, with regularly elected magistrates (*Phokarchai*, *artisteres*), revenues (although limited by the continued existence of the indemnity), and a federal sanctuary (the temple of Athena Kranaia, east of Elateia). It is engaging in international diplomacy as an autonomous entity, and presents itself as an federal body that exists because of a contractual and constitutional arrangement – *isopoliteia* – rather than because of kinship, real or putative. The pressure to develop a central administration capable of dealing with the Amphiktyonic Council may have saved the Phokians from complete annihilation, but the Hellenistic Phokian

koinon clearly conceived itself as something quite different from its Archaic and Classical predecessor. This was primarily a political federation. The complicated negotiations over Phokian ethnicity, with the currents of Phokian triumphalism in the encounter with Thessaly and countercurrents of local autonomy so strongly expressed in local myth, were now largely antiquarian matters, stories to tell visitors, but unimportant in terms of present realities. For the people of Hellenistic Phokis reality would consist of negotiations with Makedon, Aitolia, and Rome. Little fish don't worry about fishiness. They worry about big fish.

The Makedonian threat was straightforward. Following the Lamian War, the armies of Kassander and Demetrios Poliorketes used Central Greece as their battle ground. Elateia in particular proved to be a popular base, occupied by Kassander in 304 BCE. But the Phokian response was equally straightforward: an Elateian named Xanthippos was elected *tagos* ten times in succession, Elateia was liberated, and the Elateian general remained in control of Phokian affairs at least until the mid-280s. A more insidious threat, however, came from the growing power of the Aitolians. Not only did they seize Delphi in the 290s but over the course of the next half-century they gradually extended their territorial control further east. This is reflected in the number of votes they controlled in the Amphiktyonic Council.³² As they annexed territory, so too did they acquire the votes of annexed territory. Some time around 250 BCE, the Aitolian quota went from seven to nine *hieramnēmones* ("sacred ambassadors"), and when the Phokians next appear in the record, their vote had been reduced from two to one. Similarly, around 235 BCE, the Aitolians' representation rose to eleven, and the Phokians disappear from the Amphiktyonic records. Phokis had been incorporated into Aitolia, and the Phokian *koinon* disbanded once again.

Much the same pattern can be seen in the second century. Phokis was often the battleground for Makedonian, Aitolian, and Roman armies. The region was among those liberated by the Romans in 196 BCE, but Livy (33.34.8) records that the Romans recognized an Aitolian claim on at least part of Phokian territory. Of more immediate significance, Flamininus kept his winter quarters at Elateia both before and after the battle of Sellasia (195 BCE), the armies of Antiochus III crossed Phokis in 192 and 191, and Flamininus' successor, M'. Acilius Glabrio,

³² Schober 1924: 75–78; Grainger 1995: 318–320 and 336–338; McInerney 1999b: 244–245.

also kept his troops in winter quarters at Elateia in the late 190s. An inscription from Stymphalos in the Peloponnese (*SEG* 25.445) reveals that many of the Elateians were expelled by the Romans at this time and taken in by their Arkadian “kinsmen.” While the Phokians may have seemed to profit from the rhetoric of the freedom of the Greeks, reality was harsher. In 146 the Phokian *koinon* was among the old federal bodies disbanded by L. Mummius. The ban was later lifted by the senate, but the position of the *koinon* was now clear. In the geopolitical reality of Roman Greece, these bodies were an assertion of Greek identity, devoid of political power.

Microfederalism in Central Greece: the Dorians and Oitaians

Denis Rousset

Situated amidst three of the most illustrious Greek confederations – the Boiotian, Aitolian, and Thessalian Leagues – and alongside less well-known confederations of a more medium size – the Lokrians and Phokians – many smaller communities of Central Greece organized themselves in federal states. Their leagues appear to us only intermittently and it is difficult to sketch their institutional structure. But should this scarcity of evidence be attributed to the weakness of these communities, or rather to the paucity of our sources (which, in turn, could be partially the consequence of this same weakness)? The mini-leagues of Central Greece include the Dorians and the Oitaians. The purpose of this chapter will be to uncover the scanty traces of both *koina*.

The Dorians

Doris, situated north of the mountains of Parnassos, and between Phokis, Eastern Lokris, Oitaia, and Aitolia, is one of the smallest regions of mainland Greece, measuring only about a hundred square kilometers. Occupying the upper valley of Kephisos and the foothills of Parnassos, Oitaia, and Knemis mountains, this naturally enclosed region counted three or four cities over the course of its history, respectively called Boion, Erineos, Kytinion, and Akyphas-Pindos. Situated on an important corridor leading from Thessaly into Central Greece and the Peloponnese, the region often found itself along the path of major movements of warring states and their armies. Doris never played a significant political role on its own in antiquity.

The region is sometimes referred to as Doris¹ or the metropolis of the Dorians,² the “metropolis of the Peloponnesian Dorians” (Hdt. 8.31.1), or elsewhere as the “metropolis of the Lakedaimonians” (Thuc. 1.107.2;

¹ Hdt. 8.31.11, 43.1; *SEG* 38.1476, line 20. ² Andron *FGrH* 10 F 16a; cf. Strabo 9.4.10.

3.92.3). These various names emerge because the Dorians, also called the Heraklids, are said to have paused in the region while on their way south towards the Peloponnese.³ Yet archaeological excavations and surveys in the region have produced nothing which would authenticate the presence of settlers that can be associated with later inhabitants of the Peloponnese, let alone with the mythical tradition of the Heraklids. We know nothing of the region's history before the Classical period. Even the Classical period has not provided us with an inscription old enough to determine the region's characteristic dialectical traits, save to say that its forms were of the northwestern language group that was common to Central Greece in the Hellenistic period.

The inhabitants of Doris are among the extremely rare groups of people in the Greek world to be designated by an ethnic, *Dorieus*, which is also used to refer to one of the major *ethnē* of the Hellenes. It was by this name and this identity that they associated themselves with, and were recognized by others in turn. On the one hand, we possess two documents which the Dorians produced, the text of an embassy they sent throughout the Greek world in 206/5 BCE (*SEG* 38.1476, line 88), and a letter and decree issued by their federation in 40/30 BCE (*FdD* III.1 490; cf. *SEG* 44.428), in which they refer to themselves as *Dorieis hoi apo Matropolios* or *Dorieis hoi eg Matropoleos* ("the Dorians from Metropolis"). Indeed, during their embassy in 206/205 BCE, they claimed that they belonged to the Dorian *ethnos*. On the other hand, outsiders referred to them by using the ethnics *Dorieus*,⁴ *Dorieus eg Matropolios* or *Metropoleos*,⁵ or *Matropolitais* (*CID* II 74 I, line 33). This is because it was as Dorians of the Metropolis that they were part of the Amphiktyony at Delphi, but at times they had to share their representation with their fellow Dorians, the Spartans.⁶ It was this same ancestry which earned them the military assistance of the Spartans against their neighbors in 458/457 and again in 426 BCE.⁷ But for lack of any other sources we cannot make any further comments regarding the sense of the ethnic identity of the Metropolitan Dorians.

While their status as a distinct *ethnos* group is well attested as it was expressed and recognized by others, little is known about the federal institutions which united these cities. It is not until after the end of Aitolian domination of the region that a Dorian League is first attested

³ Hdt. 8.43.1; Konon *FGrH* 26 F 1, 27; *SEG* 38.1476, line 27.

⁴ For example, Hdt. 8.66.1; Thuc. 1.107.2; *IG* VII 3055; *SEG* 38.1476, line 20.

⁵ For instance, *CID* II 36 I, 25; *CID* IV 114, 117, and 144.

⁶ See Aischin. 2.116; *CID* IV 110; Lefèvre 1998a: 52–55.

⁷ Thuc. 1.107.2; 3.92.2–4; Diod. 11.79.4–6.

c. 166 (Daux 1936: 327). But was it precisely this liberation from Aitolia which allowed for the emergence of the confederation? The confederation itself reappears until the end of the first century CE, and was called the *koinon* of the Dorians in *FdD* III.1 490 (40–30 BCE). Along with other neighboring peoples who organized themselves into federations, the Dorians make their public presence felt in dedications at several sanctuaries (attested for c. 165 BCE, 33 BCE, 67–68 CE, and again at the close of the first century CE).⁸ Elsewhere, an eponymous federal magistrate, the *doriarch*, is attested on multiple occasions (in 162/1, 160/159, c. 150, 146/5, and 40–30 BCE).⁹

As is the case with sundry other peoples, we know nothing of how the federal magistrate and the *hieromnēmōn* of the Dorian Metropolis (which is attested from the fourth century until c. 117 BCE, and then later after the second century CE) were named or elected from among the citizen bodies of various cities. It should be stressed that the practice of sending a delegate or *hieromnēmōn* to the Amphiktyony who speaks on behalf of a group of *poleis* does not necessarily point to the existence of a strong federal organization. It presupposes, however, a certain degree of collectivity among the represented cities, which were capable of designating one such delegate to represent their communities jointly.

We are equally unaware of either a common sanctuary and federal cults in Doris, or a common currency among the cities, who have not left behind any traces of their own local coinage whatsoever. We can only note that the city of Kytinion (called “the Dorikon” in Thuc. 3.102.1) enjoyed a position of pre-eminence among its neighbors in 206 and in 160,¹⁰ and that around 40–30 BCE there was a federal secretary who was a citizen from Boion (*FdD* III 1, 490). This same decree shows the *koinon* conferring numerous privileges to an outside citizen: *proxenia*, *isopoliteia*, pasture rights, the right of acquiring and holding property, and protection in war and in peace.

The evidence regarding the existence of the Dorian Confederation thus clusters in two periods of time: the first spanning from c. 166 to 146/145 BCE, and the second between c. 40–30 BCE and the end of the first century CE. Does this imply that the confederation ceased to exist after 146/145 only to be recreated a century later? Effectively, does the history of the Dorian League lend some credence to the controversial observation of Pausanias

⁸ See, respectively, I. *Alexandria Troas* 5 and *FdD* III.1, 218g; *IG* II² 4114; *IG* IV.1² 80A; Knoepfler 2012: 240–247.

⁹ See, respectively, *CID* v 322, IV 110, *CID* v 494, 526; *FdD* III 1.490.

¹⁰ *SEG* 38.1476, line 32 and *CID* IV 110, respectively.

(7.16.6) that the Romans tended to suppress any kind of confederations in Greece after 145? Throughout its history, Doris remained too unobtrusive in the written sources for the league's absence from the epigraphic record between 145 and c. 40 to be interpreted in one way or the other. Thus, although Doris in Central Greece is above all, and more so than any other region in Hellas, associated with the foundation legend of one of the Hellenic macro-tribes, the federal organization of later periods almost completely eludes us.¹¹

The Oitaians

The Oitaian people, grouped around Mt. Oita between the Spercheios river and the upper valley of the Kephissos, was one of the smallest ethnic groups in mainland Greece, occupying a region of merely 150 square kilometers. Oitaia was a mountainous region, difficult to navigate; it remained then, and still remains, barely known among Greeks in antiquity and modern scholars alike. The region is called Oitaia in the ancient sources (e.g., Strabo 9.5.10) or Oita (*IG* ix.1, 227 and 229), while the people are sometimes referred to as *Oitai*, *Oitai*, *Oitai*.¹² It is difficult to define the borders of the Oitaians with regard to the surrounding regions Doris, Ainis, and Malis. Before the Classical period we know nothing about this people, and throughout their entire history they have produced only the most scarce bits of useful evidence: Herakles, for whom a funeral pyre situated high on Mt. Oita was an important regional sanctuary, is represented on Oitaian coins; the hero was honored by the Oitaians with quadrennial games and was also celebrated in Herakleia, their principal city, which bore his name.¹³ Otherwise we know next to nothing about the specific character of the Oitaian identity.

Even the names and locations of Oitaian settlements are uncertain. According to Strabo (9.5.10), Oitaia counted fourteen *demes*, among which was "Herakleia and Dryopis, which was formerly a *tetrapolis* like Doris." This is not attested elsewhere. Strabo additionally names Akypas, which we know belonged to Doris in other periods, as well as Parasopias,

¹¹ For further bibliography, see Rousset 1989: 199–239; Rousset 1990: 445–472; Rousset 1994: 361–374; Rousset 1999: 35–77; Rousset 2004: 674–675; and *IG* ix 1², fasc. 6 (*Fasti et Inscriptiones Doridis*).

¹² See Decourt, Nielsen, and Helly 2004: 684–685 for the sources of the Classical period; for the *Oitai*, see R&O no. 96.

¹³ See *Schol. in Iliadem* 22.158; *IG* ix.1 229.

Oiniadai, and Antikyra (which was originally a city of Malis). Other sources lead us to count the following cities or ethnics as being part of Oitaia: Dryope (Rousset 1989: 233), Homilai (Decourt, Nielsen, and Helly 2004: 685), Oleiaos (*IG IX.1*, 227) and perhaps also Kottaeus (Daux 1944/1945: 126–128), as well as two ethnics that are mutilated in epigraphic documents (*IG IX.1*, 102 line 4; 229 line 13). We can arrive at the figure of fourteen *demes* given by Strabo with the addition, following Friedrich Stählin and Ernst Kirsten, of the three (hardly or poorly) attested toponyms Aigoneia, Chen, and Halkyone.¹⁴ Yet despite Stählin's and Kirsten's work, it is impossible to date the organization of Oitaia into the fourteen communities indicated by Strabo to a time before the Aitolian hegemony. We otherwise do not know if these communities all had the same institutional statuses, *polis*, *komē*, or *dēmos*, which accordingly leads us to question if Oitaia was a confederation of cities or a tribal state.

The least unknown cities were Antikyra, Homilai, and above all Herakleia. The role played by the latter in the history of the Oitaians is as important as it is paradoxical (Stählin 1912; Decourt, Nielsen, and Helly 2004: 710–711). This is because the city, founded in the fifth century BCE to contain the aggressive actions of the Oitaians against their Trachinian and Malian neighbors to the north, subsequently became the most important Oitaian city. Established not far from Thermopylai in 426 BCE by the Spartans (Thuc. 3.92; Diod. 12.59), Herakleia Trachinia was a location of enduring strategic importance. The Herakleiotēs came into conflict with the Oitaians in 409/8 and then again in 399 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.18; Diod. 14.38.5). The city was destroyed in 371/0 by Jason of Pherai who then divided the territory among Malians and Oitaians (Diod. 15.57.2). Hereafter, during the fourth century, Herakleia appears sometimes as a Malian city, because of its participation in the Amphiktyony (see below), and at other times as Oitaian (in 323 BCE, according to Diod. 18.11.1). Herakleia is the only one of the Oitaian communities to have struck a proper civic coinage.

Thus the communities in the region are known to us in unequal detail; some have not been located with any certainty; others are of varied political status. In the Classical period, they appear as a political entity in interstate affairs (Decourt, Nielsen, and Helly 2004: 684–685). They were collectively invited by Perikles to a Panhellenic meeting around 449/8 BCE (Plut.

¹⁴ See Decourt, Nielsen, and Helly 2004: 709. Amphanai, Sosthenis, and Charadra cannot be counted among the Oitaians, cf. Rousset, 1989: 222–224 and 233; Kontogiannis 1994: 239–244.

Per. 17.2). They were allies of the Spartans at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (Dem. 59.101), and also in 395 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.6). And they were involved in the League of Corinth in 338/7 (*IG* II³ 318, line b48) and also, aside from the Herakleiotas, in the alliance against the Diadochoi in 323 BCE (Diod. 18.11.1).

All this implies some kind of communal organization or common political entity, as does their coinage, bearing the ethnic of the *Oitaioi* in the fourth century.¹⁵ The existence of a minimal collective organization is likewise suggested by the participation of the Oitaians in the Delphic Amphiktyony; the origins of their membership is not very clear. Along with the Malians, Aischines (2.116) also lists the Oitaians among the groups represented in the amphiktyonic council. However, in the extant lists from 344 BCE, only the Malians are mentioned, with one of the two Malian representatives normally chosen from Herakleia. It appears that this city, from when it had been given to the Malians and the Oitaians in 371/0, indeed must have had one of the two votes that were originally given to the Malians.¹⁶ It was only two centuries later, during the second half of the second century BCE, that the amphiktyonic lists officially sanctioned that which must have already been the division of Malian representation. Henceforward under a proper mandate, the vote of the Oitaians is now cast by a citizen of Herakleia, which still was the most important city in the region (*CID* IV 114, 117, and 119B). Thus, from the Classical period onwards, their actions in the arena of foreign policy, coinage, and amphiktyonic participation, taken together, indicate the existence of a common Oitaian organization.

In the Hellenistic period, the league of the Oitaians was diminished, if not outright abolished, by the Aitolians. If the mention of Herakleian exiles in a treaty concluded between the Aitolians and Demetrios Poliorketes, securely dated to 289 (*BCH* 122, 1998: 109–141), reveals nothing about the political status of the city, nonetheless, we know that Herakleia entered the Aitolian League in 280 BCE (see Paus. 10.20.9). It is likely that this would also have been the case for the other settlements on and around Mt. Oita, which separated Herakleia from Aitolia. During the third century BCE, a fair number of Oitaians from Herakleia and also Homilai, after having received citizenship from the Aitolians, occupied the highest magisterial offices of the Aitolian League, namely those of *stratēgos*, secretary, and

¹⁵ See Head 1911: 302–303; Franke 1958: 60–62; Valasiadis 2004: 173–184.

¹⁶ Lefèvre 1998a: 92–93 and 298; *CID* IV 276–277; Decourt, Nielsen, and Helly 2004: 710.

hieromnēmōn.¹⁷ The Oitaïans struck Aitolian-type coinages during this period, which suggests that they maintained their organization which existed within the broader structure of the Aitolian League.¹⁸ Contingent evidence attests that in the summer of 191 BCE, Herakleia was wrested from the Aitolians, who nevertheless were able to recover the city before 184 and retained control of it at least until 175.¹⁹ It is plausible that the rest of Oitaia experienced the same tribulations, judging by the fate of Dryope which also remained in Aitolian hands until 176.

It was only in around 166 that the Oitaïans, along with their neighbors the Lokrians, the Dorians, and Ainianes, were freed from Aitolian domination (Daux 1936: 327). This liberation was immediately followed by the very first appearance of the federation's name, *to koinon tōn Oitaieōn*, in a dedicatory inscription from c. 165 BCE (*I. Alexandreia Troas* 5). A short series of acts which shed light on the federation's institutions date to the same period, specifically between the years 161–157: an agreement between the Phokian city of Drymos and the Oitaïans regarding the payment of a loan made “to the god and to the Oitaïans.”²⁰ Three of the acts are dated by the *boularcheontes en Oitai* and by three or four *hierothytai*. A Herakleïote is named at the head of each of these two colleges, and one of the payments took place at Herakleia during the festival of the Herakleia. Accordingly, the god to which the treasury of “the Oitaïans” was entrusted was Herakles – the city of Herakleia remained the most important city of the league.

No other indication of the history of the Oitaïan confederation exists after 158/7, and one wonders what happened to it in light of the fate of Herakleia in 147, when the Romans demanded that the city leave the Achaian League (Paus. 7.14.1, 15.2 and 9). We do not know when to date the city's entry into this league, and it does not seem certain that its integration into Achaia would have necessarily been an obstacle to the perpetuation of the Oitaïan federation.

We also do not know what came of the Oitaïans as a result of the decisions made by the Romans regarding the dissolution of all Greek federations in 145 (see above). That the Oitaïans appeared somewhat later, between c. 134 and c. 117 BCE, as delegating *hieromnēmōnes* to the amphiktyony at any rate implies a minimal communal organization. It has

¹⁷ *IG IX.1*² fasc. 1, index; Scholten 2000: 38–39, 44, 52–53, 63, 94; Lefèvre 1998a: 93.

¹⁸ See Franke 1958: 60–62; Kravartogiannos 2009: 141–146.

¹⁹ Daux 1936: 266–267 and 671–674; *CID IV* 108. The fate of Herakleia between 191 and 184 remains unknown, despite Helly 2001: 275–282.

²⁰ *IG IX 1*, 226–230; Migeotte 1984: no. 29; *SEG* 48.599; Rousset 2005: 246.

been suggested that the Oitaians were folded into Thessaly at some point in the second half of the second century, (*BCH* 125, 2001: 285), but we cannot confirm that this was indeed the case.²¹

In the Imperial period, the Oitaians as an autonomous people have disappeared from our records.²² Pliny and other geographers describe the Oitaian cities of Herakleia and Homilai explicitly as belonging to the Thessalians.²³ In the Delphic Amphiktyony, as it was reformed by Augustus, the votes that had been previously given to the Malians and Oitaians, were passed, along with those of two other groups of southern Thessaly, the Ainianes and the Phthiotas, to Nikopolis (Paus. 10.8.3). It is possible that a dedication by some *tagoi* dating to either the second or third century CE made at Akyphas-Pindos, a city of either Oitaia or Doris, indicates a Thessalian institutional influence (Rousset 1994: 367). Throughout a history that is hardly known, but apparently full of tribulations, and impacted by the role of Herakleia as a regional center, we might catch a glimpse of the common organization of the Oitaians through their coin issues and participation in the Delphic Amphiktyony. The internal organization of their federation only becomes visible on the eve of the total disappearance of the Oitaian people.²⁴

Summary conclusion

Federalism featured widely throughout the world of Central Greece and also shaped the history of the two small communities of Dorians and Oitaians. Both peoples comprised a variety of settlements and cities that aggregated to form a humble, rudimentary collective organization. Their common action is attested by their respective participation in the Delphic Amphiktyony and, for the Oitaians, the emission of cooperative coinages (Mackil and van Alfen 2006). At the beginning of the Hellenistic period,

²¹ Despite Helly 2001: 239–287, A federal decree from Thessaly (*IG* IX.2, 103) cannot be cited with any certainty with regards to the annexation of Herakleia by Thessaly, because of the grave uncertainties about the text itself and the unresolved question of its date (second century CE or later).

²² The Oitaians do not appear among the smaller peoples of Central Greece and Achaia who assembled to honor the Romans around 33 BCE, and again shortly after 67–68 and between 98–102 CE: *IG* II² 4114; *IG* IV.1³ 80A; Knoepfler 2012: 240–247.

²³ Plin. *nat.* 4.28 and Ptol. 3.13.45–46; cf. Strabo 9.5.1, 3 and 10; Rousset 1994: 367 n. 27.

²⁴ For further bibliography, see Kip 1910: 31–42; Stählin 1912: col. 424–429; Stählin 1924: 205–212; Kirsten 1937: col. 2289–2294; Lenk 1937: 2294–2299; Béquignon 1937: 167–172 and 206–215; Rousset, 1989: 233–235; Rousset 1994: 363–368; Decourt, Nielsen, and Helly 2004: 684–685, 709–713; Valasiadis 2004: 173–184; Kravartogiannos 2009: 141–146; Bouyia 2010: 79–100; *The BCD Collection of the Coinage of Thessaly* 2011: 87–90 and 487–494.

when our sources for the history of Central Greece flow a little more generously, the Dorians and Oitaians were lastingly absorbed by the Aitolian League. It was only at the end of the domination of the Aitolians, from around 166 BCE until the middle of the second century BCE, that their respective federal institutions shine through in the written record. Despite this brief moment in the limelight, however, the new balance of power in the Greek world after the Achaian War ultimately got the better of both these all too fragile federations, consigning them back to the obscurity from which they had so briefly emerged.

*The Thessalian League**Richard Bouchon and Bruno Helly*

Since the Archaic period, the Thessalians were considered as an *ethnos* whose actions in their own territory, as well as over the course of exterior conflicts, were associated with a commonly accepted collective identity. The question we will ask about the Thessalians, and other Hellenic tribes, is whether that *ethnos* could have been once considered as a political community, a *koinon*, uniting the cities in which all Thessalians were residing; cities whose existence is firmly attested in the region since the seventh century BCE.¹ We shall also consider whether such an ensemble was endowed with institutions and laws, enacted in various domains (be they sovereign, civil, military, economic) by magistrates and governed by a clearly defined procedure, in order to form a federal state.

There are numerous pieces of ancient evidence attesting the existence of such a state as early as the sixth century BCE, but its institutions were the product of an evolutionary process whose individual steps are not documented. Only two major developments are fairly well known. The first one is the movement towards a Thessalian Confederacy in the Classical period. Its origins can be traced to the second half of the sixth century BCE, and it ended in the fourth century BCE when Philip II took control of the area. The second phase started after the defeat of Philip V by the Romans in 196 BCE and the subsequent proclamation of the freedom of the Greeks by T. Quinctius Flaminius, who initiated a new organized *koinon* which persisted until the end of the third century CE.

Trying to piece together the organization of the Thessalians during the two or three centuries that followed their arrival in the region is no easy task (see Helly 2007). But our knowledge of the Thessalian state during the Classical Age has been greatly enhanced and reshaped. The study of Thessaly was pioneered by Eduard Meyer in his *Theopomps Hellenika* (1909), which also covered Thessalian institutions. Meyer's conclusions

¹ Helly 1995: 64–96; Helly 2006a: 194–205.

were systematically obeyed until the mid-1990s, most notably by Marta Sordi in her study *La Lega Tessala* (1958), and we can still find traces of them in the most recent publications on the subject. Subsequent representations of the Classical Thessalian League were built on these foundations, whether it was conceived of as a tribal state, a federal state, or a unitary state, led by a *tagos*.² More recently, the study of Thessalian organization has been approached in new ways and with new methodologies, most notably the ethnicity paradigm, by exploring how the Thessalians opposed themselves to their nearest neighbors.³ But in order to give some validity to this concept in the case of Thessalians, we would first need to know who the *Thessaloi* were, and to determine if this term only designated the tribe of the invaders coming from the Pindos mountains at the start of the first millennium, or whether it was used more widely to encompass all the inhabitants of Thessaly, or even the civil communities shaping the political entity known as *koinon Thessalōn* (Helly 2007). We can therefore question whether such concepts are still pertinent or outdated after further analysis of the most recent archaeological and epigraphical discoveries, and considering the literary and historical sources anew.

The *Thessaloi* and their first *koinon* in Greek politics

The numerous treaties between the Thessalians and the Athenians concluded between the sixth and the middle of the fourth century BCE show that the *Thessaloi* formed a political entity which was able to negotiate alliances and treaties. It was represented by its own magistrates who, in turn, were able to mobilize the troops of its members; the latter were obliged to supply both material support and soldiers to the Thessalian army. As early as *c.* 560 BCE, they formed an alliance with Peisistratos (Hdt. 5.63.2, *SVF* 108) and supported his son Hippias some fifty years later, to the point of giving him the famous city of Iolkos after his downfall (Hdt. 5.94). In the spring of 480, the *Thessaloi* supported the Hellenic forces in an attempt to halt the Persian invasion by blocking the Valley of Tempe (Hdt. 7.172–173, Helly 1995: 223). In 461, the Athenians and the *Thessaloi* exchanged oaths that were directed against Sparta (Thuc. 1.102), and the Thessalians sent a contingent to Tanagra in 457 (Thuc. 1.107, Helly 2004). In 431, they supplied the Athenians with

² See Corsten 1999: 178–184; Beck 1997: 130–131 and 219.

³ Hall 2002: 139–140; Morgan 2003: 18–23 and 85–104.

six regiments (Thuc. 2.22.2–3). Their alliance with Athens was renewed at around 390/380 BCE (*IG* II² 175, Tracy 2009: 75–82) and again in 361 (*IG* II² 116 Add. 658, Tracy 2009 and 2010). All evidence indicates that their state existed with the same institutions since the last third of the sixth century BCE, after the reforms of Aleuas ‘the Red’ from Larisa. Its constitution, the *politeia Thessalōn* was described by the Athenian aristocrat Kritias at the end of the fifth century BCE,⁴ and one century later by Aristotle.⁵

According to Aristotle, Aleuas divided Thessaly into *tetradēs* (fr. 497 R).⁶ These *tetradēs* – the Pelasgiotis, Phthiotis, Thessaliotis, and Hestiaiōtis, which were geographical denominations⁷ – qualified as *moirai* or *merē*, terms designating a mathematical concept of sets and constituent parts.⁸ Based on a cartographical representation of the Thessalian areas,⁹ the *moirai* shaped the military and political organization of the Thessalian state: four *polemarchoi* took the oath in the treaty with Athens (*IG* II² 116 and 175), one for each tetrad. Out of the six regiments of 431 BCE, four came from Pelasgiotis, and two from Phthiotis (Thuc. 2.22.31). Each tetrad, a set of four units, gathered four cities or four groups of cities.

The *tetradēs* lay in the core of Thessaly (both the eastern and western plains) and were surrounded with mountains, whose inhabitants were called *perioikoi*, “those who dwell around”¹⁰. According to all available sources, their geography was characteristic: the Perrhaibians in the north, Magnetes in the east, Phthiotid Achaians in the south, and Dolopians in the west (Helly 1995: 175–191). These peoples were considered well integrated with the Thessalians, but they also formed local political entities amongst themselves. Their dependent status was embodied by the imposition of a tribute stipulated by Skopas of Krannon in the last third of the sixth century BCE (Xen. Hell. 5.1.19); an obligation later renewed by Jason of Pherai. Contrary to the speculation of modern historians (Sordi 1958: 65–67), the *perioikoi*, unlike the *penestes* (see below), were not used as auxiliaries of the Thessalians. When Xerxes imposed conscriptions on the Thessalians (Hdt. 9.32), their contingents were joined with perioikic ones

⁴ *Constitution of Thessaly*, fr. 31.

⁵ Arist. fr. 497 and 498R; see Helly 1995: 150–169 and 288–289.

⁶ See Corsten 1999: 178–184 for a summary view of earlier interpretations.

⁷ See Gschnitzer 1954: 451–464; Helly 1995: 159–161; Corsten 1999: 181.

⁸ On the technical meaning of *meros* and *tetras*, which means “a set of four parts” rather than “the fourth of a whole,” Helly 1995: 43 and 155–157; Caveing 1997: 170–171.

⁹ Strabo organized his chorographical description of Thessaly according to this scheme.

¹⁰ The term *perioikoi* appears only once in ancient sources, see Xen. Hell. 6.1.19; Sprawski 2009.

(Helly 1995: 225–226), and, in the fourth century, Jason of Pherai realized that the very presence of both the Thessalian army and the *perioikoi* as auxiliaries (*akontistai*, “skirmishes”) made for a much larger number of *peltastai* than was necessary (Xen. Hell. 5.1.19).¹¹ The dependance of the *perioikoi* essentially appears to be political as well as economic in nature: for example, the Perrhaibians were part of a monetary union of northern Thessalian cities in the Classical Age. The perioikic people, dispatched into cities ruled by their own institutions, defined themselves by their kinship, by common sanctuaries, and by the mythic ancestry that they purportedly shared with the Thessalians, alongside whom they formed part of the Delphic Amphictyony (Lefèvre 1998a; Sánchez 2001).

Organized into *merē*, i.e., four separate districts surrounded by the *perioikoi*, the Thessalian state was labelled a *tetrarchia*, an ensemble of four elements linked to one another. Accordingly, the league empowered a magistrate known as a *tetrarchos* or more simply *archos* or *archōn*: the term appears in the Athenian treaties of the fourth century and as early as the fifth century, Daochos was called *archōn* “of the whole of Thessaly” (FdD III.4, 460.5). A console from Larisa was undoubtedly mounted by the bust of a person designated as *arxas* (Helly 2000). The *archōn* of the Thessalians could stay in power for several years (Daochos remained in this position for twenty-seven years) and was the head of the state whose main military and political institutions are known to us. One step below the *archōn* we find four *polemarchoi*, one for each tetrad, as evidenced by the Thessalian officials who swore an oath in the Athenian treaty of 390–380 BCE (IG II² 175). The existence of the *polemarchoi* is already proven as early as the fifth century, through the Thessalian offering of a horse in Delphi after the battle of Tanagra in 457 BCE (Daux 1958: 329–334 = SEG 17.243); its signature on the base (“... were *polemarchoi*”), followed by two names in the genitive form and five others in the nominative form allows us to reconstruct the military hierarchy: two *polemarchoi* out of four, along with lower-ranked officers, were in command of a part of the Thessalian army. This pattern also appears in 510 and 431 (Helly 1995: 226–233). An attested oath from 361 (IG II² 116) showcases the same hierarchy: “the *archōn* Agelaos, the *polemarchoi*, the *hipparchos*, the *hippeis*, the *hieromnēmones* and all magistrates of the federal state of Thessalians.” Neither epigraphical testimony nor any historical text gives us any indication that the

¹¹ See Helly 1995: 183–187 on the interpretation of Xenophon’s text.

polemarchoi served in anything but a military capacity, an observation that is also supported by the name of their office.¹²

Aristotle in his *Thessalōn Politeia* mentions the reforms first introduced by Aleuas the Red in the organization of the army: “by dividing the city, Aleuas also imposed the *klēros*, so that each and every one of them would provide 40 knights and 80 hoplites” (fr. 498 R).¹³ By considering this text with what we learn from the *Handbook to Armies*, written at the early Hellenistic period by a certain Asklepiodotos (Helly 1995: 194–195), we get a better sense of Aleuas’ measures. The base ‘two’ (the principle of division towards unity) is the very foundation of this organization, for which the numbers 80 (hoplites) and 40 (knights) are an extension over the multiple ‘four’, which Aleuas used for the division of spaces into *tetrades* and the distribution of the cities among them. We might thus calculate the manpower of the Thessalian phalanx, which was composed of 32 regiments of heavy infantry, each of them counting 320 hoplites (4 x 80), 16 regiments of cavalry with 320 knights (8 x 40), and an *epitagma* of auxiliary troops, only half as well-equipped as the infantry (Helly 1995: 193–218). Those numbers have been confirmed by other sources. The 1,000-strong knights’ contingent sent to Athens under the command of the *basileus* Kineas in 511 BCE (Hdt. 5.63.3) was already drafted on the basis determined by Aleuas – three regiments of 320 men plus a group of staff officers – so this operation gives a *terminus ante quem* for the reform in the last quarter of the sixth BCE. We can therefore estimate a number of 50,000 men enrolled by the king of Persia (Hdt. 9.32), half of them being Thessalian and *perioikoi*.¹⁴ The *penestēs* Menon of Pharsalos sent to the battle of Eion (c. 476 BCE) formed a reinforcement unit of 200–300 *hippeis*, lightly armed, levied from the tetrad which he was responsible of (Dem. 23.109; 13.23),¹⁵ in accordance with the practices for mobilizing Thessalian contingents on the territorial basis fixed by Aleuas.

This principle is also attested in the composition of the contingent that was sent to Athens in 431 (Thuc. 2.22.31). Originating from two *tetrades*, the six regiments were formed *kata poleis* (“by cities”) and raised in three units called *staseis*, which gathered two cities or more. The two regiments from Phthiotis were commanded by Menon of Pharsalos, who enjoyed full authority over his half-tetrad. The two Larisaans each commanded two regiments of the Pelasgiotis, raised “each in his own unit”; in this text,

¹² See Corsten 1999: 179–181 for a different view.

¹³ On the various attempts to heal the opaque text, see Helly 1995: 153.

¹⁴ Helly 1995: 224–225. This was no private army as sometimes conjectured, see Helly 1996a.

¹⁵ Helly 1995: 303–306; Ducat 1997; Helly 1996a.

stasis, as a technical term of the military vocabulary, means “main position, unit of mobilization,” which equalled a half tetrad.¹⁶ The decree voted in return by the Athenians for one of the two Larisian officers, Aristonous, has been preserved (*IG* I³ 55); the other, Polymedes, had his bust put up in a public building in Atrax (*IG* IX.2, 501, Helly 2000: 151–160).

The reforms of Aleuas set the ratio of one horseman to two hoplites, which was exceptionally high. The knights, whether as a group or in single contingents, were designated by a generic term, *Thessalōn hippeis* (Hdt. 5.64.2 in 510 BCE; 7.172–173 in 480; see also Thuc. 1.107.7 and *IG* II² 116, Add. 658). The *hippeis* took the oaths after the *archōn*, the *polem-archoi* and the *hipparchoi*: they were considered as a body collectively engaged in the constitution of the league. In the cities, Aleuas’ reforms grouped members of the most noble families, such as Aristoteles of the Agathokleadaï from Larisa, celebrated by Bakchylides for his victories at the Pythian Games (Ep. 14); as well as the cavalry officers like the *basileus* Kineas sent to Athens in 511 (Hdt. 5.63.3), the three Menon of Pharsalos, father, son and grandson, the hipparch Polycharmos of Pharsalos, killed in 394 in a fight against Agesilaos’ troops in the mountains of Narthakion (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.3–4; Plut. Ages. 16.5), and many others. The wealth and nobility of those families was well known – so much so that it had become proverbial – but it would be incorrect to mistake them for feudal landlords owning large domains with huge herds of horses and cattle. Rather, it has become obvious now that, as a consequence of Aleuas’ reforms, the *hippeis* were given a *klēros*, a piece of land which they managed but did not own.

Foot soldiers, who were commanded by eight *pezarchoi* (two per tetrad) are almost never mentioned (Helly 1995: 217). As for the auxiliary troops, they are furnished by the *penestes* attached to different cities. A decree from Pharsalos (*IG* IX.2, 234) grants citizenship and a piece of land to 176 people “who for the longest time shared in the life of the city of Pharsalians and fought side by side with them.”¹⁷ These presumably landless people must have been *penestes*. The auxiliary troops formed the *epitagma* of the phalanx and also reinforced the cavalry as scouts or tarantines, while the leadership was the purview of the citizens (Helly 1996b: 49–69). The army of the Thessalians was based on the community of cities, which supplied every type of contingents and officers on every level, organized into *tetrades* and

¹⁶ This passage in Thucydides has been misunderstood ever since the days of Eduard Meyer. The context here is not one of factional politics, see Demont 1995: 198–210.

¹⁷ *I. Enipeus* 50, line 165; Decourt 1990: 163–184; Ducat 1994: 107–113; Helly 1995: 302–311.

within each tetrad into various units, which in turn comprised the regimental units of the phalanx, the cavalry, and auxiliary troops.¹⁸

The reform of Aleuas focused on the delegation of civic territory into *klēroi*, the nature of which is now clear: the distribution of *klēroi* was a simple administrative act. Sometimes parcels of land were given to casual citizens or groups of citizens (Étienne 2007: 243–248). The latter procedure is confirmed by two decrees of Larisa, dating from the last third of the third century BCE, which organized the sale of lands designated as *hippoteia*, “lots for horsemen.”¹⁹ These were public parcels which the city sold by in an auction, and we learn that the citizens maintaining them were not their owners. They merely held the title to the land and were subject to an annual tax of ten staters and strict cultivation rules mandated by law.

Land parcels were assigned to civic groups called *taga*, into which the allottees were in turn registered. The *taga* was constituted of families and was named after one of these.²⁰ For instance, regarding the convention of the Basaidai in Metropolis, it is said that those belonging to the four families shall “participate in the *taga* forever”²¹. A similar language can be found in a decree of Tethonion for Sotairos of Corinth (*IG* ix.2, 257).²² These texts, the latter from the fifth century BCE and the former from the second half of the third century BCE, show that the institution of the *taga* was both ancient and ‘Panthessalian’; it can be detected in at least three out of the four *tetrades* (Pelasgiotis, Hestiaiotis, Thessaliotis). Therefore, the word *taga* had a broader meaning than that of the function of a magistrate called *tagos*.²³ The *taga* was also part of the unit of mobilization, from which the regiments of infantry and cavalry were formed, in the territorial unit called *stasis*. The decree from Tethonion speaks of those “in the ranks or out of the ranks”, which is to say that they were mobilized or not; i.e., in times of

¹⁸ On the increase of the strength in the fourth century BCE, cf. Helly 1995: 240–256.

¹⁹ See Tziafalias 2000: 86–87, no. 4; *SEG* 53.543; Tziafalias and Helly 2013

²⁰ The lots put on sale in *SEG* 53.543 were attributed to the members of a *taga* “of the Agathokleidai” (lines 2–3), a family name already known in the first half of the fifth century (Bakchyl. 14). The same document reveals the name of another *taga*, that of the Alkeidai (line 31: “each and every lot-for-horsemen [*hippoteia*] of the Alkeidai.” Some of the *hippoteia* are said to be “ancient” (lines 19–20 and 39–40). The connection with the territorial organization of Aleuas is obvious. The *hippoteia* were evidently lots allocated to citizens who served as cavarlymen. So a distinction was made between *klēroi* and *hippoteia*, which implies that the knights were allocated two parcels of land: a *klēros* to keep their subsistence, like any other citizen, and, in order to feed their horses, another one called *hippoteion*.

²¹ See Helly 1970 (*SEG* 36.548); Helly 1995: 320–321.

²² *LSAG* 10 and plate 11, add. p. 402 (*SEG* 25.647). On the interpretation, see Helly 1995: 147 and 332.

²³ See in particular Helly 1995: 331–336.

war or in times of peace. The *taga* thus played a fundamental role, to the point that after Jason of Pherai ruled over Thessaly and started to reform the army, he took the title of *tagos* and framed his authority as a *tageia*, heralding his supreme power over all Thessalians (Helly 1995: 345–353). Long after Jason's rule, the term *tagos* was used to designate the highest magistrates of the Thessalian cities.

The sources of income for the Thessalian state mostly derived from the tribute imposed on the *perioikoi* by Skopas at the end of the sixth century BCE, a tax which Jason used to his benefit. But some of the cities that the Thessalians considered their territory and which they co-owned, as it were, also brought in finances.²⁴ Other sources of income came from taxes on various kinds of merchandise from the harbors of Pagasai and Pyrasos, which, during the fifth and fourth centuries, blossomed into veritable commercial activity. These revenues of the federal state were enticing to Philip II of Makedonia who, probably after the siege of Pagasai in 353/2, wanted to monopolize them to his profit. It is easy to see how this, in turn, led to persistent complaints of the Thessalians (Dem. 1.22, from 349 BCE).

Most of the cities struck coins in their own name, but on the same Aiginetic standard and with common iconographic types, split into two thematic cycles. The bull-hunting motif appears as a diptych, on the obverse and the reverse, in the cities of Pelasgiotis and Hestiaiotis, Larisa, Krannon, Pherai, Pharkadon, Pelinna, Triikka, and among the Perrhaibians. A horse protome on the obverse and an ear of corn or the head of Herakles with the club on the reverse are attested for Methyilion of Hestiaiotis, and coins bearing the name of *Thessaloi*. Skotoussa in Pelasgiotis successively took part in the emission of both groups.²⁵ The political character of this coinage is as obvious as its economic interest. The cities were led to issue coins according to their needs and their means, in a continuous way and for a determined amount of time (Lorber 1999: 221–227), within a single monetary union, subdivided into two groups, and under the control of the authority of the Thessalian state (Liampi 1996a; Papaeuvangelou 1998).

Two cities kept their distance regarding this monetary union. Pharsalos minted its own coins, bearing a helmeted Athena. Kierion followed Pharsalos in a similar fashion. But these separate coinages did not cut the

²⁴ E.g., Aia in Malis, which according to Soph. fr. 915 Pearson was “a common lot of all the Thessalians.” Also probably Iolkos on the Gulf of Pagasai, which was awarded to Hippias, son of Peisistratos (Hdt. 5.94).

²⁵ See Liampi 1996a; Papaeuvangelou 1998: 40–53.

ties of their cities to the federal organization. The representation of Athena was that of Athena Itonia, whose federal sanctuary was at Itonos, close to Kierion. Pharsalos appears to have been closer to the Thessalian state during the longest part of the fifth century BCE, most notably when the Pharsalian Daochos held the federal archonship (Jacquemin-Laroche 2001).

The main reason why the Thessalian cities agreed to this 'bipartite' union must have been to facilitate swift and relatively easy economic exchange. Also, the system streamlined the payment of taxes by the *perioikoi* as well as the contributions of the member-cities to military spending and the upkeep of federal sanctuaries. The federal character of economic union was not undermined by the fact that these coins featured the cities' respective ethnics. Rather than staking their claims for independence and autonomy, the notion of city-ethnics mostly helped to identify the local provenience of those coinages, and attest to the local authorities that were in charge of their emission.²⁶

In the first half of the fifth century, however, we also find coins bearing the legends ΦΕ, ΦΕ ΤΑ, or ΦΕΘΑ. Those series are often considered as federal coinage, but their very nature tied them to the group of cities clustered around Methyilion and Skotoussa.²⁷ It has become clear that the *Thessaloi* who struck these coins were only a fraction of those who comprised the federal state and did not represent the federal state as a whole. This view is also supported by epigraphical evidence. A decree of the *Petthaloi* from the first half of the fourth century BCE granted Euergetes of Chalkis the honor of *proxenia*, "under the presidency of the Sordikidai and the Kotylidai" (Peek 1934). The presence of kinship-based groups within this community of *Phetthaloi* puts it on the same level of organization with the cities: they formed a community that one should distinguish of the federal *koinon* of the Thessalians. These *P(h)etthaloi* preserved their tribal organization or *syngeneiai* next to cities such as Methyilion, Gomphoi, and others in this part of the Hestiaiotis. In this region, there were a few "small cities without importance" until the first part of the fourth century (Strabo 9.5.17), only to be gathered around c. 370 BCE when the synoikism of Metropolis was initiated. Such communities, which coexisted with big cities and collaborated to the extent of striking coins under the same name, are attested at different times in Thessaly and in other federal states.

The organization of the Thessalian League did not remain unchanged over time. Aleuas' reforms marked a decisive turning point in the organization of the league, although he certainly drew on various patterns that were

²⁶ See Martin 1985: 219–248.

²⁷ Arena 1960: 261–273; Franke 1970: 85–93.

already in place before him. In the fifth and fourth centuries, the federal state appears to be based on a principle similar to that of the Second Athenian Confederation. The league was an association of cities and autonomous communities which agreed to share in whatever would make them stronger. Their common grounds were: the army first and foremost, mostly used to strengthen outside military alliances; federal coinage, with more or less standardized types and measures; and a common economy, based on the income of tribute and commercial taxation, mainly from the harbors. The cities were the driving force in the league, as they were in charge of raising regiments, striking coins, receiving and giving honors to foreigners, and they were also the ones who might actually seek alliances with outside forces. Whether the cities were independently powerful (Larisa, Pharsalos, Pherai), or less important (Pelinna, Kierion, Pharkadon, and many others), they all had the same rights and duties. The Thessalian federal state thus was a multi-polar organization, composed by units that shared in one over-arching political and social superstructure of *tetrades*, *klēroi*, and *tagai*.

The Hellenistic *koinon*

The rise of Makedonia deeply altered the place of the Thessalians in the broader community of Hellenes. They became obliged *symmachoi* of the kings from the north, and their cities were placed under the control of new magistrates or foreign garrisons (Helly 2006). The sources also indicate a decline in the social and territorial organization. The members of the *taga* from the family of the Agathokleadaí in Larisa, for instance, were too few to maintain the cultivation of all the lots that were allocated to them, while the lots that had lain fallow were being sold in order to face financial pressures. It appears the institutions inherited from the Classical era were exhausted at some point, so that a profound reorganization had become necessary to keep the *Thessaloi* alive.

Jakob Larsen held that Hellenistic and Roman Thessaly was “somewhat of a land apart” (Larsen 1968: 281), which was probably to the point. The rebirth of a Thessalian federal state occurred in two steps. After the Second Makedonian War (200 to 197 BCE), a supreme magistrate called *stratēgos* (instead of *archōn*) was designated by the Thessalians,²⁸ while Flamininus restricted the access to political or judiciary functions by

²⁸ Pausanias, son of Echekrates of Pherai, in 196/5 BCE, see Kramolisch 1978: 45–46.

property qualification.²⁹ Two years later, a commission of ten senators set up new rules for the *koinon*. Fifty years later, the Thessalian cities continued to state that they made their decisions “according to the laws of the *Thessaloi* that are in place, given by the consul Titus Quinctius, submitted by the ten ambassadors and by decree of the senate” (*IG* ix.2, 89B, lines 50–54).

The new key institution was the federal *synedrion*, the sessions of which were held once a month in Larisa.³⁰ At the beginning of the Roman Empire, the board comprised at least 334 delegates from the cities, or *synedroi*.³¹ They spoke and decided on behalf of the Thessalians (*SEG* 47.745; *IG* ix.2, 507). Their decisions were designated as *psēphismata* and maybe *hypomnēmatismoi*.³² The few decrees that survive from this period suggest that the *koinon* functioned with only a few magistrates who formed a kind of committee, bearing the names *koinon archontes*,³³ *synarchia*,³⁴ or *synarchontes*.³⁵ The decisions taken in times of crisis, which differ from the formulaic phrases of honorific decrees, show that the annual *stratēgos* played a key role in the organization. His function was far from being ceremonial. For instance, in the notorious episode of grain requests on behalf of Rome in the 130s BCE, he appears as the solely responsible magistrate, yet is assisted by commissioners he himself designated.³⁶ It should be noted that the office could be held more than once, but not on consecutive terms. As early as 190, Aiakidas of Metropolis was designated for a second term.³⁷ This happened three times during the first twenty years, but it became more intermittent during the Imperial period, as far as we can see from the available documentation.

The *stratēgos* was the regular eponymous for federal decrees both domestic and external³⁸ and even for decrees of cities located outside of core Thessaly, in which he prevailed over local eponymous magistrates. In civic

²⁹ Ferrary 1987–1989: 206–207, *contra* Bernhardt 1984: 221 and Gruen 1984: 455, who believe the measures to have been only temporary. See also Kallet-Marx 1994: 67–70.

³⁰ Liv. 36.8.2 and 42.38.6; *IG* ix.2, 261 (= *I. Enipeus* 13), lines 11–12. It remains possible that the *synedrion* would have been in session in the federal sanctuary of Athena Itonia during the annual festival in honor of the goddess.

³¹ The number is attested in the vote on the dispute between Kierion and Metropolis: *I. Enipeus* 13.

³² *IG* ix.2, 627. This epitaph refers to heroic honours granted to a citizen from Larisa, *kata tōn tōn synedrōn hypomnēmatismōn*.

³³ *Archaiologikē Ephēmeris* 1910: 331.

³⁴ Gallis 1976, lines 16–56 (= *SEG* 34.558); cf. Garnsey, Gallant, and Rathbone 1984.

³⁵ *IG* ix.2, 509 (unpublished fragment). ³⁶ Gallis 1976, lines 30 and 38 (= *SEG* 34.558).

³⁷ Kramolisch 1978: A6.

³⁸ E.g., the *senatus consultum* about the dispute between Narthakion and Melitaia: *IG* ix.2, 89A, lines 4–7.

matters, official documents of individual cities are dated after him (although not constantly³⁹), and he was the only magistrate mentioned with regards to federal law in manumission lists. Written sources give examples of the military activity of the *stratēgos*: the *stratēgos* of 171 BCE, a certain Hippias, reinforced Gyrtone's defenses (Liv. 42.53.7), and Androstenes, in charge in 48 BCE, was besieged in Gomphoi by Caesar's troops (Caes. *BC* 3.80). Two other military officials are mentioned in the seldom-preserved headings of federal decrees: the hipparch, head of cavalry, and the *tarantinarchos*, head of light cavalry.⁴⁰ The few names that are attested all point to Larisa. It has been argued that these individuals were not part of a federal military staff but rather in charge of the local district of mobilization – in this case, Larisa, where the documents were excavated, – making their reference in the corresponding decrees a mere coincidence (Helly 1995: 274–275). Be that as it may, the *pax Romana* brought an end to the armed contingents in Thessaly, as elsewhere, but we know nothing of the details of this. To be sure, the *stratēgos* was not in charge of any military operations in the Imperial period.

The *grammateus* of the *synedroi*⁴¹ appears to be the second in command of the *koinon*. He was probably elected for a year among the members of the *synedrion*. The title – “secretary” – indicates that he was in charge of drafting and archiving federal decisions,⁴² when the official correspondence fell under the competence of the *stratēgos*. More surprisingly, the charge of any question related to justice was the responsibility of the *grammateus*. For instance, judges from Teos were mandated “to apply the laws in the cases of Poulydamas' secretaryship year” (*SEG* 47.745). Another instance reveals that the secretary, after having received the governor's approval in the early Imperial period, held a vote of the *synedrion* in regard to litigious cases within the *koinon* (*IG* ix.2, 261). Finally, a federal treasurer, designated as *tamias synedrōn*, was in charge of the *koinoi prosodoi*, the common incomes.⁴³ He was the one responsible for the inscribing of stelai and publication of the decrees voted by the *synedrion* and prepared for publication by the *grammateus*. Some other financial tasks undoubtedly also fell under his authority, including overseeing the minting of the coinage of the *koinon*, although it remains uncertain if it is his name or that of another financial officer that is carved on the coins (see below).⁴⁴

³⁹ In Larisa, the eponymous *stratēgos* is never mentioned before the Third Makedonian War: Helly 2008a.

⁴⁰ *IG* ix.2, 507 and 509; *Archaiologikē Ephēmeris* 1910: 331.

⁴¹ E.g., *IG* ix.2, 507, lines 3–4.

⁴² *IG* ix.2, 507, line 33.

⁴³ *IG* ix.2, 507; Helly 2001: 254.

⁴⁴ Helly 1987: 39–53; Burrer 1993: 14.

Lawsuits between citizens from one and the same Thessalian city were administered by their own civic tribunals, with the help of outside judges whenever necessary.⁴⁵ At no time did the federal authorities interfere with strictly local matters. The cases between Thessalian cities were, on the other hand, submitted to the federal level. When sent to the senate in Rome, the ambassadors from NARTHAKION referred to the laws of the Thessalians that guaranteed them rightful recognition against the city of Melitaia (*IG* ix.2, 89B, line 14). In the case of the *hiera chōra* located between the cities of Halos and Thebes (*FdD* III.4, 355), the resolution offered by Makon of Larisa shows that the *synedrion* did not judge such matters as a proper court but rather turned to an arbitration brought from the outside, a citizen like Makon, with an authority acknowledged by both parties, or to an ‘international tribunal’.⁴⁶ As a last resort, the cities that were unsatisfied appealed to the Roman senate. Based on the available documentation, the only attested case where the *synedrion* acted as a true court dates from the beginning of the Imperial era. In the [final chapter](#) of an ongoing dispute between Kierion and Metropolis, the *legatus* C. Poppaeus Sabinus, with whom the federal *grammateus* consulted, ordered that the Thessalian *synedrion* arbitrate on this matter; the *grammateus*, in turn, obtained a confirmation of the *synedrion*’s vote by the Roman authorities (*IG* ix.2, 261, line 23). It is possible that in the Imperial era the judicial powers of the *koinon* were fairly wide-ranging. A *rescriptum* of Antoninus Pius, preserved in a case-law book from Late Antiquity, shows that cases logically falling under the competence of the governor of the province were instead a matter for the *koinon*, especially if they involved the use of violence or property theft. Yet the *rescriptum* does not mention which tribunal is in charge of the judgement.⁴⁷

A decree from Larisa gives us a better understanding of the constraints that came along with membership in the *koinon*. During the first years after the reshaping of the league, Athenian commissioners negotiated with different Thessalian cities in order to purchase wheat at the lowest possible price. They obtained from the Larisaiaans a large tax reduction – as large as possible, considering that federal law prohibited a full tax exemption (*IG* ix.2, 506).⁴⁸ It appears that the export laws had changed in the first

⁴⁵ Robert 1973; Fournier 2010. For Thessalian affairs, see Crowther 2006 and *SEG* 27.226, where the judges mostly originated from Thessaly. We only have one single example of judges being sent from a member-state of the *koinon*: judges from Metropolis sent to Krannon (Crowther 2006: 41).

⁴⁶ Unpublished inscription from Larisa, archived in Lyon, *GHW* 6110: dispute between Kierion and Metropolis, arbitrated by judges from Priene, Smyrna, and Krannon.

⁴⁷ Kallistratos, *Dig.* 5.1.37 and Marcianus, *Dig.* 48.6.5. ⁴⁸ *IG* ix.2, 506; Helly 2008: 82–98.

years of the new *koinon* and that the Thessalian cities were required to comply with the new economic legislation. The city of Larisa, the document continues (lines 44–45), “although inclined to resume the previous system, is unable to do so.” The *koinon* evidently controlled the trade of the grain cultivated in its own territory. Larisa had to pay heed to the *koinon*’s regulations (lines 41–42) and adapt its own laws “according to the lawful regulations regarding taxes on grain” (lines 40–41). The same goes for another legislative arena. Taxes on manumission were levied according to federal legislation and then applied at the local level. In order to be freed, a slave had to pay a fee (*IG* IX.2, 346). Federal legislation stated that this amounted to 15 staters, or 22 *denarii* by the end of the first century BCE, when the law was modified by a *diorthōma* (“amendment”; see Bouchon 2010). Once collected by the cities’ treasurers, the funds were kept in local depots rather than in the *koinoi prosodoi*, the common treasuries of the *koinon* (Bouchon 2009).

The league had a monopoly on issuing silver coins, proclaiming its desire to forge a politically united space.⁴⁹ Although a detailed study on Thessalian silver coinage is still in need of preparation,⁵⁰ it can yet be surmised that the league used a double-standard system throughout the second century BCE: Attic standard drachmas or hemidrachmas, and Aiginetic-weight staters. Attic standard drachmas bearing an Apollo and Athena have been found in coin hoards from the first third of the second century (Robinson 1936), while traditional Aiginetic standard Thessalian issues are known from hoards which postdate the Third Makedonian War (171 to 168 BCE). It has therefore been deduced that the new Thessalian *koinon* originally adhered to the monetary habits inherited from the era of Makedonian domination, by using the most current standard of the day (a somewhat “natural choice,” according to Kremydi-Sicilianou 2004), but then went on to strike 6-gram staters in order to reassert Thessaly’s freedom and independence from both Makedonia and Aitolia. The stater is also used as official currency account in public documents, especially in the collection of the manumitted slaves’ fee by the local treasurers, for which the oldest testimony dates back to the 160s BCE (Pouilloux 1955), until the first years of Augustus’ reign, when it was replaced by the denarius. The passing of the *diorthōma* in the cities of the *koinon* in the 20s BCE, fixing a

⁴⁹ Helly 1987: 40.

⁵⁰ So far, see Franke 1959; Helly 1966; Helly 1982; Helly 1987; Klose 1998. Substantial coin hoards continue to remain unpublished: Kremydi-Sicilianou 2004. For the Imperial period, see Burrell 1993.

conversion of the manumission tax from staters to denarii, may constitute a *terminus ante quem* for the end date of Thessalian silver coin emissions (Helly 1997b; Bouchon 2010: 446–449). Yet, very shortly after this, the *koinon* started to mint bronze coins bearing the imperial portrait on the obverse. Friedrich Burret (1993; cf. Bouchon 2010) showed that the weight system the Thessalians adopted was an obvious vector of continuity with the Hellenistic coinage, although some scholars have questioned the names he proposed for the various denominations that were emitted.

Several personal names (up to three) may appear on the same coin, some in the nominative form, others in the genitive. It has been argued that one of them was the annual *stratēgos* and another the federal *tamias*, but Bruno Helly showed that the coinage was struck by lots on an irregular interval, and that the names might as well be those of wealthy citizens taking part in financing the production costs of the emission.⁵¹ In the Imperial era, the *stratēgos* is mentioned on bronze coins, yet we cannot be certain if he was referred to as a mere eponymous or as the person in charge of the emission (Burret 1993: 178–179).

The monetary types themselves are relatively few: three deities occupy the central position (Moustaka 1983: 15, 23, 36). Athena Itonia, as a warrior at ease or ready to attack, is the main one. Apollo is the first god associated with her: by referring to the laurelled god, Thessaly reasserted the traditional links which tied it to Delphi, as the first series with the Apollo type dates from various quarrels in the Amphictyony after its liberation from Aitolian domination (Habicht 1987). During the Imperial era, the Apollo *kitharoidos* type becomes frequent, maybe due to the effective monopoly of Thessaly on the *agonothesia* of the Pythian Games (Bouchon 2005). The other main figure which shares the function of symbolizing the Thessalian identity with Athena and Apollo was the bearded and crowned-with-laurels Zeus Eleutherios (Franke 1959). He may have replaced the Zeus Olympios, whose festival formed the heart of a Panthessalian cult in the third century BCE, but whose name was likely to be associated with Makedonia – and hence of no good use in Thessaly (see Bouchon and Helly 2013).

The Hellenistic league had no primary assembly at its center to govern its legislative process. The Thessalians gathered at Itonos on an annual basis in order to hold the *thysia* in honor of Athena Itonia, but the assembly

⁵¹ See Helly 1982: 53. At least one attested series may have been financed by the city of Larisa, see Burret 1993: 178–179.

there did not constitute a political body. Nor were the cities of the *koinon* united by means of a common citizenship; the Thessalian cities granted exclusively local citizenship to their benefactors.⁵² However, the federal *synedroi* were able to award citizenship rights in any Thessalian city, on the condition that the recipient approached the local authorities of the city of his choice.⁵³

A Thessalian decree from c. 130 BCE organizing the collection of grain (see p. 241) clearly states that the system of *tetradēs* survived in the second *koinon*. Cities from Achaia Phthiotis and Malis, since the 190s BCE, and from Perrhaibia, since 146 BCE, were also members of the *koinon* (Kramolisch 1975). Geographers from the Imperial era report that Malis and Achaia had been incorporated into the *Phthiotis*, whereas several Perrhaibian cities are mentioned by Claudius Ptolemaios among those of the *Pelasgiotis*.⁵⁴ During the first century BCE, Thessaly gradually incorporated the people of the Spercheios' valley (the Ainianes) and some tribes of eastern Pindos, for instance the Dolopians and Athamanians or the *Talaroi*, which are otherwise practically unknown.⁵⁵ The various steps of this integration remain obscure and although historians usually link those developments to the most important episodes of the military presence of Rome in Greece, we need to acknowledge that the political mechanism behind it is unknown.

At some point, a new territorial division was superimposed upon the tetradic system. An annual festival was held in, and organized by, the city of Larisa, in order to commemorate, as suggested by modern historians, a battle in 171 BCE (Helly 2008a). Although no city-ethnics are mentioned in the victor lists, some are known to be citizens from Gomphoi, Krannon, and Gyrton;⁵⁶ moreover, the *agonothetēs*, at least in one case a man not from Larisa,⁵⁷ is addressed as "the *tagos* of the first *chōra*." These competitions were likely to be open to all citizens of a first *chōra*; by implication, this means that there must have been at least one

⁵² Note also that there is no attested example yet of *epigamia* rights granted to a Thessalian in a Thessalian city other than his hometown.

⁵³ Theocharis 1960: 81–82, # 2 (*SEG* 23.448); see Helly 2001: 249–252. A recently published inscription from Larisa shows how a man from Chalkis, *proxenos* of the Thessalians, made use of his citizenship in Larisa, as he was entitled to: Tziafalias and Helly 2004–2005: 407–417.

⁵⁴ Strabo 9.5.3; Plut. *Mor.* 822e; Ptol. *Geog.* 3.12. See Larsen 1963: 240; Helly 1995: 151.

⁵⁵ Strabo 9.4.17. See Bouchon 2005: 1–23. According to Sekunda 1997: 208–209, Ainis could have been attached to Thessaly in 48 BCE.

⁵⁶ Kramolisch 1978: 135–136; Bouchon 2005: 253–257.

⁵⁷ Themistogenes son of Androstenes originated from Gyrton: *IG* IX.2, 532 (last third of the first century BCE).

other *chōra*, a second one.⁵⁸ Since all the victors identified as non-Larisaian originate from the (pre-171 BCE?) ‘old Thessaly,’ one might infer that, in spite of the integration into the tetradic system, a distinction between a Thessaly of the origin and an *epiktētos*, “additional or extended,” Thessaly was in place, as in the third century in Aitolia.

The cultural oppositions in this extended Thessaly were manifold. For instance, during the second century BCE, the cities of core Thessaly used a common Thessalian dialect in their official documents, while the southern cities of Thessaly, once a part of Aitolia, used central Greek *koina*, and the cities of Perrhaibia, once Makedonian, used *koinē*. This might have been a simple way for the ancient Thessalian cities to assert their local identity, since in some way their language was no more than *koinē* retroverted into dialectical forms. At the federal level, in any case, the language of this somewhat heterogeneous group was *koinē*, as used in the decrees or arbitrations of the *koinon*.

With this diversity in mind, it is no surprise that the process of unification of Thessaly was gradual. The calendars are a perfect example of this (Graninger 2011: 87–114). As far as we know, the Thessalian calendar appears to have been fixed as early as in the fourth century BCE, if not earlier. It comprised, for the first semester, the months Panemos, Themistios, Agagyllos, Apollonios, Hermaios, and Leschanorios, and, for the second semester, Aphrios, Thyos, Homoloios, Hippodromios, Phyllikos, and Itonios.⁵⁹ If most of these names are to be found in the local calendars of the cities of the *tetrades*, it is now clear that Larisa’s calendar was established before the common calendar. Outside the core of Thessaly, the cities of ancient Achaia Phthiotis adopted the Thessalian calendar only more than a century after they became members of the *koinon*: it appears from the inscriptions found in several Achaean cities that local Achaean calendars were still in use in the first half of the first century BCE – probably as late as 50 BCE (IG IX.2, 109; Trümper 1997: 236–240), whereas the Thessalian calendar dates every document of the Imperial time, without exception. The lack of documentation prevents us from knowing more precisely the date of the replacement of the calendar. The situation seems to be identical with Lamia or Echinon of Malis (Trümper 1997: 231–233), though both cities were members of the *koinon* from the 180s onward. On the contrary, the cities of Perrhaibia replaced

⁵⁸ Helly 1995: 276 supposes that the term *chōra* replaced that of *stasis* (see above) to designate the units for military recruitment. Zachou-Kontoyianni 2003 thinks it addresses the most important *tagos* of the collegium, the first in rank.

⁵⁹ See Trümper 1997: 216–218.

their calendar with the Thessalian one as soon as they entered the league, most likely because they renounced the Makedonian calendar and decided not to return to an epichoric one (Kramolisch 1979). Be that as it may, the union was effective in the Imperial era. As a proof of its uniformity, starting in 10/11 CE and continuing with this practice for the next half-century at least, every city in the *koinon* reckoned the years according to the era of the emperor's name and years of reign (Bouchon 2010).

The common cults were another important engine that steered the integration of the region (Graninger 2011).⁶⁰ The venerable sanctuary of the Itonion, attended from the beginnings of the first millennium BCE (Kilian-Dirlmeier 2002: 1–6), functioned at least until the end of the third century CE. The new confederacy also set up a cult of Zeus Eleutherios, as a symbol of liberation from Makedonia's domination. It took place in Larisa (IG IX.2, 507) under the administration of a *hiereus*, who is mentioned among the officials of the *koinon* in federal decrees. The cult was designed to gain some 'international' visibility and as such, probably as soon as 194, to accommodate the "Games of the Thessalians in honor of Zeus Eleutherios,"⁶¹ open to all the Greeks, in Larisa. To the three kinds of competitions – gymnastic, hippic, and musical – a typical element of Thessalian identity was added: the *taurothēria* or bull-hunting, the very activity that was represented on many coins of Classical times. The games were originally of *stephanitēs* rank, but by the second century CE they became a *chrematitēs agon*, where money was given as a victory reward. Such a regulation supposedly made the *Eleutheria* more attractive to athletes which, as we might suggest, neglected them for as long as they offered only a wreath.⁶²

It took more than a century, possibly two, to turn Thessaly into an integrated entity. One has to underline the centralizing way it happened, around the city of Larisa, as the road network in the Imperial time shows (Decourt and Mottas 1997). Once a fragmented *ethnos*, Thessaly became a strongly unified state. In the Second Sophistic, the unity of Roman Thessaly was praised: from Thermopylai to Mt. Olympos, from Oita to the Pindos, Thessalians could claim to be part of a same entity that was one and unique since heroic times, under a common patronage of Achilles, who turned from a Phthian heroic figure into a hero of Panthessalian

⁶⁰ For a more detailed development on the common cults of Thessaly, see Bouchon and Helly 2013.

⁶¹ IG IX.2, 525 and 528. In the Imperial era, the *Eleutheria* were designated as the "Games of the Thessalian *koinon* in Larisa."

⁶² Strasser 2003: 270–3 and 292–297.

qualities.⁶³ Theagenes the Ainian could not but be a part of Achilles' lineage (Heliod. *Aith.* 2.34; see Bouchon 2008b). The cult to Achilles' tomb was of Panthessalian concern, diverting to it water from the Spercheios and earth from the Pelion (Philostr. *Her.* 52.3–14). Yet Achilles' ghost would moan about the way the Thessalians neglected to commemorate this place of memory (Philostr. *VA* 4.13).

⁶³ Under Hadrian's reign, the *koinon* struck bronze coins bearing Achilles' head, see Burrell 1993: 194–197.

*The Arkadian Confederacy**Thomas Heine Nielsen***The interaction of Arkadian *poleis* prior to the foundation of the league***An Arkadian Confederacy in the fifth century BCE?*

The numerous *poleis* of Arkadia¹ were united in a confederacy only in 370 BCE,² and that confederacy was an ephemeral organization preserving effective unity only until 363.³ Admittedly, scholars have occasionally assumed an Arkadian Confederacy in the fifth century BCE. The basis for this assumption was provided by an extensive fifth-century silver coinage inscribed ΑΡΚΑΔΙΚΟΝ (“of the Arkadians”), which was interpreted as the coinage of an Arkadian confederacy.⁴ However, this interpretation has never been universally accepted (Nielsen 2002: 123–4, notes 72–3), and recent research has firmly rejected it, primarily because the existence of a confederacy cannot be established independently of the coinage itself, but also because the exiguous evidence attests, in fact, to serious political instability in fifth-century Arkadia.⁵ A confederate union, then, was an exception in the political history of Arkadia, existing only in the years from 370 to 363 BCE.

An Arkadian Amphiktyony in the fifth century BCE?

Prior to the foundation of that ephemeral confederacy, however, there were several other political, military, or perhaps religious, structures in Arkadia that united a number of *poleis* in various ways, and these may profitably be surveyed before considering the confederacy itself. A suitable point of

¹ On the thirty-nine individual *poleis* of Arkadia, see Nielsen 2004a.

² Roy 1974 and 2000a: 308–10; Nielsen 2002: 474. ³ Roy 2000a: 308; Nielsen 2002: 490–492.

⁴ For this coinage: Williams 1965, the chief proponent of the thesis that it was struck by a confederacy, but cf. Wallace 1954: 33–35 and others cited at Nielsen 2002: 123, notes 65–71. On the legend, Nielsen 2002: 149 with n. 183.

⁵ Nielsen 2002: 121–141; Beck 1997: 72–3; Psoma 1999: 81.

departure is provided by the ΑΡΚΑΔΙΚΟΝ coinage mentioned above. This coinage was the most abundant Peloponnesian coinage of the mid-fifth century (Kraay 1976: 98), and was presumably struck by an important organization. This organization, however, remains unidentified. It is, nonetheless, an important observation that it claimed to act in the name of “the Arkadians,” as the legend demonstrates; accordingly, it considered itself to represent the Arkadians (Nielsen 2002: 54; cf. Roy 2011: 72), a fact of far greater importance than the question of which form the organization took (Nielsen 2002: 153). Essentially, this means that the Arkadians, though settled in numerous *poleis*, nevertheless claimed to be a distinct and recognizable group, and the available evidence confirms that an Arkadian identity was well-developed at the very latest by the fifth century BCE.⁶ Individuals occasionally ascribed themselves to this group, or were ascribed to it, by adding the ethnic Arkas to their names: a fifth-century monument from Olympia styles an Olympic victor “an Arkadian from Oresthasion”, and Thucydides names the victor in the pankration of the 420 Olympics “Androsthenes from Arkadia” (*IvO* 147 and 148; Thuc. 5.49.1); the three great historians habitually refer to the group by their shared common name of *Arkades*.⁷ It may have possibly been a religious association of (some of) these Arkadians which minted the ΑΡΚΑΔΙΚΟΝ coinage. The goddess depicted on the reverse remains unidentified,⁸ but the god adorning the obverse is universally recognized as Zeus Lykaeos,⁹ whose cult on Mt. Lykaion in Parrhasia in southwestern Arkadia is one of the more conspicuous cults of fifth-century Arkadia; in that it seems to have been widely known outside the region itself, primarily on account of its athletic contests which attracted competitors even from afar, e.g., from Rhodes and Opus in Eastern Lokris, as appears from the epinician odes of Pindar.¹⁰ It is, however, impossible to conclusively establish that it was a cult of such central importance for Arkadian identity in the fifth century, that a formal organization – an Arkadian Amphiktyony – was created to administer it; though admittedly, key episodes of the Arkadian origin myth were linked to the sanctuary.¹¹ And one other piece of evidence is, at the very least, suggestive: at *Anabasis* 1.2.10, Xenophon reports that “Xenias the Arkadian” celebrated the festival in honor

⁶ Nielsen 2002: 45–88; Pretzler 2009: 92–100.

⁷ E.g., Hdt. 1.66.1; 9.35.2; Thuc. 1.9.4; 8.3.2; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26; 7.4.28.

⁸ Williams 1965: 33; Psoma 1999: 88–89; Nielsen 2002: 148.

⁹ E.g., by Babelon 1907: 853–854; Head 1911: 448; Williams 1965: 33; Kraay 1976: 97; Jost 1985: 183; Psoma 1999: 88; cf. Zolotnikova 2005: 108.

¹⁰ Rhodes: *Ol.* 7.83; Opus: *Ol.* 9.95–96.

¹¹ E.g., Hesiod fr. 163. On the Arkadian myth of origin: Nielsen 2002: 66–72.

of Zeus Lykaïos during a three-day break in the march at Peltai. This incident is commonly interpreted as a concession on the part of Cyrus to the sense of ethnic togetherness of the Arkadians in the army,¹² and indeed Arkadians constituted the single largest contingent of the mercenaries, perhaps some 4,000 men (Roy 1967: 308–309). This may very well be a correct interpretation of the curious incident, and if it is, it would be a strong indication that the cult of Zeus Lykaïos was already an important constituent of Arkadian identity in the fifth century. However, Cyrus' gesture may possibly have been directed towards Xenias himself. Mt. Lykaion was situated in Parrhasia (Pind. *Ol.* 9.95), and Xenias, one of Cyrus' most important officers, was a Parrhasian.¹³ If so, the incident does not necessarily testify to any vital role played by the cult on Mt. Lykaion in Arkadian ethnic consciousness. It remains, then, that the obverse type of the ΑΡΚΑΔΙΚΟΝ coinage is the only significant piece of evidence suggesting the existence of a Panarkadian organization centered on the cult of Zeus Lykaïos. If the hypothesis of such an organization is accepted, we shall have to think in vague terms of an amphiktyony or some other kind of religious association (Nielsen 2002: 149).

Local military leagues of the fifth century

Less obscure are two fifth-century alliances uniting groups of Arkadian *poleis* for military purposes.¹⁴ The two major *poleis* of Arkadia, Tegea and Mantinea, both presided over local hegemonic alliances, just as both at various points concluded treaties with major states outside the region: Tegea with Argos (Hdt. 9.35.2; Strabo 8.6.19), and Mantinea with Athens, Argos, and Elis (Thuc. 5.47). Both treaties were in direct opposition to Sparta (Nielsen 2002: 396–7) and its Peloponnesian League, of which most Arkadian *poleis* seem to have been members by the early fifth century (Nielsen 2002: 127–9, 142, 380). Tegea, in fact, succeeded in uniting most of Arkadia in an alliance. This appears from Herodotus (9.35.2), who mentions two battles in which the Spartans defeated Arkadians somewhere between 479 and 465 BCE (Powell 1988: 106–7): “one at Tegea against the Tegeans and Argives; after that, at Dīpaia against all the Arkadians except for the Mantineians” (trans. Purvis 2008). The

¹² Roy 1972a: 134–135; Nielsen 2002: 149–150; Pretzler 2009: 91–92.

¹³ Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.2. There were at least two other Parrhasians in the army: 4.1.27; 6.5.2.

¹⁴ For the possibility that Kleitor in northern Arkadia was the leader of a local hegemonic *symmachia* already in the sixth century BCE, see Nielsen 2002: 365–366.

detail that the Mantineians were absent from Dipaia is confirmed by *Hell.* 5.2.3, and the historicity of Herodotus' information seems assured.¹⁵ It is a fair assumption that for the battle of Dipaia, the Arkadians were united in an alliance headed by Tegea. If the cult of Zeus Lykaïos was of Panarkadian significance in the fifth century, the ΑΡΚΑΔΙΚΟΝ coinage may perhaps have been minted by Tegea to emphasize the city's claim to regional leadership; at least, no other contemporary Tegean coinage is known (Nielsen 2002: 144). It is unknown whether the Tegean alliance survived the defeat at Dipaia, but later in the fifth century, Tegea is again seen acting as the head of an alliance, although a less extensive one. In 423 an alliance led by Tegea fought an undecided battle in the territory of the Mainalian city Oresthasion against an alliance led by Mantinea.¹⁶ The allies of both major cities were in all probability minor Arkadian communities. This is certain in the case of Mantinea. This city had, during the earlier part of the Peloponnesian War, subdued a part of Arkadia, including at least Parrhasia, and turned the communities there into dependent allies.¹⁷ Mantinea may have had ambitions of Panarkadian leadership at this time and signaled them by transferring the bones of the eponymous hero Arkas from Mt. Mainalon to its agora.¹⁸ In 421, the Spartans detached the Parrhasians from the Mantineian alliance (Thuc. 5.33.1–3), but the Mantineians still had Arkadian allies at the battle of Mantinea in 418 (Thuc. 5.67.2), and these must have been Mainalians and perhaps others (Nielsen 2002: 289–290). Some time after their defeat in 418, the Mantineians had to dissolve their alliance, presumably due to Spartan pressure (Thuc. 5.81.1). On the fate of the Tegean alliance, nothing is known. The crucial role played by Sparta in the events, here briefly summarized, is noteworthy. At Dipaia, Tegea led Arkadians against Sparta, whereas Mantinea was friendly towards Sparta (Nielsen 2002: 143–144); in 418, Mantinea and its local and foreign allies fought Sparta, which was supported by Tegea (Thuc. 5.67.1). Thus, Mantinea and Tegea were archenemies (Thuc. 5.65.4) and seem to have conducted their policies towards Sparta with their eyes firmly fixed on each other;¹⁹ this standing

¹⁵ Nielsen 2002: 143–144. The Mantineians, in fact, took a pro-Spartan stance during the helot revolt of the 460s BCE, see Larsen 1968: 182.

¹⁶ Thuc. 4.134.1 with Nielsen 2002: 366–367.

¹⁷ Thuc. 4.134.1; 5.28.3–29.2; 5.47; 5.67.2; 5.81.1, with Nielsen 2002: 367–372.

¹⁸ Paus. 8.9.3 and 8.36.8 with Jost 1985: 128 and Nielsen 2002: 403–404. Pretzler 2009: 97 furthermore draws attention to the types of fifth-century Mantineian coins depicting bears and acorns, imagery reflecting central constituents of the Arkadian charter myth as known from later evidence. For the coins: Babelon 1907: 861–867; Head 1911: 449.

¹⁹ Andrewes 1952: 3; cf. Larsen 1968: 181.

conflict between two of the most important *poleis* of the region must have been a serious hindrance to Arkadian confederate unity if such was desired in the fifth century.

The synteleia of Orchomenos

Another major *polis* that subjected a number of minor *poleis* to its control, was Orchomenos (Nielsen 2002: 352–7). The relation of these minor *poleis* to Orchomenos is described in a late source by the expression “to belong with” (*syntelein es*: Paus. 8.27.4), a phrase commonly used to describe various forms of subordination of minor entities to larger ones.²⁰ It is, however, too vague to allow any conclusions about what exactly this subordination entailed. It is unknown how Orchomenos achieved this subjugation of the minor communities, but it must have been effected prior to c. 368, when the Arkadian Confederacy detached three of the subjected communities from Orchomenos and incorporated them into Megalopolis: Methydrion, Teuthis, and Thisoa. Only these three can be identified with certainty as belonging with Orchomenos, though there were others in their same position (Paus. 8.27.4). It may perhaps have been this expansion by Orchomenos that led to war with Kleitor in northern Arkadia in 378 (*Hell.* 5.4.36–37). Kleitor was another major *polis* which had brought a number of minor communities under its control (Nielsen 2002: 365–6), and so it may have been conflicting geopolitical interests that fueled the tensions between these cities (Roy 1972b).

The sympoliteiai of Mantinea

The way in which Orchomenos may have reduced a number of minor communities to a state of subjection, i.e., by concluding bilateral treaties, is illustrated by a fourth-century inscription²¹ recording an agreement of *sympoliteia* between Mantinea and the Mainalian community of Helisson.²² It has been variously dated, but the present consensus is that it belongs in the early fourth century BCE, and thus antedates the Spartan *dioikismos* of Mantinea in 385 (R&O no. 15; Funke 2004: 431–432). In compliance with the treaty, the citizens of Helisson were to become full

²⁰ Tuplin 1986: 339–340; Hansen 1995a: 23; Nielsen 2002: 354.

²¹ SEG 37.340; IPArk 15; R&O no. 14.

²² The inscription refers to the agreement which it records simply as a [*sy*]nthesis, “agreement,” but the content of the agreement makes it clear that it is the kind of agreement later known as *sympoliteia* (R&O nos. 14 and 64; Funke 2004: 430–431).

citizens of Mantinea,²³ whose citizen body was accordingly enlarged; it is furthermore stipulated that the city and territory of the Heliswasians were to be covered by Mantineian law.²⁴ The physical center of Helisson, now a constituent part of Mantinea, was to remain in existence,²⁵ and its traditional religious life was to persist unchanged, including the reception of sacred embassies from abroad.²⁶ The continued existence of Helisson is acknowledged by the stipulation that there was to be a *thearos* from Helisson “as from the other *poleis*”²⁷. This last phrase demonstrates that Helisson was not the only community having such an arrangement, or a similar arrangement, with Mantinea.²⁸ These subordinate communities of Mantinea had the right to provide a *thearos* for the Mantineian board of *thearoi* known from Thuc. 5.57.9; here the board is seen alongside the *polemarchoi*, administering the oath of the famous quadruple alliance concluded in 420 (SVA II 193). They therefore clearly had religious duties, but comparative evidence from the neighboring *poleis* of Tegea and Orchomenos suggests that they may also have had other important competences (Nielsen 2002: 360, note 251). The right to provide a local man for the board was thus presumably of some significance for the *poleis*, which had this arrangement with Mantinea.

In short, the inscription testifies to the creation by negotiation of a sophisticated ‘extended inside’ for Mantinea and Helisson, as well as for the other *poleis* in a position similar to, or resembling that of, Helisson. It has been persuasively argued that the Mantineians turned to *sympoliteia* agreements as a new means of power-building after the Spartans had dissolved their hegemonic league, following their victory at Mantinea in 418 (Funke 2004: 533). It was this extension of the Mantineian citizen body which provoked the Spartans into their severely harsh treatment of the Mantineians, which they meted out when they infamously subjected Mantinea to *διοικισμος* in 385 (Funke 2004: 434): the circuit wall of the city was torn down, the inhabitants were forced to relocate to villages in the

²³ Lines 3–5: “The Heliswasians shall be Mantineians, equal and alike, sharing in all the things in which the Mantineians share too” (trans. R&O).

²⁴ Lines 5–6: “conveying their land and their *polis* to Mantinea to the laws of the Mantineians” (trans. R&O).

²⁵ Lines 6–8: “the *polis* of the Heliswasians remaining as it is for all time, the Heliswasians being a *komē* of the Mantineians” (trans. R&O).

²⁶ Lines 9–10: “The sacrifices shall be sacrificed at Helisson and religious delegations (*theariai*) shall be received in accordance with tradition” (trans. R&O).

²⁷ Lines 8–9: “There is to be a *thearos* from Helisson in the way there is from the other *poleis*” (trans. T. H. Nielsen).

²⁸ R&O no. 66; Nielsen 2002: 360–361; Funke 2004: 433.

territory, and a new aristocratic regime was imposed on the formerly democratic city (see Nielsen 2002: 390–1). That, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.2.7), made a much more compliant ally of the Mantineians, and, it would have spelled the end of Mantinea's new and inventive project of power-building.

The subethnic federations of the Parrhasians and the Mainalians

From a confederate perspective, the most interesting type of political association in pre-370 Arkadia is the small states traditionally described as tribal states (Nielsen 2002: 272), though they are better described as subethnic federations (Nielsen 2002: 278). These states comprised a number of communities, presumably mostly minor, which shared a common identity as, e.g., Parrhasians or Mainalians.²⁹ There were four such states,³⁰ all in southern and southwestern Arkadia: the Eutresians, the Kynourians, the Parrhasians, and the Mainalians, the latter two being the best known. They were referred to by the plural of their shared common name as, e.g., *Parrhasioi* or *Mainalioi*;³¹ and individuals were ascribed to the groups by adding the singular of this ethnic to their names, e.g., *Damoxenidas Mainalios* or *Arexion Parrhasios*.³² To emphasize that these groups formed parts of the *ethnos* of the Arkadians, these subregional ethnics could be combined with the regional ethnic *Arkas*, both in the collective use and in the personal use, e.g., *Parrhasioi Arkades* (Diod. 15.72.4) or *Kallimachos Parrhasios Arkas*.³³ The communities of which these subethnic federations consisted were settled in several nucleated settlements,³⁴ some of which, e.g., Mainalian Asea or Kynourian Alipheira, were not insubstantial.³⁵ Recent archaeological fieldwork in Parrhasia has revealed a walled and orthogonally planned fifth-century city of considerable size, perhaps the city of Trapezous.³⁶ These communities developed individual local identities (Nielsen 2002: 282–288) and, more importantly, functioned as *poleis*. City-ethnics are attested for eleven of them and toponyms for nine in

²⁹ On the shared identities of these tribes, see Nielsen 2002: 272–278.

³⁰ A fifth such state, the Azanians, may have existed in northern Arkadia; however, by the fifth century it had disintegrated, if it ever existed: Nielsen and Roy 1998.

³¹ *Parrhasioi*: Thuc. 5.33.1; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28; *Mainalioi*: Thuc. 5.67.1: *IG* v.2 1, line 16.

³² *IvO* 158; Xen. *Anab.* 6.5.1. ³³ Xen. *Anab.* 4.1.27; Nielsen and Roy 1998: 34.

³⁴ For a list of these settlements, Nielsen 2002: 537–539; see also 285–287.

³⁵ Nielsen 2004a: no. 266 (Alipheira); no. 267 (Asea). On Asea: Forsén and Forsén 1997 and 2003; Forsén et al. 2005. Forsén 2000: 39 assesses the urban centers of Mainalian Oresthasion at 12–14 hectares and that of Mainalian Haimoniai at 25–30 hectares.

³⁶ Karapanagiotou 2005 (the area enclosed by the fortification wall may have been as large as 40 hectares, see 337); cf. Roy 2011: 68.

Archaic and Classical sources (Nielsen 2002: 541–3); thus, the name of Mainalian Pallantion appears in a late fifth-century or early fourth-century catalog of *theōrodokoi* from Delphi (*Revue des études grecques* 62 [1949] 6–8). The city stamped its silver coinage with the abbreviated city-ethnic ΠΑΛΛΑΝ[ΤΕΩΝ] (“of the Pallantians”); one of its citizens is listed as *Asalatos Pallanteus* in the Delphic accounts of 358 (*CID* II 5.I.21); and the *Pallanteis* fought at the battle of Mantinea in 362 (*Hell.* 7.5.5); finally, Pallantion had its own territory within Mainalia (Nielsen 2002: 349–350). Pallantion, then, clearly functioned as a *polis*, and so did the other communities of the subethnic federations (Nielsen 2002: 288–300). But, and this is the important point, the Mainalians and the Parrhasians as such also functioned as states in possession of defined territories, striking coins, raising troops, and concluding treaties (Nielsen 2002: 276–278). The Mainalians, Parrhasians and Kynourians entered the Arkadian Confederacy as groups,³⁷ not as individual *poleis*. In short, these subgroups of the Arkadian *ethnos* constituted confederacies *en miniature*.

Arkadian synoikisms prior to the synoikism of Megalopolis

The last phenomenon which may be briefly noted is synoikism. Three Arkadian synoikisms are on record prior to the great synoikism of Megalopolis carried out by the fourth-century confederacy. According to Strabo (8.3.2), the cities of Tegea, Mantinea, and Heraia were created by synoikism at unspecified points in time (see Nielsen 2002: 172–175 on this passage). These synoikisms cannot be firmly dated and no real details are known about them; it is not even clear whether the urban centers of these *poleis* were created or simply enlarged by synoikism.³⁸ Strabo does, however, add the detail that the Mantineian synoikism was carried out “by the Argives,” and this detail, if accurate, may suggest that the synoikism was a political as well as an urban project. Mantinea and Tegea were among the leading *poleis* of Arkadia and both are known to have created local power bases by means of alliances and, in the case of Mantinea, *sympoliteia* (see above). It may then be suggested that their synoikisms were power-building measures as well, designed perhaps to centralize control of resources such as manpower (Demand 1990: 59–72), but we cannot go any further than that.

³⁷ Paus. 8.27.2; *IG* v.2 1, lines 16 and 40; *IG* v.2 2, line 6.

³⁸ Recent archaeological investigations at Tegea suggest a foundation in the second half of the sixth century: Ødegård 2008; Pretzler 2008.

In conclusion, when the Arkadians in 370 set out to create a confederacy, they could draw not only on the confederate experiences of other Greeks, but also on the region's own considerable experience in forming military leagues, conducting synoikisms, and subordinating minor communities to larger ones in *sympoliteia*, *synteleia*, and even small confederacies.

The Arkadian Confederacy of 370–363 BCE

The foundation of the confederacy

One necessary precondition for the foundation of the Arkadian Confederacy³⁹ was the defeat of Sparta at Leuktra in 371, though the foundation did not occur immediately after the battle: there were both Mantineians and Tegeans in the force sent into the field by the Spartans when news of the defeat arrived; these two cities, Xenophon explains, were still controlled by regimes friendly to Sparta.⁴⁰ Another precondition, then, was a change of regimes in these two cities, and the termination of their age-old conflict of interests. At Mantinea the change of regime was achieved through a peaceful revolution made possible by the guarantee of *autonomia* included in the Common Peace that was concluded in Athens in 371 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.2–3). Under the cover of that guarantee, the Mantineians in 370 “all came together and decreed to make Mantinea a single *polis* and fortify the city” (*Hell.* 6.5.4). This complete reversal of the arrangement imposed by Sparta at the *dioikismos* of 385 (see above), was implemented despite an official Spartan protest (*Hell.* 6.5.4–5), and must have entailed the re-adoption of democracy (Nielsen 2002: 475–6). Importantly, “some of the Arkadian *poleis*” (*Hell.* 6.5.5) sent workers to help the Mantineians construct the new fortification wall; the refoundation of Mantinea thus marks the beginning of collaboration between the Arkadian *poleis* in direct opposition to Sparta. According to Diodoros (15.59.1) it was Lykomedes of Mantinea⁴¹ who was the architect behind the creation of the confederacy, and though this is presumably “an

³⁹ Central bibliography on the Arkadian Confederacy includes: Beck 1997: 67–83; 1997/1998; Braunert & Petersen 1972; Bury 1898; Demand 1990: 107–119; Dušanić 1970, 1978, 1979; Hansen 1999; Hornblower 1990; Larsen 1968: 180–195; Moggi 1974; Nielsen 2002: 474–499; 2008; 2013; Pretzler 2009; Roy 1968a: 196–225, 238–279; 1968b, 1971, 1974, 2000a, 2005, 2007; Thompson 1983; Trampedach 1994: 21–37; and Tsiolis 1995.

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.18; see Nielsen 2002: 475. Diod. 15.62.1 describes Orchomenos as friendly to Sparta as well.

⁴¹ Here Diodoros incorrectly describes Lykomedes as a Tegean; he was a Mantineian: *Hell.* 7.1.23; Paus. 8.27.2; Diod. 15.62.2.

oversimplification” (Stylianou 1998: 416), what is known of this Lykomedes⁴² makes it probable that he was the leader of the confederate movement, and that this movement originated at Mantinea (Larsen 1968: 183; Dušanić 1970: 284–285).

At Tegea, on the other hand, the situation was more complicated, and erupted into *stasis* in 370. Two factions faced each other: one, loyal to the Spartans, advocated that the traditional Tegean constitution be maintained, the other “that all the *Arkadikon* should unite and that what prevailed in the *koinon* should be binding on the *poleis* as well” (*Hell.* 6.5.6). This formulation of the confederate principle, attributed by Xenophon to the Tegean federalists, has been described as a ‘milestone’ in early confederate history since it envisaged that the *koinon* was to be “superior to the political competence of the member-cities” (Beck 2001b: 370). What is not clear, however, is whether the Tegean confederalists wanted Tegea to join an existing or nascent organization, or to “support the movement in this direction proposed by Mantinea” (Larsen 1968: 183). When the federalists were unable to carry the day with the city magistrates⁴³ and thus turned to the *dēmos*, fighting ensued. The *stasis* was decided in favor of the confederalists by the requested arrival of troops from Mantinea: some traditionalists were executed in collaboration with the Mantineians, and around eight hundred others fled to Sparta, who decided to intervene in favor of these Tegean exiles. The following Spartan invasion of Arkadia was, however, completely unproductive. Resistance to it was organized by the confederacy, which was now definitely in existence: while the greater part of the confederate forces watched the Spartan movements from a base at Mainalian Asea, the Mantineians operated separately under the command of Lykomedes against the Orchomenians “who were not willing to take part in the *Arkadikon* due to their hatred of the Mantineians” (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.11): thus, an Arkadian Confederacy existed,⁴⁴ but Orchomenos was not a member of it. Another community which was

⁴² He served as the first federal *stratēgos* (Diod. 15.62.2) and was re-elected for a second annual term (15.67.2; see Larsen 1968: 188, n. 1); he was one of the oikists who founded Megalopolis (Paus. 8.27.2; see Nielsen 2002: 421); and he served the confederacy as ambassador on at least two occasions (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39; 7.4.2). He was assassinated in 366 (*Hell.* 7.4.3), presumably by Arkadian anti-federalists: Beck 1997/1998.

⁴³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.7, on which see Nielsen 2002: 360, n. 251.

⁴⁴ If the report of Diodoros can be trusted (as by Larsen 1968: 188), one of the most remarkable confederate institutions, the standing corps of the *eparitōi*, was already in existence. According to 15.62.2, Lykomedes had this corps at his disposal during the operations against Orchomenos (Diodoros terms them *epilektoi* but the reference is clearly to the *eparitōi*: Larsen 1968: 188, n. 2; Stylianou 1998: 424; Roy 2000a: 318).

not a member was Heraia, which joined Agesilaos for the invasion of Arkadia (*Hell.* 6.5.11). When the Spartans withdrew from Arkadia, the confederate forces attacked the Heraians “because they did not want to share in the *Arkadikon*” (*Hell.* 6.5.22). Since both Orchomenos and Heraia are attested as members of the *Arkadikon* after these confederate attacks, we may assume that they were forced into the confederacy.⁴⁵

It is consequently clear that after the revolution in Tegea, an Arkadian Confederacy was either greatly strengthened by the incorporation of that city, or was created by it and Mantinea, whose political interests had finally converged in opposition to Sparta. The new organization was commonly referred to as the *Arkadikon*, although its official name was simply “the Arkadians” (*hoi Arkades*)⁴⁶: hence, it was conceived of as a confederacy proper in which decisions made in the *koinon* were to be binding on the member-*poleis*.⁴⁷ Some communities must have joined this *Arkadikon* willingly either before or soon after the Tegean revolution, but force had to be employed against others such as Heraia and Orchomenos. The foundation of the confederacy, then, was accompanied by considerable warfare.

Membership of the Confederacy

According to Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.6), the ambition of the Tegean federalists was that “all of the Arkadians” should unite, and a number of sources suggests that though force had to be employed against some communities (above) this ambition was realized. Diodoros (15.59.1) states that Lykomedes persuaded the Arkadians “to be organized in a single *synteleia* with a shared assembly.” The only decree of the league which survives intact (*IG* v.2 1, lines 6–7) appoints an Athenian *proxenos* of “all Arkadians.” And in 363, when the confederacy concluded a peace with Elis, representatives from “all the *poleis* of the Arkadians” were present at the oath-swearing ceremony at Tegea (*Hell.* 7.4.39). Moreover, membership is securely attested for fourteen communities (Nielsen 2002: 477–8), and is probable in the case of three or four others.⁴⁸ Among the securely attested members are not only all the major *poleis* of the region, but also minor *poleis* such as Mainalian Eutaia (*Hell.* 6.5.12) and Thelphousa in western Arkadia (*IG* v.2 1, line 64). It seems a reasonable assumption, then, that

⁴⁵ See *IG* v.2 1, lines 46 and 58, with Nielsen 2002: 476–477.

⁴⁶ *IG* v.2 1, lines 2–3 (Dušanić 1970: 337).

⁴⁷ On this term as applied to the confederacy, though never by official documents: Larsen 1968: 193–194.

⁴⁸ Asea: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.11; Pallantion: Diod. 15.59.3; the Triphylians: *Hell.* 7.1.26. Eua in the Thyreatis may just possibly also be attested as a member: Roy 1968a: 34–36; Nielsen 2002: 104, 106–107, III.

even in its earliest phase, the confederacy comprised all communities of Arkadia proper.⁴⁹ But, interestingly, the confederacy also included among its members a few communities whose Arkadian identity was not obvious, e.g. Lasion, a *polis* on the border between Arkadia and Elis (see Nielsen 2002: 563–564; Roy 2004a: 499). In the fifth century BCE, Lasion had been a perioikic dependency of Elis,⁵⁰ but was detached from Elis by Sparta c. 400 and entered the Peloponnesian League.⁵¹ According to Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.30), the city was “being claimed by” unspecified Arkadians c. 400, though it is uncertain what this means.⁵² But it entered the confederacy, as is clear from *Hell.* 7.4.12. Another example is provided by the Triphylians who also had a previous history of subjection to Elis. They were clearly not originally ethnically Arkadians,⁵³ but they entered the confederacy⁵⁴ and had their eponymous mythology adjusted accordingly.⁵⁵ In general, however, the confederacy seems not to have been bent on annexing areas outside the core region of Arkadia.⁵⁶

Institutions of the Confederacy

It may first be noted that there is no evidence that the members of the confederacy adjusted their local constitutions to each other, i.e., no evidence that membership entailed the adoption of a requested variety of constitution (Roy 2000a: 311). The organizational set-up is known from one single inscription (*IG* v.2 1) and select passages in Xenophon’s and Diodoros’ writings; accordingly, it may be described in vague outline only.⁵⁷ The inscription dates to the 360s before the league split into two⁵⁸ and attests to the existence of a probouleutic council (*boulē tōn Arkadōn*, “council of the Arkadians”) and an assembly styled *hoi Myrioi* (“The Ten Thousand” or “The Myriad”). Nothing is known about the composition of the council or the recruitment of its members; the confederated cities may possibly have

⁴⁹ Roy 2000a: 310; Nielsen 2002: 478. Cf. Larsen 1968: 186 who thinks that the successful campaign against Sparta in winter 370/69 brought many cities into the confederacy.

⁵⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23 and 30 (cf. 7.4.12) with Roy 1997: 283–285.

⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23 and 30; 4.12.16. ⁵² Roy 2000b: 138, 143–144, 148; Nielsen 2002: 86, 98.

⁵³ Nielsen 2002: 233–247; 2005: 60–67; cf. Ruggeri 2009: 52–55.

⁵⁴ *IG* v.2 1, line 20; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.26; Nielsen 2002: 258–261; 2005: 78; cf. Ruggeri 2009: 61.

⁵⁵ Larsen 1968: 189–190; Nielsen 2002: 24, 99, 249–250; 2005: 77–81; cf. Ruggeri 2009: 59–61.

⁵⁶ Dušančić 1970: 299; Trampedach 1994: 36–57; Nielsen 2002: 117–119.

⁵⁷ Late sources report that Plato and the Academy were involved in setting up Arkadian constitutions in the 360s; what little can be said about these doubtful reports is discussed in detail by Trampedach 1994: 21–41.

⁵⁸ Larsen 1968: 187; Roy 2000a: 312; Nielsen 2002: 305, 477; cf. R&O no. 160.

been represented on it in proportion to their populations,⁵⁹ but this is uncertain. As for the assembly, its name may, if it was meant as a strict numeral, be interpreted to imply the existence of a property qualification for attendance, and that the confederacy was, accordingly, moderately oligarchic.⁶⁰ Or it may on the contrary, if it was meant as an ideal number representing “the border between the countable and the uncountable,” be interpreted as an ideological statement of the great power of confederated Arkadia, which would imply that it was a primary assembly open to all citizens of the member-states, which is the more reasonable interpretation.⁶¹ It is unknown how often the assembly convened and whether it met at a designated place. Megalopolis is usually considered its regular meeting place, but this is at least doubtful (see below). The assembly had considerable powers: it elected magistrates (below), and probably had the power to overrule decisions by these magistrates (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.33–4 with Larsen 1968: 191) and subject them to audits at the expiration of office (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.34). It took the initiative in foreign policy (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.2; Diod. 15.59.1), sent out ambassadors (*Hell.* 7.4.2–3, 35), and received their reports (*Hell.* 7.1.38; 4.40); it received foreign representatives (*Hell.* 7.4.39) and granted *proxenia* (IG v.2 1). It was presumably entitled to sit as a court,⁶² and is known to have discussed financial issues (*Hell.* 7.4.34.). The constant warfare by the confederacy must have increased the significance of the assembly even further: the league concluded at least eight treaties with foreign powers before it broke up (Nielsen 2002: 483–4), and formally the assembly must have been the primary mover of these treaties. It should be noted, however, that most of the evidence for the other competences of the assembly refers to the troubled days when the confederacy disintegrated, and so it may not speak to the league’s proper constitutional design.

The confederacy appointed various officials. To the actual text of its only surviving intact decree (IG v.2 1) is appended a seemingly complete list of fifty *damiorgoi*, who must be confederate officials. They are listed as representatives of their local communities, five being the standard number supplied, e.g., by Tegea, Mantinea and Kleitor; a unit of five seems to be divided between the minor communities of the Mainalians (three) and Triphylian Lepreon (two), listed next to each other; Megalopolis, however,

⁵⁹ So Larsen 1968: 187 on the assumption that the *damiorgoi* of IG v.2 1 constituted an executive committee of the council.

⁶⁰ On the possible meanings of the name: Larsen 1968: 194; for the view that it implies moderate oligarchy: Stylianou 1998: 416–417 and R&O no. 160.

⁶¹ Trampedach 1994: 32–33; Roy 2000a: 314 (source of quotation); Nielsen 2002: 479.

⁶² Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.33 (Larsen 1968: 191; Nielsen 2002: 479, n. 291).

had two units and supplied ten *damiorgoi*. The list is a puzzle in several respects: the function of these *damiorgoi* is unknown, not all attested confederate members appear on the board, and it is not clear why Megalopolis supplies two units. The *damiorgoi* may have constituted an executive board of the *boulē*,⁶³ but this is uncertain. The absence of attested members may suggest that the *damiorgoi* were recruited from the different communities on a rotational basis,⁶⁴ but this again is uncertain. The seemingly privileged position of Megalopolis on the board may perhaps best be explained as “an act of propaganda like the very name of Megalopolis itself” (Roy 2000a: 313). Such a propagandistic gesture may possibly have also served as a way of obliging those communities which were synoikized into Megalopolis against their will (below). But the most important observation to be made from the composition of the board is that major cities such as Mantinea and Tegea were not privileged: they provided the standard five, as did a minor *polis* such as Thelphousa.

Xenophon makes several references to confederate officials, styling them simply *archontes*, which reveals nothing about their functions and competences. But if the references are to the same officials throughout, these *archontes* seem to have had considerable powers, including perhaps the power to bring officials of the member-cities to court, and they clearly handled at least some of the finances of the confederacy (*Hell.* 7.4.33–4.). Nothing is known about the requirement(s) for appointment to these posts, but the *archontes* seem to have been elected by the assembly,⁶⁵ probably by a majority of hands (Larsen 1968, 1987).

Another magistracy filled by election in the assembly was in all probability that of *stratēgos* (“chief commander”). Diodoros (15.67.2) states that the *Arkades* appointed Lykomedes *stratēgos* “by a vote of hands”, which probably refers to election in the assembly. The few passages which refer to commanders of confederate forces refer to only one *stratēgos*,⁶⁶ and this is commonly interpreted to mean that there was only a single *stratēgos* in the confederacy,⁶⁷ though caution is advisable.⁶⁸ It is furthermore assumed that the constitutional competence of the *stratēgos* was so privileged that he should be considered “the president”,⁶⁹ though the evidence does not quite allow this conclusion. Admittedly, the influential Lykomedes of Mantinea (see above; *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.24) was elected twice, and Aineas, the only other

⁶³ Tod no. 132; Larsen 1968: 187; Trampedach 1994: 28.

⁶⁴ Roy 2000a: 313; Nielsen 2002: 477–478. ⁶⁵ *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.23–25 with Nielsen 2002: 480.

⁶⁶ *Xen. Hell.* 7.3.1; Diod. 15.62.2, 67.2.

⁶⁷ Larsen 1968: 188; Dušanić 1970: 338, 341; Roy 2000a: 311–312. ⁶⁸ So Trampedach 1994: 33–34.

⁶⁹ Larsen 1955: 74; cf. Dušanić 1970: 341; Roy 2000a: 312.

known *stratēgos*, was from Stymphalos, also one of the major *poleis* of Arkadia (Ps-Skylax 44). Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.3.1) attributes a politically motivated intervention at Sikyon to the personal judgement of Aineas, but this does not preclude that he acted on orders from the assembly. Evidently, the assembly elected the *stratēgoi* among influential men from big *poleis*, but this does not illuminate their constitutional position (Trampedach 1994: 33); the incessant warfare by the confederacy, however, must have increased the *de facto* importance of its commanders.

The confederate army consisted of contingents from the member-states⁷⁰ and of a standing elite corps called the *eparitōi* (“picked hoplites”).⁷¹ It was financed by funds contributed by the confederate members.⁷² Diodoros (15.62.2) gives their number as 5,000 which seems very large; Pritchett (1974: 223) believes that it was in fact a small unit comparable to the Theban Sacred Band, but recent opinion tends to accept Diodoros’ report:⁷³ a large elite corps will help explain why the confederacy broke up over the question of financing it, and as pointed out by Roy (2000a: 318) the number may have varied. The corps served as a regular fighting force (Diod. 15.62.2, 67.2) and also as a police force assisting the confederate magistracies (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.33).

One of the most significant projects carried out by the confederacy was the foundation of Megalopolis.⁷⁴ Ancient reports unanimously agree that the synoikism was carried out as a security measure intended to protect southern Arkadia against the Lakedaimonians,⁷⁵ and modern scholars accept this.⁷⁶ However, scholars also customarily treat Megalopolis as the capital of the confederacy.⁷⁷ It is doubtful if capital is a useful concept to apply to ancient confederacies or how such capitals may be identified (Roy 2007: 291), but clearly some cities held extremely privileged positions within their confederacies, e.g., Thebes in the Boiotian Confederacy. But the available evidence, fragmentary as it is, does not allow the conclusion that Megalopolis during the 360s held a position in the Arkadian Confederacy resembling that of Thebes in Boiotia (Trampedach 1994: 28): the fact that Megalopolis provided ten *damiorgoi* for the confederacy need not mean that it was the capital (Roy 2007: 291), and besides Pausanias (8.32.1), there is no evidence that the

⁷⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.11: a contingent from Mantinea; 6.5.12: one from Mainalian Eutaia.

⁷¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.22, 33, 34, 36; 7.5.3. On the name: Chantraine 2009: 339; on the corps: Pritchett 1974: 223; Trampedach 1994: 35; Roy 2000a: 316–321.

⁷² Larsen 1998: 188; Roy 2000a: 317.

⁷³ Buckler 1980: 292, n. 3; Trampedach 1994: 35; Beck 1997: 82.

⁷⁴ On the synoikism of Megalopolis: Nielsen 2002, 414–455; Roy 2005.

⁷⁵ Diod. 15.72.4; Paus. 8.27.1. ⁷⁶ Demand 1990: 111–118; Stylianou 1998: 472; Roy 2007: 292.

⁷⁷ Larsen 1968: 187; Demand 1990: 116; Beck 1997: 26, 202–203.

assembly regularly held its meetings in the Thersilion at Megalopolis during the 360s.⁷⁸ The fact that the *Myrioi* met at Megalopolis in 348/7 BCE (Dem. 19.11; Aischin. 2.157) cannot be retrojected to mean that they met there regularly during the 360s, since Megalopolis probably posed as the leader of the confederacy after the split in 363 (Nielsen 2002: 495, cf. 574; 2008: 206). This is essentially a negative argument and does not disprove that Megalopolis was the capital of the Confederacy, but new evidence is in fact needed to prove that it was.

The question of the existence or not of a confederate sanctuary is very similar to this. The obvious candidate is the sanctuary of Zeus Lykaïos, but again the evidence is too fragile to allow the conclusion that this sanctuary served as a confederate sanctuary during the 360s in the way that, for instance, the Homarion served the Achaian Confederacy or Thermos the Aitolian Confederacy (Nielsen 2013). Accordingly, unless new evidence appears it must remain uncertain whether Megalopolis was the capital of the confederacy and Zeus Lykaïos its patron divinity, though both are possibilities.

The political orientation of the confederacy

No city seems to have held a constitutionally privileged hegemonic position within the confederacy, and in structural terms it seems to have been a democratic and egalitarian organization (Nielsen 2002: 481–2). Though there was no Thebes in Arkadia, the major *poleis* did dominate the confederacy by providing, e.g., the *stratēgoi* and the majority of the *oikistai* who founded Megalopolis (Nielsen 2002: 482). This is best interpreted, however, as a reflection of their actual importance, as well as the preferences of the assembly, which elected both the *stratēgoi* (above) and the *oikistai*.⁷⁹ The policy of the confederacy during its heyday of 370–363 was consistently democratic and anti-Spartan, and this consistency was probably the product of unanimity of purpose among the major *poleis*, especially Mantinea and Tegea. Only a single episode of serious discord may have occurred prior to the crisis which split the confederacy in 363: four of the communities which the league had decided to incorporate into Megalopolis resisted the decision, and force was consequently exercised.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Roy 2000a: 315; 2007: 291.

⁷⁹ Paus. 8.27.2, which presumably refers to election by the assembly.

⁸⁰ Paus. 8.27.5–6. Pausanias here ascribes the use of force to the *Arkades*, which may mean that the incident he describes dates to the foundation of the city and is distinct from the rebellion of 361 described at Diod. 15.94.1–3, in which Theban forces wiped out opposition against the synoikism. But certainty is impossible, since Pausanias gives no chronological indications (Nielsen 2002: 425).

This may mean that in general, the lesser states of the confederacy supported the policy of the major states, which provided the confederate leadership.

The best contemporary source to illuminate the political aims of the confederacy is an assembly speech of 369/8 by Lykomedes of Mantinea reported at *Hell.* 7.1.23–24.⁸¹ Departing from some of the central components of Arkadian perceptions of self – such as martial prowess – Lykomedes points out that this intrepidity had traditionally been put at the service of the Spartans, and was now serving Theban interests. He urges this to stop, and that the Arkadians step up to become a major political player, i.e., that the confederacy avoid dependence upon any hegemonic power. It can be taken for granted that the hegemonic power that the confederacy was originally intending to curb was Sparta: confederate warfare against Sparta proves this conclusively (Nielsen 2002: 486, note 320), and it has thus been taken as self-evident by scholars (Larsen 1968: 180; Roy 1971: 569). Lykomedes urges Arkadian independence as such, and since Sparta was the chief obstacle to this independence, the confederacy became strongly anti-Spartan. Lykomedes' rhetoric of Arkadian unity and identity, as referenced by Xenophon, is paralleled by a confederate dedication at Delphi, celebrating the famous invasion(s) of Lakedaimon in which the confederacy took part (*CEG* 2 824). There is thus no reason to doubt the essential historicity of Lykomedes' speech. The confederacy pursued its anti-Spartan policy by concluding alliances with Boiotia, Elis, Argos, Pisa, Sikyon, and Messene (Nielsen 2002: 483); to lessen dependence on Thebes, an alliance was concluded with Athens (*Xen. Hell.* 7.4.2, 6). In collaboration with its allies, the confederacy was quite successful in its opposition to Sparta. Credit for breaking Sparta's dominance must be given in part to the Boiotians, and in part to the confederacy itself, who brought about the Boiotian alliance. Sparta's loss of power and regional hegemony was decisive: the Arkadian *poleis* never became Spartan puppets again.

Another defining characteristic of the confederacy was its commitment to democracy.⁸² Founded by Mantineian and Tegean democrats, its constitution may reasonably be described as democratic, and its democratic orientation was probably consolidated by the conflict with Sparta (Nielsen 2002: 489); and, though it was much less successful in

⁸¹ On this speech: Nielsen 2002: 485; Pretzler 2009: 88–91.

⁸² Roy 2000a; Nielsen 2002: 486–490; Robinson 2011: 41–44.

this than in its opposition to Sparta, the confederacy consistently supported democrats elsewhere in the Peloponnese.⁸³ Thus, the political aims of the confederacy were democracy and independence from hegemonic powers.

The breaking point

In 363 the Arkadian Confederacy split up into two factions which appear to have never re-united (Nielsen 2002: 493–7). Exactly why this happened is unclear, but it was occasioned by a conflict concerning the financing of the *eparitai*. In 365, the confederacy had waged war upon Elis for the possession of Lasion, a confederate member which had been conquered by the Eleians (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12). During the war, the Arkadians captured Olympia, set up Pisa as a puppet statelet and in 364 celebrated the Olympics (Crowther 2003; Nielsen 2007: 35–47). According to Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.33), the confederate magistrates began using Olympic funds to finance the *eparitai*, apparently in replacement of member contributions. The Mantineians objected to this use of Olympic funds and sent the city's share from its own treasury. The confederate magistrates then summoned the Mantineian leaders (*prostatai*) to meet before the assembly; when this summon went unheeded, the Mantineians were convicted *in absentia* and the *eparitai* sent to arrest the convicts; the Mantineians, however, refused them entry into the city. The situation took a new direction as the confederate assembly, too, decreed not to use Olympic funds for the *eparitai*. The confederacy must have severely lacked other funds, for when Olympic resources were no longer available, the composition of the *eparitai* was gradually changed as citizens of lesser means dropped out and were replaced by wealthier men who seem to have volunteered in order that “the men of means would no longer be beholden to the poorer element, but instead the poor would now be under control of the wealthy” (*Hell.* 7.4.34, trans. Marincola 2009). The re-composition of the *eparitai*, then, was tantamount to an oligarchic take-over of confederate control (which implies that the earlier composition of the corps had been a source of democratic control). This oligarchic reaction originated at Mantinea, but apparently had a wider appeal. The magistrates who had handled the Olympic funds now sent to Thebes to intervene, lest the confederacy lakonize (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.34), as it ultimately did when the new-composed *eparitai* concluded an alliance with Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.3). At the battle of Mantinea in 362, the old antagonism between Mantinea and Tegea

⁸³ Roy 2000a: 321–325; Nielsen 2002: 488–490.

is again visible: on one side stood the remnants of the confederacy, centered on Mantinea and allied to Athens and Sparta, and on the other, a faction centered on Tegea and Megalopolis and supported by the Boiotians – and the days of a united Arkadia were over (Nielsen 2002: 491–2).

To judge from Xenophon's account, the confederacy broke down due to a combination of economic problems and ideological conflict. Another reason, however, was perhaps the unwillingness to set aside local interests and to respect the principle on which the confederacy had been founded, i.e., "that what prevailed in the *koinon* should be binding on the *poleis* as well" (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.6), as exemplified by the Mantineian stance during the final crisis. Thus, when the Spartan menace had been fought off, and the interests of the major *poleis* – particularly those of Tegea and Mantinea – no longer coincided, the confederacy lost not only its unanimity, but also its *raison d'être*.

Conclusion

A confederate union was a brief exception in the political history of Arkadia. It was produced by the unique circumstances following the Spartan defeat at Leuktra, when the democrats of Mantinea refounded their city and supported a democratic faction at Tegea. The new organization was conceived of as a confederacy proper, in which confederate decisions were to be binding on the *poleis*. It did not, however, succeed in rooting this principle firmly. Its chief political aims were democracy and independence, particularly from Sparta. In the latter respect, it was reasonably successful, not in the least because of its alliance with Boiotia. It disintegrated, however, when the interests of its leading cities, which clearly dominated the confederacy, no longer coincided. Mantinea's return to an oligarchic regime marked an insurmountable challenge for a future cooperation with Tegea. This ideological conflict was probably aggravated by economic difficulties caused primarily by the large size of the standing army as well as by a pervasive unwillingness to respect the superiority of confederate decisions. After the battle of Mantinea, Arkadia reverted to the traditional condition of extreme political fragmentation.

*Elis (with Akroria and Pisatis)**James Roy*

Over several centuries Elis pursued a policy of expanding its control and influence over a large area of the western Peloponnese. One result of this was that the area concerned eventually acquired a common Eleian identity. For convenience in this chapter, the region as a whole will therefore be referred to as Eleia (though it was certainly not known as such in the Archaic period), while the name Elis will be used for both the city-state Elis and the town at its center. The region of Eleia was bound by Achaia to the north, Arkadia to the east, and by Messenia in the south, covering an area of approximately 2,660 square kilometers. Over the centuries, however, its borders varied somewhat, particularly those with Arkadia.¹ The Peneios and the Alpheios were the two major rivers of this region, flowing from east to west. The area south of the Alpheios down to the river Neda (the frontier with Messenia), became known from c. 400 BCE as Triphylia; the region's earlier name is not entirely clear.² While Eleia approached Mt. Erymanthos to the northeast, there were no high mountains within Eleia itself. In Akroria, the hill country in eastern Eleia north of the Alpheios, some routes were difficult,³ and in Triphylia Mt. Minthe and its westward extension Mt. Lapithas divided Triphylia into a northern and a southern section. Even Akroria and Mt. Lapithas are crossed by trails, however, and generally there is no major obstacle to movement in Eleia. Similarly, with the exception of the northeast near Mt. Erymanthos, there were virtually no obstacles to movement between Eleia and neighboring regions. This region's only good harbors were at Kyllene and Pheia, but small ships could be beached elsewhere. There was much good agricultural land, particularly in the western plain, north of the Alpheios river.

¹ Roy 2000b. There is a good map of the physical geography of Eleia in *Geographia Antiqua* 12 (2003), facing p. 57.

² Nielsen 1997 and 2004b: 540–541. ³ Siewert 1987/88: 10–11, n. 15; Ruggeri 2004: 144–149.

Clearly the region here called Eleia had no common identity in the Archaic period. This is very obviously true even in the Classical period in the region south of the River Alpheios and north of the River Neda (eventually known as Triphylia), as can be seen from Herodotus (4.148). Correspondingly, however, the *Akrorioi*, whose homeland was in eastern Eleia north of the Alpheios (Minon 2007: no. 45), maintained their own, separate, identity, as did other communities in the area. By the later fifth century BCE, when Elis had come to dominate the entire region for a time, it was possible to see it as connected to Elis and to refer to it as Eleia, as Thucydides did (5.34.1). This same passage from Thucydides, however, demonstrates a certain degree of disunity: it refers precisely to a time when Lepreon, with the support of the Spartans tried to detach itself from Eleian control. The perception of the region as Eleia should not be taken to mean that its inhabitants all shared a common Eleian identity at any time before the region was finally united within the territory of the *polis* Elis in the Hellenistic period. While some groups within the region might have politicized their local ethnic identity, as the Triphylians did *c.* 400,⁴ there was no common ethnic identity to unify Eleia. Instead, Eleia emerged through the expansion of the influence and power of the Eleians over the region.

The Eleians, the people of Elis, were in their own dialect the *Waleioi*, the people of the Walis, or valley, of the Peneios in which the town of Elis developed.⁵ Homer referred most commonly to the inhabitants of northern Eleia as Epeians, and only once (*Il.* 4.537) as Eleians, but by the early Archaic period an Eleian identity must have replaced the earlier Epeian. Another sign of growing Eleian importance is that by *c.* 550 Elis controlled Olympia, as can be seen from Eleian inscriptions displayed there (Minon 2007: nos. 9–12).⁶ How, and how rapidly, the Eleians achieved this growing importance within Eleia is obscure. Ancient accounts of early Eleian history are largely devoted to reports – varying in detail – of conflicts between Elis and Pisatis (the area around Olympia) for control of the great sanctuary. A notable series of recent articles, however, has developed strong arguments against the historicity of these ancient reports.⁷ If the reports of Archaic conflicts between Elis and Pisatis are rejected, as it seems they

⁴ See Chapter 13 by Thomas Heine Nielsen, above.

⁵ On the origins and ethnogenesis of the Eleians see Gehrke 2003.

⁶ The Eleians may of course have been dominant at Olympia long before they began to publish epigraphic texts there.

⁷ Nafissi 2001 and 2003; Gehrke 2003; Möller 2004; Giangiulio 2009.

should be, there is little other ancient literary evidence on which to base a reconstruction of early Eleian history.

Nonetheless, Elis' expansion remains clear, and it is possible to see its results in the later fifth century BCE, particularly in the accounts of the war between Elis and Sparta from 402–400, as well as its aftermath.⁸ By the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Elis controlled Lepreon, the southernmost *polis* of Triphylia (Thuc. 5.31.2–3), and it can therefore be assumed that Elis had direct or indirect control of all of Eleia. The region was divided between the territory that belonged directly to the *polis* Elis and was inhabited by Eleian citizens, and the territories of the other communities of Eleia, which had all become dependent allies of Elis.⁹ North of the Alpheios lay all purely Eleian territory, as well as the dependent territories of Akroria, east of Elis, and the three small communities Letrinoi, Marganeis, and Amphidolia, west of Olympia. On the other hand, all the communities south of the Alpheios were dependent allies. At the end of the Spartan–Eleian war, out of which the Spartans emerged victorious, the Spartans deprived the defeated Eleians of all their subordinate allies. Thereafter, Elis tried, with varying success, to regain control of the other communities of Eleia, until the region was finally and enduringly united in the Hellenistic period, when – probably in 146 BCE – all of Eleia was brought within the territory of the single *polis* of Elis.¹⁰

As Elis expanded, it developed a dual system, reducing many of its neighbors to the status of subordinate allies, while simultaneously absorbing other communities north of the Alpheios directly into the Eleian *polis*, whose territory was eventually well in excess of 1,000 square kilometers.¹¹ The sanctuary at Olympia was clearly in Eleian territory: at the end of the Spartan–Eleian war, Olympia was not covered by the Spartan insistence that all of Elis' subordinate allies be released, and its future status was the subject of a separate Spartan decision leaving it in Eleian hands (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30–31). While the existence of the dual system in the later fifth century BCE is clear, the scanty nature of the available evidence does not clearly demonstrate how the system first developed. One suggestion has been that a federal structure existed, at least for a time, in a fairly early phase of Eleian development: it has been supported again recently by both Möller and Nafissi.¹² The existence of an Eleian federal constitution has also, however,

⁸ On the war see Schepens 2004; Roy 2009b. The date is disputed.

⁹ Roy 1997. The dependent allies are sometimes referred to in modern works as *perioikoi* but there is no evidence that the Eleians used the term.

¹⁰ Roy 1999: 166–167. ¹¹ Roy 1997: 284 with n. 16.

¹² Möller 2004: 256–257, Nafissi 2003: 42–45, arguing for a “stato etnico-federale.”

been denied.¹³ It is notable that there is no mention at all of Eleian federalism in Jakob Larsen's seminal account from 1968; there is in fact no explicit evidence of federation in Elis at any period. A variety of indirect evidence must therefore be analyzed in considering the question of a possible Eleian federation.

In the early stages of Eleian expansion, the Eleians evidently incorporated some non-Eleian communities into their own territory, and presumably gave Eleian citizenship to their citizens. This process of incorporation is clear because by around 400 BCE, purely Eleian territory included land that lay well beyond the original Eleian homeland in the Peneios valley, notably in Pisatis and down the coast as far as the port of Pheia.¹⁴ Hans van Wees (2003: 64–66) suggested that after conquering Pisa, the Eleians “reduced Pisatis to a thinly settled agricultural area and, quite possibly, its population to serf-like dependents,” but the number of known settlements in Pisatis¹⁵ contradicts these suggestions, and there is no evidence at all of a “serf-like” labour force in Pisatis or elsewhere in Elis. Moreover, van Wees’ suggestion faces the difficulty that by around 400 the Pisatans were certainly full Eleian citizens. It is therefore simpler to suppose that the free inhabitants of Pisatis became Eleian citizens when Pisatis and Olympia came under Eleian control. Elis, however, eventually ceased to incorporate neighboring territories directly into the Eleian state, and by the later fifth century there was a clear distinction between purely Eleian territory and neighboring communities within Eleia that had become subordinate allies.

References to “the alliance” in Minon 2007: no. 5 (Siewert and Taeuber 2013: no. 2), dated to 525–500 BCE, and the alliance between Elis and Ewa (or Eua) in Minon 2007: no. 10, dated to 500–475 BCE, suggest that the creation of a network of subordinate allies was well under way by the later sixth century, and it is quite possible that Elis had by then already ceased granting citizenship to neighboring communities. It is notable that north of the Alpheios in the area west of Olympia, the three small communities of Letrinoi, Marganeis, and Amphidolia remained allies and were not incorporated into Elis. These communities were weak and insignificant: the combined contribution of all three communities to the army of the Peloponnesian League in 394 BCE, was only 400 slingers (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16). It is therefore difficult to understand why Elis did not simply absorb them as it had the surrounding territories north of the Alpheios – unless they had

¹³ E.g., Siewert 1994a: 30; Hansen 1995b: 60. ¹⁴ Roy 1997: 284.

¹⁵ Roy 2002b; Ruggeri 2004: 188–197.

become allies of Elis at a fairly early date when Elis was facing serious tensions in the area of Olympia and needed local friends.¹⁶

The granting of Eleian citizenship to non-Eleian communities would be attested still in the fourth century BCE if, as some scholars have argued, Elis gave citizenship to subordinate allies in 368. In a well-known passage (5.9.4–6), Pausanias sets out the successive changes in the number of Eleian officials (*hellanodikai*) appointed to administer the Olympic Games.¹⁷ In 368 the number of *hellanodikai* was increased from ten to twelve in order to allow one *hellanodikas* to be appointed from each of the twelve Eleian tribes (*phylai*). Some scholars suppose that at this time Elis created not only additional *hellanodikai*, but also additional tribes, and that the new tribes were made up of former allies who were given citizenship, but there is no evidence, in Pausanias or elsewhere, that the number of tribes was increased in 368. Hellanikos (*FGrH* 4 F 113) knew of a period when Elis had ten tribes, but there is no evidence that the increase from ten to twelve was made in 368. There is equally no evidence that Eleian citizenship was given to allies in 368. Moreover, postulating such a grant makes it very difficult to understand the next change in the number of *hellanodikai*. In 364 BCE (i.e., at the first possible opportunity after 368, since *hellanodikai* were appointed for the Olympic Games) the number of twelve *hellanodikai* was reduced to eight because, as Pausanias says, Elis had lost territory to Arkadia in a war (known to have begun in 365) and the number of Eleian tribes was thus reduced to eight. Elis fought hard, with some early success, to recover the lost territory, and indeed regained it all when, in 363/2, the Arkadians were no longer able to pursue the war because of internal dissension. Given the Eleians' obvious desire to recover what they had lost, some explanation is needed for the fact that the Eleians themselves immediately recognized their territorial losses by doing away with four tribes. In fact, with Arkadian support, a Pisatan state had been set up in the territory around Olympia recently taken from the Eleians, and the newly independent Pisatans controlled Olympia and ran the games of 364. If we suppose that Pisatis, when part of the Eleian state, made up four of the twelve Eleian tribes – a reasonable assumption given the known settlements in Pisatis – then in 364 (or late 365, if the *hellanodikai* were appointed some time in advance of the games) the Eleians could have

¹⁶ Dismissing as unhistorical the various ancient accounts of early wars between Elis and Pisatis for control of Olympia does of course not require us to dismiss entirely the possibility that there were tensions in the area, see Giangiulio 2009: 81–82.

¹⁷ Their original title, though not mentioned by Pausanias, was evidently *diaitatēr* rather than *hellanodikas*, see Minon 2007: no. 5 = Siewert and Taeuber 2013: no. 2.

removed the four Pisatan tribes to show that the breakaway Pisatans were no longer Eleian and had no legal claim to run Olympia.¹⁸

If a supposed grant of Eleian citizenship to allies in 368 is dismissed, there is no evidence of such grants between the Archaic period and the Hellenistic period, when, probably in 146, all the communities of Eleia became Eleian and were united under the single *polis* of Elis.¹⁹ The Eleian practice, reported by Pausanias (5.5.3),²⁰ of announcing Lepreate victors at the Olympic Games as “Eleians from Lepreon” is not evidence that Lepreates were Eleian citizens; on the contrary, it implies that they were not.

Eleian domination of its subordinate allies is probably already apparent in the terms of the alliance with Ewa. It has been argued that the Ewa/Eua in question was the community known in the Thyreatis in the eastern Peloponnese,²¹ but it is very difficult to see why, or how, in the early fifth century Elis would have formed an alliance with a very small community on the other side of the Peloponnese. The fact that an agreement between the *Anaitoi* and the *Metapioi* (Minon 2007: no. 14) was also published at Olympia when the two communities, otherwise unknown, were presumably small and insignificant does not explain an early fifth century treaty, with political and military commitment, between Elis and a small community of the Thyreatis:²² the *Anaitoi* and *Metapioi* spoke an Eleian dialect and were presumably located in Eleia, and it was entirely normal that they should post a record of their agreement at Olympia. In fact, it is equally likely that Ewa was a community of Eleia. Formally, Elis and Ewa are represented as equal partners in the alliance, with mutual and equal obligations, but any breach of the terms of the alliance was to be punished by a fine payable to Zeus at Olympia. In other words, Ewa was subjected to the jurisdiction of a god whose sanctuary was controlled and administered by Elis.²³ The subordinate status of the allies is also clearly shown later in the terms of the alliance of Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis in 420 (Thuc. 5.47.1–12, especially 8–9; *IG* 1³ 83): the four main parties to the alliance were to swear to its terms on behalf of themselves and their allies. Moreover, Thucydides (5.31.5) has the Eleians speak of Lepreon as “a *polis* of theirs that had seceded,” and Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.2) likewise has them say in 371/0 BCE, when formulating the Eleian claim to Marganeis, Skillous, and Triphylia, that “these *poleis* were theirs.” Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.23),

¹⁸ This argument is set out more fully in Roy 2006b; on settlement in Pisatis, see Roy 2002b and Ruggeri 2004: 188–197.

¹⁹ Roy 1999: 166–167. ²⁰ On this practice, Nielsen 2005: 67–74. ²¹ Minon 2007: 79–80.

²² Pace Minon 2007: 80 n. 324. ²³ Minon 2007: 81–82.

Diodoros (4.17.5–6), and Pausanias (3.8.3) report the demands made by Sparta before the outbreak of the Spartan–Eleian war of 402–400, and all three agree that Sparta required Elis to leave its allies autonomous: the Spartans had evidently recognised that Elis dominated and controlled its allies.

Among the various methods that Elis used to control its allies,²⁴ the role of Olympia is important. Understandably, offenses relating to the sanctuary or the cult at Olympia were punished by penalties imposed by, or for, the god Zeus (e.g. Minon 2007: nos. 3, 4, 6, 9), and these penalties would have been imposed and exacted by the Eleian officials who administered the sanctuary. In some instances the penalties could be imposed for what were in fact political motives (though the Eleians and the others concerned probably made no clear distinction between the religious and the political). The clearest case is the quarrel between Elis and Sparta in the late 420s.²⁵ Elis accused Sparta of breaching the Olympic truce for the games of 420 by moving 1,000 men into Lepreon, and imposed a fine of 2,000 mnai. In fact, Lepreon, with Spartan help, was distancing itself from its alliance with Elis, and the Eleian accusation, supposing as it did that Lepreon was covered by the Olympic truce, implied that Lepreon still belonged to Elis. On this occasion Elis' attempt to use Olympic authority for political purposes failed, since Sparta refused to pay the fine; the result was lasting tension between Elis and Sparta, but the incident shows that Elis was not deterred from exercising Olympic jurisdiction when it was itself an interested party. In the treaty between Elis and Ewa, as stated above, any breach was to be punished by a fine payable to Zeus, and in the text relating to Skillous (Minon 2007: no. 22, from c. 450/25), evidently the Eleian response to trouble at Skillous, penalties payable to Zeus are prescribed for various offenses. Eleian control of the sanctuary at Olympia thus became a device for controlling Elis' allies in Eleia. Moreover, communities of Eleia seem sometimes to have subjected themselves voluntarily to such Eleian control. In the agreement between the *Anaitoi* and the *Metapioi* (Minon 2007: no. 14, c. 475 BCE), anyone breaching the agreement was to be “banished from the altar”, and the *iaromaoi* (Eleian officials at Olympia) were to decide on the case of anyone transgressing the oath to the agreement. When the *Chaladrioi* granted citizenship to Deukalion (Minon 2007: no. 12, from 500–475 BCE), anyone seizing Deukalion was to be banished before Zeus. There is no mention of Elis in either of these two

²⁴ Roy 1997, 2008, and 2009a. ²⁵ Roy 1998.

texts, but in effect the communities concerned were subjecting their affairs to the authority of the Eleians at Olympia.

It has been argued that other local communities had some share in the administration of the sanctuary alongside Elis. Kahrstedt's theory of an Olympic Amphiktyony has been revived by Siewert and Taita, but has not been generally accepted: the negative reactions of Gehrke and Nafissi are typical.²⁶ There is in fact no good evidence that communities other than Elis had any part in the administration of Olympia from the mid-sixth century onwards. Save for the brief interlude of Pisatan control in the 360s, the Greek world saw the sanctuary as run by the Eleians. Elis' allies could have had little, if any, say as to how Olympic jurisdiction was administered, but that did not prevent them from subjecting themselves to it.

The evidence relating to Elis' network of alliances in Eleia thus suggests that, at least from the later sixth century, Eleia was divided between purely Eleian territory on the one hand and, on the other, the territories of the numerous small communities successively allied to Elis. While Elis was prepared to intervene in an allied community, as the text relating to Skillous (Minon 2007: no. 22) shows, there is no reason to suppose that the allies' constitutional developments would have matched those at Elis. This means that, while the alliances were of great importance to Elis, the allies would not have played any part in Eleian federalism, if there was even such a thing.

Elis continued to have subordinate allies in the Hellenistic period, although the extent of Elis' network of alliances varied considerably over time.²⁷ Examples are provided by two communities that had not been controlled by Elis in the Classical period. Alipheira was given to Elis by Lydiadas, tyrant of Megalopolis, in 244 BCE (Polyb. 4.77.10), and an inscription in Eleian dialect (Minon 2007: no. 31, with commentary) survives from the period of Eleian control of the city (which lasted until 219). The text, which is fragmentary, probably shows Eleian intervention in the affairs of Alipheira, though it has also been interpreted as an Eleian arbitration between Alipheira and another city. In any case, Elis clearly treated Alipheira as a *polis* in its own right, not an integral part of the *polis* Elis. We know from Polybius (4.70.2–72.10) that Psophis in northwestern Arkadia was attached to Elis from an unknown date until it was captured by Philip V of Makedon in 219, and two Eleian voting-discs have been

²⁶ Siewert 1991; Taita 1999, 2002: 136–138 and 145–146, and 2007: 126–130; negative reactions in Gehrke 2003: 18 and Nafissi 2003: 41 with n. 139.

²⁷ Roy 1999: 164–165.

found at the site. The discs suggest that an Eleian court had sat at Psophis, and in 219 it had an Eleian garrison, but Polybius' account distinguishes Psophidians and Eleians in a way that suggests that Psophis, although subordinate to Elis, continued to be a *polis*.²⁸ Several communities in Eleia elected Delphic *thearodokoi* in the period 230–210,²⁹ but may not all have been attached to Elis at the time.³⁰ Certainly in the Hellenistic period communities that had been subordinate allies of Elis were still capable, once detached from Elis, of acting as independent *poleis*; for instance, Hypana in Triphylia struck coinage as a member of the Achaian League.³¹ As noted earlier, the whole area of Eleia was finally united in the single *polis* of Elis, probably in 146, and that union continued under the Roman Empire.

Information on the allies' obligations towards Elis is limited.³² Presumably every community had, at least originally, a treaty with Elis, but the treaties need not all have been in identical terms, since the circumstances under which the various cities entered into alliance with Elis differed. At the outbreak of the Spartan–Eleian war in 402, Elis claimed that its allies were *epileïdas* (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23): the word does not occur elsewhere but is evidently connected with *leia*, meaning spoil or booty,³³ and so suggests that the allies had been conquered. Yet Lepreon voluntarily sought alliance with Elis, even offering half its territory to secure the alliance (Thuc. 5.31.2), and Epeion was bought by Elis (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30–1). From the use of the word *sym(m)achia* to describe the group of allies (Minon 2007: no. 5 = Siewert and Taeuber 2013: no. 2), we can deduce that the allies had military obligations, and such obligations are explicit in the treaty between Elis and Ewa (Minon 2007: no. 10). The allies could certainly produce troops: for instance, Lepreates fought at Plataia (Hdt. 9.28.4) and men from Triphylia, Akroria, and Lasion fought for the Peloponnesian League alongside the Eleians in 394 after they had been freed from Eleian control (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16). There is, however, no attested instance of such allied troops fighting for Elis, and it is not clear whether Thucydides' figure of 3,000 for the Eleian army in 418 (5.58.1, 5.75.5) includes allies.

There is also no evidence that Elis consulted its allies in Eleia before making decisions, whether about warfare or anything else. The wording of the treaty between Elis and Ewa is formally and technically that of an

²⁸ Roy 2006a. ²⁹ Perlman 2000: 168–169.

³⁰ NB, the institution of *thearodokia* is not undisputed evidence of *polis* status, see Perlman 2000: 32–33.

³¹ Warren 2007: 69. ³² Roy 1997: 291–298. ³³ Gschnitzer 1958: 12.

agreement between equal partners, but nothing suggests that Elis treated its allies as equals.

Since Elis' network of alliances with other communities of Eleia was clearly not a federation, any evidence of Eleian federalism must be sought within Elis itself. For the earlier stages of constitutional development within Elis there is some limited literary evidence, particularly from Aristotle, and valuable evidence from inscriptions.³⁴ Aristotle (*Pol.* 1306a16-19) describes an oligarchic regime in Elis with a body of ninety *gerontes*. Because the *gerontes* held office for life, few men could become a member of the board, and moreover the choice of *gerontes* was dynastic, meaning that it was dominated by a restricted number of families. This is evidently an early form of constitution,³⁵ and has no clear federal structure. A council of five hundred is attested first by an inscription dated c. 525/500 (Minon 2007: no. 4), and a body of six hundred, no doubt a council with increased membership, is attested by Thucydides (5.47.9) in 420 BCE. The *damos*, evidently an assembly of citizens, is also attested first by the inscription of c. 525/500.³⁶ It thus appears that the oligarchy with ninety *gerontes* had given way by the later sixth century to a more moderate constitution with a council of five hundred, later increased to six hundred, and an assembly of citizens. The references in ancient evidence to these various constitutional bodies do not exclude a federal structure, but do not suggest one either.

A synoikism of Elis is reported by Diodoros (11.54.1) and Strabo (8.3.2). According to Diodoros, who gives the date 471/o, "the Eleians, who lived in several small *poleis*, were synoikized into one, that known as Elis." Strabo, on the other hand, after speaking of earlier settlement in villages, says that the Eleians "came together into the present *polis* Elis, after the Persian Wars, from many demes." There is no reason to doubt that some event of significance took place in Elis in 471/o (if Diodoros' date is correct), important enough to find its way into the historical record, but the sources do not tell us why the synoikism was undertaken or what exactly occurred.³⁷ Elis was clearly functioning as a state long before 471/o, and archaeological evidence shows that already in the sixth century there

³⁴ There is a convenient summary of the evidence for Eleian constitutional development in Gehrke 1985: 52–57 and 365–367. However, he sees the synoikism of 471 as a major moment of constitutional change, and takes it for granted that the *Chaladrioi* belonged within Elis proper.

³⁵ Gehrke 1985: 365; Trampedach 1994: 43–44.

³⁶ On the council and the *damos* of Elis, see Minon 2007: 510–516.

³⁷ On the problems raised by the report of the synoikism see Roy 2002a; note the comments of Nafissi 2003: 48–49 and Moggi 2008.

was a significant settlement, with public buildings, on the site where the town of Elis developed. There were likewise numerous other settlements within the territory of Elis proper, both before and after the synoikism. On present evidence it is hard to see what the synoikism changed, and consequently any attempt to link the synoikism to other major constitutional change in Elis can only be speculative. There is also no evidence that any of Elis' allies in Eleia were involved in the synoikism.

The status of the settlements within purely Eleian territory is not clear. By the criteria adopted by the Copenhagen Polis Center, only two, Kyllene and Pylos, can be considered *poleis* in the Classical period, and even for them the evidence is not strong. Kyllene is called a *polis* solely by Ps-Skylax 43, and for Pylos the only evidence is the ethnic "Pylian" at Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.26, where Xenophon appears to include among the Pylians both Eleian exiles and non-Eleians. Pylos is generally identified with the site excavated at Armatova, which was a significant nucleated settlement of the Classical period, but apparently possessed no monumental architecture, i.e., no buildings obviously erected for communal purposes.³⁸ Kyllene was an important port, and was the naval base of the Eleian fleet (e.g. Thuc. 1.30.2). A port serving an inland *polis* was often a dependent *polis* within the territory of the *polis* that it served,³⁹ and that was probably the status of Kyllene. Other towns in the territory of Elis included Pheia, the other port of Elis that primarily served Olympia, and towns in Pisatis,⁴⁰ but there is no ancient evidence of their status: while some may have been dependent *poleis* of Elis, they may have also been demes of the *polis* Elis.⁴¹ In sum, in the territory of the *polis* Elis there were clearly a number of other settlements besides the town Elis, and we have only very limited evidence of their constitutional status, but there is no evidence that the Eleian *polis* operated as a federation of such settlements.

The *Anaitoi*, the *Metapioi*, and the *Chaladrioi* present a special problem in the study of possible Eleian federalism. The only evidence for the *Anaitoi* and the *Metapioi* is a single inscription from c. 475 (Minon 2007: no. 14) recording an agreement between the two communities. Similarly, the only evidence for the *Chaladrioi* is an inscription from 500–475 (Minon 2007: no. 12) recording a grant of citizenship by the *Chaladrioi*. Both inscriptions are in Eleian dialect, both were found at Olympia, and both specify penalties to be put into effect at the sanctuary in the event of a breach: it

³⁸ Coleman 1986: 67. ³⁹ Hansen 2004: 87–94. ⁴⁰ Roy 2002b.

⁴¹ On the demes of Elis see Jones 1987: 142–145, and on settlements within Eleian territory see Roy 1999: 158–164, and 2004a.

would seem safe to assume that the three communities were all located in Eleia. The *Chaladrioi* specified that Deukalion, who received citizenship, was to have “the land in Pisa,” which is further evidence that the *Chaladrioi* were located in Eleia, though clearly not in Pisa.⁴² The *Chaladrioi* were clearly acting like a *polis* in granting citizenship. The agreement between the *Anaitoi* and the *Metapioi* is for friendship for fifty years, suggesting that there had previously been tension, perhaps even conflict, between the two;⁴³ and that in turn suggests that they were able to act with some degree of independence. Nafissi mentions the possibility that the agreement may have been imposed on the *Anaitoi* and *Metapioi* by Elis,⁴⁴ but there is no textual evidence to support this. The inherent and practical freedom of these three states, and particularly of the *Chaladrioi*, has been explained by the supposition that they were members of an Eleian federation.⁴⁵ In this case the two inscriptions would be the only evidence directly attesting a federal structure within Elis. However, since the three communities cannot be located, it is equally possible that they were situated outside the territory of the *polis* Elis, and they may, for instance, have been allies of Elis,⁴⁶ or simply, at the time of the inscriptions, cities of Triphylia still independent of Elis. Small communities in Eleia, like the *Anaitoi*, *Metapioi*, and *Chaladrioi*, whether or not attached in some way to Elis, recognized the authority of the sanctuary at Olympia and may well have chosen to grant Olympia the authority to sanction the breach of an agreement or a decree. In any case, it would be hazardous to assume the existence of an Eleian federation on the basis of these two inscriptions, and it is much simpler, and perfectly in accordance with the available evidence, to suppose that Elis was, from the sixth century onwards, a unitary *polis* with dependent settlements within its large territory. After c. 475 BCE there is no further evidence comparable to the inscriptions concerning the *Anaitoi*, *Metapioi*, and *Chaladrioi*.

It is incidentally not surprising that the three groups are mentioned only in the two inscriptions of the earlier fifth century. Ewa, or Eua, is a similar case: it is attested only in one inscription from Olympia of c. 500/475 (Minon 2007: no. 10) recording an alliance for a hundred years between

⁴² It is not clear how the *Chaladrioi* could have at their disposal land in Pisa. It has been suggested (Roy 1997: 313, n. 31) that the land may have been assigned for accommodation during the Olympic festival, and granted to Deukalion for use outside the period of the games. Nafissi (2003: 43, n. 156) asks how such land would have been available to the *Chaladrioi* outside the period of the games, but such plots might have been assigned permanently to local communities.

⁴³ Nafissi 2003: 42, n. 146; Taita 2007: 46. ⁴⁴ Nafissi 2003: 43, n. 156.

⁴⁵ Recently by Möller 2004: 256–257; Nafissi 2003: 42–45.

⁴⁶ A possibility recognized by Möller 2004: 257.

Elis and Ewa. The status of Ewa is not, however, in question: the alliance shows that it was not part of the *polis* Elis but rather an allied state, no doubt situated somewhere in Eleia. There is also a body of other evidence that from the later Archaic period onwards various settlements in Eleia appeared and disappeared.⁴⁷

Though Elis can be regarded as a unitary state rather than as a confederacy, it is important to recognize that Olympia was extremely important not only for the religious life of the region, but also for the administration of the *polis* Elis. While the Eleians conducted business of their *polis* at the town Elis, they also used the sanctuary for the administration of the sanctuary itself and the games, but also as a place to conduct Eleian business.⁴⁸ For instance, the *hellanodikai* had quarters both at the town of Elis and at Olympia. There was a *bouleutērion* at Elis and another at Olympia: whether the same Eleian council met at both is unclear, but, even if there was a separate Olympic council, its members were Eleian. In any case voting-tokens of very similar type were used at the two sites.⁴⁹ Strikingly, there was a *prytaneion* at Olympia whereas none is known at Elis: Nielsen has emphasized the central role of the *prytaneion* in the life of a *polis*, and it may well be that the *prytaneion* of the *polis* Elis was at Olympia.⁵⁰ Eleian officials ran both the sanctuary and the games, and will have been visible to all visitors. Elis displayed public documents at Olympia, and chose a form of language that marked a difference between the Eleian texts and other related western Greek dialects.⁵¹ Eleian coinage also used Olympic images: on the obverse appeared the Eleian ethnic and either Zeus or Hera, the Olympic deities, and on the reverse such Olympic emblems as the eagle of Zeus.⁵² The Eleians also announced the holding of the games on each occasion to other Greek states. At least by the fifth century, Eleian *thearoi* traveling to announce the games to other Greek communities were received and no doubt helped by appointed *thearodokoi* in these communities.⁵³ Since *thearodokoi* were frequently men of consequence, Elis must have been in regular contact with a wide network of leading men across the Greek world. States recognizing the games sent their own *thearoi* to participate in the religious ritual at Elis that accompanied the games: these *thearoi* will also have met leading Eleians. Finally, as noted earlier, Eleian control of jurisdiction at Olympia was used as an instrument to reinforce Elis' authority over the other communities of Eleia.

⁴⁷ Roy 1999: 167–171. ⁴⁸ On Eleian administration at Olympia, see Nielsen 2007: 29–54.

⁴⁹ Baitinger and Eder 2001 and 2003. ⁵⁰ Nielsen 2007: 52–53. ⁵¹ Nielsen 2007: 52–53.

⁵² Walker 2004 lists a very rich collection of Eleian coins, with excellent illustrations.

⁵³ Nielsen 2007: 39–40.

By the fifth century it was normal for a Greek *polis* to have as the focus of communal activity an urban center, but the *polis* Elis was unusual in having two such focal points, the town of Elis and the sanctuary at Olympia.

Although the evidence suggests that Elis was a unitary *polis* rather than a confederacy, as many as three federal states may have existed, at least briefly, within Eleia. One was Triphylia, which certainly became a federal state *c.* 400.⁵⁴ The other two possible cases are Akroria and Pisatis.

Akroria was the hilly region between the Eleian River Ladon and the River Erymanthos, and was therefore a buffer zone between Elis and Arkadia.⁵⁵ It contained four *poleis*, namely Alion, Eupagion, Opous, and Thraistos.⁵⁶ These *poleis* became subordinate allies of Elis, and, like all such allies, at the insistence of Sparta were freed from Eleian control, after Sparta defeated Elis in the war of 402–400 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30). Before that the *Akrorioi* – presumably all four *poleis* acting together – and the Alasyes had dedicated an inscribed bronze cauldron at Olympia (Minon 2007: no. 45).⁵⁷ Minon dates the inscription on it to 475–450 BCE, with a query: the dedication was in any case obviously made well before Akroria was liberated from Elis in 400. Clearly, by the fifth century the Akrorians sometimes acted together, though that need not mean that they were then constitutionally united in a single state. *Akrorioi* means ‘Mountain Men’,⁵⁸ and the name was possibly coined by the Eleians, themselves ‘the People of the Valley’ (*Waleioi*). But, whether or not that is so, the *Akrorioi* had clearly adopted the name and with it a common identity. Once freed from Elis, the Akrorians joined the Peloponnesian League, and in 394 sent a common contingent to a campaign of the league (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16). It has therefore been deduced that the Akrorians formed a single state.⁵⁹ Elis then recovered control of the Akrorian cities, probably when Spartan power declined after the battle of Leuktra in 371 BCE: in 365 Elis was able to seize Lasion, which lay immediately east of Akroria, and when the Arkadians counter-attacked, they captured Lasion and took Alion, Eupagion, and Opous, but not Thraistos.⁶⁰ Under Arkadian patronage the Akrorians again formed a state, but it is not known whether Thraistos eventually joined it. An inscription, no doubt of 365, records an alliance of the Arkadian confederacy, Pisa, and Akroria.⁶¹ The text is fragmentary, but there are clear

⁵⁴ See Thomas Heine Nielsen in Chapter 13. ⁵⁵ On its geography see Ruggeri 2004: 144–149.

⁵⁶ Roy 2004a: 490, 493–494, 498–499, 500, and 502. ⁵⁷ On the *Alasyes* see Roy 2004a: 493.

⁵⁸ Nafissi 2003: 40.

⁵⁹ Siewert 1987/88 refers to it as a “Regionalstaat,” supposing that the Spartans played a large part in its formation, while Ruggeri 2004: 157 writes of “una comunità politica indipendente.”

⁶⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4. 12–14; see Ruggeri 2004: 157. ⁶¹ Ringel, Siewert, and Taeuber 1999: 413–417.

references to Pisa and Akroria, evidently the territories of Pisatan and Akrorian states. There is no later evidence of any common action by the Akrorian *poleis*, and they probably passed back to Eleian control when the war effort of the Arkadian League collapsed in 363/2. Given that there were four *poleis* in the region, it is difficult to see how the Akrorians could act as a single state – as they did in the early fourth century and again in the 360s – unless they then had a federal structure. Our very limited evidence, however, does not allow us to see how that federal structure might have operated.

In 365, early in the war between Arkadia and Elis, the Arkadians overran the area around Olympia, removed it from Eleian control, and allowed it to become an independent Pisatan state.⁶² This may well have been the first Pisatan state. Ancient accounts of early Eleian history give much attention to supposed conflicts between Eleians and an early Pisatan state for control of Olympia, but several scholars have recently produced strong arguments that these reports are unhistorical,⁶³ and there may well have been no Archaic Pisatan state. The Pisatan state created in 365 did not last long, and Elis probably regained control of Pisatis when war with Arkadia ended in 363/2. In 360 Elis certainly controlled Olympia and conducted the games of that year. The independent Pisatis of 365–362 was probably a puppet-state of the Arkadians, but it clearly functioned as a typical Greek state. It struck coinage;⁶⁴ it formed alliances with the Arkadian League and Akroria, as well as with Messenia and Sikyon;⁶⁵ and it granted proxeny and *theorodokia* to two Sikyonians (*SIG*³ 171). However, while Pisatis clearly functioned as an independent Greek state in these years, it is not clear what constitutional form this state took. One problem is that there is no good evidence that a town of Pisa ever existed.⁶⁶ On the other hand, there is evidence for several towns within Pisatis that might possibly have functioned as *poleis* in the Classical period, though their status as *poleis* is not explicitly attested.⁶⁷ The Pisatan state may thus have been either a *polis* with no urban center but several subsidiary settlements, or a federal state made up of several small Pisatan *poleis*. A short-lived Pisatan League is therefore a possibility, but no more than that.

⁶² Nielsen 2002: 118–9, Ruggeri 2004: 178–207; Roy 2004a: 500–1.

⁶³ Nafissi 2001 and 2003; Gehrke 2003; Möller 2004; Giangulio 2009. ⁶⁴ Head 1911: 426.

⁶⁵ Ringel, Siewert, and Taeuber 1999: 413–420.

⁶⁶ Roy 2002b: 233. Minon 2007: 90, n. 368 draws attention to the scholion on Pindar *Ol.* 10.55a, locating Pisa three stades from Olympia, but the scholiast there mentions Pisa only as a place where people camped during the Olympic Games.

⁶⁷ Roy 2002b.

In conclusion, the only evidence that might suggest federation in Elis is the two inscriptions concerning the *Chaladrioi* (Minon 2007: no. 12) and the *Anaitoi* and *Metapioi* (Minon 2007: no. 14), but we do not know whether these three communities lay within Elis. Against the possibility of Eleian federation is the total absence of evidence that Elis operated as a federal state, and likewise the total absence of evidence that Eleians were identified as citizens of both a federal state and a variety of cities within such a state. What is clearly attested for Elis, from the later sixth century onwards, is a complex structure that aimed to establish and maintain Eleian control of the region Eleia. The main elements of that structure were the *polis* Elis with a very large territory by Greek standards, and a network of allies subordinate to it. The sanctuary at Olympia was very important both for the administration of the *polis* Elis and as an instrument to strengthen Eleian control of its allies in Eleia. Elis' success in controlling allies in Eleia fluctuated over time, until – probably in 146 – all Eleia was united within the *polis* Elis, but the methods used by Elis remained essentially the same from the later sixth century until the Hellenistic period. Federalism was well known in Eleia: the Triphylians adopted a federal constitution, the Akrorians probably did the same, and the Pisatans possibly established one as well. The Eleians, however, sought to unify Eleia not by federalism, but by a mechanism that subordinated the whole area to the *polis* Elis. When the Eleians finally abandoned that mechanism, it was replaced by the union of all Eleia in a single *polis*.

*Traces of federalism in Messenia**Nino Luraghi*

The Messenians did not garner a chapter of their own in Larsen's *Greek Federal States*, and not without a reason. Even though we can be certain that some sort of political organization of a higher order joined together Messenian *poleis* from the time when Epameinondas made the region independent in 369 BCE, there is hardly any evidence that explicitly illuminates the nature of such an organization, let alone its development through time. Carl A. Roebuck's discussion of the matter in his 1941 dissertation remains the standard reference, and only on minor points of detail is it now possible to add something to it, despite the enormous growth in documentary evidence produced by Petros Themelis' excavations of Messene. On the other hand, our understanding of comparable organizations, especially in the Peloponnese, has improved significantly in recent years, so that the general picture into which the Messenians should fit has changed enough to make it possible to add some nuances to Roebuck's views.

The Messenians were latecomers in the political world of mainland Greece. In 369, a large portion of the region located south of the Neda River and west of the Taygetos Ridge – the region that later came to be called Messenia – became independent, separating from Sparta, which had ruled it since the Archaic period. In the years between 369 and 338, the Spartans appear to have lost their few remaining strongholds in the region, located mostly on the western coast and in the southern portion of the Akritas Peninsula.¹ As a part of Lakedaimon, Messenia was occupied by a number of small towns inhabited by Lakedaimonian *perioikoi*, while a portion of the countryside was owned directly by Spartiates, who are generally assumed to have been absentee landowners and to have

¹ See Diod. 15.77.4 (the Arkadians capture Kyparissia and Koryphasion in 365/4 BCE). For a discussion of the chronology of the Spartan loss of perioikic towns of Messenia, see Luraghi 2008: 32–35 and 228–230.

controlled their estates and the helots who worked on them through bailiffs, who may or may not have been helots themselves.² Whether new settlements were founded at the time of the liberation from Sparta is unclear, and archaeological evidence seems to suggest that every major settlement of free Messenia was in fact a former Lakedaimonian town. One of these settlements, however, located at the foot of Mt. Ithome in the center of the region, was now massively upgraded, and it is generally thought, based on its later history, that it came to control the land that had belonged to the Spartiates, which is plausibly identified with the Stenykleros Plain, the fertile plain in the northeastern part of the region.

The existence of some form of political integration in Messenia from the time of its independence is amply documented by fourth-century documents and literary sources that speak of the Messenians as a political entity, entering diplomatic relations with, or fighting wars against, other *poleis*, federal states, and, later, kings.³ On the other hand, there is no evidence for any of the towns in the region having direct relations with any other Greek *polis* or federal state until the time when, starting from the last quarter of the third century, they began to be absorbed, one by one, by the Achaian League.⁴ There is only one exception – but it is an exception that really confirms the rule, as we will see in a moment. Before addressing the possible political shape of the entity called ‘the Messenians’, however, we need to take a step back, as it were, and turn our attention to a problem of toponymy.

As is often the case with Greek federal states and in general with regional political organizations in the Greek world, the terminology used in the literary sources talking about Messenia is somewhat inconsistent and confusing. The place-name Messene oscillates in time between indicating a region and indicating a specific settlement within that region, a settlement that at least from a certain point in time had, unquestionably, the status of a *polis*. Correspondingly, it is often difficult to understand what the sources mean when they speak of Messenians. Roebuck’s thesis, however, according to which in 369 and until approximately the middle of the third century, Messene (locally referred to in the Doric form Messana) was the name of the independent polity created by Epameinondas, while the

² On Messenia as a part of Lakedaimon, see Luraghi 2008: 117–146.

³ The earliest example being the alliance with Pisa and Sikyon dating to 365/4 BCE (*SEG* 49.466), on which see Ringel, Siewert, and Taeuber 1999.

⁴ The proxenies granted by Arkadian Lousoi to Phillidas and Erimanthos from Kyparissia, tentatively dated to the late fourth or early third centuries by Perlman 2000: 241–242, are no exception, see Roebuck 1941: 113.

city at the foot of Mt. Ithome was called Ithome, still seems preferable.⁵ The terminology of the Delphian proxeny decree for a “Messenian from Ithome” from 321/20 (*FdD* III 4.6), mentioned by Roebuck, now finds correspondence in the text of the treaty with Philip III and Alexander IV, which was found in the Messene excavations and dates between 319 and 317 BCE, and which very likely uses the term *Ithōmaioi* as a city-ethnic, or at least confirms the use of the place-name Ithome in a political sense found on the proxeny from Delphi.⁶ On the other hand, thus far, no document from the fourth century unambiguously attests to the use of the terms Messene and Messenians to designate the city by Mt. Ithome and its citizens, nor, for that matter, the use of the term Messenia.⁷ In a reassuring case of terminological consistency between literary sources and inscriptions, Diodoros (19.54.4) talks about a campaign of Kassandros in the Peloponnese in 316, during which the son of Antipater was able to win over all the *poleis* of Messene (*sic*) except for Ithome (*sic*), which remained faithful to Polyperchon.⁸

Already in the first half of the third century, possible signs of change began to appear. In the very lacunose final part of the treaty between the Messenians and King Lysimachos (*SEG* 41.322), dated *c.* 295 BCE, the magistrates who appear to take the oath for the Messenians include the ephors, who were clearly civic as opposed to federal magistrates, while in a new treaty of alliance between the Messenians and various cities of western Crete, so far known only in a preliminary transcription, the

⁵ Roebuck 1941: 37 and n. 54. The valuable discussion of Grandjean 2003: 93–97 blurs the issue, partly because it is based on the assumption that the former perioikic towns of Messenia joined the free Messenian polity only after 338, which is manifestly false in the cases of Koryphasion, Kyparissia, and Korone, and almost certainly incorrect in that of Thouria (Luraghi 2008: 228–230).

⁶ *SEG* 43.135, on which see the notes of Matthaïou 2001: 223 (= *SEG* 51.456). The fact that Ithome was entering an alliance apparently on its own is perplexing and makes one wonder about the cohesion of the Messenians at this point. Tellingly, immediately thereafter we observe the apparent separation between Ithome and the other Messenians (see below).

⁷ Shipley 2004: 562 refers to a list of contributions towards the reconstruction of the temple of Apollo in Delphi (*CID* II 4, col. I, lines 28–30, spring of 360 BCE) as using *Messanioi* as a city-ethnic. It is true that the heading of the list refers to contributions from *poleis* and individuals, but this heading, which recurs many times in the lists of contributions, really refers to political communities, as shown by many examples, most clearly *CID* II 5, col. II, line 47, where the Hesperian Lokrians appear (as for Shipley’s second alleged occurrence, Dem. 16.25, there is simply no reason to think that “Messenians” there is a city-ethnic, rather than referring to, e.g., members of a federal state of whatever sort). Note that in the Delphian proxeny for the brothers Aristeus and Philidas from Asine, from 315/14 (*SEG* 12.219, date according to Sánchez 2001: 519), “Messania” is a modern supplement, while the stone itself only has the letters *Messan-* followed by a lacuna, which can just as easily be filled with the genitive of the word Messana; for the form, see e.g., the *Megalopolitai ex Arkadias* of *CID* II 4, col. III, lines 50–51.

⁸ On Cassander’s campaign in the Peloponnese, see Fortina 1965: 41–42.

gerontes appear to be (among) the magistrates swearing the oath (*SEG* 58.369). In both cases, in other words, as soon as the Messenians assume more recognizable traits, magistrates of the *polis* show up. Finally, in the second half of the third century the terminology started to change in an unambiguous way. In 242 BCE, in a decree of the Messenians recognizing the *asylia* of the sanctuary of Asklepios on Kos (*IG* XII 4.1, 215 lines 6–19), ‘Messana’ appears to be the equivalent of ‘the *polis* of the Messenians’. Around the same time, a treaty of *isopoliteia* and *epigamia* between Messenians and Phigalians brokered by the Aitolians (*IPArk* 28) apparently includes a decree issued by ‘the *polis* of the Messenians’. The same terminology, with ‘the Messenians’ and ‘the *polis* of the Messenians’ used interchangeably, appears in four decrees from Delphi expressing gratitude to the Messenians for military support during the First Makedonian War (*FdD* III.4, 21–24). Correspondingly, during the third century there is no example of the name Ithome being used in a political sense.

This new terminology is the one we find used consistently by Polybius, who calls Messene the *polis* by Mt. Ithome and Messenia the region, although even in Polybius there are many passages where the Messenians seem to have a broader meaning than just the citizens of the *polis*, and also passages in which it is perfectly clear that the term retains its traditional meaning.⁹ On this basis, whenever the ‘Messenians’ appear in literary sources referring to events dated from the middle of the third century onwards, and sometimes even in retrospective references to the fourth century, we have to wonder whether our author means the citizens of the *polis* or the citizens of a broader political organization, whatever its form or setup.

This slippage in the meaning of the place-name Messene is an unambiguous pointer to the increasing pre-eminence of the city of Ithome/Messene within the region of Messene/Messenia, a phenomenon that reverberates across evidence of all kinds and is especially clear in the material record. As long as it was a part of Lakedaimon, Messenia had no major urban settlement. Its liberation had a deep and visible impact on the human geography of the region. Even though it is almost certain that there was a pre-existing perioikic settlement on the site of the new city of Ithome, that settlement does not appear to have been particularly prominent.¹⁰ Based on the present state of the evidence, there is no reason to think that it had been

⁹ For an example of the former, see, e.g., 5.92.4; for an example of the latter, the historical digression of 4.32–33.

¹⁰ Pre-369 archaeological evidence from the site: Luraghi 2008: 124–127.

bigger and/or more important than other perioikic towns in Messenia, such as Thouria, Pharai, or Kyparissia. Ithome however, both in terms of size of the urban center and of territorial extension, was of a different order of magnitude compared to its predecessor, or to any other settlement in Messenia at that time. Its gigantic fortifications, built in ashlar blocks all the way to the battlements, stood out in the region, and indeed in the whole of the Greek world, in terms of size and sophistication – to this day, they are a landmark in the Peloponnese.¹¹ They enclosed an extraordinarily large area of 290 hectares, of which some 100 were built up.¹² No other urban settlement in free Messenia appears to have come even close to its size.

In many ways, this large new city was an intrusive body in the region. The location of its urban center, up on the hills, was determined purely by strategic and defensive needs, as demonstrated by the fact that as soon as such needs were no longer salient, the main focus of settlement in the area slowly shifted towards the plain, in the area of Meligalas, and, on a regional scale, back towards the coast. In other words, free from military constraints the settlement pattern in Messenia returned to its natural geographic state, the one that had formed during the Bronze Age and that is still visible today. Furthermore, Ithome is also likely to have been different from the rest of free Messenia in terms of inhabitants. The helots of Messenia, who resided on the Spartiate land, were located predominantly on its territory, and nothing suggests that they moved elsewhere in the region. It also seems most likely that further settlers came to this area from outside the region: real or alleged descendants of Messenian exiles from the fifth century and earlier, and probably also assorted settlers from Arkadia and maybe even from the Argolid – who may in part have been identical with the supposed exiles.¹³

Rather paradoxically, this new and mixed population quickly came symbolically to dominate the region. It had its own narrative of the Messenian past, based on a sequence of revolt, exile and return, that rapidly established itself as the master narrative, in part also, at the beginning at any rate, because it suited the agenda of the Theban liberators.¹⁴ If the evidence makes it

¹¹ For a preliminary presentation of the evidence, see now Muth 2010.

¹² Data in Muth 2007: 280; there the most detailed discussion of the urban settlement of Ithome/Messene.

¹³ For a discussion of the ancient evidence on the identity of the inhabitants of free Messene, see Luraghi 2008: 219–230.

¹⁴ As expressed particularly in the epigram on the base of the statue of Epameinondas at Thebes, quoted by Paus. 9.15.6; Luraghi 2008: 219–220.

difficult to establish a precise timeline of this development, in other respects it has become increasingly clear that already in the fourth century Ithome tried to become a focus for Messenian religion and identity, as well. In a very prominent place, in the middle of the agora of the new city, stood a Doric temple dedicated to the heroine Messene, in whose precinct public documents of the Messenians and honorary statues dedicated by them were on display. Excavations in the last decade or so, still only partially published, have shown that the temple dates to the fourth century, probably to its second half.¹⁵ Now, it is important to remind ourselves that, at the time when the temple was built, Messene as a place-name still meant the region, or any sort of political entity that united all the Messenians, but in any case, it could not indicate the city alone.

Correspondingly, this central sanctuary of Ithome was – or at least, aspired to be – a sanctuary for all Messenians. This aspiration was emphasized by a series of paintings displayed in the temple, mentioned by Pausanias (4.31.11–12), that brought together mythic heroes from all over Messenia.¹⁶ The impression that, in its early period, from the liberation to the first decades of the third century, Ithome attempted to function as a religious center for the whole of Messenia is reinforced by the evidence for the institution in the city of sanctuaries dedicated to two cults whose main centers were located elsewhere in Messenia, Athena Kyparissia and Artemis Limnatis.¹⁷ Even the new prominence acquired in Ithome by the cult of Asklepios, which in itself went back to the time before the liberation, may be interpreted in the same light, since Asklepios was at home in the southeastern part of Messenia, from Thalamai all the way up to Thouria, as shown by the recent excavations on that site.¹⁸

¹⁵ See Müth 2007: 73–76, with references to the preliminary publications by Petros Themelis.

¹⁶ This interpretation of the cult of Messene is laid out in Luraghi 2008: 269–275.

¹⁷ The cult of Athena Kyparissia in Ithome/Messene is attested by a series of catalogs of sacred officials called *prostatai* and *kistiokosmoi* of the goddess, dating mostly from the third century, with some going back to the fourth; see Müth 2007: 136 and n. 790 and the complete references to the fourteen inscriptions so far known in SEG 58.376. With identification based on the inscription IG v 1, 1442, the remains of the temple of Artemis Limnatis are located on the southern slopes of Mt. Ithome; architectural terracottas pertinent to its early phase date to the second half of the fourth century (Badie and Billot 2001: 127). The original center of this cult in Messenia was located on the Taygetos, northeast of Thouria, and was inextricably linked to the memory of the wars between Messenians and Spartans (Luraghi 2008: 16–27).

¹⁸ The cult of Asklepios is documented at Thalamai (IG v 1, 1313 with Riethmüller 2005: 11 135), Leuktron (Paus. 3.26.4), Gerenia (Strab. 8.4.4) and Abia (Paus. 4.30.1); his son Machaon's tomb was supposedly in Gerenia (Paus. 3.26.9 and 4.3.2; archaeological and epigraphic evidence in Riethmüller 2005: 11 134); in Pharai there was a temple dedicated to Nikomachos and Gorgasos, sons of Machaon (Paus. 4.30.3 and 3.2). Epigraphic evidence for the cult of Asklepios at Thouria has surfaced recently in the excavations of the 26th Ephoreia on the site, see Ergon 2011: 25–6.

Symbolically as well as tangibly, we can take it for granted that Ithome/Messene had a dominant position in the region and within the political organization of the Messenians. The question is whether this position translated itself in constitutional terms, and if it did, how and when. Early fourth-century Greece offered many different models which can be roughly arranged on a spectrum ranging from genuinely federal ones, as for instance the Achaian League is taken to have been, to highly hierarchical ones, such as Lakedaimon with its dependent communities of *perioikoi*. In-between, however, there were many shades of grey (cf. above, pp. 10–13). At different points in its history, Arkadia could be taken as a model of a genuine federal state, with shared citizenship on top of the pre-existing *polis*-citizenship, but it also presented various cases of mid-size *poleis* absorbing in different, often unclear ways, smaller communities, as in the famous case of Helisson and Mantinea documented by an early fourth-century inscription.¹⁹ Elis appears to have controlled, and then lost control of, a number of *poleis*, some of which were quite sizeable, which ancient sources tend to call the *perioikoi* of Elis, although the term is unlikely to be the original Eleian one. These *perioikoi*, in fact, are likely to be the people called “the alliance” (i.e., the allies) of Elis in a late sixth-century document.²⁰ Finally, if nothing else, on account of the role played by Epameinondas in the liberation of Messene, it is worth extending our collection of possible analogs to the Boiotian League itself, a genuine federal state where one *polis* enjoyed a strongly dominant position, probably rooted in the very constitution of the league by way of a mechanism of proportional representation in the federal organs.²¹

The nomenclature examined above reinforces the assumption that the Messenian polity at its beginning included various urban settlements, most likely with the status of *poleis*, within some sort of federal structure whose name was ‘the Messenians’. The subordination of smaller *poleis* or communities to larger ones was one of the most contentious topics of political debate between Greek states from the King’s Peace all the way to the Third Sacred War, making it less likely that Ithome may have been granted a dominant position in the constitution of the new polity: *a fortiori*, a perioikic model, at least at the outset, is harder to imagine.²²

The few documents that go back to this early stage in the history of the free Messenians add little to our understanding of the structure of this new polity. Two proxeny decrees from Delphi dated 322/1 and 321/20, for a

¹⁹ *IPark* 9, on which see Funke 2004: 430–434.

²⁰ *SEG* 48.541, first made known by Siewert 1994b. ²¹ See Beck 2000.

²² For a concise discussion of the original constitutional setup of the free Messenians, see Beck 1997: 221–222.

Messenian from Ithome and a Messenian from Thouria respectively,²³ exhibit the double ethnic identification typical of citizens of federal states, and even the proxeny for an Asinaian from Messene falls in the same category.²⁴ But unfortunately, even official documents are not always so detailed, as shown by other proxeny decrees from Delphi, ranging in time from the middle of the fourth to the mid-third century and exhibiting the simple ethnic *Messanios* without any further qualification.²⁵

Conditional upon the appearance of new evidence that might teach us otherwise, there are two documents in which the use of the ethnic the 'Messenians' may tell us something of importance in relation to the question of Messenian federalism. The proxeny decree of the Messenians for Menalkos of Zakynthos, dated at the end of the fourth century,²⁶ is enacted by the *dēmos*, a formula one could tentatively interpret along the same lines as the prescripts of documents of the Boiotian League from the central years of the fourth century. The same is true, *a fortiori*, for another similarly early document published in a preliminary form only a few years ago, a proxeny for Satyros of Megalopolis, where the enacting body may be called 'the *dēmos* of the Messenians'. Both inscriptions are said to be stoichedic, and both mention *damiorgoi* who might very well be federal magistrates.²⁷ On the other hand, if these are indeed federal documents, it is remarkable that the *damiorgoi* have no city-ethnic and the name of the proponent of the decree for Menalkos is accompanied by the tribal name but, again, not by the city-ethnic. Needless to say, both documents come from Ithome/Messene.

²³ *FdD* III 4.5 and 6; dates according to Sánchez 2001: 519. ²⁴ See above, n. 6.

²⁵ See *FdD* III 4.4 (340 BCE), 7 and 8 (both 323 BCE), 9 (315 BCE), 11 (272 BCE), 14 (251 BCE); all dates according to Sánchez 2001.

²⁶ The doubts voiced by Roebuck (1941, 60 n. 10) regarding the date of this document can meanwhile be laid to rest. Roebuck thought that the numeral in line three referred to a month and connected it with the adoption of the Achaian calendar, where months were numbered. Since Messene became a member of the Achaian League only in 191 BCE, the inscription would have had to be later than that date. However, other documents that have been found more recently, including an early third-century inscription from Korone now in the Benaki Museum at Kalamata (*SEG* 48.514j, on which see Luraghi 2008: 230 n. 70) and also, it seems, a group of unpublished late fourth-century stelai from the agora of Messene (Themelis 2004: 41), provide evidence for the presence of a numeral after the tribal name. Clearly, this numeral refers to a subdivision of the tribe and not to a month.

²⁷ For *damiorgoi* as federal magistrates, one would have to look no further than Arkadia (R&O no. 32); see Roebuck 1941: 115. To be sure, civic *damiorgoi* would not be unparalleled, either: see Deshours 2004: 143, with reference to their appearance in the inscription of the mysteries of Andania (*IG* v 1, 1390, lines 116–126, from 91/0 BCE or 24 CE); but this inscription, regardless of whether we follow the high or the low chronology, dates to a period when the ephors had disappeared from Messene, unlike the two proxenies. The *damiorgoi* of *SEG* 56.476, line 7, a decree from Messene dated to the second or first century BCE, are not magistrates: since they appear to be associated to a *cheiristēs* ('manager'), they must be simply craftsmen. *Damiorgoi* (of Messene, presumably) appear also in the decree of Pylos published by Bardani 2011 and dating to the first century BCE.

The only document that may actually provide a definition of the political organization of the Messenians, apart from collective references to them as a political actor, has been generally discounted by scholars. A *koinon* of the Messenians appears in a decree dated 208 BCE, granting recognition to the festival of Artemis Leukophryene in Magnesia on the Maiander (Rigsby 93). It has been mostly maintained that here *koinon* means ‘political community’, as it often does in Greek political parlance, especially during the Hellenistic period.²⁸ It is, however, not at all clear that this conclusion is correct. Unfortunately, the inscription is mutilated precisely where the enactment formula would have appeared, so we cannot tell what the Messenians really called themselves in this decree. It is not even certain that *koinon* of the Messenians was a self-description chosen by the Messenians themselves: Chaniotis’ brilliant analysis of the way the decrees and documents that the *theōroi* from Magnesia submitted to the various communities they visited found their way into the texts of the decrees of those communities makes it conceivable, indeed quite likely, that the unparalleled label *koinon* of the Messenians may have been used by the Magnesians addressing the Messenians.²⁹ If that were the case, however, it would be worth noting that in all other inscriptions of the dossier, which would also largely echo the documents the Magnesian *theōroi* brought with themselves, the designation *koinon* is used only for federal states, with no single exception. In other words, if it was the Magnesians who called the Messenians a *koinon*, they must have thought that they were addressing a federal state. Ultimately, however, surrounded as it is by documents emanating from the *polis* of the Messenians, the decree of Magnesia can do little more than encourage the scholar to approach the evidence with an open mind.

It has to be said, however, that there is no doubt that at the time when the decree was passed, political bonds of some sort tied many of the towns of Messenia to Messene/Ithome. Indeed, the half-century that goes roughly from 230 to 180 BCE is largely occupied by the process by which such ties were progressively severed, and the Messenian towns one by one joined the Achaian League. Pylos had entered the league from before 220 BCE, and the Messenians were claiming it back at least since the time of the First Makedonian War (Liv. 27.30.13). By 197, Asine, too, had joined the Achaians, provoking the protests of the Messenians (Polyb. 18.42.7). At this point, it is extremely unlikely that Methone, given its geographical

²⁸ See Roebuck 1941: 111 and n. 12 and Rigsby 1996: 224, with further references.

²⁹ Chaniotis 1999a: 55–60.

position, may have still been under the political control of Messene. A recently published inscription, dated between 191 and 182 BCE, shows Asine, Kyparissia, and Korone providing *nomographoi* to the Achaian League (*SEG* 58.417). Finally, as a consequence of the war between the Messenians and the Achaian League in 182, Thouria, Pharai, and Abia also became independent members of the league (Polyb. 23.17.2). This final stage of the dissolution of whatever sort of regional and political organization that existed in Messenia, put an end to terminological ambiguity: at this point, we find in a document relating to border disputes between Thouria and Megalopolis, the terms ‘Messenians’ and ‘Thourians’ used without any anxiety about overlaps (*IPArk* 31 II), while the long decree from Messene on the border dispute with Megalopolis, from 178 BCE or thereabouts, is enacted simply by the *dēmos*, which in this case is unambiguously the *dēmos* of the *polis* of Messene.³⁰

Apart from the few documents discussed earlier, the Messenian federal state becomes visible only at the moment when it breaks apart. In this process, it is worth noting that the Messenians appear to claim back the *poleis* much in the same way as the Eleians did with their dependents;³¹ if this says anything about the institutional nature of the relationship between Messene/Ithome and the other Messenian *poleis* in the second half of the third century and in the first decades of the second, then we can hardly refrain from observing what could be a striking parallelism with the terminological development observed earlier, as though the process by which ‘the Messenians’ became synonymous with ‘the *polis* of Messene’ corresponded to a decrease in the autonomy of the other Messenian *poleis*.

In conclusion, it remains to consider an isolated case in which the civic ethnic of Ithome appears to be used in a political sense long after its last occurrence in this sense in the treaty with Polyperchon. This happens on a series of silver tetradrachms of the Attic standard, minted in the first decades of the second century BCE, with the traditional Messenian types of the head of Demeter and, on the other side, of Zeus Ithomatas striding, with a tripod in the background, and the legend ΜΕΣΣΑΝΙΩΝ ΙΘΩΜ. Most likely, the abbreviated word has to be completed as ΙΘΩΜ[ΑΙΩΝ], i. e., the citizens of the *polis* of Ithome.³² Catherine Grandjean has connected

³⁰ *SEG* 58.370 (the enactment clause is in line 90). On this important document, see now Luraghi and Magnetto 2012, with revised text and translation.

³¹ See esp. Polyb. 18.42.7, where the Eleians, also allies of the Aitolians at this point, are reclaiming Triphylia; for the vocabulary that described the relationship of the Eleians to their dependent *poleis*, see Chapter 14 by James Roy above.

³² On this series, see Grandjean 2003: 126–130.

this emission with the Messenian revolt against the Achaian League in 183/2 BCE. The types replicate those of the original Messenian coinage of the fourth century, whose legend was simply ΜΕΣΣΑΝΙΩΝ. No silver coinage had been minted in Messenia since c. 330 BCE, except for a few Alexander coins minted immediately before the ones that interest us, probably at the very beginning of the second century. In other words, the types of Zeus Ithomatas and the tripod and the head of Demeter were by now almost antiquarian in nature, and this encourages speculation about the legend as well. Was this a way of evoking the early times of the Messenian federal state, when its main *polis* was called Ithome and not yet Messene? We know from Pausanias (4.29.11) that in 183/2, anticipating the invasion of the army of the Achaian League, the leading Messenian politician Dinokrates blocked the passes into Messenia with troops composed, in Pausanias' words, of "Messenians from the city and as many of the *perioikoi* as lent their support." One should probably not put too much stress on the accuracy of the term *perioikoi* used by Pausanias, but one thing is clear in any case: the *polis* Messene needed help from the other Messenians to face the Achaians, and it did receive some help. It may not be too incautious to speculate that these coins, with legend and type, might have been part of an attempt at reviving the memory of the roots of the Messenian federal state, evoking the age in which 'the Messenians' and 'the Ithomaians' were not yet one and the same thing, but the latter were a subset of the former. This attempt to mobilize memories of the past would itself be consistent with the impression that the position of Messene/Ithome within the region had become, in time, more dominant, and more disagreeable to the other Messenians.

Regardless of whether our angle is political/institutional or religious, looking at Messenia as a federal state, we constantly end up taking a very centralizing perspective, driven by the centripetal pull of the big city at Mt. Ithome. In the present state of the evidence, when the other *poleis* of Messenia emerge in our sources, it is almost always because they are trying to break free of Messene/Ithome, or because the Messenians, i.e., the citizens of Messene/Ithome, are claiming them back from some other federal organization. This is in large part a result of the availability of evidence, textual as much as material, and accordingly, we may hope that ongoing Greek and Italian archaeological fieldwork on the hill of Thouria will in the coming years do something to redress this imbalance. Preliminary results are highly promising and include remains of striking monumental architecture that seems to reach

back in time to the fifth century.³³ Similar investigations in other centers of the region do not offer equally promising prospects because of the coincidence of ancient and modern settlements. However, it has to be recognized that the dramatic increase in evidence, especially epigraphic, brought about by Petros Themelis' excavations of Messene has provided very little information on Messenian federalism; at this point, this can hardly be a coincidence.³⁴

³³ For the first detailed report, see Arapoyianni 2012.

³⁴ We circle back to Roebuck's conclusions (1941: 116): "Throughout the period of Messenian independence, from the founding of the state in 369 to its incorporation into the Achaean League in 191, Messene was evidently a unified, strongly centralized state."

*Molossia and Epeiros**Elizabeth A. Meyer*

Charter a sailboat at Venice and sail, anchoring at night for a good meal and a deep sleep, down the east coast of the sparkling Adriatic. By the sixth day you will be off ancient Epeiros, a word that in Homer meant land as seen from the sea (*Od.* 3.90). The beautiful island of Corfu lies off this coast. And inland rises a mountain range, and then another, and then another, like a pattern of waves, all running generally northwest to southeast, the first and most westerly sometimes constituting a coastal cliff along the Adriatic and Ionian seas, a cliff in turn pierced by a handful of rivers that carve out their own alluvial plains. Movement along the valleys between these limestone massifs, that is northwest to southeast, is easier than movement east–west, especially across the fourth and greatest northwest–southeast mountain range, the Pindos, that separates this western realm of Greece from Makedonia and Thessaly. The coast and the valleys between the first, second, and third mountain ranges were, to the ancients, all part of Epeiros, the northern region called Chaonia and the southern Thesprotia, with good if occasionally soggy and mosquito-infested bottomland along their rivers and well-watered, rolling land between the limestone outcrops.¹ But the larger and more fertile valley between the third range and towering Pindos was, with its mountains, the area the ancients called Molossia (the name first attested in Pind. *Nem.* 7.38), a land considered geographically part of Epeiros as well. In 167 BCE the Romans made a waste of this inland region, punishing the Molossians for siding against Rome in the Third Makedonian War after Roman pressure had broken apart the Commonwealth of the Epeirotes – a regional federation of Molossians, Chaonians, and Thesprotians – at the start of that war, in 170 BCE.

Scholars interested in this rather distant corner of the Greek world have asked why this Epeirote Commonwealth (the word used here for

¹ Description, Hammond 1967: 3–23.

self-governing federal state) came to be and when Molossia (originally independent) came to be a part of it; whether Molossia (which had a king) was itself a commonwealth before melding with the Epeirotes; and, if so, how long Molossia had been such. For almost forty years there has been near-consensus: the Epeirote Commonwealth developed by 232 BCE as a small adjustment from a federal entity awkwardly called ‘the Epeirote Alliance;’ a Molossian commonwealth had been formed in the fourth century BCE; and Molossia had become part of the Epeirote Alliance at some point between 328 and 297 BCE. A story of continuous political federation, then, starting in the fourth and lasting until the mid-second century BCE. This received position is not, however, the one presented here: the author instead has argued (extensively, but elsewhere) that the Molossians never developed an independent commonwealth, only (in the third century BCE) a sense of community in partnership with their kings, and only joined their neighbors, previously their military allies, to form the Epeirote Commonwealth after the death of the last member of the royal house.²

Let us begin with a glimpse of the very end, where disagreements are minor. At some point between 175 and 170 BCE, a group acting collectively as the Epeirotes voted to honor a foreigner from Brundisium, in Italy, conferring upon him the status of *proxenos* (a kind of honorary consul), and granting to him a series of other conventional Hellenistic legal privileges and honors (*SEG* 26.703). The recorded mechanics of granting these privileges apparently show that the Epeirotes had organized a common government for themselves, which commonality would be implied not just by “the Epeirotes,” as here, but also (in other documents) by “the *ethnos* of the Epeirotes” and “the *koinon* of the Epeirotes.”³ This common government had a general, the *stratagos* of the Epeirotes, and *synedroi* with a secretary; general and secretary together dated the year of the grant. There was also a *prostatas* (“headman”) of the Molossians, listed but not grammatically part of the dating formula. Another man, Lysanias Kariopos, son of Nikolaos, made the proposal and gave an account of the honorand’s goodwill towards the Epeirotes. The meeting at which this proposal was presented, defended, and passed probably took place at Bouneima (whose calendar was used in the inscription’s dating formula), a settlement on the western slope of Pindos far away from the coast, and also (therefore) a certain distance away from Dodona, on the southwestern edge of the

² For the received version, see esp. Hammond 1967; Cabanes 1976b; Beck 1997: 135–147; S. Funke 2000; Davies 2000; Moustakis 2006: 60–90; Cabanes 2011; for the new version, Meyer 2013, based on the re-dating of many inscriptions.

³ *Ethnos*: *I. Magnesia* 32.42; *SEG* 24.448; *koinon*: *SEG* 24.450 and 451; both: *SEG* 37.709A–B.

Molossian plain, where the inscribed stone recording these events was found.⁴

What one learns from this inscription is both predictable and tantalizing. Predictable, because the granting of proxenies and privileges by a self-identifying group (“the Epeirotes”) is, by the second century BCE, a well-known phenomenon, and practiced by many a Greek commonwealth; indeed, the inscription itself gives its privileges, at the end, with a kind of wave of the hand, as if saying “all the usual, *et cetera*, you know what we mean.” Predictable, too, because the governing structures of this ethnic commonality – a general or generals, a council, a secretary, a larger group in assembly – are easily paralleled elsewhere. It is tantalizing, however, because this inscription is one of only five known decrees of “the Epeirotes”⁵ (which exist only after the death of the last Molossian king) and even all five together do not tell us as much as we would like to know, especially further details of the Epeirotes’ internal organization. The inscriptions are populated by men with personal ethnics (such as Kariopos) that are seemingly local tribal names, but whose significance is unclear; the role of the *prostatas* of the Molossians, either in inscriptions or in the commonality, is not understood; who the *synedroi* were, how they were chosen, and what the extent of their participation in the decision taken was (another inscription of the Epeirotes, *SEG* 26.702, mentions an assembly, *ekklēsia*), are all unknown. The secretary’s role would seem to be obvious, except that one of the other decrees implies financial responsibilities (*I.Magnesia* 32, lines 38, 47–48). The Epeirotes also decreed grants of *epigamia* (*SGDI* 1342), as well as citizenship (*politeia*) making a man “similar to other Epeirotes” (*SEG* 26.702) or given “according to the law” (*SEG* 26.701, lines 13–14), although how and when that law was passed are unknown. But it is the Epeirotes’ capacity as a group to determine their own fate that establishes their communal governance beyond a reasonable doubt: that they could make decisions about alliance, war, and peace is known from narratives in Polybius and Livy, as is the movement of their meetings from place to place in the northwest.⁶ A commonwealth of the

⁴ Location, see Hammond 1967: 139–140 and 660; Cabanes 1976b: 375.

⁵ In approximate chronological order, *I.Magnesia* 32, *SEG* 26.701, *SEG* 24.448, *SEG* 26.702 and 703; *SGDI* 1342 is fragmentary, but includes “of the Epeirotes.” *SEG* 24.450 and 451 signal the *koinon*’s approval of honorific statues, but include no verb of decision or dedication. *SEG* 37.709 is a fragmentary letter with a heading (“of the Epeirotes the *archontes*, the *synedroi*, and the *koinon*”), which suggests that *koinon* was not the word for the entire commonwealth.

⁶ Actions by “the Epeirotes,” e.g., Polyb. 4.16.1; 4.30.6–7; 20.2.5–6; Liv. 32.10.2; the *ethnos*, e.g., Polyb. 20.3.1. League meetings: at Phoenikē (Liv. 29.12.11; Polyb. 16.27.4); Gitana (Liv. 42.38.1); Bouneima (*SEG* 26.703, above).

Epeirotes existed, then, between 232 and 170 BCE (and indeed, by name in two different diminished forms down to c. 150 BCE, after the Romans' bitter visit) – a political commonwealth, not just a vaguely perceptible commonality and certainly more than an alliance, even if the details of its internal arrangements remain out of reach.

If one starts here, in the late third and second centuries BCE, the existence and contours of a commonwealth seem (relatively speaking) clear. But the hypothesized preceding commonwealths are difficult to discern, and the path to this last commonwealth is therefore not so straightforward. The path traced here emphasizes religion and monarchy, the continuities provided by adaptable tribal affiliations, and the gradual growth of ethnic self-consciousness. A religious amphiktyony was the first manifestation of Molossian regional organization after the tribal kingship; layered over it was then military alliance, led by the Molossian king; only after the death of the last king did a commonwealth – that of the Epeirotes – with full powers of decision come into existence. It took time, practice in cooperation, a religious center important to the entire region, and inspired leadership for the inhabitants of the larger area known as Epeiros to come to see themselves as a single *ethnos* and make for themselves a system of communal governance.

This northwestern corner of the Greek world was never intensely urbanized although, in the Hellenistic period in particular, it was prosperous and populous.⁷ The coastal areas had (comparatively) many more cities (or villages or fortified places) than Molossia itself,⁸ where the religious topography was more important, or certainly more visible, than the urban one. In the north of the Molossian plain was the site of Passaron, with a nearby temple to Zeus Areios (likely a war god);⁹ in the plain's southwestern corner was the very ancient oracular shrine of Zeus at Dodona. Known already to Homer (*Il.* 2.750; 16.234), "harsh-wintered Dodona" was tended by barefoot priests who worshipped Zeus under the open sky and listened to the rustlings of the leaves of his great oak (or even to the oak itself speaking) in order to understand the god's wishes (*Od.* 14.327–330 = 19.296–299).¹⁰ Dodona's history as a sanctuary would be lengthy and rich:

⁷ Hammond 1967: 41. 43. 658.

⁸ Funke et al. 2004: 338–350: of a total of seventy-one named and unnamed settlements, only three (including Dodona and Passaron) were in Molossia; Dausse 2004 and 2007 adds more, but of the small-village variety.

⁹ Although the identification of Radotope as Passaron's temple of Zeus and Gardiki as Passaron is doubted by Pliakou 2011: 643–644.

¹⁰ For the operation of the oracle, Parke 1967: 7–93; Johnston 2008: 63–72.

bronze dedications survive starting in the eighth century BCE, as well as *lamellae* (lead strips) recording petitioners' questions from the end of the sixth; the latter peak in the fourth and third centuries, and come to an end only with the destruction of Molossia by the Romans in 167 BCE.¹¹ Dodona was the most famous and important shrine in the entire region even by the end of the Dark Ages, acting as a magnet that pulled people into what would become Molossia's mountain-kingdom, to which otherwise most would have had few reasons to go. After 400 BCE the questioners even started to come from Athens, up through the river gorges from the *polis* of Ambrakia to the south of Molossia, or following the few difficult passes over the mountains to east and west.¹²

Homer called Zeus of Dodona "Pelagian" (*Il.* 16.233), as did Hesiod (fr. 319W, specifically Zeus' oak), while the poet of *Prometheus Unbound* referred to him as "Thesprotian" and the plain on whose edge Dodona sat, Molossian (829–31). Pindar called Dodona itself Thesprotian (fr. 263 Bowra), as did Euripides (*Phoin.* 982). This attribution of ethnic name to god or sanctuary may have been traditional, rather than an historical indicator that real Thesprotians exercised some sort of real control over the sanctuary; but sometime after the mid-fourth century the Dodonaïans themselves, and therefore also the sanctuary, were considered Molossian.¹³ This – an apparent change of control from Thesprotian to Molossian – is only the first of several ethnicity puzzles in the northwest, since even such a simple statement assumes that we know what Thesprotian and Molossian mean. But do we? Older scholarly understandings of tribes assumed a blood relationship between members, or posited that tribal members assumed (or invented) a blood relationship. But a geographical relationship can create a terminology that looks exactly the same: people who live in Dodona become Dodonaïans. For the peoples of the northwest we simply do not know what the ethnics – either the fairly large and inclusive ones like Thesprotian and Molossian, or the myriad others usually assumed to be sub-tribes of these larger ones – actually signify, beyond an asserted relationship. But as the Dodonaïans themselves show, an ethnic, an affiliation, could change, and that change might even, under some circumstances, have been a choice.

¹¹ Dedications, Dieterle 2007: 169–234; *lamellae*, Lhôte 2006: 335, 425–427.

¹² Lhôte 2006: 429–430 (in the fifth century, more petitioners from Magna Graecia, Corinthian colonies in northwest, Epeiros itself, Thessaly, and Boiotia).

¹³ Traditional, Hammond 1967: 491–492; Dodonaïans not Molossian in Hekataios *FGrH* 1 F 108; Dodonaïans as Molossians, *SGDI* 1351 (witnesses to a manumission); for date, see Meyer 2013: 35, 37, 136–7 (300–250 BCE). Strabo (7.7.11) later claimed that Dodona was first "under the Thesprotians, but later under the Molossians."

If or when control of Dodona did change hands, “becoming Molossian,” there would have been one certain consequence, for Molossians were led by kings; the kings themselves, the Aiakid dynasty, were reputedly descended from Neoptolemos, the brutal son of Achilles.¹⁴ The Thesprotians and Chaonians had supposedly once had kings as well, but even during the Peloponnesian War, when Thucydides took a brief look at them (2.80.5 and 81.4), the kings were gone, and one or both groups were led in the campaigns of that war by *prostatai*, the Chaonians indeed having two at a time, both drawn from the (formerly) royal (*archikou*, “leading”) family. The Molossians, by contrast, had kept their kings, even when their king was a child during that war, and the king’s role (with the help of a guardian, in this case) was to lead and decide. Aristotle a century later was cautiously admiring of the long-lived Molossian kingship, calling the kings “benefactors” and “less envied” because they had made themselves “less despotic and more equal [to their subjects] in habits (*ēthesin*)” (*Pol.* 1310b38–40; 1313a18–24). Molossian kings ruled, but with a light hand; they led, but by emphasizing similarity, not difference or distance, between king and followers.¹⁵ Perhaps in parallel with the two Chaonian royal-family *prostatai* there were also often two kings at a time, as was (much more consistently) the case of the Spartans, with whose kingship Aristotle grouped that of the Molossians as “more measured” (*Pol.* 1313a25–30).

For most of the century between 425 and 322 BCE, when Aristotle died, kings led and ruled the peoples and lands of Molossia, and controlled the sanctuary of Dodona. In this context belongs the first ‘political’ inscription found at Dodona, two texts (inscribed on the same stone) that grant *politeia*, in each case to a woman (*SEG* 15.384). Who grants, or indeed whose *politeia* is granted, is not specified by either text. The dating formula gives the name of the king, Neoptolemos son of Alketas; of the *prostatas* of the Molossians; of the secretary; and of a group of ten men named as *damiorgoi* (“people-workers”). Each of the last has a group ethnic: each is “of the *Ethnestoi*” or “of the *Omphales*” or “of the *Onopernoi*,” and so on, each group ethnic different, and one is an “Arktan of the *Eurymenai*,” which might refer to yet another tribal sub-division, or might be a name deriving from a *polis* called *Eurymenai* (Diod. 19.88.6). Thus at this moment in time (370–368 BCE, the only years when Neoptolemos I ruled by himself) there were smaller ethnic groups, all or almost all of which were

¹⁴ S. Funke 2000: 23–28, 38–101.

¹⁵ Further discussion, Meyer 2013: 57–58 and 121.

probably sub-groups of the *Molossoi* (scholars claim one as Thesprotian),¹⁶ while the *Molossoi* themselves have king and *prostatas*; and these smaller groups are people referred to in the genitive plural. Still, the basis of these smaller ethnic groups is, like that of the larger ones, unclear. Genitive plurals may evoke more of a sense of real people with (actual or assumed) blood relationships, but it has also been possible to locate these ethnic groups (approximately) within Molossia as well, all of them in the plain or on the inward-facing slopes of its surrounding mountains;¹⁷ and if *Eurymenai* were indeed a *polis*, then at least one designation combines an ethnic with a city-name ethnic.

Grants of *politeia* and the ten *damiorgoi* with ten different ethnics have been fundamental in identifying the organization here as political, and indeed the state as a commonwealth: a council of representatives of different peoples or districts advises, or makes a decision for, the group, the *politeia* granted is a federal citizenship, and the king is a figurehead.¹⁸ *Damiorgos* is a title found in other federal states, as is the control of such a state's administration achieved by having both *prostatas* and secretary hail from the same tribe.¹⁹ But all known Molossian sub-tribes are not included, and the lack of specificity (who grants, and what kind of citizenship?) as well as the fact that citizenship is granted to women, along with the inscription's placement in Zeus' sanctuary at Dodona, all suggest a religious purpose for the grants of citizenship and for the group of ten men.²⁰ Indeed, drawing the *prostatas* and secretary from the same tribe finds a significant parallel in the composition of the leadership cadre of the Delphic Amphiktyony, a body of men who (like other amphiktyonies elsewhere) protected and oversaw the administration of religious sites.²¹ Moreover, the men all come from Molossian sub-tribes that surround Dodona as the Delphic amphiktyons came from tribes in areas around (Thessalian Anthela and) Delphi; and neither Dodonaians nor Delphians, the closest locals, are included in the group. Despite Dodona's long

¹⁶ Onopernos as Thesprotian, *SGDI* 1351; other attributions no longer considered reliable, references at Meyer 2013: 51 n. 106. One hundred years later, an Onopernos is Molossian *prostatas* (*SEG* 26.706): is he still "Thesprotian," or has he now become "Molossian"? He is the only evidence for non-Molossian participation in "Molossian" governance, Larsen 1968: 275, 277.

¹⁷ Meyer 2013: 93–95, based on Hammond 1967: 526–532, 674–675; Cabanes 1976b: 122–128; and Cabanes 1997: 101.

¹⁸ See Hammond 1967: 529–530, 536–538; Larsen 1968: 275; Giovannini 1971: 69; Cabanes 1976b: 120–122, 167–168; Beck 1997: 142–143; S. Funke 2000: 130–135.

¹⁹ For *damiorgoi*, e.g., in the Achaian League, Larsen 1968: 86, 221–223; from same tribe a form of "engere Regierung," Corsten 1999: 201–202.

²⁰ Other sub-tribes, Meyer 2013: 52 n. 107; religious purpose, argued in Meyer 2012 and 2013: 47–57.

²¹ References in Meyer 2012: 213–214 and 2013: 55.

existence even before the fourth century BCE, we do not know, beyond the fact of priests and (by the fifth century) priestesses (Hdt. 2.53.3), how the sanctuary itself was protected or maintained. The creation of an established group drawn from neighbors to watch over sanctuary matters (cult, territory, market), nested within the light control and rudimentary tribal governance of the Molossians (king and *prostatas*), emphasizes the prestigious prominence of Dodona and its importance to the Molossians, and also accommodates the evidence of kingly leadership (even if at times poor or inept) that narrative sources so consistently attest for fourth-century Molossia.²² As Strabo later concluded, the trajectory was simple: “the *Molossoi* became powerful partly because of the kinship of their kings, who belonged to the family of the Aiakidai, and partly because the oracle of Dodona was among them, an oracle both ancient and renowned” (7.7.5).

The Molossian kings were indeed the Molossians’ undisputed and visible leaders in the fourth and third centuries. They hosted foreign envoys announcing sacred games, joined the Second Athenian Naval League (the only kings to have done so) on the Molossians’ behalf, made marriage alliances with Makedonian kings, personally accepted gifts – cities and territories – taken in war, led allies on great (or lesser) war-expeditions themselves, and minted the coinage with which those troops would be paid.²³ For the fourth century, and Molossian King Alexander I’s expedition to south Italy (Liv. 8.24), these allies are unspecified, but a story in Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 5.2), which has the Molossian kings Neoptolemos II and Pyrrhos in the early third century swearing oaths in a customary ceremony at Passaron (“a place of Molossis”) with “the Epeirotes,” suggests that these allies were Molossia’s neighbors towards the sea. According to Plutarch, these Epeirotes swore to “guard the kingdom according to the laws” (or “as was customary”: *kata tous nomous*) and the kings in turn swore “to lead (*arxein*) according to the laws.”²⁴ By this point in time, this alliance between Molossia and the Epeirote neighbors was of some standing, a matter of established rules with agreed-upon components, and probably sworn only with these specific allies. Those Epeirotes best placed

²² Kings, summarized, Meyer 2013: 60–64, 69–72, 118–131.

²³ *Theōrodoikoi*, IG IV² 1.95, line 31 and SEG 33.189, line 11, with Meyer 2013: 61–62, 64–66, 118–119, 122; Second Athenian League, R&O no. 22, lines 109–110; marriage-alliances, Meyer 2013: 63, 118, 119; Philip’s gift of three cities, [Dem.] 7.32, and Alexander V’s of Ambrakia, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6.2–3; war-leaders, Gauthier 1979: 12; minting, Meyer 2013: 75 n. 211.

²⁴ This story is often interpreted as an agreement between king and Molossians that limited the powers of the king – but only by impeaching Plutarch’s careful distinction between “Molossia” and “Epeirotes,” Cabanes 1976b: 164 and 2005: 148; S. Funke 2000: 133–134; see Meyer 2013: 58–59, 70–71, 120.

to guard or to do harm to Molossia were those two who were closest, the Thesprotians and the warlike Chaonians, whose relations with the Molossians were cordial as early as the Peloponnesian War, but who likely maintained their independent existence, their allied status, and their own *prostatai* until the creation of the Epeirate commonwealth.²⁵

In this telling, then, fourth-century Molossia remained a tribal kingdom, its kings, good or bad, the chief power in the land. Greatly prestigious for the kings and their people was the ancient sanctuary of Dodona, whose smooth administration was now overseen by an amphiktyony of men drawn from Molossian sub-tribes. As Jakob Larsen noted (1968: xiv–xv), amphiktyonies should be distinguished from other forms of common governance by their primarily administrative-religious function, as alliances should be distinguished from them either by their defined purpose or by their lack of interest in establishing common institutions that would weave separate peoples or political entities together. Neither amphiktyony nor alliance was a commonwealth, and both, rather than a commonwealth, were what the Molossian kings created in the fourth century and continued to nurture and extend in the third. Thus the aggressive Molossian king Pyrrhos would construct a still greater alliance of many peoples in the northwest, including the Akarnanians, the Athamanians, and the Apollonians.²⁶ The amphiktyony, in the dating formula for two more grants of privileges found at Dodona (at the end of the fourth century (*SEG* 54.576) and probably sometime in the middle of the third (*SEG* 26.697)),²⁷ would change the name of its supervising group – to *hieromnamones* (“remembrancers of sacred things,” as the Delphic amphiktyons were also called) and then to *synarchontes* (“fellow-leaders”) and with the last grow in number to fifteen. Even so, the distribution of those amphiktyons remained Molossian in their geography (at least as suggested by their ethnics) and new members mostly added to the existing distribution rather than replacing one sub-tribe with another.²⁸

²⁵ Warlike, Thuc. 2.81.4; cordial, drawing on Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.10, see Meyer 2013: 61; fought in separate contingents under Pyrrhos, Dion. Hal. *ant.* 20.1.2 and 5, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 19.2; Chaonian *prostatas*, two in the fifth century (Thuc. 2.80.5), one in the third and second centuries (*SEG* 26.720–1); Thesprotian *prostatas*, *SEG* 26.717 (for a third century date, Meyer 2013: 107–108); their status as independent allies in general, Meyer 2013: 61–62. 65–66. 104–113. 120 (*contra* Cabanes 1976b: 177–179 and, e.g., 2007: 235).

²⁶ Dion. Hal. *ant.* 20.1.2, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 19.2, 30.2, 30.5; discussed Meyer 2013: 98, n. 279.

²⁷ For date, Meyer 2013: 79–88; they were previously dated to the fourth century, see, e.g., Cabanes 1976b: 166–172.

²⁸ Summary in Meyer 2013: 95–100 (once, in *SEG* 54.576, a new ethnic may have substituted). Rigid membership was characteristic of the Delphic Amphiktyony as well, Lefèvre 1998a: 136–137; Sánchez 2001: 466–471.

On the other hand, the adjectival ethnics carried by the men in these later two inscriptions may reflect internal change in Molossia at a different level, for these personal ethnics – a change from genitive plurals – perhaps indicated a physical or conceptual distancing from the naming group: this ethnic conveyed affiliation while implying mobility. Molossians, like their kings, were on the move, although the kings themselves, probably from the Peiales sub-tribe (descended from a mythical ancestor, Pielos, and located in the eastern mountains), preferred to stress their affiliation to the group as a whole, calling themselves only “king” or “Molossian.”²⁹

Reading the heroic story of the restless Molossian king Pyrrhos, breathlessly chronicled in Plutarch’s *Life* and elsewhere, one can almost forget that there was a stretch of time, between the death of Alexander I (on campaign in Italy) in 331/0 BCE and the return of Pyrrhos in 297 BCE (from a youthful exile), when the kings were terribly weak. Alexander left a child-heir, with its mother as regent; the regent’s own mother, Queen Olympias, daughter of the Molossian king Neoptolemos I, widow of Makedon’s king Philip II, mother of Alexander the Great, and Molossian Alexander’s own sister, then came home and involved herself in the affairs of the kingdom. Indeed, she involved Molossians in Makedonian affairs as well, rarely to their benefit, and this resulted in heavy-handed, long-term interference of the Makedonians in Molossia. These are also years in which Molossian kings are driven out and recalled, associate themselves closely but unwisely with Olympias or other Makedonians, lose battles, and seem to prove themselves unworthy, at least at times, of the blind trust of their people and allies. At least three times the Molossians balked at their leaders’ actions, driving out two pro-Makedonian kings and putting another to death.³⁰ And at least once, indeed, “the allies of the Epeirotes” (some sort of war-alliance involving more than the traditional two allies)³¹ stepped in to grant economic privileges “in Epeiros” itself (*SGDI* 1336), within a dating framework provided by king and *prostatas*. The alliance survived and the kingship survived, but the experience of these years had consequences for the Molossians themselves, who – probably for the first time – developed a sense of their own identity as separate from that of their kings. There had been few indicators of this in the preceding two centuries, apart from the existence of *Molossoi* in literary sources and an exiguous bronze coinage “of the Molossians” in the fourth century, its circumscribed, sanctuary-related

²⁹ Peiales: Paus. 1.11.2; Cabanes 1976b: 125; S. Funke 2000: 100–101; “king,” *SGDI* 1368, 1369, and *BE* 1969.347 (all Pyrrhos); “Molossian,” Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.5 (in a dedication). This is also the terminology of fourth century literary sources for earlier kings, Aischin. 3.242 and Arist. fr. 614R of Alexander I.

³⁰ Summarized, Meyer 2013: 69–72. 122–126. ³¹ Argued, Meyer 2013: 67–69.

purpose also emphasized by its limited circulation.³² Even the mythology of heroic descent, from Pielos the son and Molossos the son or grandson of Neoptolemos, applied only to the royal family until broadened to include Trojans and extended to include the king's subjects in or by the first decade of the early third century, for its first attestation is a dedication of a Zakynthian *proxenos* "of the Molossians and their allies . . . the race of Cassandra" at Dodona (*IG IX² I.4.1750*).³³ The king was his kingdom and his people; his people followed him and, for centuries, had defined themselves through him.

After the troubles of the last thirty years of the fourth century, however – and perhaps even during those years, since in 317 they took a "common decision" (*koinon dogma*) not to follow King Aiakides into war³⁴ – the Molossians as a group, as a community, step forward more prominently.³⁵ A new temple is built at Passaron.³⁶ They become active agents in inscriptions, sometimes referring to themselves as "the Molossians," sometimes as "the *koinon* of the Molossians," once (possibly) even as the "*ek[k]lēsia* of [the Molossians]," and are responsible for granting *politeia* (seven times), *proxenos*-status (three times, once combined with *politeia*), and other honors and privileges, always to men.³⁷ Indeed, *politeia* may have been the most important benefit the Molossians offered – and perhaps in particular to those who asked, as a contemporary oracular *lamella* ("should I ask for *politeia* now or next year?") implies.³⁸ On two occasions they grant benefits with the old amphiktyonic group as part of the dating formula (*SEG* 54.576 and 26.697, the latter offering its economic privileges "in all Molossia"); both grants were to Thessalians (from Pherai and Mondaia), and the participation of the *amphiktyones* in these two grants – only – may reflect respect offered to the old mythical links between Thessaly and Dodona.³⁹ In the other eight (or possibly thirteen) cases the Molossians

³² Meyer 2013: 76, notes 216–217, to which add Talvio 2011: 314 and Gjongecaj 2011: 135–137.

³³ Molossos as son of Neoptolemos, S. Funke 2000: 100–101; inscription discussed, Fraser 2003 with Meyer 2013: 73–74.

³⁴ Diod. 19.36.3–4 (incorrectly attributed to "the Epeirotes"), with Meyer 2013: 69–72 and 123–124.

³⁵ For *koinon* as "community," see esp. Hammond 1991.

³⁶ Dakaris 1956: 66; Moustakis 2006: 164–169; but see also above n. 9.

³⁷ "Molossians," *SEG* 54.576 and 26.699, *SGDI* 1340, 1341, and 1344 (restored); *koinon*, *SEG* 26.697, *SGDI* 1334, 1337, and 1343 (both restored); *ekklesia*, *SGDI* 1335.

³⁸ Only once, *SGDI* 1340, is it certain that *politeia* was not given (other grants are fragmentary). *Lamella*, Lhôte 2006: 145–147, no. 61 B (c. 300–250), with *SEG* 56.656; a grant from the Epeirote commonwealth (*SEG* 26.702) later specifically gives *politeia* to a man who asked.

³⁹ Ainianes and Perrhaibians, later Thessalians, lived around Dodona in *Il.* 2.749–750; Hdt. 7.176.4; stories of the oracle being brought to Dodona from Thessaly summarized in Parke 1967: 38–39. Mondaia also had a Themis cult, as did Dodona; on the treasure of this cult the *koinon* of the Mondaia consulted Dodona (Lhôte 2006: 47–51 no. 8 B).

honor on their own.⁴⁰ The Molossians become more conscious of themselves, and through their inscribing more visible to us, but as a people in cooperation with their king rather than declaring their independence from him, for the grants continue to nest within the dating structure provided by the old Molossian institutions of king and *prostatas*, the latter now more commonly identified as “of the Molossians” although his role is no clearer.⁴¹

The benefactions the Molossians chose to bestow connect them quite emphatically to honors granted elsewhere in the third-century Greek world. Unlike the grants of *politeia* to women in the fourth century, which were internal actions with religious consequences undertaken for a local audience, the honors bestowed in the third century announced that the Molossians were joining the wider Greek economy of honors, inscribing grants whose contents would have been comprehensible to all other Greeks. There was still much that was quite odd and different about Molossia – its king, for one – but the actions undertaken by the Molossians as a group convey a strong desire to participate in an established and widespread paradigm of Greek behavior. Such behavior also, however, required an honoring body, not just an honorand. And so it may well be that the Molossians come into better focus as a group in the third century not just for internal reasons of new communal self-definition, but also in order to play this honoring role better, as the Makedonians once called themselves a *koinon* to honor their king (*IG* IX 4.1102). The Molossians take no other decisions we know of, at least epigraphically: the inscriptions in which the Molossians feature is an honorific epigraphy, albeit one not yet standardized (e.g., in its dating) into totally predictable formulae.⁴² Recipients of honors were (as far as we can tell) always those whose cities or peoples were not in formal alliance with the king.⁴³ For allies, the fact of alliance might have been honor enough; and Pyrrhos (for example) also honored friends individually by including them among his companions.⁴⁴ Otherwise, important political decisions, especially about alliance and war, but even, also, about accepting requests to grant *asylia* (“inviolability,” one of the standard honors) were in this century still made by the king.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ In five cases the inscriptions are fragmentary: *SGDI* 1366, *SEG* 26.699, *SGDI* 1345 (*SGDI* dated after 242), and possibly *SGDI* 1367.

⁴¹ Meyer 2013: 45, 125 n. 390. ⁴² Meyer 2013: 23 n. 46; 36 n. 81; 38.

⁴³ Meyer 2013: 100–104, 127–131.

⁴⁴ Esp. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 20.4 (invitation to C. Fabricius); see Meyer 2013: 128 n. 402.

⁴⁵ Gauthier 1979: 12; Hammond 1967: 562; Meyer 2013: 127 n. 401. *Asylia*, *IG* IX 1² 4.1474 = *SEG* 51.1059, with Hatzopoulos 2007a.

In the third century Molossians and king worked together as they had for centuries, the troubles of the last thirty years of the fourth century notwithstanding. Kings were still the leaders, although “the Molossians” were developing their own sphere of honor-based actions, and Molossians were valued contingents in Pyrrhos’ army of many allies, specifically supplying rearguards and horsemen (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 30.2, 5). It was Pyrrhos who made the city of Ambrakia (received as a gift from Alexander V of Makedon in 295, and in older times an arrogant and independent *polis*) into his capital city – the kind of capital city his Molossians had never had – and adorned it appropriately.⁴⁶ And a third project grandly regal in conception and execution but probably also reflecting collaborative interest was the glorification of the sanctuary of Dodona, where the honorific inscriptions were found. It was in the third century that this sanctuary was built up tremendously: adorned with new buildings (the theater in particular, and possibly a *prytaneion* and *bouleutērion*), inscribed dedications, and honorific statues, Dodona also became the site of the Naia, a new and high-profile penteteric festival with athletic and tragic competitions.⁴⁷ This ambitious transformation also responded, as the royal beautification of Ambrakia and the honorific inscriptions did, to perceptions of an existing paradigm – the great sanctuary with the great festival – and helped to bring yet more visitors to Dodona.⁴⁸ In this way Dodona, like Dion for the Makedonians, became a showplace for achievements of king and people, for shields taken in battle were dedicated (sometimes Pyrrhos even dedicated his own, Paus. 1.13.3), and treaties displayed.⁴⁹ So closely associated with political and military achievements did the sanctuary become that it is not surprising to learn of the Aitolians’ glee in destroying it (and “all the dedications”) in 219 BCE, these enemies devoting special attention to the destruction of the colonnades and the “sacred house” of Zeus because they were adorned with military trophies and treaties (Polyb. 4.67.3; Diod. 26.4.7).

The transformation of Dodona into a showplace in the third century, before as well as after the death of the last king, is the culmination of one story’s trajectory, that of the growth into settled power and confidence of the kingdom of Molossia, with its king, its *prostatas*, its tribe of

⁴⁶ Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6.2–3; Meyer 2013: 129 n. 412.

⁴⁷ Third century, see references in Meyer 2013: 34 notes 72–73, 89–90, with Moustakis 2006: 90–126 and, now, Gravani 2007–2008: 61–63 (late fourth/third century date for *prytaneion*; identification and date doubted by Emmerling 2012: 211–228, but perhaps now strengthened by a later reference to the Molossians’ “common hearth,” SEG 57.510; at 230–236 she is skeptical about Pyrrhos’ involvement at Dodona). Naia: Cabanes 1988.

⁴⁸ Evidence collected in Meyer 2013: 103–104 n. 288.

⁴⁹ Parallel with Dion, Hatzopoulos and Mari 2004; shields, SGDI 1368 (c. 279 BCE), BE 1969.347 (c. 274 BCE); BE 1976.345 (Alexander II). Treaties: IG ix² 1.3.13–16, with Dakaris 1971: 23, 46.

Molossians – and the Molossians’ own sense of themselves, both in what they were and in the honor they could bestow. But Dodona was more than just a showcase, and more than a showcase for just Molossian achievements. It was an ancient and important religious center, and continued to operate as one. Kings consulted the oracle; the gods worshipped there – for Zeus at some point, possibly in the fourth century, had been joined by Dionē, Apollo, and Themis – received sacrifice and gifts of land; inscribed releases, sales, or manumissions of slaves were deposited there, the recorded witnesses to these acts coming from both within and outside Molossia proper; the new festival honored the gods but also contributed to the sanctuary’s prestige and wealth, gave rise to a new official called the *naiarchos*, and probably added financial duties to the tasks of the amphiktyons, which their new title of *synarchontes* (which elsewhere had financial implications) may also attest.⁵⁰ Dodona may also have functioned as a meeting place in the spring for those on the move with their flocks, for even in the sixth century the area was famous for its cattle and sheep, and in the third century royal herds and Pyrrhos’ own interest in animal husbandry (the best breed of cattle was named after him, and he forbade breeding of excessively young animals) make clear that cattle and sheep were important elements of the entire area’s economy.⁵¹ Alexander I’s alliance of inland pasture with coastal plain may in fact also have enabled or simplified, after 334 BCE, the long-distance movement of animals up to Molossia in the summer and down to Thesprotia and Chaonia in the winter. As this old alliance strengthened with time, as new allies joined Pyrrhos, and as the area became more integrated both militarily and economically, the central node that was the sanctuary at Dodona became more and more important. The mature and assured splendor of the kingdom of Molossia in the third century is the first story, but Dodona and Pyrrhos are at the heart of a second story’s trajectory, that of Molossia *and* Epeiros, and with it the growing sense of an Epeirote rather than merely Molossian community.

The sanctuary at Dodona had in a sense always belonged to all the people of the region, and had been characterized even as early as Pindar as

⁵⁰ Kings consult, Liv. 8.24.1–2 (Alexander I), Cass. Dio 9.40.6 and *FGrH* 532 F C40 (Pyrrhos); sacrifice, Emmerling 2012: 211–228. 251–255; property to Dionē, *SEG* 26.715; Dionē, Themis, Apollo, Lhôte 2006: 75–76 no. 21, 198–201 no. 94; slave-documents, Meyer 2013: 91–100. 136–61; *naiarchos*, *SGDI* 1356, agonothete, *SEG* 54.578; and “judges of the Naia” also, *SGDI* 1370; implications of *synarchontes*, Davies 2000: 253 (Athens and Delos).

⁵¹ Meeting place, Hatzopoulos and Mari 2004: 512 (spring); cattle and sheep, Hekataios *FGrH* 1 F 26.8–10; Arist. *de animal.* 3.21; herd, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5.5; Pyrrhos, Plin. *nat.* 8.176.

(at least geographically) part of Epeiros, not merely Thesprotian or Molossian: “far-stretching Epeiros . . . from Dodona to the Ionian strait” (*Nem.* 4.51–53). The “allies of the Epeirotes” posted at Dodona their bronze grant of privileges “in Epeiros” (*SGDI* 1336). As Pyrrhos and his successors chose to enhance, beautify, and publicize Dodona, they were making a statement not of exclusively Molossian achievement but of Dodonan regional centrality. Pyrrhos’ great achievements abroad would not have been possible without his many Epeirote allies, and historians of later periods saw Pyrrhos as Epeirote, even as an Epeirote king, while Plutarch, drawing on Pyrrhos’ own court-historian Proxenos, carefully distinguished throughout his *Life* of the king between Pyrrhos’ own Molossians and the wider group of allied Epeirotes, who expressed great enthusiasm for Pyrrhos and his heroic leadership, nicknaming him “the eagle.”⁵² Pyrrhos was the greatest man of war of his generation, both a gifted leader and a tremendous hand-to-hand fighter – inspirational to his followers, as if he had stepped out of the heroic age into their own; an Alexander the Great for their own time. And it appears that fighting with him, and sharing in his manifold successes, was an experience that could take individual allied peoples – still brigaded as ethnic units⁵³ – and give them a larger identity as well: Epeirote as well as Thesprotian, Athamanian but also Epeirote. And so at least one of the shields at Dodona was dedicated by Pyrrhos along with “the Epeirotes and the Tarentines” (*SGDI* 1368), and another fragment of a bronze dedication included the words “king” and, on the next line, “the Epeirotes” (*SEG* 47.823). The model for this new identity, formed without the loss of a sense of belonging to one of the many sub-units, was presumably the *Molossoi* themselves, animated by events into a self-conscious whole but comprising also self-defining and -affiliating sub-tribal units. And this new sense of Epeirote identity brought into consciousness by the exhilaration and rewards of fighting with Pyrrhos had its roots in dragon’s teeth sown earlier, for it was under the warrior King Alexander I (343–331/0) of Molossia that limited quantities of a coinage “of the Epeirotes” were minted.

This earliest “of the Epeirotes” coinage had already linked Epeirote identity to the sanctuary at Dodona by relentlessly employing images associated with that shrine: the head of Zeus (or Zeus and Dionē), oak

⁵² Later historians, references in Meyer 2013: 73 n. 200; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5.1; 5.7; 7.5; 10.4; 12.7; 13.6, and eagle at 10.1. In the geographical sense, *ēpeirōtika ethnē* are found as early as Hekataios *FGrH* 1 F119.

⁵³ Above n. 25, to which add Ambrakiotēs and Thessalians (Dion. Hal. *ant.* 20.1.2–3; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 17.3).

leaves, thunderbolts, and eagles.⁵⁴ Pyrrhos adopted all this iconography for the coinage with which he paid his troops, and Epeirote, Alexandrian, and Pyrrhan issues all borrowed such symbols not only from each other but also from the earlier “of the Molossians” coinage.⁵⁵ Indeed, although the “of the Molossians” coinage was the earliest to use many of these symbols, reaffirming the specific Molossian association with Dodona, other local coinages (like that of the Chaonians) soon reproduced them as well, and it seems likely that the later local Epeirote issues in Dodona not only continued what was a regional trend but accelerated it, inspired by the kings’ campaign coinages, by which the Epeirote issues were always outnumbered and with which they shared many images and technical details.⁵⁶ Epeirote issues, unlike Molossian issues, also introduced bulls, another reminder of pastoralist obsessions across the region.⁵⁷ Dodona, Molossians, and Epeirotes had by Pyrrhos’ time long been associated in the coinage that served sanctuary purposes or that paid soldiers, an association that Pyrrhos could continue to exploit.

The gradual development of the concept of an *ethnos* of Epeirotes, a kind of super-identity constructed over rather than replacing other affiliations, perhaps permits a retrospective re-evaluation of the dynamic by which tribal names acquired meaning in this part of the northwest. Dramatically numerous (at least 14 tribes and 157 sub-tribes are known, even before 167 BCE⁵⁸) some ethnics appeared more frequently than others, and tribal affiliations (such as Orestan to Molossian, or even Molossian to Epeirote) could, and continued to, change.⁵⁹ For specific sub-tribal ethnics to gain in visibility and significance or for changes of affiliation to occur, it seems that some sort of reason to draw distinctions or to look for commonalities or to feel a kindred spirit needed to be suggested or experienced. In the northwest, these reasons (before 232 BCE) were almost always

⁵⁴ Franke 1961: 125–132; coinage “of the Epeirotes” begins soon after 342 BCE, Oikonomidou-Karamesini 1984: 42 and 1994: 174.

⁵⁵ Pyrrhos, Franke 1961: 256–257; S. Funke 2000: 206–207; Borba Florenzano 1992. Alexander I: Vlasto 1926; Franke 1961: 89–81. 259. Overlap with “Molossian,” Franke 1961: 89–91. 117. 252–258. For the same symbols under the later Epeirote commonwealth, Moustakis 2006: 126–128.

⁵⁶ Chaonians, Gjongecaj 2011: 141; also Kassopē (from 232 to 167), Franke 1961: 64. 76–79; Pandosia (after 167), Franke 1961: 108–109. Numbers, Oeconomides 1990: 270 (chart); Pyrrhos and “Epeirotes” issues, Franke 1961: 118–120 (close stylistic ties in 69.8 per cent of the cases).

⁵⁷ Franke 1961: 91. 122. 125–126. 161–164.

⁵⁸ Fourteen tribes in the fourth century BCE, Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 382; sub-tribes, Cabanes 1976b: 134–141.

⁵⁹ Orestan, Cabanes 2011: 83 n. 11; Meyer 2013: 82 n. 237; Molossians cease to be “Epeirotes” after 170, see below; and after 163 a number of Molossian, Chaonian, and Thesprotian ethnics are found among the *Prasaiboi*, Cabanes and Drini 2007: 242–243.

provided, directly or indirectly, by the kings themselves. “Molossian” was the name acquired by those without a heroic genealogy of their own who followed kings descended from Molossos; a king likely constructed the Dodonan amphiktyony from members of different Molossian sub-tribes around that sanctuary, giving a religious significance to their ethnics that would fossilize into prominence over the following century; during the reign of a king building alliances at home and dreaming of conquest in the West, the first Epeirate coinage was minted, along with the coins in the king’s own campaign chest, both with themes that called to mind the Dodona divinities. The damaging disruptions at the end of the fourth century, and especially the ineptitude or bad behavior of some of the kings, helped to produce a new sense of Molossian identity, and a manifestation of that identity in the granting of honors to foreigners. The kings in the third century also encouraged followers and allies, both Molossian and Epeirate, to feel that they were a signal part of their success, and directed their attentions to Dodona as the central place to express that success. Kings, in short, could activate already existing tribal units or geographic designations, large or small, at specific moments infusing some of these with new meanings that then, and especially over the third century, took on a reality and an emotional life of their own.

Even so, much of the history of Molossia and Epeiros was preparing the way, at a level below that of conscious regal agency, for the construction and experience of a lived *ethnos* of the Epeirates that was to include the Molossians: by the middle of the third century there was geographical propinquity, an accepted common name, an acknowledged sacred center, myths of common descent, a shared history, a sense of solidarity, and a distinctive and shared culture.⁶⁰ Yet even all this did not necessitate the final transformation of the Epeirates into a state. As happened in the history of so many other Greek leagues, it was fear of enemies and of the future that finally helped to bring “the Epeirates” into political existence. The Molossian king Alexander II, son of Pyrrhos, died c. 243–240 BCE,⁶¹ leaving behind two young sons. Both died in the course of the next decade, and the fall of the Molossian Aiakid house was finally and dramatically punctuated by the murder in 232 BCE of Deidameia,

⁶⁰ Propinquity, Larsen 1968: xvi–xvii; other factors, Smith 1986: 22–30. Myths of common descent included myths that connected royal families of Molossia, Thesprotia, and Chaonia, as well as myths that viewed the area as a unity, see Meyer 2013: 120 n. 359. “Shared culture,” see Strabo 7.7.8 and 7 fr. 2; transhumant practices contribute to this as well.

⁶¹ Rigsby and Hallof 2001: 342–345.

granddaughter or great-granddaughter of Pyrrhos,⁶² in Ambrakia. After this, there was a distant Aiakid daughter in Sicily but no sons, and enemies all around – not only the hostile Ambrakians, who would finally pull free from the alliance after 232, but also shifty Aitolians to the south, equivocal Makedonians to the east, and opportunistic Illyrians to the north, Illyrians who were soon to sack the Chaonian city of Phoinikē, “the richest” and “most powerful city in Epeiros” (Polyb. 2.8.4, 2.6.8). Very soon after 232, “the Epeirotes” (a commonwealth including both the western Epeirotes and the Molossians) are seen to start making difficult decisions for themselves, their inexperience perhaps revealing itself in some dizzying shifts of military allegiance even in the first four years.⁶³ It was the disappearance of the kings and the ensuing perils that constituted the last prompt, or indeed push, that turned this new perception of Epeirote *ethnos* into a political entity.

The commonwealth that was “the Epeirotes,” led by generals,⁶⁴ differed from the alliance that preceded it because it made its own decisions – it was not a military entity sworn into existence by the Molossian king himself and led by that king. It also differed from the Dodonan amphiktyony that preceded it in its responsibilities, powers, and institutions. It had a council whose members were known as *synedroi*, with whom the secretary was now clearly associated (unlike before).⁶⁵ These *synedroi* were never listed by name, inscribed documents reveal a process of presenting, defending, and voting on proposals not (the details imply) attested previously, and Molossians, Thesprotians, and Chaonians were all included in the Epeirote commonwealth, as they had not been in the amphiktyony. Such inclusion was signaled by naming practices and varying meeting locations, while the retention or even enhancement of a sense of local affiliation and identity is suggested by the persistence of tribal *prostatai* and regional religious centers, as well as by one example of the seal of a sub-tribe and the renewal of a grant of local honors by a sub-tribal community, the *koinon* of the Aterargoi near Passaron.⁶⁶ That these local or regional-tribal

⁶² Just. *Epit.* 28.3; exact family relation unclear, see Hammond 1967: 591–592 and Cabanes 1976b: 42–65.

⁶³ Summarized, Meyer 2013: 132–133.

⁶⁴ Whether there were three (*praetores*, Liv. 29.12.11), or one general and two *prostatai* (Cabanes 1976b: 359–362), is still debated.

⁶⁵ Secretary clearly associated in *I. Magnesia* 32.38–9 and 48, SEG 26.703; *synedroi* only in SEG 37.709.

⁶⁶ Naming practices, e.g., “Epeirote from the Thesprotians” or “from the Chaonians” (*IG* iv² 1.98, lines 19–20; *IG* ii–iii² 2313, line 34 = *SIG*³ 1076), with Funke et al. 2004: 339. Meeting locations, above n. 6. Regional religious centers, Moustakis 2006: 170–171. Seal: of the *Onopernoioi*, found at Gitana (before 167 BCE), Preka-Alexandri and Stoyas 2011: 679. Local honors: *philia* and *proxenia*

koina were not organizations that reported such decisions to the Epeirote *synedroi* is suggested, however, by the fact that while the tribal *prostatai* were integrated into the dating formula for the granting of local honors and for manumissions (undertaken by private citizens), they were not integrated into the dating formulae in the acts of “the Epeirotes.”⁶⁷ The Epeirote commonwealth rested on top of other commonalities, but did not necessarily depend on them or interact with them. Dodona continued to be the major religious center of the Epeirotes, and its rebuilding after the Aitolian destruction of 219 BCE was undertaken in a grand style, men of importance to the league were honored with bronze statues wearing military garb; it was (possibly) home to the commonwealth’s mint; and the Naia were raised to be crown games.⁶⁸ Members of the commonwealth – specifically the “*polis* of the Chaonians” – as well as outsiders continued to consult the oracle.⁶⁹ Between 230 and 220 BCE it was a destination of religious envoys, *theōroi* from Delphi, probably because of its established significance to the Epeirotes (since *theōroi* had not stopped at Dodona before) – although the *theōroi* stopped in Phoinikē and Kassopē as well, the first certainly, the second possibly, affiliated with “the Epeirotes.”⁷⁰

In addition to continuing the emphasis on Dodona, “the Epeirotes” continued the tradition of conferring honors on outsiders, adding, now,

with the *Pergamioi* renewed (*SEG* 26.719), and both groups have their own *prostatai*; the *Pergamioi* appear to be Thesprotian (see Meyer 2013: 106 n. 298). *SGDI* 1370 is restored as an honor from the [*koinon*] of the Thesprotians; for date, Meyer 2013: 108–110.

⁶⁷ Local honor, *SEG* 26.719 and *I.Bouthrotos* 7 (Chaonian); *prostatai* dating manumissions, no. 75 in Cabanes 1976b, *SEG* 26.704 and 709, *SGDI* (chaonian restored) 1350 (of the Molossians); no. 49 in Cabanes 1976b (of the Thesprotians; for date, Meyer 2013: 107–108); *SEG* 26.720 and 721 (to be restored in line 2), with *I.Bouthrotos* 1–6 (Chaonian). In league documents: *SEG* 24.448 has no dating formula; *prostatas* does not appear in *I.Magnesia* 32 or *SEG* 26.701; in nominative in *SEG* 26.702 and 703 (all from Dodona except *I.Magnesia* 32, which was, however, to be inscribed there). Hammond 1967: 653 thought the *synedroi* “representatives of tribal states,” while Cabanes 1976b: 368–369 and 379–383 argued for local *prostatai* protecting people against the power of the league and local *koina* subordinate to regional and Epeirote *koina*.

⁶⁸ Rebuilding, summarized Hatzopoulos and Mari 2004: 508, also included the stoa added to the *prytaneion*, in front of which 26 statue bases were found, Gravani 2007–8: 63–67. 80. A bema was built by the Athenians (*I.Magnesia* 32.36). Honored: *SEG* 24.449, 450, and 451. Bronze statues: Katsikoudis 2005: 79–122. 133–166 (62 statue base fragments, 98 bronze fragments), and 182–183, with Ma 2008. Mint: Franke 1961: 92 n. 47. 150. Crown games, Cabanes 1988: 74–79.

⁶⁹ Lhôte 2006: 59–61 no. 11 (for date after 230, see Meyer 2013: 20 n. 33), about moving the temple of Athena Polias.

⁷⁰ Plassart 1921: 65–67, IV.31, IV.51–52; date, Hatzopoulos 1991. Phoenikē hosted meetings (above n. 6); Kassopē: Cabanes 1976b: 201–202 argued for independence after 232, but association perhaps suggested by no. 13 in Cabanes 1976b, a fragmentary inscription found at Passaron with “*Apeirōtōn*” and “[*Kassopa[iou]*,” by Kassopē’s signing on to *I.Magnesia* 32 (Rigsby 2001: 186–187), and Kassopē’s fate in 167 (Meyer 2013: 112 n. 319).

honors to insiders as well. It may have been easier for the commonwealth to agree on honors (*politeia* again prominent)⁷¹ – to Magnesians *theōroi*, a Boiotian, an Achaian, a Brundisian, a Thesprotian, a Molossian – than on how they as Epeirotes could best protect themselves, for the external pressures were tremendous: after 230 (Polyb. 2.12.7), the Romans entered into what was already an area populated by a volatile mix of potential friends and traditional enemies. Throughout the centuries of Molossian pre-eminence the greatest foes had always been to the north (the Illyrians) and, on and off, to the east (the Makedonians), with meddling occasionally experienced from those who entered from the south (the Athenians); but now not only were southeastern foes (the piratical Aitolians) stronger, but this new power to the west had a more dramatic impact on the coast than on the inland, straining the new commonwealth itself. Allies of Pyrrhos and Alexander II to the north gradually slipped into a “Roman protectorate,”⁷² and it was eventually Rome’s final war with the Makedonians that imposed a choice on the Epeirote commonwealth that broke it apart, the Chaonians and northern Thesprotians going over to Rome, the mountain Molossians and southern Thesprotians allying with Makedon. This fateful moment of changed affiliation made the Molossians no longer Epeirotes but Molossians again, for an anxious local *koinon* now asked the oracle at Dodona “whether it was safe to affiliate (*sympoleiteuousei*) with the Molossians.”⁷³ As it turned out, it was not, since the Romans under Aemilius Paullus in 167 destroyed 70 *oppida* (Liv. 45.34.6) and enslaved 150,000 persons, essentially obliterating an entire people and turning Molossia into a vast emptiness from which it apparently never fully recovered (Strabo 7.7.9).

From some communities and from the Epeirote commonwealth, *prostatai* and *koina* survived. Whether they actually governed and whether they made significant decisions is not always clear, and the latter is perhaps to be doubted, since Roman hegemony over the region and its people was now decisive, if intermittently enforced. But *prostatai* continue to appear in dating formulae, and four self-identifying groups vote honors: one was “the *koinon* of the Epeirotes

⁷¹ Given in *I. Magnesia* 32, *SEG* 26.701, 24.448, and 26.702, the last two stressing that recipients would be “like Epeirotes” or that privileges ran in Epeiros.

⁷² Hammond 1967: 599.

⁷³ Lhôte 2006: 51–55 no. 9 (name not preserved); in Polyb. 30.7.2 the *ethnos* of the Molossians joins the Makedonians.

around Phoinikē” (*SIG*³ 653A.4 = *I.Alexandreia Troas* 5.4, and 653B), under the ferocious control of the local tyrant Charops the Younger (Polyb. 30.12.1; 32.5–6); one, a few years later, was “the *koinon* of the Epeirotes” (*SIG*³ 654A and *I.Oropos* 433.3); one calling itself “the *koinon* of the Prasaiboi” voted six decrees, to run “in Prasaibia”;⁷⁴ and the last, calling themselves “the Molossians,” in 140–130 BCE honored judges from Thessaly for judging justly between the Molossians and the Akarnanians (*SEG* 57.510). Here three Thessalian Larisans are made *proxenoi*, and are given other privileges and honors in Molossia. The language is familiar from the decrees of the Epeirote commonwealth (and elsewhere) but even more fulsome – praise and crowns are decreed as well – and the Molossians again control Dodona and assert claims to a territory in which the honors are to run. The Thessalians, in the heading, called them a *koinon*, while the Molossians call themselves an *ethnos* (for the first time), and refer to their common hearth and laws. But what has been reconstituted here? To be sure, some Molossian-Kassopaian coins had been minted after 168 BCE, the sanctuary had been in part rebuilt, and the Naia may have revived between 146 and 130 BCE.⁷⁵ Yet the same man, Menedamos the Argead, appears both as Molossian *prostatas* in this inscription and as a priest – and the only named minting authority – in a short-lived series of Dodonan coins;⁷⁶ such prominence, enjoyed by only one man, is uneasily reminiscent of the cruel domination of Charops in Phoinikē. Moreover, in this last inscription, as in the others from the region after 167 BCE, no *politeia* is granted. This may be purely a coincidence, but it may also hint that belonging to the group is no longer seen as having pre-eminent value. While it is possible that groups exist to do more than grant honors, the granting of honors has come to be what they do best, and indeed may be the only role they are now allowed.

Self-awareness, identity, a sense of the group, honor: all of these grew over time in the northwest, helped along especially by the Molossian kings. At times, these changes expressed themselves reflexively or defensively, and once even in the developed form of a commonwealth, a self-governing state. But after war and geography pulled apart the peoples whom war and

⁷⁴ *I.Bouthrotos* 8–11 (the earliest c. 150 BCE); there are *prostatai* here as well.

⁷⁵ Molossian-Kassopaian coinage, Franke 1961: 81–84, discussed Martin 1975: 244–246; rebuilding, Moustakis 2006: 148 n. 527; Naia, Cabanes 1988: 67–69.

⁷⁶ Franke 1961: 31–34, 37–39, 308–311, with *BE* 2011.357 (Lhôte), on Menedamos.

kings had encouraged to grow together, and when the great regional commonwealth was no longer possible, memories and sense of self remained, as did the damaged sanctuary of Dodona. Both were slowly re-established and rebuilt, if only in innocuous ways that would not disturb the new ruling power: the last time any *koinon* appears epigraphically at Dodona, it is honoring Livia, fearsome wife of the emperor Augustus (*SEG* 23.472).

*Federal Makedonia**Miltiades Hatzopoulos*

Until the beginning of the last century ancient Makedonia was largely a *terra incognita*. Even after liberation from the Ottoman rule in 1912, very little progress was made in the exploration and delimitation of its territory or in the discovery of the identity and history of its ancient inhabitants, because of the devastating wars that plagued this part of Europe until 1949.¹ Under such conditions it was inevitable that the imaginations of scholars, incensed by the fascinating personality of Alexander the Great, should run wild in their attempt to fill the gaps left by a lacunose literary tradition and practically non-existent archaeological research.² It was also only natural that the largely arbitrary reconstructions of the Makedonian state should be heavily influenced by the national experiences of each one of them and the intellectual trends of their time. Thus, ancient Makedonia could in turn be modeled on nineteenth-century Prussia, Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Homeric Ithaka, Merovingian France, or the African jungle (Hatzopoulos 2006: 95–96). Nevertheless, one could distinguish two main schools of thought: the orthodox, essentially German, tradition, attached to the theory of a primitive democratic kingship of Homeric or Indo-Germanic origin,³ and a revisionist theory, the first exponent of which was Pietro de Francisci. According to de Francisci, Makedonia, after remaining for centuries a *Heerkönigtum*, suddenly became an absolute monarchy of oriental type.⁴ Whereas the supporters of both the orthodox tradition and of the revisionist school applied themselves to the study of early Makedonia, for which there was little literary or archaeological evidence, André Aymard turned to the study of Hellenistic Makedonia,

¹ See Hatzopoulos 2011a: 35–42, with references.

² For what follows, see Hatzopoulos 1997: 7–25.

³ For the most systematic exposition of this thesis, see Granier 1931.

⁴ De Francisci 1947: 345–355. His main latter-day followers are R. M. Errington (in particular Errington 1978; see, however, Errington 2007 for a more nuanced appreciation) and E. N. Borza (1999: 27–49), both influenced by Badian 1964.

much richer in literary and especially in epigraphic documents which were unearthed, if not yet in Makedonia itself, in other parts of the Greek world. From the middle of the twentieth century he successfully pursued a judicious distinction first made by Elias Bickerman (1938: 6–7), recognizing the originality of the ‘national’ character of the Makedonian and Epeirote kingships – as opposed to the personal monarchies of the Ptolemies and the Seleukids – which made them comparable to other *ethnos*-states of Greece, such as Thessaly, Aitolia, or Akarnania.⁵

While the academic controversy was well under way, the resumption and spectacular extension of archaeological exploration in Makedonia after the end of the Civil War in 1949 started to bring forth new evidence, which radically modified the very basis of the debate on the nature of the Makedonian state. In effect, such was the entrenchment of a primitivist vision of ancient Makedonia – equally shared by orthodox constitutionalists and by revisionist supporters of the absolutist school – that until then scholarly discussion was exclusively focused on the respective powers of the king and the *ethnos* assembly, while nobody envisaged the possibility that the rights of the Makedonian *ethnos* might be exerted in some field other than the occasional meetings of Makedonians in arms. It was to that vision that more recent discoveries brought a resounding contradiction.

Today, the relation between the Greek type of city – the very concept of which was declared as something ‘un-Makedonian’ – and ancient Makedonia, hitherto described as a feudal state and an ‘enemy of the *polis*-state’, emerges now in a different light. The cradle of the Makedonian power west of the Axios, that is to say Pieria and Bottia, counted no fewer than fifteen cities at the close of the Classical period (Hatzopoulos and Paschidis 2004: 794–809). Moreover, thanks to the work carried out by archaeologists, it is now easy to verify that these cities with their defensive walls, theaters, gymnasiums, porticos, and sanctuaries had the same features as any other city in the Greek world. Even Upper Makedonia, traditionally considered as living in a tribal past even after the Roman conquest, does not appear alien to the *polis* culture, as shown by the results of excavations at Aiane, the capital of the Upper Makedonian kingdom of Elimeia (Hatzopoulos 2003c and 2011b).

Another peremptory assertion proved equally erroneous, to wit that Makedonia possessed no religious center. The discovery at Dion of the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus, with its porticos, royal documents and trophies, its theater and stadium, revealed a religious center comparable

⁵ See his various contributions, collected in Aymard 1967.

to the federal sanctuaries of the Epeirotes at Dodona or of the Aitolians at Thermos.⁶ However, even those who admitted the existence of urban centers excluded the possibility that their inhabitants practiced any form of political activity. The reasons invoked might vary from the supposed incompatibility of the Makedonian assembly with civic autonomy, according to those following the orthodox tradition of a constitutional kingship, to the supposed absence of all experience in assemblies, according to the supporters of the revisionist absolutist school.

Although until the last quarter of the twentieth century evidence of civic life in Makedonia remained scanty and the rare documents available were either ignored or misinterpreted as concerning the so-called coastal Greek cities of the realm exclusively, three scholars (Jean Kalleris, Fanoula Papazoglou, and Nicholas Hammond) dared to defy the *communis opinio*, drawing attention to the scattered literary attestations of civic life in the cities, to the fewer than half-a-dozen published civic decrees, and to the lists of Makedonian cities from Epidauros and Delphi.⁷

The discovery of new epigraphic documents in Makedonia itself and elsewhere, and their systematic collection and publication, permitted a new synthesis. It appeared that between the death of Perdikkas II in 360 and the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE the territory of Makedonia proper (with the exception of royal land) was systematically divided into autonomous civic entities formally endowed with a legal personality, which were regrouped in three (later four) military, but also administrative districts later (if not already at the time of their inception) known as *merides* (Hatzopoulos 1996a: 231–260). The instigator of this reform could have been none other than Philip II, both because the very short period of time that Alexander III spent in Makedonia left him no leisure to undertake such an ambitious reform and because its effects are already reflected in literary and epigraphic sources dating from the early years of his reign (Hatzopoulos 1996a: 472–486). Moreover, the study of all sorts of documents taken together left no doubt that these civic units were endowed with the full apparatus of a *polis* (assembly, council, magistrates) and that on the local level they were centers of lively political activities. In view of this image of the Makedonian state, it has become a pressing issue to understand how the king and the common assembly, the traditional organs of the *ethnos* state, combined with the new

⁶ See Hatzopoulos and Mari 2004: 505–513; Hatzopoulos 2013.

⁷ Kallérís 1976: 589–623; Papazoglou 1988: 37–51; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 474–477; Hammond 1999: 369–375.

elements of civic units and districts, functioned within the framework of the new Makedonian state born from Philip II's reforms. More specifically, did Makedonia remain a unitary state, be it a democratic kingship of the orthodox tradition or a *Heerkönigtum*, transformed overnight into an oriental monarchy? Or did it become a quasi-federal state, albeit different from the Classical federal states of central and southern Greece, but akin to Epeiros and Thessaly?

Images

Between legend and history

In his description of Makedonia during the first years of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides (2.99.2–6) writes that Perdikkas ruled in Lower Makedonia, but that the *Lynkestai*, the *Elimiotai* and other peoples (*ethnē*) in the uplands were also Makedonians and that they were allied and subject to the kings of Lower Makedonia, but still had their own kings. Why does Thucydides ascribe the same ethnic *Makedones* to peoples forming different states? Answering 'because they called themselves so' would only shift the question to 'why did they call themselves so in the first place, and what did they have in common?'

Thucydides is as forthcoming with details about the Lower Makedonians, as he is sparing with the information he provides about the Upper Lands. We hear that the dynasty reigning over Lower Makedonia were called *Temenidai*, that they hailed from Argos in the Peloponnese, and that their kingdom was won by Alexander, the father of Perdikkas, and by his ancestors. They conquered Pieria, Bottia, part of Paionia, Mygdonia, Eord(a)ia, and Almopia, systematically expelling the indigenous populations beyond their frontiers, and, overwhelming also other peoples, they ruled over Anthemous, Grestonia, Bisaltia and extensive territories inhabited "by the Makedonians themselves." Thucydides does not give a particular name to these Makedonians, but other sources (Strabo 7 fr. 11 and 20; App. *Syr.* 63) call them *Argeadai*, putting forward, however, a different version: that they came not from Argos in the Peloponnese, but from an homonymous city of Orestis and that they owed their name to Argeas (Steph. Byz. s.v. *Argeou*), the son of Makedon – the eponymous ancestor of the Makedonians – and grandson of Zeus.⁸

⁸ The traditions and the genealogies of Makedonia are extensively discussed by Hammond, in Hammond and Griffith 1979: 3–39; cf. Mari 2002: 19–22.

It is significant that in both versions of the above tradition the people who created the kingdom of Lower Makedonia – whether their kings came from the Peloponnese or from Orestis – are no more and no less Makedonians than their Elimiotai or Lynkestian cousins. The belief in their common origin is enshrined in a legend first recorded in the Hesiodic *Catalog of Women* (fr. 7), according to which they all descended from Makedon, son of Zeus and Thyia, the daughter of Deukalion.⁹ Thus Zeus was the ultimate ancestor of all the Makedonians, and it was only natural that he was their national deity and received a cult at their religious center at the foot of Mt. Olympus.

As much as this genealogy underlines the ethnic unity of the Makedonian people(s), other dynastic legends concerning the several dynasties stress their political diversity. The best known is that of the Temenids of Lower Makedonia, to which Thucydides adhered. We first hear about it from Herodotus (8.137–138), who tells the story of three descendents of Temenos, the brothers Gauanes, Aeropos, and Perdikkas, who were exiled from Argos, went to Illyria and thence crossed to Upper Makedonia, and worked for wages at the household of a king at Lebaia tending his horses, his oxen, and – in the case of Perdikkas, the youngest one – his sheep and goats. In particular he relates how Perdikkas, thanks to a portent and to his presence of mind, took possession of the gardens of Midas “and began to subdue the rest of Makedonia as well” (see Hatzopoulos 2003a: 203–218).

Later authors complete the legend of the conquest of Lower Makedonia by Perdikkas. An echo of the story is preserved by Diodoros (7.16; cf. Euseb. *Chron.* 1. p. 227 [Schoene]). According to it, Perdikkas, wishing to increase his kingdom consulted the Pythia at Delphi and received the following oracle: “The noble Temenidai wield royal authority over a wealth-producing land; for the aegis-bearing Zeus grants it. But go in haste to Bouteis rich in flocks, and wherever thou shalt see gleaming-horned, snow-white goats sunk in sleep, on the soil of that land sacrifice to the blessed gods and found the city of your state” (trans. Hammond, modified¹⁰). At the end of the fifth century Euripides used this tradition in his tragedy *Archelaos*, written and produced in Makedonia at the court of the homonymous king, whom he was eager to please at the price of substituting his host’s name for that of Perdikkas. He reported for the

⁹ According to a different tradition surviving in a fragment of Hellanikos (*FGrH* 4 F 74), Makedon was the son of Aiolos and thus the grandson of Deukalion.

¹⁰ Hammond and Griffith 1979: 8. It is interesting that the pattern and the vocabulary of this oracle echo that of the foundation legend of Sparta.

first time the theme of the goat(s), thanks to which the Makedonians captured the city of Aigeai and which supplied the aetiological myth justifying the name of their capital.¹¹

A further elaboration of the legend is preserved in Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus, whose *Philippicae Historiae* relied on Theopompos' homonymous *Philippika* for the history of Makedonia down to Alexander the Great.¹² It is probable that this important work reflects the official version of early Makedonian history as established at Philip II's court, which explains why with minor variants (in particular a further extension of the genealogy) it was adopted by all subsequent authors. Theopompos (Trogus) does not suppress Perdikkas as the first Temenid king¹³ as Euripides did – apparently he was indiscernible from the foundation legends in the popular mind and his reputation as the first Temenid king was too well established – but has him preceded by Karanos, who is the actual founder of the kingdom, though not the first king. Particularly interesting is the fact that in Theopompos' version the *res gestae* ascribed to each king have their correspondence in Makedonian practices, which cannot but mean that Theopompos' saga was not, like Euripides' *Archelaos*, the fruit of a writer's imagination, but a version deeply rooted in legends elaborated locally in order to explain practices whose origin had been forgotten. In fact, no genuine historical records existed for the kings before Amyntas I; the surviving historical narrative is nothing but a series of aetiological myths. If Karanos with the help of a flock of goats captured a Phrygian city and renamed it in their honor Aigeai, it is because *karanos*, "the chief," was apparently the name given to the goat marching at the head of the flock used for sacrifices and accompanying the Makedonian as well as the Lakedaimonian army in campaign.¹⁴ Of Perdikkas, Karanos' heir and successor, it is said that before he died he showed to his heir Argaios the place at Aigeai where he and his successors should be buried, predicting that as long as the kings of his family conformed to this rule they would retain the kingship of the Makedonians. Argaios' successor Philip died young, leaving the kingdom to his infant son Aeropos. The Makedonians in the absence of their king were defeated by the Illyrians, but when they returned to battle with their baby king's cradle in the front line, they crushed their enemies. The implicit

¹¹ This tragedy, with the exception of few fragments, is lost, but its plot has been preserved by Hyg. *Fab.* 219.

¹² See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 12, *contra* Hammond 1983: 87–93, who assumes more than one source for Book 10.

¹³ See Solin. 9.12: *primus in Macedonia rex nominatus*.

¹⁴ See Paus. 9.13.4. For another military ritual common to Makedonians and Lakedaimonians, see Andronikos 1984: 168.

lesson is, of course, that only the presence of a Temenid king can guarantee the victory of the Makedonian arms.

The unification of Makedonia by the Temenid kings of Lower Makedonia rendered the corresponding traditions of the Upper Makedonian dynasties irrelevant. Thus, only disparate fragments thereof survive, which cannot be easily combined into a significant pattern or even dated. On the one hand, thanks to Strabo (7.7.8.), we are informed about the Corinthian origin and, more specifically, the Bakchiad ancestry of the Lynkestian kings, which has been recently confirmed and expanded by a papyrus containing fragments of Satyrus' work on the demes of Alexandria (*Ox. Pap.* 27 [1962] 2465, fr. 3, col. II), and on the other, information from later authors seems to link Perdikkas with the foundation of the kingdom of Lower Makedonia, Aeropos with that of Lynkos (*FGrH* 401 F 1; cf. Hesychius s.v. *Aeropes*) and, by inference, Gauanes with that of Elimeia, stressing thus the common origin of the three rival kingdoms of the Argeadai, Elimiotai, and Lynkestai Makedonians, respectively. It is difficult to say which of the two traditions is more ancient. Was the Bakchiad ancestry invented by the Lynkestian kings in order to challenge the higher status of the descendants of Perdikkas and to dissociate themselves from their Temenid suzerains? Or was the three-brothers version a later development dating from Philip II's reign and elaborated in order to erase the memory and suppress the ambitions of the scions of the Lynkestian dynasty, who seem to have nurtured dreams of emancipation down to the first years of Alexander's reign?¹⁵

The appropriation of the whole Makedonian heritage by the Lower Makedonian kingdom by the end of the fourth century is also reflected in the equation between Makedonia and Emathia, first attested in Theopompos (*Just. Epit.* 7.1.1; cf. *Solin.* 9.10). The attempt to restrict the legitimate inheritance of Makedon to the core area of the Temenid kingdom is obvious. The interest of these legends goes well beyond mere antiquarian erudition. They define the Makedonian space, underline the central position acquired by the Argead kingdom at the expense of its Upper Makedonian rivals, illustrate the difficulties encountered by state-building, and indicate the means subsequently used by the Temenid kings to impose unity.

Spaces

Makedonian space can be viewed as a series of non-concentric and occasionally intersecting circles. Alfred Delacoulonche (1858) rightly considered

¹⁵ On the three Lynkestan brothers, see Berve 1926: 80, # 144; 17–19, # 37; 169, # 355.

Emathia, that is the great Makedonian plain to the south and to the west of river Loudias, as the cradle of Makedonian power. It is not an accident that Theopompos (Just. *Epit.* 7.1.1) and writers following him assert that Emathia was the former name of Makedonia. This central position of Emathia in legend is a reflection of the central position of Aigai right from the inception of Makedonian history.¹⁶ Marsyas (probably of Pella, *FGrH* 135–136 F 13), however, and the writers who follow him present Makedon as having two sons, Pieros and Amathos, after whom Pieria and Amathia/Emathia, the two regions composing the Old Kingdom are called, acknowledging thus the dual origin of the primitive kingdom perpetuated by the existence of its two capitals: Aigai the political capital and Dion the religious one. If, as has been suggested elsewhere, the birth of the kingdom coincides with the acceptance by (or the imposition on) an Achaian element, present in Pieria since Mycenaean times, the rule of a western Greek clan,¹⁷ such a dual ethnic origin goes a long way to explain not only the two capitals, but also a number of other jigsaws: the intermixture of Achaian and western elements in the Makedonian speech; the two great festivals, *Olympia* and *Basileia*, at Dion and at Aigai, respectively – the cult of Zeus, the father of Makedon, in the former, that of Herakles, the ancestor of the Temenid dynasty in the latter; and finally the dual nature of the Makedonian state, composed of the king (or rather the royal dynasty) and the Makedonians as a people (Hatzopoulos 1996a: 491).

This Old Kingdom in Emathia and Pieria stood on the intersection of two circles: the projected ethnic community of the Makedonian peoples (Argeadaí, Elimiotai, Lynkestai), and the political entity of the kingdom of Lower Makedonia, which primitively did not include all the Makedonian *ethnē*, but after the Persian retreat from Europe incorporated under its rule several non-Greek peoples – and finally under Philip II several southern Greek colonies – in the ‘New Territories’ East of the Axios. These two intersecting circles were fused into Greater Makedonia, once Philip II finally incorporated the Upper Makedonian kingdoms and extended his eastern frontier as far as the Strymon basin (Hatzopoulos 1996a: 167–216). Finally, an even larger circle consisted of states or areas (Thessaly, southern Illyria, Paionia, Thrace) which never became part of Makedonia proper, but in the course of history came under Makedonian suzerainty for substantial periods of time.

¹⁶ On the location of Aigai, see Hatzopoulos 1996c: 264–269. There is some confusion concerning the relation between the terms Emathia and Bottia (see Strabo 7, fr. 11; Just. *Epit.* 7.1.1–3. For an explanation of this state of affairs, see Hatzopoulos 1996a: 239–242).

¹⁷ Helly 2007: 195–205; Hatzopoulos 2007b: 167–176; Hatzopoulos 2006: 46–51.

Material and social networks

The unity of the Makedonian state materialized on the ground by a network of roads, which we are just beginning to discover. The existence of royal roads (Thuc. 2.100.2), a *via regia* in Livy's translation, 39.27.10, of Polybius) was known to us from literary sources and had been confirmed by the discovery of a *stadion* stone in Eordaia (Rizakis and Touratsoglou 1985: 109), which revealed that the Via Egnatia was one of these royal roads (Hammond and Hatzopoulos 1982: 135–136). No fewer than three other *stadion* stones have recently been found. Two of them, which were unearthed near Pella and near Philippi respectively, belong to the same east–west axis as that of Eordaia, but another one excavated near Idomene, just north of the border between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Makedon, belongs to the north–south axis, which from southern Greece crossed Makedonia and led to the Danube basin (Koukouli-Chrysanthaki 2001: 53–64). These were the roads trodden by the Makedonian armies – e.g., Alexander's campaign in Thrace (Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.5), Perseus' march to Thessaly in 171 (Liv. 42.51.1–2; 53.5), Perseus' flight from Pydna¹⁸ – and travelled over by the king's *philoï* making haste to execute the missions entrusted to them (Liv. 44.6.1–2; 10.1–4).

Material infrastructures decay and fall to pieces without the spiritual, political, social, and economic ties which animate their users and induce them not only to build but also to maintain them. The belief in the common descent of the variegated peoples which composed the Makedonian *ethnos* (see Just. *Epit.* 7.1.12 and 8.6.1–2, after Theopompos), and the legends destined to entrench it in the consciousness of the population have been examined above. Besides this fictitious link there were other ties as strong and real, that enhanced a sentiment of community and furthered exchanges.

The first place should be given to the Makedonian Greek dialect, and from the reign of Philip II onwards to the Attic variety of Greek, which became the official language of administration and served as the basis of education (Plut. *Alex.* 47.3) and intra-Makedonian communication (Curt. 6.9.34–36).¹⁹

The Makedonian variety of Greek religious practices and beliefs had its own regional flavor, such as the prominence given to the old Indo-European trinity of Zeus, Herakles, Asklepios, the diffusion of Dionysiac-Orphic mystery cults and after-life beliefs, and above all its particular

¹⁸ Hatzopoulos, in Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulou 1989: 48–52.

¹⁹ See Kalleris 1976: 473–478.

common sanctuaries and cults. In every Makedonian city the eponymous priest of Asklepios, whose name figured in all the public documents, and the use of the Makedonian calendar under the supervision of the king reminded the population at large that they were part of the Makedonian commonwealth.²⁰ Every year in the month of Dios, Makedonians from all over the region gathered at Dion to celebrate the cult of their forefather Zeus Olympios. There they could see the statues of their kings and other citizens who had served the *ethnos* well, the trophies from the victories of their armies, as well as important political and administrative documents exposed at the *epiphanestatos topos*, the sanctuary of Zeus. Dion was the principal meeting point of the common assembly and the delegations from the cities had the opportunity to be heard there by the king.²¹

There was, of course, also a community of customs and rites ranging from dances (such as the *telesias*: Kalleris 1954: 147, with references) to rites of passage for boys and girls, systematized for the former in the *ephebeia* (Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993), which created ties and supplied common background and common references to the male citizens. Makedonian women (as well as women in some other parts of the Greek world, such as Sparta or Epeiros), on the other hand, were less subordinate to their menfolk than in most southern city-states.²² Not only were they empowered to buy and sell property and act as guardians of their underage sons, but they were reputedly allowed to have lovers before their marriage (Diels *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁶ II 90.2.12) and to preside at the funeral of their fathers who had died without male offspring (*FGrH* 76 F 94).

Besides these spiritual ties one should not underestimate the legal, administrative, and economic bonds created by a common Makedonian citizenship, in addition to that of the several *poleis*, and – if not the automatic rights, at least – the increased opportunities of intermarriage (*epigamia*) and of acquiring property (*enktēsis*) all over the country that they entailed.²³ Upper Makedonia, the Old Kingdom and the New Territories were to a large extent economically complementary, the first specializing in stock farming, the second mainly supplying agricultural products and the last being particularly rich in forests and mines which

²⁰ Hatzopoulos 2006: 53–60; Mari 2011: 453–465.

²¹ Hatzopoulos and Mari 2002: 505–513; Hatzopoulos 2013: 163–171.

²² Le Bohec-Bouhet 2006: 187–198. For additional evidence strengthening the case for an enhanced legal status of women in Makedonia, see Xydopoulos 2006: 91 and 125–126; Tziafalias and Helly 2010: 94–104.

²³ Hatzopoulos 1996a: 99, n. 4; 354; 483.

were considered crown property and provided the financial foundations of the Makedonian state.

Last, but not least, the frequent wars to which its geographical position as the *prophragma* of Greece condemned Makedonia (Polyb. 9.35.3)²⁴ made the practically universal military service in the 'national' army since Philip II's reforms a decisive factor for enhancing the sense of community and the loyalty to the king who led them to battle²⁵ and who became in military circumstances readily visible and sometimes also accessible to the common Makedonian soldier. Makedonian kings from Alexander to Perseus Makedonia were able to mobilize as many as roughly 30.000 citizen soldiers, thus elevating their country to the rank of the foremost military power in the Greek peninsula (Hatzopoulos 2001a: 33–34).

Wars and marriages did not only serve to develop a sense of community among the common people. Before the unification of Makedonia by Philip, battle and matrimony had been recurrently employed to bring together rival Makedonian dynasties, and, even afterwards, continued to be used as means of conciliating different branches of the Temenid royal house or to attach aristocratic clans to the throne. Philip himself was the offspring of such a union between his father and a Lynkestan princess (Strabo 7.7.8), he himself married a bride from the Elimiot royal house (Satyrus, *FHG* III 161 F 5), and he joined one of his daughters to his nephew (Polyain. *Strat.* 8.60; Arr. *FGrH* 156 F 9.22), in order to prevent a dynastic crisis after his death. Some have also interpreted his last marriage to Kleopatra in such a light, despite the unanimous tradition which ascribes it to amorous passion (Satyrus, *FHG* III 161 F 5; Plut. *Alex.* 9.4; Carney 1992: 174). Similarly the Illyrian wars of the fourth century played no small part in the success of Philip II's efforts to incorporate Upper Makedonia into the Temenid kingdom (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 396).

The above review omitted the most important tie that linked the citizens of Makedonia: loyalty to the king, the mainspring of the political system, not so much to his person as to the institution.²⁶ This was demonstrated several times by the rejection of republican institutions whether they were proposed (at Babylon²⁷), imposed (by the Romans²⁸) or arose from fortuitous circumstances (Sosthenes, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 254–257). But a king could not operate without an inner circle of people

²⁴ Toynbee 1935a: 162–164; Toynbee 1935b: 477–489.

²⁵ Hatzopoulos 1996a: 209, n. 1, and 267–271; Hatzopoulos 2001a.

²⁶ See the term *philobasileus* (Diod. 17.114.2; Plut. *Alex.* 47.5–6).

²⁷ Curt. 10.6.15; Just. *Epit.* 13.2.12. ²⁸ See Errington 1986: 196, with references.

both loyal and capable of carrying out his decisions and of overseeing their implementation. These were provided by the king's immediate entourage styled "companions" (*hetairoi*) under the Temenids or "friends" (*philoî*) in the Hellenistic period. They formed an aristocracy of merit (at least in the king's eyes) rather than of descent. They were his councilors, his fellow fighters at war, his fellow hunters at peace, his table mates and fellow drinkers on a daily basis. The fact that their children usually served as royal pages and then as royal hunters and royal youths created additional ties.²⁹ These, along with the *aides de camp* (*somatophylakes* under the Temenids; *hypaspistai* under the Antigonids), the royal cavalry squadron, the *agema* (of the hypaspists under the Temenids, that of the peltasts under the Antigonids), and the mercenaries formed a nucleus of standing armed forces devoted to the king and always available at his beck and call.³⁰ The body of the king's companions or friends was constantly renewed, since losses in battle, if not simply royal disfavor, created vacancies and the need for new recruits. Service in the army and service in the cities and other local political units, especially in the position of *epistates*, chief magistrate providing the necessary interface between local and central government, offered ample opportunities for the appreciation of zeal and talent and for royal favor.³¹

Realities

Greece north of a line stretching from the Ambracian to the Malian Gulf was hardly considered as belonging to Hellas in Classical times.³² Modern scholars stress the distinctiveness of the region in natural geography, political organization, social institutions, and culture as compared with Greek lands south of this line. But the common characteristics should not obfuscate another division, perhaps of equal importance, between western and eastern (Aegean) Greece, cutting down the Greek peninsula along the Pindos range. Lower Makedonia shares with Thessaly the vast plains and the wide thermic variations, while Upper Makedonia is a land of high plateaux like much of Epeiros.

²⁹ Hammond and Griffith 1979: 395–404; Hammond 1989: 53–58; Hammond 1990: 261–290; Hatzopoulos 1996a: 330–336; Ma 2011: 526–537.

³⁰ See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 405–449; Hatzopoulos 2001a.

³¹ Hatzopoulos 2003–2004: 27–59; Paschidis 2006: 251–268.

³² For the following paragraphs, see Hatzopoulos 1996a: 487–496; Hatzopoulos 2003b: 51–64, with references.

It does not come as a surprise that Epeiros was a land of herdsmen, mostly transhumant, while Thessaly was famous for its big landowners. Makedonia fell between the two, presenting an important pastoral economy in the uplands and extensive farming in the plains; life in open small communities (*komai*) made Upper Makedonia much look like Epeiros, while Lower Makedonia, where walled cities prevailed, resembled the Thessalian realm. The constitutions of the three northern Greek states unmistakably possessed common characteristics. Not only were they *ethnos*- and not *polis*-states, but they also shared one very important element: the survival of a strong monarchical institution. The Head of State enjoyed not just an annual mandate, but life tenure. His office was theoretically elective, but in practice hereditary.

The constituent elements of the state, duly present in official documents, were the king (*basileus*, *tagos*) and the people (*ethnos*). Annual festivals at religious centers (Itonos in Thessaly, Dodona in Epeiros, Dion in Makedonia) common to the whole *ethnos* were also opportunities for deliberations of concerted actions ranging from the administration of the common sanctuary to the designation of the head of state and the resolution of conflicts. They gradually evolved into regular meetings of the common assembly (*koinē ekklēsia*, formerly *apella*³³), which acquired some political clout when reformer kings, such as Philip II, extended military service to most free citizens. In internal matters the local communities were left to their own devices once the common assembly had proclaimed or – more usually – acclaimed the Head of State. This implied conferral on him of the traditional prerogatives to mobilize and command the army and freely to dispose of the federal revenues, so that he was in effect free to pursue a foreign policy of his choice. The control of war and diplomacy (through the declaration of war and the ratification of treaties), usually listed among the traditional rights of the common assembly, inevitably became illusory. Once the army was mobilized under the orders of a prestigious commander-in-chief, the actual decision of the declaration of war was bound to be a mere formality, whereas no assembly would challenge an advantageous treaty contracted by a victorious chief. In case of failure, of course, the Head of State could always be deposed, as happened several times, but this hardly constituted a means of regular democratic control.

Another shared feature of the three northern monarchical *ethnē*, in contradistinction to the southern *koina*, was the absence of a proper *synedrion*, a standing organ of representative government reflecting the

³³ See the Makedonian month Apellaios.

relative importance of the constituent local communities and enabling them to make their voice heard. It is true that Molossia in Epeiros possessed a small board of delegates from local communities, but this body apparently disregarded the idea of proportionality. The only *synedria* attested in Makedonia and Epeiros are not proper organs of the *ethnos* but consultative bodies composed of the king's companions and friends. It is a fact that this court nobility was recruited among city elites. It is also a fact that delegates from the local communities might join such privy councils on certain solemn occasions, and from one of the rare surviving decrees of the pre-republican Thessalian *koinon* it has been deduced that there existed a board acting as a probouleutic body vis-à-vis the common assembly and providing the presidents of the *koinon*. However, even this did not make such bodies the equivalent to the federal *synedria*, which were eventually established in the three northern states too, but only after the abolition of the monarchical constitution. It is thus not an accident that Polybius (31.2.12) associates democracy with a syndrial constitution.

Bodies of local and central government

The bucolic simplicity embodied by a patriarchic king surrounded by his companions and a common assembly of obedient (or turbulent) commoners was disrupted by the development of sedentary life and the rise of urban centers, which soon became focal points not only of economic and social but also of political activity.³⁴ The fact is well attested in Thessaly, which possesses a rich institutional vocabulary of venerable antiquity. It is now established also for Makedonia, where dialectal civic institutional terms, such as *peligan* (= *bouleutēs*), *tagos* (= *archōn*), and *skoidos* (= *oikonomos*) undoubtedly predate the mid-fourth century reforms of Philip. A period of conflict between central and local authorities led to divergent results. In coastal Epeiros, in Thesprotia and Chaonia, kingship was replaced by republican regimes, but in practically landlocked Molossia, where urban centers were almost non-existent, king Tharypas (430–390?) introduced reforms that secured the survival of kingship for nearly two centuries. Besides the common assembly of the Molossian *ethnos*, an annually rotating board of magistrates under a *prostatas* and a *grammateus*, one from each constituent smaller *ethnos*, was created, and an annual exchange of oaths between the king and the *ethnos* guaranteed the mutual

³⁴ For what follows, besides Hatzopoulos 1996a: 473–486, see Hatzopoulos 2011b: 235–441.

respect of rights and obligations.³⁵ In Thessaly, Philip II of Makedon intervened in order to restore on his behalf the traditional institutions of the Head of State and of his four lieutenants, the four *tetrarchoi*, each in charge of one of the four *tetradēs*.³⁶ In Makedonia itself the conflict between king and cities lasted at least half a century. It was only resolved by the reforms introduced by the same Philip. They were probably inspired by the annexation of Amphipolis, a city with a fully developed democratic constitution, and by the conquest of the Chalkidian League, a *koinon* which combined an authentic civic autonomy on the local level with a common citizenship, common revenues from a uniform system of taxation, common armed forces and common magistracies.³⁷ Following such models, Philip officially recognized the autonomy of the cities and other local administrative units (*ethnē* in Upper Makedonia, groups of villages around a borough, later styled *mētropolis*, in the hinterland east of the Axios), each with a territory marked off by *horoi*, a registered citizen body (*politeuma*), and endowed them with laws and governing bodies (assemblies, councils, and boards of magistrates). Following the Thessalian example, the territory was divided in administrative districts, each under a *stratēgos*.

The Makedonian *ethnos* had a common citizenship and was composed from all free Makedonians who were registered as citizens in the *politeuma* of a Makedonian autonomous political unit: a *polis*, a group of villages, or one of the lesser *ethnē* of Upper Makedonia (Hatzopoulos 1996a: 167–168). *Hoi Makedones*, *to Makedonōn ethnos*, *hai poleis Makedonōn*, or *hē chōra hē Makedonōn* were equivalent terms designating the people and the country of this state.³⁸ Makedonia proper, as an *ethnos*-state, comprised all the constituted Makedonian political communities into which the kingdom was divided, to the exclusion of royal land and the external possessions of the Makedonian kings in Thrace, Illyria, or southern Greece.

The scarcity of documents from Upper Makedonia from before the Roman conquest does not allow for a precise picture of its political organization under the kings. Its division in several lesser *ethnē*, administratively assimilated to *poleis* (Tripolitai, Elemiotai, Eordaioi, Orestai, Tymphaioi-Paravaioi, Lynkestai, Derriopes), is amply attested by literary sources and confirmed by documents from the Roman period

³⁵ Cf. Chapter 16 by Elizabeth Meyer above, with a divergent interpretation of the Molossian *koinon*.

³⁶ See Chapter 12 by Richard Bouchon and Bruno Helly above, for a nuanced reading.

³⁷ See Chapter 18 by Michael Zahrnt below; also Hatzopoulos 1996b: 25–38; Mari 2007: 31–49; Errington 2007: 275–282.

³⁸ Hatzopoulos 1996a: 220–221; cf. the same technical vocabulary used in Thessaly, Sordi 1958: 331.

(Hatzopoulos 1996a: 77–104). A dedication of the statue of a Makedonian king to Apollo by the Orestai found in Delos leaves no doubt about the reality of such an organization in Hellenistic times (Hatzopoulos 1996b: 91). Information about the internal division of the *ethnē* in *poleis* and *komai* mainly comes from later documents which show that, in contradistinction to conditions prevailing in Lower Makedonia, the Upper Makedonian *komai* were not subordinated to *poleis*, but were, along with them, constituent parts – albeit of a lesser status – of the *ethnos*, to which both types of civic units were subordinated. For instance, Argos and Keletron in Orestis were probably or possibly *poleis*, whereas Battyna and Lyka, usually styled in the documents as *politeiai*, seemed not to possess a *boulē* of their own and to have the status of *komai* (see Hatzopoulos 1999: 328).

Eight documents from Upper Makedonia dating from the royal period allow us to draw certain conclusions about its inner organization. Two letters jointly addressed to a certain Megalokles and to the Tripolitai indicate that the former was a federal official responsible for all the three *poleis* of this small *ethnos*: Azoros, Pythion, and Doliche. His exact title is a matter of speculation, but that of *stratēgos*, attested in a late third century BCE inscription from Samothrace, seems probable (Lucas 1997: 84–85). Two other inscriptions, from Azoros(?)³⁹ in Tripolis and Evia in Elemia⁴⁰ respectively, dating a dedication by the name of an *epistatēs* or mentioning an *epistasion*, leave no doubt that such was the title of the magistrates in charge of the *poleis* or the *komai* of the Upper Makedonian *ethnē*. Other inscriptions from Derriopos and Tripolis mention senders and addressees of documents, who are not otherwise identified. Doules, who addressed a letter to Nikolaos in Alkomena,⁴¹ might have occupied a position similar to that of Megalokles within the *ethnos* of the Derriopes. Damason, to whom Antigonos Doson communicated the same letter that he addressed to Megalokles, might either be the *epistatēs* of Azoros (Tziafalias and Helly 2010: 94–104), where the relevant inscription was discovered and citizens of which it concerned, or a financial official, like the *oikonomoi* Diogenes and Therson mentioned in two other inscriptions from Tripolis.⁴² The latter hypothesis seems more probable, because, if Damason had been a magistrate subordinate to Megalokles, the letter would not have been sent

³⁹ Unpublished inscription seen in 1987 by K. Vitkos, who saw it in the back courtyard of the monastery of Panagia Olympiotissa in Elasson; cf. Hatzopoulos 1996a: 156, n. 15; 373, n. 8.

⁴⁰ Hatzopoulos 1996a: 95–101; Hatzopoulos 1996b: 41–42; cf. Gounaropoulou and Hatzopoulos 1998: 41.

⁴¹ Hatzopoulos 1996a: 411–415; cf. Hatzopoulos 1996b: 43.

⁴² Tziafalias and Helly 2010: 72–93; cf. Hatzopoulos 2011c.

directly by the king to him, but transmitted by his superior, as in Derriopos, where Doules transmitted the royal instructions to Nikolaos. Finally, a document, probably a catalog, from Tymphaia mentions in its preamble an official whose title and name do not survive, the day of the month Gorpaios, the name of the *skoidos*, and the name of another official whose title (in the genitive case) ends in *-archou* (politarch, or gymnasiarch?).⁴³ Given that *skoidos* was the title of a financial official glossed by some ancient lexicographers as *tamias* or *oikonomos*, one may wonder whether it might not be the dialectal name of the office which is usually rendered by *oikonomos* (Hatzopoulos 1998: 1198) and whose main functions seem to be that of managing royal land and all forms of movable state property in a given administrative district.⁴⁴

Most civic units in the Old Kingdom and in the New Territories, whether old Makedonian foundations in the cradle of Makedonian power in Emathia and Pieria or southern Greek colonies east of the Axios, were *poleis* consisting of an urban center and a number of subordinate *komai* (see Hatzopoulos 1996a: 105–123). Their governing bodies were the assembly and the council, the members of which in the old Makedonian foundations still bore the dialectal name of *peliganes*. The day-to-day government of the city was carried out by annually elected executive magistrates, who convened and presided the meetings of the council and the assembly, were the most likely to introduce decrees and laws, and were responsible for their implementation. Their titles varied from city to city according to local traditions. Originally allied cities founded by Makedonian kings outside the Makedonian territory, such as Philippoi, Kassandreia, and Demetrias, had each an eponymous priest assuring the cult of its legendary or historical founder(s), a chief magistrate styled *archôn* and boards of senior magistrates called *nomophylakes* and *stratêgoi*.

In the cities of Makedonia proper the eponymous magistrate was the priest of Asklepios and the chief magistrate bore the title of *epistatês*. In each city there was a board of senior magistrates, called *tagoi* in the Makedonian cities of the Old Kingdom and simply *archontes* in the New Territories. In all cities there were also boards of variable numbers of junior magistrates (*agoranomoi*, *tamiai*, *exetastai*). In the last years of the Antigonid dynasty, a sweeping reform seems to have been carried out, which replaced the eponymous priest and the *epistatês* by two *politarchai*.⁴⁵

⁴³ Hatzopoulos 1996a: 77–78; Hatzopoulos 1996b: 85–86.

⁴⁴ See Kougeas 1934: 196–197; Hatzopoulos 2001a: 151–153, # I 1 and I 11; Apergis 2004: 280–281.

⁴⁵ For more details, see Hatzopoulos 1996a: 129–165.

Inscriptions found in the hinterland of the New Territories show that in Roman times civic units in that area had a composite nature combining an urban center, later called *mētropolis*, and a number of *komai*. Such was the case of Morrylos and of Bragylai in today's prefecture of Kilkis.⁴⁶ The formation of these political units was the direct result of conditions prevailing after the Makedonian conquest. As the Makedonians expanded east of the Axios, in the hinterland of Mygdonia, Krestonia, Bisaltia, and Odomantike, they met pre-Greek tribes settled in villages. From the massive population expulsions and transplantations, which had been practiced since the foundation of the Argead kingdom but attained an unprecedented scale under Philip II, there emerged a new landscape. In some cases the pre-Greek populations were expelled, especially when they resisted, but otherwise they were eventually called to participate in the life of the new settlements along with the colonists. However, Makedonian foundations *ex nihilo* must have constituted an exception. In most cases native communities were either expanded to comprise a vast territory with its *komai* or, if they were too small to form separately viable units, combined among themselves, and were endowed with a Greek constitution. Within these enlarged units some inequalities perhaps subsisted, but they do not seem to have been linked – at least not directly and officially – to the ethnic origin of the inhabitants. Only the major communities had the right to the title of *polis*. The rest were simple *komai*, and one may expect that the more urbanized Makedonians and other Greeks tended to settle mainly in those of the first category, which eventually were given the title of *mētropolis* of the composite political unit. But the distinction was principally one of prestige, the only conspicuous difference between the two sorts of communities being the presence, or absence, of a council.

It was previously thought that the origin of these local sympolities should be ascribed to Roman policy (Papazoglou 1963: 534). The boundary inscriptions from Bragyllos referring to a ruling by a king Philip (II?) and a Hellenistic decree of Gazoros from the reign of Philip V or Perseus leave no doubt that it was due to the initiative of Makedonian kings, plausibly of Philip II himself (Hatzopoulos 1996a: 51–75). In this text the citizens of Gazoros and “the nearby villages” jointly decide to honor Pleistis, one of their citizens, who was probably their *epistatēs*, for he had provided them with grain at a low price in time of dearth.⁴⁷ It ought to

⁴⁶ Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulou 1989: 57–63; Hatzopoulos 2011c.

⁴⁷ Hatzopoulos 1996a, 51–56; Hatzopoulos 1996b, 57–58, # 39.

be noted that the names of the three ambassadors elected to notify the king of Pleistis' benefaction perfectly reflect the mixed origin of the citizen body.

Makedonia under the kings was not only subdivided into civic territories but also into regional districts (*merides*). The first to draw attention to their existence was Hugo Gaebler in his studies devoted to the Makedonian non-regal Hellenistic coinage.⁴⁸ He remarked that besides coins of the *koinon* bearing the legend MAKEΔONΩΝ, there were coins struck with the inscriptions ΑΜΦΑΞΙΩΝ and ΒΟΤΤΕΑΤΩΝ (spelled out or in monograms), with or without the wider ethnic MAKEΔONΩΝ. A closer study of the Greek historians and geographers showed that by the third quarter of the fourth century BCE Amphaxitis and Bottia, as well as Upper Makedonia and the Strymon area were also military districts for the recruitment and formation of levies. It became thus clear that Bottia comprised Pieria and Emathia, and Amphaxitis the lands between the Axios and the Strymon basin. More recent numismatic studies indicate that the early issue (head of Zeus/Tauropolos) with the legend MAKEΔONΩΝ ΠΡΩΤΗΣ were minted in Amphipolis on the Strymon river before the abolition of the Makedonian kingdom by the Romans. The Makedonian districts, which played a central role in the proportional participation of the political units to the armed forces and in the rotation thereof (Hatzopoulos 2001b), were thus shown not to be Roman innovations but older Makedonian administrative divisions. Confirmation of the above was provided by the publication of inscriptions dating from the third and the second century BCE referring to Bottia as an administrative–military district and mentioning heads of districts as eponymous magistrates with their official title of *stratēgoi*.⁴⁹

Form and content of documents

How did the venerable and inclusive institutions of *basileus* and *koinē ekklēsia* of the *ethnos* manage to coexist and effectively function alongside the modern and more exclusive ones of the *polis* under the new dispensation inaugurated by Philip II? There is no doubt that the

⁴⁸ Gaebler, 1897, 169–192; Gaebler 1926a, 111–116 and Gaebler 1926b, 183–198.

⁴⁹ Hatzopoulos 1996a: 231–260. For the coinage of the first *meris*, see now Kremydi 2007: 91–100, and Kremydi 2009: 191–201. For the inscriptions mentioning Bottia, see Helly 1973: 107–110, and Hatzopoulos 2001b: 45–52. For the documents mentioning *stratēgoi*, see Hatzopoulos 1996b: 69–70 and 75–83.

Makedonian king, supreme commander in war, master of all sacrifices that were not reserved to the priests, and appellate judge in lawsuits (Arist. *Pol.* 1285 b), constituted the mainspring of the political system. In the eyes of a fourth-century Athenian he appeared as “sole master of his own policy, open or secret, at once general, absolute ruler, and treasurer”⁵⁰.

We possess now at least twenty-seven laws and decrees voted by Makedonian cities as well as some thirty-eight documents (ordinances, letters, grants) emanating from, or related to, decisions of the central authorities. This epigraphic body of evidence allows us to draw a less schematic picture of his omnipotence. There is no doubt that in military matters the king as commander-in-chief had a direct relationship with the Makedonians under his orders, paid and probably equipped by him. Thus, army regulations in the form of ordinances (*diagrammata*) were decided, probably in council, but by the king’s sole authority, and acquired force of law as soon as they were promulgated, without any intervention by the local authorities. Such is the case of the military *diagrammata* discovered, often in more than one copy, in Kassandreia, Amphipolis, Chalkis, and Kynos,⁵¹ and of *diagrammata* arbitrating territorial disputes between civic communities of the kingdom (Hatzopoulos 2006: 22–26). The king could also promulgate ordinances on various civil matters, such as the organization of athletic contests, but in this case his rulings could not become effective before the local authorities took the appropriate measures in order to incorporate them into local legislation (Hatzopoulos 2006: 83–84).

The king as chief executive authority was empowered to demand by letter to the local authorities the publication of all sorts of information or rulings made by him in that capacity. Such is the case of the letter of Antigonos Gonatas to Dion requesting the publication of a letter clarifying that a certain domain exploited by somebody’s sons was still their father’s property and, therefore, could not become, without his knowledge, the object of commercial transactions (Hatzopoulos 2006: 87–88). The letter of Philip V informing the authorities of Evia about the grant of land situated in its territory to a military–religious association points

⁵⁰ Dem. 1.4; cf. 18.235.

⁵¹ Hatzopoulos 2001a: 151–164. The ordinance about the uniform of the *kynēgoi*, a paramilitary corps, belongs to that category of documents, see Intzsiloglou 2006: 67–77.

in the same direction. Finally, the king (or the regent), in his double capacity as the highest legal and religious authority, arbitrated litigations, especially when petitioned between various parties of the *ethnos*, and particularly between civic authorities and sanctuaries (Hatzopoulos 2006: 86–87).

The usual addressees of royal correspondence were persons described only by their name, who have been traditionally identified as *epistatai*. A recent epigraphic discovery from Dion has vindicated this identification, but at the same time it proved wrong the inference that has been made from this identification, namely that the *epistatai* were royal governors appointed by the central authorities to oversee and control the cities of Makedonia. As new inscriptions come progressively to light, it appears that 1) *epistatai* were present not only in major cities, but even in very small communities; 2) in all known cases these *epistatai* did not come from elsewhere, but were citizens of the communities in which they functioned; 3) they held an annual mandate and could serve as eponymous magistrates. All these elements taken together clearly show that the *epistatai* were not royal officials but civic magistrates serving as an interface between central authorities and local political units. Thus, the odd tendency (at times) of royal letters to sporadically resort to the second person plural when writing to them can be explained. It should have been clear that, as Bickerman was the first to acknowledge, the *epistatai* were not governors, and that they figured as addressees of royal correspondence not in their personal capacity, but as representatives of the local community (Hatzopoulos 2003/2004: 27–59). Now the address of Philip V's letter to Dion has confirmed the above remarks. It reads: "King Philip to Eurylochos, chief magistrate (*epistatēs*) of the Diestai, to the councilors (*peligasi*) and to the rest of the citizens (*politais*), greetings."

Conclusion

The Makedonian constitution, revealed by the ancient authors and epigraphy, appears to the modern observer as a highly original creation. It combined a strong kingship, religious as much as military, an aristocracy centered around the court (but with strong roots in the cities, affording them a certain independence), and a sort of democracy both on the 'national' and on the local level. This was based on the right of speech equal to all who were fully enfranchised Makedonian citizens – even vis-à-vis the king – in the common assembly, as well as during audiences for the submission of petitions, but especially in the context of civic

institutions. However, the greatest originality of Makedonia was the combination of kingship and other inclusive traditional institutions of its ethnic past with the progressive *polis* state with its ideals of autonomy and autarky, as well as its other exclusive tendencies. It is this original synthesis which allowed Philip II to unify Greater Makedonia from the Pindus chain to the Strymon valley and which functioned successfully until it was conquered by Rome.

*The Chalkidike and the Chalkidians**Michael Zahrnt*

In antiquity the term Chalkidike did not apply to the large peninsula that resembles a hand with three fingers, stretching out south from the depression near the Lakes Koronia and Vólvi and extending into the Aegean Sea. Instead, it referred to the settlement area of the Chalkidians, namely the Sithonia – i.e., only the central finger of the hand – as well as its hinterland. It was limited in the east by the territory of Akanthos (which ran from the Isthmus of the Akte, today's Athos, towards the north), in the west by the area inhabited by the Bottiaians (who lived in the northwest of Potideia near the Thermaic Gulf), and in the north by the mountain ridge that extends across the peninsula's body. Accordingly, the name Chalkidike will be used here exclusively for the territory of the Chalkidians, while the peninsula will be referred to as the Chalkidian peninsula.

Who were the Chalkidians, some of whom united in 432 BCE to form a new state that rose to become, at least for some time, the greatest power in the northern Aegean world? Because of their name and a few late literary attestations, the Chalkidians were generally believed to be colonists from Chalkis on Euboia who had settled in the northern corner of the Aegean at the beginning of the so-called great Greek colonization. Ernest Harrison was the first to question this assumption more than a hundred years ago. He tried to show that the Chalkidians were not colonists from Chalkis but, like their neighbors, the Bottiaians, a Greek tribe whose origins could not be ascertained. At the same time, he determined the Sithonia and its hinterland to be their area of settlement. His restriction of the Chalkidians' settlement area to the center of the Chalkidian peninsula was generally accepted, but only a few were convinced by his doubts regarding the Chalkidians' origin from Euboia.¹ In the meantime, however, during excavations in the area of ancient Olynthos numerous inscriptions have been found that are clearly written in Ionic dialect. Contrary to

¹ Harrison 1912, followed by, e.g., Gude 1933: 4, n. 11; Kahrstedt 1936: 416, n. 5, 426.

Harrison, Donald W. Bradeen used these texts and the month names they contain in order to reinforce the Chalkidians' origin from Chalkis.² I myself once took up Harrison's thesis and declared the Chalkidians to be a tribe speaking an Ionic dialect that had immigrated from the north to the Chalkidian peninsula before the end of the second millennium. Yet Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos and Denis Knoepfler in particular opposed this view and convincingly established that the language of the Chalkidian inscriptions, as well as the names of persons and months mentioned, clearly point to an Euboian origin.³

While my treatment of the epigraphic evidence provoked considerable criticism, the justice of which I here acknowledge, I still adhere to the observations made at the time concerning the literary sources. Herodotus (7.185.2) mentions in his list of European troops in Xerxes' army the *Chalkidikōn genos* in the same breath as the Thracians and other peoples from the northern coast of the Aegean down to the Thermopylai. Thucydides, who with remarkable consistency notes the name of the mother-city with every colony, does not do so in the case of any Chalkidian town. Aristotle chose to distinguish the Chalkidians on Sicily from those in Thrace by calling them the Chalkidian towns of Italy and Sicily (*Pol.* 1274a23–25), and the Thracian Chalkidians (1274b23–26). The *Periēgēsis* of Pseudo-Skymnos, following the models of Ephoros and Theopompos, distinguishes between the Dorian and the Chalkidian colonies in the list of the towns of Sicily and consistently mentions their origin (264–312). On the Chalkidian peninsula (627–649) only Potideia, the Pallene, and Akanthos are named as colonies along with their mother-cities. Olynthos, Mekyberna, and Torone are not listed in this category, even though the poet knows more to report about these cities than just their names. Polybius (9.28.2) is the first to call the Thracian Chalkidians colonists from Chalkis, but he does so in a context that is not free from errors and other shortcomings.

In the meantime an entirely different explanation for the phenomena I observed has come up. The excavations of recent years have revealed that the first Euboians had appeared in the north of the Aegean not at the time of the great Greek colonization, but several centuries earlier. They had then settled permanently in this region, demonstrably in Mende on the Pallene and in Torone on the Sithonia. This would have happened at a time when

² Bradeen 1952. In his attempt to determine the settlement area of these Chalkidians he is definitely too generous, since in many cases he considers a later membership of the Chalkidian Confederation as signalling an origin from Chalkis.

³ Zahrt 1971: 12–27; Hatzopoulos 1988b: 40–55, 65–66; Knoepfler 1990b.

the colonists were sent out by tribes, and not by the cities that did not yet exist in Greece, making it impossible in later centuries to identify a mother city. In the eighth century, Eretrians and Chalkidians seem to have again appeared on the peninsula and settled there, the Eretrians on the Pallene and the Chalkidians on the Sithonia and in its hinterland.⁴ In the present context only the latter are of interest, and only from the fifth century onwards. In the meantime, the archaeologists may decide how we need to chart the process of separate yet interrelated waves of Euboian colonizing ventures in the northern Aegean.

In the literary sources, the Chalkidian peninsula turns up for the first time in the geographical treatise of Hekataios of Miletos, who mentions the cities located by or in proximity to the sea. Herodotus' account of the passage of the Persian fleet in 480 through the canal located on the Isthmus of the Akte and past the coasts of the Sithonia, i.e., the Chalkidike, the Pallene, and the Krossaia (the Krusis of later sources), taking troops and ships from the cities located there (7.122–3), is based on Hekataios. The Chalkidians' provision of troops on this occasion does not necessarily support the claim that they pursued pro-Persian politics: The coastal cities had no other choice but to heed the demands of the king, and Herodotus needed a historical background to his description of the Chalkidian peninsula's coasts. In the account of the fleet's journey, he follows Hekataios in naming individual towns, but in the list of the troop units recruited by Xerxes, he summarizes them as "the Greeks from Thrace," Bottiaians, and the *Chalkidikōn genos* (7.185). The Chalkidians here appear as one entity, as in the winter 480/79, when the Persian commander Artabazos conquered Olynthos which until then had been Bottian, and handed it over to Kritoboulos of Torone and the *Chalkidikōn genos* (8.127). The character of this *Chalkidikōn genos* is controversial. Some scholars consider it an ethno-political entity which had existed in the period before the invasion of Xerxes, and still survived in the following *Pentekontaëtia* even though the Athenians did not acknowledge it. Others, however, do not see an indication of any kind of political association among the Chalkidians in Herodotus' account of the conquest of Olynthos, but only an allusion to their common origin.

The remains of the *Athenian Tribute Lists* are the only source for the period between the failure of Xerxes' campaign and the eve of the Peloponnesian War. They show that the Chalkidians were split up into individual and independent cities. There are no indications of a political

⁴ Snodgrass 1994; Vokotopoulou 1996 and 2001: 746–759; Tiverios 2008: 6–17, 33, 52, 124–125.

union or of steps taken towards this goal. Since the accounts begin no earlier than in 454/3, the individual cities' date of admission to the Delian League cannot be determined. According to the amount of their tribute, Sermylia, located to the east of Olynthos, and Torone, dominating the southern tip of the Sithonia, were the most important among these communities, while Olynthos with a consistent tribute of two talents belonged to the middling category. This impression is confirmed by the fact that the southern hill encompassing the whole area of settlement at the time was no larger than six hectares.⁵

Even though the Chalkidians were not organized in a singular integrated state, there nevertheless seems to have been a sense of solidarity, as their defection from Athens demonstrates. Several stages need to be distinguished in this process that quickly led to the creation of a Chalkidian state. Following the foundation of Amphipolis at the lower Strymon (437/6 BCE) the Athenians increased the pressure on their allies living on the Chalkidian peninsula. They raised some of the tributes and simultaneously created new tributary cities. Furthermore, in the fall of 433 they demanded that the Potideians pull down the southern part of their city walls, provide hostages, and end their contacts with Corinth. The Makedonian king Perdikkas II, who was angry with the Athenians for supporting his internal enemies, took advantage of the agitation and bitterness caused by these measures. He stirred up Sparta and Corinth against Athens and asked the Chalkidians and Bottiaians to secede from Athens along with the Potideians. The Athenians increased the tension further by ordering the fleet that was meant to depart against Makedonia in spring 432 to enforce the measures that had been demanded in Potideia and prevent the neighboring cities from secession. But they were too late. Before the Athenian fleet appeared, the Potideians conspired with the Chalkidians in the northern section of the Sithonia as well as with the Bottiaians and together they seceded from Athens:⁶ according to the *Athenian Tribute Lists* (that fortunately survive almost completely for the years 433/2 and 432/1), their revolt was joined by all Chalkidian settlements with the exception of the southern part of the Sithonia, notably the cities of Torone and Sarte.

⁵ For the membership of the towns located on the Chalkidian peninsula see Zahrnt 1971: 31–48; Beck 1997: 150–151. Regarding the settlement on the southern hill of Olynthos, see Hoepfner-Schwandner 1994: 74–75; Cahill 2002: 34–35. To avoid excessive footnoting, references to scholarship prior to Larsen 1968 will be rare.

⁶ The main source is Thuc. 1.56–65; for the *anoikismos* of 432, see Larsen 1968: 62–64; Zahrnt 1971: 49–57; Moggi 1976: 173–189 (who has exaggerated ideas about the size of the *anoikismos*); Beck 1997: 154; Psoma 2001: 189–209; for the archaeological findings, see Hoepfner-Schwandner 1994: 68–82; Cahill 2002: 35–44.

After this event, Perdikkas persuaded the Chalkidians to vacate their towns situated by the sea, move to Olynthos, and turn this city into their single stronghold; in addition he offered to all those who had to leave their homes land to settle on, located in the Mygdonia south of the Lake Vólvi, for the duration of the war. At the time, Olynthos was by no means the largest city of the Chalkidians, but due to the topographical conditions it was evidently the most able to absorb a large number of new settlers and was the most suited to be fortified. Some Chalkidians abandoned and tore down their cities before they moved to Olynthos or Mygdonia, where they founded a city named Apollonia; those who had gone to Olynthos were settled on the northern ridge that until then had been uninhabited. This archaeologically detectable extension of the settlement that took place according to a uniform plan enlarged the town's size by a factor of four or five. However, few of the houses built at the time can be dated precisely, with the consequence that the gradual growth of the town also cannot be dated more precisely, but only guessed at. The same goes for the size of the *anoikismos*. Exceptions are the towns of Mekyberna, Gale,⁷ and Singos, located on the coast to the east of Olynthos, for which it can be securely attested on the basis of epigraphic evidence and a regulation in the Peace of Nikias of 421. However, if the tributes of the years immediately before the Peloponnesian War are taken into consideration – Olynthos had paid consistently two, Mekyberna, Gale, and Singos three and a half talents in average – we need to assume that further Chalkidian communities lost their inhabitants to Olynthos. Sermylia, located to the east of Mekyberna, is often counted among these. This town at first did not join the secession and was thus attacked by the Chalkidians and the Corinthian commander Aristeus. Shortly thereafter, however, it seems to have broken away from Athens, since its name is missing from the *Athenian Tribute Lists* of the following years. On the other hand, Sermylia is not listed in the Peace of Nikias among those cities whose inhabitants were told to return; thus it may have seceded, but not become part of the Chalkidian state. In the course of the war there was a further influx of settlers from non-Chalkidian communities, thus in winter of 430/29, following the capitulation of Potidea (Thuc. 2.70) and again in 423 from Skione and Mende that had defected to Sparta (Thuc. 4.123.4).

⁷ Gale was usually thought to have been located at the western coast of the Sithonia in the region of Neos Marmaras. Recently, however, it was found to have been situated to the north, in the area of Nikiti, between Mekyberna and Singos; see Psoma 2001: 204, n. 134; Tiverios 2008: 47. This location corresponds well with the order in which the three towns are named in the text of the Peace of Nikias (Thuc. 5.18.6 with the correction made by West 1937).

In addition to the report in the first book of Thucydides and the evidence offered by the *Tribute Lists* and the archaeological findings, we also have coins that were minted in Olynthos soon after the secession from Athens. The earliest among them are tetrobols of the Thracian-Makedonian coin standard with the inscription ΟΛΥΝ that show a great resemblance to the contemporary coinage of the Makedonian king Perdikkas II; they are undoubtedly linked to an expected attack by the Athenians. A few years later another series of coins was minted, showing on the obverse a head of Apollo and on the reverse a kithara and the inscription ΧΑΛΚΙΔΕΩΝ. A state of the *Chalkideis* was thus responsible for these emissions. This state, whose emergence Thucydides fails to mention, is described in modern research by some as a unitary state, but by others as a federation. In order to reach a conclusion on this issue, we need to examine the sources on the history of the Chalkidians during the subsequent years. The available sources are again the *Tribute Lists*, the coins of the Chalkidians and the historical work of Thucydides that reports about the battles between Athens and the Chalkidians that had seceded.

The details of the military and diplomatic events set aside, the following can be established about the period of the Archidamian War.⁸ In foreign affairs, the Chalkidians acted as a united political entity: they concluded treaties, sent embassies, intervened in other cities against the interests of the Athenians, appointed a *proxenos*, and ultimately performed the functions of a state as a political entity. Considering that in Akanthos, Torone and Mende it was the oligarchs that collaborated with the Chalkidians and played their cities into the hands of the Spartan Brasidas whom the Chalkidians had summoned, the Chalkidian constitution itself may very well have had oligarchic tendencies.⁹ In the military, too, the Chalkidians acted as one entity, since their contingents were always called the ‘troops of the Chalkidians’ or simply ‘Chalkidians’, and seem to have been stationed largely in Olynthos. Over the years they became so strong that they were able to beat the Athenians as early as 429, and could not be overcome until the end of the Archidamian War.

Epigraphic sources offer further information that goes beyond Thucydides’ report. In the list of the so-called Kleon Assessment (fall of 425) the cities Mekyberna, Gale, and Singos are recorded with the remarkably low amount of ten drachmas each. This was correctly explained by the

⁸ For the state of the *Chalkideis* see Larsen 1968: 64–70, 74–75; Zahrt 1971: 57–66 (with an outline of the events and a complete list of references); Psoma 2001: 209–221; Zahrt 2006a: 604–605.

⁹ Larsen 1968: 76, who has further arguments for the oligarchic constitution, mentions the opposition to Athens and the special role of the Chalkidian cavalry.

fact that these cities had lost most of their inhabitants to Olynthos during the *anoikismos*. At some point they seem to have been reclaimed by Athens, which because of their obvious inability to pay, had merely imposed a symbolic contribution upon them, amounting for the three towns to only 0.2 per cent of the total tribute that was paid to Athens before the war. A list of persons killed in action from the year 423, mentioning deaths at Potidea, Sermylia, and Singos, suggests that there were battles in this region (*IG* 1³ 1184). Thus the Chalkidians were forced to resist the Athenians to a greater extent than is shown in Thucydides' description. For the summer of 425 he mentions merely the presence of Athenian garrisons in this region, but then he recounts in detail the ventures undertaken by Brasidas against cities that clearly did not belong to the Chalkidian state, as well as the operations carried out by the Athenian Kleon in this area in the summer of 422, for personal reasons describing his successes on the Chalkidian peninsula only partially.

Thucydides not only knew of a state of the Chalkidians, but on five occasions also mentions a Chalkidike. In some cases, however, it remains unclear whether he means the territory of the Chalkidians or the settlement area of the Thracian Chalkidians. Thus it cannot be said to what extent the latter (of course with the exception of the southern part of the Sithonia) had been integrated into the Chalkidian state or how far its territory extended towards the east and into the inland and encompassed cities that were located there which are known from the *Tribute Lists* but had by then seceded (Stolos, Píloros, Assera and the inland communities whose location is unclear). However, in the region of the Chalkidian state no other *polis* besides Olynthos can be attested, and the arguments put forth by some researchers for the existence of a federal state are derived entirely from fourth century conditions. The name *Chalkideis* carried by the unitary state and at times considered as evidence for its federal character can be explained differently: after the population of Olynthos had at least tripled due to the relocations, the new citizens understandably did not want to blend in with the minority of Olynthians, and thus a name was chosen which emphasized their common origin and could be accepted by all citizens.¹⁰ The Olynthians had no reason to oppose this, since it allowed them to support their claim of being the spokesmen for all Chalkidians. It was generously overlooked that not all Thracian Chalkidians had come together in this state, as well as that not all had even seceded from Athens.

¹⁰ This is confirmed by the fact that on the coins the name of the minting city Olynthos was soon replaced by that of the Chalkidians.

According to the evidence offered by the excavations, Olynthos had experienced a considerable growth in the time of the Archidamian War, and the state of the Chalkidians had not been definitively conquered by the Athenians or reintegrated into the league, in spite of the territorial losses already mentioned. In 421 the Peace of Nikias was meant to force through by diplomatic means what had not been achieved militarily. The Chalkidians were not involved in its conclusion, nor were they named in the text of the Peace in spite of being heavily affected by the conditions that had been negotiated between Athens and Sparta, as more than half the regulations concerned the region of the Chalkidian peninsula.¹¹ First, the towns of Argilos, Stagira, and Akanthos, that had gone over to Brasidas during the Archidamian War, as well as Stolos, Olynthos, and Spartolos, that had seceded as early as 432, were to be autonomous and neutral, but obliged to pay tribute to Athens, and thus return to the Delian League. Second, Mekyberna, Gale, and Singos, which obviously were still under Athenian control, were to be restored, meaning that the *anoikismos* of 432 was to be undone. Finally, the Athenians were granted total control over Sermylia and Torone that were expressly named as being in their possession. By transferring the cities named in the treaty onto a map, it becomes obvious that two cities in the area of the Chalkidike are in Athenian control (Sermylia, Torone), three further ones are supposed to be restored (Mekyberna, Gale, and Singos) and two cities are guaranteed autonomy and neutrality (Olynthos, Stolos). With an Athenian garrison in Sermylia and the restoration of Mekyberna, Gale, and Singos, the whole Sithonia from the northern boundary of Torone up to the gates of Olynthos was separated from the Chalkidian state. So the Athenians not only did not acknowledge the Chalkidian state, but also broke it down into its original parts by the regulations of the Peace, thus trying to restore the situation to what it had been before the war.

According to Thucydides the Chalkidians refused to accept the arrangements that concerned them, even though the entire Sithonia was under Athenian control and the Chalkidian state was for the time being limited to the vicinity of Olynthos; nevertheless the city remained relatively intact and claimed the position of representative of the Chalkidian state.¹² Even after 421 it was diplomatically and militarily active on the side of Athens' opponents, and by the summer of 421 had concluded an alliance with

¹¹ Thuc. 5.18.5–8; on the attempt to dissolve the Chalkidian state in the Peace of Nikias, see Larsen 1968: 70–71; Zahrt 1971: 66–72; Beck 1997: 153–155; Zahrt 2006a: 602–604.

¹² For the effects of the Peace of Nikias and the events until 415, see Larsen 1968: 71–73; Zahrt 1971: 72–79, and 2006a: 605–607.

Corinth and Argos. In the following winter it gained control over Mekyberna, driving away the Athenian garrison, and in the winter of 418/7 it joined the alliance between Argos and Sparta. In the following spring the city of Dion, located on the Akte, seceded from Athens and joined the Chalkidians. The Chalkidians successfully resisted the troops sent by Athens, and in the spring of 415, Nikias accused the Athenians of wanting to sail to Sicily with the Thracian Chalkidians yet unconquered. Thus, over the course of several years, they had successfully resisted the Athenian efforts to recapture them. Thucydides, however, who provides this information, says nothing about the size of its territory. The coins confirm that after 421 a Chalkidian state existed that continued to mint under this name.

Thucydides mentions this state for the last time in the year 415, and for the next twenty years the coins are the only evidence of its existence. In the literary and epigraphic sources it reappears no earlier than the 390s, presenting itself in the late 380s as a fully developed and mature federal state.¹³ It is impossible to say when this development began; but an essential precondition was the complete expulsion of the Athenians from the Chalkidian peninsula. This happened at the latest with the battle at Aigospotamoi. In 395 the Chalkidians appear as members of a coalition that had formed against Sparta, but are not named in the course of the following Corinthian War. Shortly thereafter the Makedonian king Amyntas III was threatened by the Illyrians and concluded a defensive alliance with the Chalkidians for fifty years, paying for this by handing over a piece of borderland, probably the Anthemus located to the southeast of modern Thessaloniki.¹⁴ Having been driven away from the throne for a short time, he seems to have renewed and extended the treaty with the Chalkidians, granting them great commercial concessions. Moreover, the treaty contained a stipulation prohibiting both parties to enter into an alliance with Amphipolis, Akanthos, Mende, and the Bottiaians without consulting the other party. These names are sometimes considered as indicative of the size of the Chalkidian state at the time, thus encompassing not only the region inhabited by the Chalkidians, but also the Isthmus of the Pallene and extending right down to the border of Mende. Archaeologically, an enlargement of the urban area of Olynthos, dated to the period between the end of the Peloponnesian War and the year 379, can be observed as corresponding to this extension of the state's

¹³ For the formation of the Chalkidian federal state, see Zahrnt 1971: 80–90; Beck 1997: 155–156.

¹⁴ About Amyntas and his problems with Illyrians and Chalkidians, see Zahrnt 2006b: 129–132.

territory.¹⁵ This increase in both the population of Olynthos and the territory of the Chalkidian state resulted in a rise in military power. The Makedonian king painfully felt the effects of this when, in the second half of the 380s, he had secured his rule to such an extent that he could reclaim the land given to the Chalkidians. They not only refused to return it, but also interfered in Makedonia, capturing the cities right up to Pella, and nearly driving Amyntas out of the country. At the same time, they invited the cities Akanthos and Apollonia to join their state and support them militarily. In 382, these two cities, like Amyntas himself, turned to the Spartans.

On this occasion, Xenophon has the Akanthian ambassador claim the following:¹⁶ unnoticed by the Spartans and their allies, a mighty power was emerging in Greece. The Olynthians, he says, had convinced various other cities to live with them according to the same laws in a *sympoliteia*. Subsequently, they had succeeded in winning over larger cities, and had finally begun to liberate the cities of Makedonia, having advanced already to Pella and nearly driven Amyntas out of the country. At the same time, they had demanded that the Akanthians and Apollonians join their military campaign, threatening to use force if they did not comply. The Akanthians and Apollonians, however, preferred to live according to their inherited law code, and as citizens of a free city. The ambassador goes on to speak about the army of the Olynthians, the danger that they would gain control of the rest of the Pallene to the south of Potideia, as well as their economic power. He claims that this power could still easily be dissolved, as many cities only reluctantly participated in the *politeia*, but that it had been decided to join them more closely together by allowing them to award each other the rights of *epigamia* (legal marriage across city boundaries) and *enktēsis* (land acquisition in another *polis*). Olynthos was responsible for this development, intending to join the *poleis* into a *sympoliteia*, and thus to create, as has already been understood, a federal state in which the individual members continued to exist as *poleis*, while at the same time being parts of a greater federation.

These features clearly distinguish it from the unitary state that was formed in 432 through the *anoikismos*, as well as through possible further additions and annexations. The process of state-formation, too, had taken an entirely different course from the one preceding the outbreak of the

¹⁵ See Hoepfner-Schwandner 1994: 71; Cahill 2002: 44–45.

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12–19; for the interpretation of this speech, see Zahrnt 1971: 83–90; Beck 2001: 360–362.

Archidamian War.¹⁷ After the Chalkidian state had been limited to the region surrounding Olynthos as a consequence of the military events in the final phase of the Archidamian War, and this condition had been fixed by the regulations of the Peace of Nikias, an annexation of cities could only have been possible once the Athenians had left the area. An exact dating of the individual stages is not possible and we can only guess at the size of the federation before the conclusion of the treaty with Amyntas. It remains equally unknown how far it extended in 382. The state that had developed in this way was called Chalkidians (ΧΑΛΚΙΔΕΙΣ) on its coins and in the treaty with Amyntas, while Xenophon consistently speaks of Olynthos and the Olynthians. Considering that for him Olynthos was not only the largest city in Thrace but also the founder of the federal state that held the hegemony within the federation, it is understandable that he speaks of the Olynthians when he means the federal state, thus using the name of the most important city for the whole federation. Other authors do the same, while in inscriptions the correct name is used.

In addition, Xenophon's choice of words corresponded to the Spartan view of not acknowledging federal states, as well as to their political intention at the time of breaking up associations of this kind. Thus, the assembly of the Peloponnesian League decided to wage war on Olynthos, and in the summer of 382 BCE, the first troops set out for the north.¹⁸ In contrast with the previous and simultaneous undertakings against Mantinea, Phleious, and Thebes, this was to be a very long and difficult war with high losses, as is reported by Xenophon and Diodoros. They always speak of the Olynthians, which is understandable considering that the war was targeted at the hegemonic power of Olynthos – the nerve of the Chalkidian state – and thus took place primarily in Olynthian territory. But their descriptions also hint at the existence of other cities in the territory of the state, thus demonstrating its federal character. The Chalkidians' main weapons were cavalry and lightly armed troops, just like during the Peloponnesian War, while the hoplites were less important. In the second year of the war the Peloponnesian troops took flight in the direction of Spartolos and Akanthos, as well as to Potidea and Apollonia, following a defeat before the walls of Olynthos. Therefore, the land in-between still seems to have been under the control of the Chalkidians, and the Chalkidian federation turned out to be a tough enemy. Indeed the war

¹⁷ Thus it should not be thought that the development described by the Akanthian ambassador means that the first step refers to the *anoikismos* of 432 and the second to the reclamation of the cities after 421; an *anoikismos* never leads to a *sympoliteia*.

¹⁸ See Zahrt 1971: 91–97; for the chronology, Stylianou 1998: 209–211.

was to go on until 379, when Olynthos was so utterly surrounded and cut off that it was forced to surrender and join the Peloponnesian League. According to Diodoros, other cities followed, with the result that the Chalkidian federation seems to have fallen apart after the defeat of Olynthos.

Soon afterwards, however, the power of Sparta began to deteriorate, and within a few years the federal state was refounded, again with Olynthos as leader. Having survived the war against the Spartans relatively unimpaired, this city continued to claim the role as representative of the Chalkidian state, as can be observed from its coins. Once again the individual stages are difficult to grasp and not always precisely datable.¹⁹ The literary sources do not mention the Chalkidians until the second half of the 360s, but apart from the coin legends, their name also appears in two Athenian epigraphic attestations from the 370s, under the name of Thracian Chalkidians in a document recording the members of the Second Athenian League (*IG* II² 43), and in a fragment mentioning a treaty concluded between the Athenians and the western Chalkidians (*IG* II² 36). This name indicates that the Chalkidian state was again limited to the area surrounding Olynthos, having lost the cities in the Sithonia, on top of Potidea.

The duration of the Chalkidians' membership in the Second Athenian League is unknown; it is usually thought that they left as a consequence of the Athenian claims on Amphipolis. In 368 the Athenians sent the general Iphikrates north, but neither he nor his successor Timotheos, who was active here from 364, managed to capture the city supported by the Chalkidians. Timotheos was more successful on the Chalkidian peninsula where he won Potidea and Torone for the Athenians. It is, however, unclear whether these cities had at the time become members of the Chalkidian state once more.²⁰ The earliest evidence for its size at that time is provided by an Epidaurian list of *theōrodokoi* dated to 360 (*IG* IV² 1.94). This records, as independent cities on the western coast of the Chalkidian peninsula, Aineia, Dikaia, and Potidea, which had in the meantime become an Athenian cleruchy, as well as three cities of the Pallene; moreover, in the area inhabited by the Chalkidians, Olynthos and Stolos, on the east coast Akanthos and Stagira, and in the north of the peninsula Kalindoia, Apollonia, and Arethusa. This list offers information about the territory that at the time may have belonged to a possibly newly

¹⁹ On the refoundation of the federal state, see Zahrnt 1971: 97–104; Beck 1997: 157, 161; Stylianou 1998: 227–228.

²⁰ Regarding the military and diplomatic events of the 360s, see Psoma 2011: 124–132.

founded Chalkidian federation with Olynthos at its center: at most this would be limited to the actual Chalkidike (without Stolos), but Torone may still have been under Athenian control at the time. The refoundation of the federation, even if not in its former size, probably happened in the last years before the accession of Philip II to the throne. The archaeological findings, too, may support the thesis that the Chalkidians gained strength in the second half of the 360s, showing a further extension of the urban area of Olynthos during the second quarter of the fourth century BCE.²¹

The rule of Philip II saw both the heyday of the Chalkidian federation and its abrupt end.²² Up until that time the Chalkidians had been able to stand up to the Makedonian kings, provided that these did not receive foreign aid, and they had often been superior to them. Since the undertakings of Timotheos they were still in a state of war with Athens. But Philip's initial – and unexpected – successes seem to have frightened them, so that they tried to reach an agreement with Athens in 357. But the Chalkidians were refused. As a consequence they concluded a treaty with the Illyrian king Grabos that has survived only as an inscription. However, a different treaty soon replaced this. For after the Athenians had declared war on Philip, he entered an alliance with the Chalkidians against Athens in 357/6, promising to make sure that they would obtain Potideia.²³ While our literary sources again speak of the Olynthians, the final part of the treaty concluded with Philip, which was found during the excavations in Olynthos, not only speaks of the Chalkidians as those who concluded the treaty, but also names the administrative bodies of the Chalkidian federation, thus providing definite evidence for the federal character of their political system. Some literary sources confirm this impression, mentioning *poleis* which were held by the Olynthians, with whom they were allied, had a joint *politeia*, or were part of the same federation of states. The way in which these texts speak of these cities again demonstrates the leading role of Olynthos within this association.

Olynthos was thus the city that profited most from the treaty concluded with the Makedonian king. He captured Potideia in 356 and handed the city without its inhabitants over to the Olynthians, who in this way gained an excellent harbor. They also received the Anthemus that they had once possessed during the rule of Philip's father. The Athenian orator Demosthenes frequently mentions that Philip favored the Olynthians during the following years, making sure that a strong pro-Makedonian party emerged by handing out presents to important citizens in Olynthos

²¹ See Hoepfner-Schwandner 1994: 92–93, 103.

²² See Zahnt 1971: 104–111; Psoma 2011: 132–135.

²³ For both treaties, *SVF* II 307–308.

and other Chalkidian cities. Philip's support of Olynthos and the federation is understandable because at the time, he still desired to secure and extend the boundaries of Makedonia and of the areas nearby, and could not accept the presence of Athenian strongholds or allies on the coasts of the northern Aegean. To their own detriment, however, the Chalkidians failed to notice that Philip did not need them any longer once the process of consolidation and extension of the kingdom was completed.

In the beginning, however, they profited from the favor of their powerful ally, and not least in terms of territory. While until recently we had to rely on scattered literary notes to find out about the size of the federation at the time, thanks to some new findings we now have some epigraphic evidence proving the membership of individual cities. Both bodies of sources render the following picture: The Byzantine grammarian Stephanos of Byzantion calls the Bottian city Aioleion a member of the Chalkidian state; Skapsa, located in Krusis which lies in the northwest by the coast, he designates as part of the Chalkidian land; and, finally, the neighboring Tinde, probably to be found in the inland, as a Chalkidian city. Furthermore, a house-purchase contract from the late 350s BCE has been found between Nea Silata and Elaiochoria in the location of ancient Spartolos. The text was dated because of the mention of an eponymous federal priest also known from Olynthos, Torone, and the northern hinterland of the Sithonia, thus proving the city's membership in the federation at that time.²⁴ The evidence mentioned above is sufficient to declare the regions Bottike (to the northwest of Potideia) and Krusis part of the federation. To the northeast of the Krusis extended the Anthemus with the *polis* Strepsa, located near the modern Basilika. Here, another house-purchase contract has been found. Although it survives only in fragments and cannot be dated, it resembles the texts found in the Chalkidike regarding its form.²⁵ In contrast, the cities Kalindoia and Apollonia located south of Lake Vólvi were part of Makedonia since Philip's conquest of Amphipolis (357) at the latest. The membership of Stagira situated in the northeast of the Chalkidian peninsula in the federation is again attested, while the coastal cities Akanthos and Dion further to the south were verifiably independent. The same probably applied to the other cities in the Akte. To the southwest of ancient Stagira is modern Arnaia. There, too, a house-purchase contract is said to have been found which is also dated to the federation's final years.²⁶ The northeastern part of the Chalkidike is

²⁴ SEG 46.804 = BE 1997: 402. ²⁵ SEG 37.583; see Hatzopoulos 1988a: 42.

²⁶ SEG 37.570; regarding the possible find spot, see Hatzopoulos 1988b: 15, n. 4.

reached by transgressing the mountain ridge to the south of Arnaia. In this region, in the proximity of the villages Kelli and Smixi, where ancient Stolos and Polichnion still need to be excavated, seven similar contracts have been found.²⁷ That the majority of these house-purchase contracts have been found at Olynthos causes little surprise, like the fact that one text from Torone has been known for about fifty years.²⁸ In 2001, an inscription found in Aphytis was published which fits into the series of already known texts and shows that the Chalkidian federation extended as far as the Pallene.²⁹ Whether it extended into the territory of the cities Mende and Skione, situated on the southern coast, cannot be said. Thus the Chalkidians had once again joined to form a federal state. Furthermore, on this occasion they had extended their boundaries much farther than at the time prior to the Spartan-Olynthian war, now encompassing almost the entire Chalkidian peninsula. By now a few epigraphically attested house-purchase contracts can be added to the list of known literary attestations. They match the form of those already familiar that were found in Olynthos and thus securely attest the membership of these communities in the Chalkidian federation.

All these house-purchase contracts, provided that they are sufficiently complete, mention the month names characteristic for the Chalkidians as well as an eponymous federal priest that was responsible for the federation's entire territory. This leads us to the question about further magistrates, of whom only few are attested, and about the federation's constitution, of which, in comparison with other federal states, rather little is known.³⁰ Our literary sources rarely mention the Chalkidian peninsula, and if they do, they deal with the military and political aspects, and not with its internal conditions. Hardly any documents and resolutions survive from Olynthos, the federation's center. This is not surprising considering that the excavators were mostly interested in the residential architecture of a city whose abrupt end offers secure indications for dating, rather than in the excavation of public spaces. Furthermore, the excessive preponderance of Olynthos makes it difficult to decide whether it is the city or the whole federation that is referred to when the literary sources speak – so casually – of Olynthos.

Apart from the federal priest mentioned above, a college of *archai xynai* ("common officials") is attested, as well as a head magistrate of the coins

²⁷ Hatzopoulos 1988b: 19–40; SEG 40.553. ²⁸ SEG 24.574 = 37.588.

²⁹ SEG 51.795 = BE 2002: 282.

³⁰ See Larsen 1968: 75–78; Hatzopoulos 1988b: 66–70; Beck 1997: 159–162.

(whose name appears on the mintages of the final years), and the office of *hipparchos*. Further military commanders are unknown, as is the organization of the army.³¹ It is also unclear if the *dēmos* of the Olynthians that is known to have exiled a certain politician named Apollonides was a popular assembly of the Olynthians or a federal institution, if such an institution existed at all. The *boulē* of the Olynthians mentioned by Theopompos was presumably that of the city, since this author usually speaks of the Chalkidians.³² It is also unknown which institution decided on the general introduction of *epigamia* and *enktēsis* that the Akanthian mentions in Sparta. Finally, it is controversial whether the Chalkidian state's constitution was oligarchic or democratic. There is some evidence, however, suggesting that the unitary state of the fifth century had an oligarchic constitution, and that the federal state of the fourth century a more democratic constitution.

The following is known about the distribution of responsibilities: The federation dealt with foreign policy and the conclusion of treaties, as well as with commercial policy, namely controlling imports and exports; these secured the federation's income, which to a great extent consisted of the customs levied in the harbors and emporia. Coin production, originally organized by the unitary state, was also centralized in the fourth century. However, the more important members like Torone and the Bottiaians seem to have minted coins during the time of their membership, thus supporting the local monetary circulation. A house-purchase contract found outside Olynthos is not dated like all the others only by the mention of the federal priest, but in this case also by the mention of an eponymous *epistatēs*.³³ The existence of this official can also be assumed for other cities of the federation, offering an indication of a local administration. The Akanthian's claim that the Chalkidians had common laws confirms the information by Aristotle that Androdamas had given laws to the Thracian Chalkidians; those about murder and inheritance are named.³⁴ Apparently these were valid for all federal cities, as were the *epigamia* and *enktēsis*. By introducing these laws, the Chalkidians did more to create a common civil

³¹ There is also no mention of a fleet, although the treaty concluded with Amyntas III regulates the import of timber for the building of ships (*SVF* II 231; in contrast with most publications, the stone speaks of "import," not "export"), the Akanthian ambassador references the resources in the country (*Xen. Hell.* 5.2.16), and the coast of the Chalkidike has many harbours.

³² *Dēmos*: *Dem.* 9.56, 66; *boulē*: Theopomp. *FGrH* II 5 F 143.

³³ Hatzopoulos 1988b: 27–30; moreover, the reference to the city of the Olynthians as former proprietor of real estate strongly indicates a separate administration on a communal level (Hatzopoulos 1988b: 68).

³⁴ *Xen. Hell.* 2.5.12; *Arist. Pol.* 1274b23–5.

right than most Greek federal states. In addition, they were one of the earliest federations that transgressed ethnical boundaries.

During the first years of his reign, Philip had needed the Chalkidians as allies against the Athenians and had thus supported them without interfering in their internal affairs. After some years, however, the state had become an alien element in his kingdom that had grown and consolidated itself within a few years, and the Chalkidians thoughtlessly attracted Philip's attention to this. In 352 they made peace with the Athenians, contrary to the terms of the contract concluded with the king. To make matters worse, shortly thereafter they took in his two surviving half-brothers. As a reaction to these provocations, Philip seems to have invaded Chalkidian territory on his return from a campaign against the Thracians. The literary sources mention a temporary reconciliation; but the house-purchase contracts found in Olynthos and other cities dating to the final years of the federation give a rather different impression. They attest to a considerable deterioration in prices on the property market, thus demonstrating a major crisis.³⁵ In 349 the war broke out openly, at first against individual federal cities, subsequently against Olynthos itself. Details concerning its course and chronology are unsure, but the literary sources indicate that the war was no military walk in the park for Philip, just as the Spartans had realised earlier on. The capitulation of Olynthos took place no earlier than the late summer of 348. Philip was now also master of the remaining Chalkidian cities. Thus, the Chalkidian federation ceased to exist.

³⁵ See Hatzopoulos 1988b: 76.

Federalism and the sea. The koina of the Aegean islands

Kostas Buraselis

Geography imposed both a special frame and fate on Greek federalism in the Aegean. While the natural separation of settlements and territories on the typically mountainous Greek mainland was a factor that favored political fragmentation, this development played out differently in the island world of the Aegean. Some bigger islands experienced similar problems to the mainland and were often organized into more than one *polis*-community, though the surrounding sea secluded them from the world further away, encouraging a higher degree of political collaboration and unity. This was even more likely if a common ethnic substratum existed in a certain region: this was the case on Lesbos, which was considered an Aiolic island (but not on Euboia, which was only in part Ionian). The presence and influence of important religious centers such as Delos (see below), which tended to coordinate the action of separate communities on a regional or interregional level through common undertakings (mainly festivals), also played a complementary role.

On the other hand, the maritime seclusion of these island worlds was only a relative one as the sea, the easiest method of transport in antiquity, did more to connect than to separate.¹ Sea transport and communication depended on the effective seafaring capacities and the corresponding range and degree of activities in the case of each maritime state involved. Individual islands, especially the smaller ones, had very limited opportunities to develop major merchant or war fleets, so they could not claim principal roles in wider political games of thalassocracy. Rare exceptions (e.g., Samos in the Archaic Age, Hellenistic Rhodes) essentially served to prove the rule. Even larger islands were usually intertwined with, and exposed to, more extensive naval aspirations of developing, hegemonic sea powers. Thus the structural model of island-federations was essentially predisposed to yield various alliances

¹ See esp. the analysis on the “espaces égéens” by Brun 1996: 163–182.

under leading sea powers active in the same area, even when the administrative centers of those powers were located outside the Nesiotic world itself. Most characteristic of this were the two Athenian Leagues of the Classical Age, which brought most of the Aegean under Athenian control, imprinting on Nesiotic political experiences and shaping the self-perception of satellites of a naval hegemon.² Thus the rules of the sea significantly conditioned federalism in the Aegean.

The diverse appearance of Aegean federalism can be best illustrated, and – in accordance with diverging local conditions and traditions – interpreted in three significant examples of relevant developments: the League of the Islanders (*koinon tōn Nēsiōtōn*) in the Hellenistic period covered a larger Nesiotic area of the central Aegean, while separate attempts at forms of federal unification on a ‘one-island-level’ took place on Keos and Lesbos from Archaic to Hellenistic times.³ The evidence preserved on these federal phenomena in the Aegean is very limited, mainly inscriptions and coins, but allows at least respective – though admittedly imperfect – patterns to emerge. Crete, constituting another experiment in federal cooperation on an island of ‘mainland proportions’, is examined in a separate chapter by Chaniotis in this book, while Euboeia, somewhat a semi-island because of its close connection with its opposite mainland, exists as another special case which is treated by Denis Knoepfler.

The *Nēsiōtai*: a synthesis between *sympoliteia* and a hegemonic league

Historical Background

Delos was a religious center of gravity in the Aegean since the later Mycenaean period. The cult of Apollo, Artemis, and Leto and the concomitant festivities there originally concerned all Ionians but soon gained the recognition and participation of Delos’ neighboring islands, transforming the sanctuary into some sort of enlarged but rudimentary amphiktyony. The geographical term coined for all these islands, the Cyclades (from *kyklos*, ‘circle’), expressed their role of surrounding or ‘encircling’ Delos,

² On Athenian impact on the islands in the Classical period: Brun 1996: 176–177, 206–209; Constantakopoulou 2007: 61–136.

³ A shorter synthesis on the cases of the *Nēsiōtai*, the *Lesbioi* and the *Krētaieis*, focusing on the relations to their respective central sanctuaries, is now offered by Buraselis 2013.

independent of the ethnic origin of their dwellers.⁴ That pre-existing religious network was then utilized by Athens as the organizational frame on which its first naval alliance was built, the so-called Delian League. The official seat of the league, where its treasury was also deposited, was Delos until it was moved later to Athens (454 BCE). However, Delos never lost its role as an important religious center, and thus it was only to be expected that this geographically and historically central location of the island with its widely recognized cult and sanctuary might be exploited again by future powers who would attempt to establish their hegemony over the Aegean.

The League of the Islanders under the Antigonids and Ptolemies

Favorable conditions for such a development were initiated by the antagonism of Alexander's successors, which gave way to the plan of grouping their allies among Greek cities into larger organizations under their control. These either repeated the form of a traditional general symmarchy (after the model of the Hellenic League) or appeared as more modest, local federations under dynastic aegis. In the case of the Aegean the result was the emergence of a *koinon tōn Nēsiōtōn*, a League of the Islanders, which is known only from epigraphic sources.⁵ The foundation of this *koinon* falls in the early Hellenistic period, though the precise date and setting of its beginnings has recently become again a matter of dispute. The original view of Félix Dürrbach (1907) who first published and studied in detail the relevant evidence was to connect the creation of this *koinon* with the policy of Ptolemy I and his successors. However, Dürrbach later revised his opinion, supported by the authoritative remarks of Maurice Holleaux (1907: 100–101), and preferred to recognize a basic Delian inscription (IG XI.4, 1036) as a testimony of an earlier period of the *koinon* (between c. 314 and 288 BCE) under the leadership of Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes. These two would then be the first founders of the confederacy. Later scholarship has ascribed to this conclusion and enriched its argument with further remarks. Recently, Andrew Meadows has forcefully revived Dürrbach's first conclusion of a Ptolemaic context for the foundation of the *koinon*, though under Ptolemy II.⁶ The

⁴ The word and notion appear already in Hdt. 5.30 and Thuc. 1.4; 2.9.4 (where Melos and Thera are included into the Cyclades). On Delos as religious center of the Aegean islands see Constantakopoulou 2007: 38–60.

⁵ Its first and only monographic treatment, covering all of its phases, continues to be the PhD dissertation by König 1910, now outdated. For the main literature since then see below; most recently also Constantakopoulou 2012; Meadows 2013.

⁶ See Meadows 2013. The recent study by Constantakopoulou 2012 does not question the orthodox date of foundation.

main argument for this thesis may actually be seen in the numerous inscriptions attesting the activities of the *koinon* during exactly the reign of that Ptolemy (Philadelphos). However, there seems to be no reason to lower the date of the only inscription mentioning an Antigonid phase of the *koinon* with its festivals of *Antigoneia* and *Demetrieia*, and connect the latter with Antigonos II Gonatas and Demetrios II. The letter forms of the inscription as well as the independent mention of a festival named *Antigoneia* taking place on Delos in 296 BCE (*IG* XI.2, 154A, line 42) are strong arguments against this.⁷ It is more probable to accept a paucity of inscriptional evidence on an early phase of the Confederacy of the Islanders under the Antigonids, which may be put forward for various reasons, than to ignore those remarks and transfer the only preserved epigraphic testimony of the Antigonid Confederacy to the middle of the third century BCE, that is, after a correspondingly first and often-attested Ptolemaic period of this institution.

Based on the traditional chronology, the main traits of the League of the Islanders in its consecutive Antigonid and Ptolemaic phases can be established. Its members comprised mainly the Cyclades and possibly some islands in the central Aegean.⁸ The basic constitutional body of the confederacy was the assembly of the islands' delegates (*synodos*: *IG* XI.4, 1036, from the Antigonid period, *koinon synedrion* or simply *synedrion* under the Ptolemies), which periodically convened on Delos. In the Antigonid period these sessions were annual, alternatively (and practically) coinciding with the celebration of the federal ruler-cult festivals of the *Antigoneia* and the *Demetrieia* on the same island. The representatives (*synedroi*) of the Islanders decided on the means necessary for the organization of the festivals and their respective provision. The evidence from the Ptolemaic period draws a more detailed picture of the federal areas of action. The confederacy apparently issued decrees (seventeen testimonies survive),⁹ with which it thanked and honored its Ptolemaic patrons and their officials, as well as through the erection of statues; it conferred on various of its benefactors and their descendants the rights of proxeny and/or citizenship in all members of the confederacy; it organized the dispatch of delegates (*theōroi*) to Alexandria for the participation in the Alexandrian royal festivals, as in the case of the famous decree from Nikouria near

⁷ See esp. Buraselis 1982: 60–75. 80, with further arguments (where the date for the latest mention of the federal *Antigoneia*, 294 BCE, is a misprint for the correct 296 BCE, the year of the Delian *archōn* Phillis I).

⁸ E.g., Samos, according to the Nikouria decree (see below). On the list of members: Buraselis 1982: 78 (with discussion).

⁹ For a full list see Buraselis 1982: 180–183.

Amorgos concerning the first *Ptolemaieia* in the Ptolemaic capital (*IG* XII.7, 506); and it apparently held a similar periodic festival of *Ptolemaieia* with contests of tragedies on Delos (*IG* XI.4, 1043), not necessarily coinciding with meetings of the *synedrion*. The publication of the relevant decrees took place on Delos and also at prominent places on each participating island. In connection with the *synedrion* appears a curator (*epimelētēs*) of the *Nēsiōtai* who took care of the members' contributions to a common fund and paid from it the costs for the inscription of the confederacy's decrees (*IG* XI.4, 1040 and 1041).

The head of the confederacy was the *nēsiarchos*, the “*archōn* of the islands.” Hellenistic rulers would obviously never like to bear the title themselves, for it would not comply with their more elevated image as kings.¹⁰ It is telling that no known *nēsiarchos* is of Nesiotic origin himself: a chronologically early case (possibly bridging the Antigonid and Ptolemaic period of the confederacy) is Apollodoros, son of Apollonios, who was a citizen of Kyzikos. The two other known *nēsiarchoi* appear exclusively during the Ptolemaic period. They were Bakchon, a Boiotian, and Hermias, probably a Halikarnassian.¹¹ The role of the position seems rather to be that of an imported governor, somehow imposed by the Ptolemies on the confederacy. The best-known case, Bakchon, appears repeatedly as acting in collaboration with other Ptolemaic officials: thus he co-organizes with Philokles, king of the Sidonians, the dispatch of foreign judges to Karthaia on Keos (*IG* XII.5, 1065). An even clearer case of a royal official responsible for the administration of these islands under the Ptolemies in financial respect was the “*oikonomos* of the islands”; a certain Thrasykles is attested as a new incumbent of this post (*IG* XII Supplement, 169). The financial aspect of the islanders' inclusion in the Antigonid and, subsequently, the Ptolemaic area of control must have been an important one. In the Nikouria decree Ptolemy I is praised for having abolished the contributions that were paid previously, that is, to the previous hegemons of the league.¹² However, the formerly mentioned office of the Ptolemaic *oikonomos* responsible for those contributions, and the fact that the Nikouria decree itself mentioned the collection of money by the islanders for sending a golden crown to Philadelphos,¹³ shows that some form of financial

¹⁰ See the episode Plut. *Dem.* 25.7 (possibly from Douris), where Demetrios Poliorketes' *philoi* ridicule Agathokles as being just a *nēsiarchos*, unlike their king. On this testimony, see Hauben 1974; Buraselis 1982: 81–83.

¹¹ On the *nēsiarchoi* of the confederacy, see Buraselis 1982: 81–83. 184–186. Hermias' origin from Halikarnassos depends on whether one accepts his identification with the homonymous Halikarnassian honored by the Delians in *IG* XI.4, 565; cf. Bagnall 1976: 138; Buraselis 1982: 182.

¹² *IG* XII.7, 506, line 16. ¹³ *IG* XII.7, 506, lines 44–45.

obligations of the confederacy to its successive patrons was always a part of the situation.

On the other hand, there is no evidence of any military participation of the confederate islands in Antigonid or Ptolemaic operations, or any other indication of a common coinage of the *Nēsiōtai*.¹⁴ One also hears nothing of any judicial activity of the confederacy's council as a sort of federal court. The already mentioned implementation of the system of foreign judges by the *nēsiarchos* and other Ptolemaic officials was apparently a sufficient substitute for that, certainly suggesting the functional interconnection of the Confederacy with the larger pattern of Ptolemaic alliances and administration.¹⁵

The League under Rhodian leadership

Perhaps the best proof of the suitability of the confederacy as a tool of control over the islands of the central Aegean in the framework of Antigonid and Ptolemaic policy is the further use of that model in the second half of the third century BCE by the new leader of the Aegean, Rhodes. Evidence for this phase of the confederacy is even more limited. The earliest likely testimony is the base of a statue for the Rhodian admiral Agathostratos, son of Polyaratos, who was honored by the *koinon tōn Nēsiōtōn* on Delos (*IG* XI.4, 1128). On paleographical grounds, the inscription should be dated to c. 240 BCE, though Agathostratos is most likely identical to the Rhodian admiral at the sea-battle between a Ptolemaic fleet and the Rhodians off Ephesos, which is usually dated to the mid-third century BCE.¹⁶ Apparently, the Rhodians at that time had already attained maritime supremacy and a sort of protectorate over the Islanders. However, this becomes certain only after the close of the third century, when the weakness of the Ptolemies eventually encouraged the Rhodian effort to succeed them as the leading sea power in the Aegean and protectors of the Island League (Wiemer 2002: 271–276). There are two decrees of the confederacy acting in this period, both from Tenos (*IG* XII.5.2, 817 and

¹⁴ Geagan 1968: 381–384 published a fragment of an inscription from Nemea where several contingents of island troops are mentioned, namely Keians, Kythnians and (partly restored) Mykonians. He interprets this as evidence for a military engagement of Nesiotic troops in Antigonid service in the Peloponnese in c. 312 BCE. Constantakopoulou 2012: 4 agrees. But the context of the inscription is altogether uncertain (see, for instance, Robert 1969b: 236). Alternatively, the document might reflect the possibility that the Aegean islands entered the Hellenic League of the Antigonids in 302 BCE.

¹⁵ On this aspect see esp. Bagnall 1976: 140–141, 156–158.

¹⁶ Polyain. 5.18; cf. Wiemer 2002: 98–100 (with the earlier literature). On the date of *IG* XI.4, 1128, see Buraselis 1982: 184 (autopsy).

824B), where the meeting place of the federal delegates and the actual seat of the confederacy had been transferred. The temple of Poseidon and Amphitrite on Tenos can be recognized as the religious center connected with these actions during the same period, since it is also recorded to be the second place of publication (that is, together with Delos) for the decrees of the *Nēsiōtai*.¹⁷ Both decrees honor benefactors of the *Nēsiōtai*: the first concerns a Syracusan businessman who supplied them with the necessary money to buy corn in a food crisis; the honoree of the second is a Milesian doctor who served the islanders' interests in difficult times (apparently during some sort of epidemic). The latter text is inscribed on a stone that contains a Tenian decree of similar content honoring the same man. The Islanders' decree, however, is characteristically dated first by the Rhodian eponymous priest and then by the corresponding *archōn* of Tenos.

Further evidence for closer control of Rhodes over the league emerges from two epigraphic testimonies from Delos (*IG* XI.4, 751 and 752) where the Delians honor two respective Rhodian admirals in approximately the same period. The first commander is mentioned as having taken care of "the security of the islands" while he had the command of a fleet including "the Nesiotic triremes"; the second is even more expressly described as having been sent out by Rhodes in the capacity of "the commander of the islands and the Nesiotic ships."¹⁸ The political and military subordination of the islanders to Rhodes and the mobilization of whatever naval strength they possessed for the common purpose of policing the Aegean thus becomes evident. Numismatic observations may further illustrate the picture of the confederacy's Rhodian phase. The emblem of Rhodes, the rose, appears on Tenian coins of this period, also indicating that Tenos has become a sort of base for the Rhodian administration of the confederate islands.¹⁹ Tenian efforts to attain *asylia* from the Cretan League might also be interpreted against the same political background.²⁰

Concerning the confederacy's magistrates during this period, we know from the evidence cited that a board of *prostatai* acted as a probouleutic body for the decrees of the *Nēsiōtai* (*IG* XII.5.2, 824B). A treasurer (*tamias*)

¹⁷ Both the Rhodians and the Delians may have found it more expedient not to use Delos any longer as the meeting place of the confederacy in this phase of its existence. The Delian decree *IG* XI.4, 751, honoring the Rhodian admiral Epikrates, son of Polystratos, for his prohibition on abusing the sacred island as a base for piracy operations, and the concern it implies for the security of Delos, is telling.

¹⁸ *IG* XI.4, 752, lines 4–5.

¹⁹ Étienne 1990: 225–252 (the rose: 246); cf. further Sheedy 1996: 438–443.

²⁰ On the Tenian dossier of Cretan *asylia* grants: Rigsby 1996: nos. 56–60. Cf. further Foderà 2008: 354–355.

appears in charge of the confederacy's finances and the implementation of the honors decided (inscription of decree, golden crown), while envoys (*presbeutai*) of the confederates undertook the task of traveling to Delos to ask for the permission to erect there the second copy of the honorific decree (IG XII.5.2, 817).

Concluding remarks

To what extent did the various phases of the League of the Islanders represent the notion of federalism and federal integration? The synthesis of the old pattern of hegemonic leagues with the model of Nesiotic cooperation created a highly interesting hybrid form for subsequent federal experiments that were geared towards the contemporary great powers' claims of hegemony over the Aegean. The form of a *sympoliteia* was thus able to camouflage alliances that were inspired by the concept of hegemony. On the other hand, one should not underestimate the process of a top-down ethnogenesis taking place here, manipulated by the royal dynasties of the Antigonids and Ptolemies: the term *Nēsiōtai* does not appear in the Classical period as a term to describe a specific and larger political community in the Aegean. One should also notice some salient differences from the model of hegemonic leagues like the Hellenic League of Philip, Alexander, and the Antigonids: (a) the originally Ionian religious amphiktion of Delos acted here as a sort of distinct forerunner; (b) in the case of the *Nēsiōtai* a specific and limited geographical region was covered; and (c), decrees conferring citizenship, proxeny and other honors were issued and were binding for all members of the confederacy. This strongly recalls the practice of the Achaian and Aitolian Leagues, while we do not know of any such provision in the case of the previously mentioned hegemonic leagues.²¹

These remarks help us then perceive why and how the *koinon* of the Islanders represents an intriguing combination of traits associated with both a hegemonic league, led by a royal or a *polis* power, and with a more or less standard form of Greek confederacy. It is perhaps the first such tribute the kings and the hegemonic cities of the post-Alexander world were indirectly forced to pay to the advancing idea of Greek federalism (see Buraselis 2003). It served their needs in the spirit of a new age, which they were clever enough to consider. The view taken of the confederacy by the islands themselves is more difficult to assess. However, it seems probable

²¹ See the chapters by Peter Funke, Athanassios Rizakis, and Bernhard Smarczyk in this volume.

that this loose form of political coordination of their interests was also to their liking, as long as their financial and/or military obligations to this form of larger political community did not overburden them. Their participation in the confederacy offered, potentially, a sense of both passive and active political unity and a feeling of security from external menace, which cannot be underestimated in view of their past experience or contemporaneous context.²²

Federal experiments on islands with multiple city-states

Keos

The individual *poleis* of Keos were most probably members of the league of the *Nēsiōtai*.²³ They also had their own history of federal interaction with other *poleis* on the island. Keos never became a unified island *polis* with one main, politically dominating settlement (like Chios and Samos, or Rhodes and Kos after their respective synoikisms in the Classical period). However, it is noteworthy that Keos presented not only the pattern of a multi-*polis* island but also a strong tendency to attain alternative forms of unity through elements of federal collaboration of its four *poleis*: Koressos, Poieessa, and Karthaia were situated in different zones of the coast, and Ioulis at a more or less central point of the interior. The name Keios, in general reference to the island's inhabitants, is attested already during the Persian Wars. The Keians appear collectively among the dedicators on the relevant victory monuments,²⁴ while Herodotus mentions them as an island unit in all episodes of the war and as a specific Ionian *ethnos* (8.1.2; 46.2). Further, the four *poleis* of Keos appear to have possessed a common dining-house on Delos (Hdt. 4.35.4), a distinct landmark there but at the same time an unmistakable expression of coordinated action and common external representation of the Keian cities. This impression of a pan-Keian community is further corroborated by the joint mention of the Keians in the *Athenian Tribute Lists* (e.g. in *IG* 1³ 263. IV. 21, between the entries for

²² Constantakopoulou 2012 sees the Island League as the “result of a bottom-up negotiation of power” (12) between the island-members and their successive hegemon and “an expression of a strong regional identity, which can be interpreted as resistance to power” (*ibid.*), which seems to overstate the case. The provenance of the known *nēsiarchoi* alone (see above) is strong counter-evidence.

²³ See Bakchon's juridic actions at Karthaia, mentioned above. This as well as other instances of direct relations between the Ptolemies and individual *poleis* of the island (e.g., the renaming of Koressia to Arsinoë) speak against a pan-Keian organization within the League of the Islanders.

²⁴ They appear as one body on the Serpent Column at Delphi (M&L 27, line 7, between Mykenaians and Melians) and in a similar dedication at Olympia, reported by Paus. 5.23.1–2.

the Siphnians and Andrians, which are well-attested cases of one-*polis* islands). The numismatic evidence also speaks to this, with the appearance of the common symbol of a dolphin on the separate coinage of Keian cities during the late sixth and early fifth centuries BCE.²⁵ These mechanisms must have led to the conclusion that Lysias, in the early fourth century, expressed when he spoke of the island as one *polis*, although this was never the case.²⁶ The image of a politically unified Keos must have been an accepted notion.

When Keos entered the Second Athenian League in 377 BCE, the same status of the four cities was apparently still the norm. The foundation decree of the Athenian League lists them as “of the Keians, the Ioulians, Koressians, Karthaïans”, while mentioning Poieessa separately on a different occasion.²⁷ Most probably the Athenians accepted the Keians formally as individual cities into their new alliance, but simultaneously recognized the long-lasting collaboration on the island through that specific formula comprising at least three of the four Keian *poleis*. In the same year (377 BCE), the Keians are mentioned collectively as one of the cities repaying a part of the interest on their loans in the accounts of the temple on Delos, while the cities of Ikaria appear separately in the same text.²⁸ The main impulse towards an enhancement of political unity on Keos then came apparently from abroad through contacts with Euboia, an island also alienated from Athens. This emerges from two inscriptions found on Keos. They are treaties of *isopoliteia* between the Keians and, respectively, Histiaia and Eretria on Euboia.²⁹ Keos appears here as a unified political entity that offers citizens of the two Euboean cities Keian citizenship, with the possibility that this be implemented by the Histiaians’ and Eretrians’ inscription into specific political and administrative subdivisions of the whole Keian state, in this sequence: a *phylē*, a *triptys* (= *trittys*) and a *chōros*. Unfortunately, we do not know enough to understand how this new political system on Keos worked. However, it apparently did not eliminate the pre-existing *poleis* of the island but instead integrated them into a new

²⁵ Papageorgiadou-Banis 1997: 43 and 2007: 31; cf. Brun 1996: 178.

²⁶ Related in Harpokration s.v. *Keioi*. The lexicographer goes on to explain this strange mention of the whole island as a *polis* by citing similar passages concerning Euboia and Sicily in poetry. However, prose is usually not entitled to a similar degree of metaphorical freedom. The date of Lysias’ speech may be placed in c. 380 BCE; see Reger 2004b: 747–748.

²⁷ IG II² 43, lines 119–122 and 82; cf. Brun 1989: 122. ²⁸ I.Delos 98 A, lines 11–13.

²⁹ IG XII.5, 594 ≈ SEG 14.531 = SVA II 287 (Histiaia); SEG 14.530 = SVA II 232 (Eretria). Both inscriptions have been found on the citadel of Ioulis (modern Chora), which probably suggests that this city was the political center of the Keian federation, without, however, any signs of the otherwise ‘typical solution’ of synoikism.

pattern of political organization with a tripartite structure such that the island could also stand on equal footing regarding the mutual awarding of citizenship with the two Euboian *poleis*.³⁰

The Euboian model and leanings of this phase of political developments on Keos may be deduced from one of the previously stated rare subdivision-names of the Keians as well as general historical considerations on the relations of Keian *poleis* to Athens and Euboia. The term *chōros* ("space," "area") reappears in a similar function to describe parts of the citizen body of Eretria (Lewis 1962: 2–3). It is plausible then to assume a relevant influence of Eretria on that restructuring of Keian collaboration. Furthermore, we know that the cities of Euboia had begun since the Athenian decline of power in the later phase of the Peloponnesian War to distance themselves from the Athenians, and, in light of Thebes' ascendancy in the 370s BCE, to later align themselves with their Boiotian neighbors to rival Athens' naval prowess.³¹ Therefore, it was concluded that the advanced form of a Keian federation went hand-in-glove with the separation from Athens. It is evident from an Athenian inscription pertaining to Athenian–Keian relations around 360 BCE that in Ioulis and Karthaia there were robust, and militant, anti-Athenian parties, which had seized power and caused a military intervention of the Athenians on the island in two phases to restore the Keian alliance.³² Insisting on "the Keians being politically organized [i.e., divided] into cities," Athens imposed this state of affairs on Keos, which meant a wholesale condemnation of the island's experiment in closer federation and rather simultaneous defection from the Athenians. Apparently, what had been still tolerated by Athens as a loose form of federation in 377 BCE became incompatible with Athenian interests when it developed further, inspired and supported by enemies of the Athenians.

The testimonies we have from the later fourth and third centuries BCE seem to indicate a return to the original, looser form of federation on the basis of independent *poleis* of the island. The relevant evidence exists in the onomastic way of mentioning Keian citizens in inscriptions of this period and in the island's coinage. The list of recipients on the famous inscription

³⁰ Further testimonies of an integrated Keian state in approximately the same period are: (a) *IG* XII.5, 609: a list of names, probably citizens, arranged under the headings of three Ioulitan tribes and Koressia; (b) *IG* XII.5, 608: a list of Panhellenic victors from Keos, obviously presented as some sort of common state. Both inscriptions have been found at Ioulis. See Brun 1989: 126–127, 130, 135; Mendoni 2007: no. 1.

³¹ See in particular Brun 1989: 124 and 134.

³² *IG* II² 404 (with restoration of lines 19–20 by Dreher 1989). Cf. also line III, where "the *poleis* of Keos" are mentioned as representing the Keians. See also Mendoni 2007: nos. 2 and 3.

of corn exports from Cyrene (R&O no. 96, from c. 330 BCE) includes the following entries: five thousand *medimnoi* going “to the Ioulian Keians” (*Kēois Ouliatais*: line 45), four thousand “to the Karthaian Keians” (*Kēois Korthaessi*: line 51), and three thousand “to the Koressian Keians” (*Kēois Korēsiois*: line 55). Only once do we find the mention of three thousand *medimnoi* delivered generically “to the Keians” (line 53). Given the specific character of the other three entries, however, we should understand that the recipient was here the fourth city on the island, Poiessa, whose name may have been missed out after referring to the general ethnic (Brun 1989: 128). After all, from the perspective of Cyrene, the Poiessians might be also sufficiently cataloged as Keians. The distinction of the four *poleis* as the practical norm, while also existing as branches of a political larger unit, seems to be suggested again. Similar is the usage that is attested in the way that individual Keians are mentioned in the lists of Delphic *proxenoi* from the early third century BCE, where the double designation (ethnic origin with *polis* identity attached) is also practiced.³³ In the same lists a Keian identity alone seems to turn up only later, at the beginning of the second century BCE, as a sufficient designation.³⁴

The numismatic evidence also points to the existence of some form of common action between the *poleis* of the island in the period from the later fourth or early third centuries onwards. A limited federal bronze coinage has been issued bearing the inscription KEI (= KEIΩN), with the emblematic Keian hero Aristaios on the obverse. Coins of Ioulis and Karthaia with similar types may coincide already with the period of the above-mentioned Keian defection from Athens.³⁵

A new phase of federal initiatives on Keos may be dated approximately to the last third of the third century BCE and connected with a new influential external power, Aitolia. Our sources of information this time are four inscriptions testifying the conclusion of an *isopoliteia* between the Keians and the Aitolians.³⁶ The Keians appear here to have collectively acquired Aitolian citizenship and, in turn, granted the Aitolians Keian citizenship, a precious political move to safeguard themselves against Aitolian acts of piracy. Apparently, the need to meet eventual Aitolian

³³ Cases of Delphic grants of hereditary rights: *FdD* 3.2.188 (from 278/7 BCE?); 4.402, col. IV (mid-third/second centuries BCE); 4.402, col. II. Cf. the discussion in Reger-Risser 1991: 306–307.

³⁴ *FdD* 3.2.211.

³⁵ Papageorgiadou-Banis 1997: 43 and 2007: 30–31. Reger and Risser 1991: 307–308, attribute these issues to the subsequent phase of the league (see below), mainly on stylistic grounds.

³⁶ *IG* XII.5, 526, 527, 532, 539. On the historical interpretation of these texts, see Reger and Risser 1991: 310–314.

danger as a union urged the cities of Keos to common action and protection of their interests. This time their federation does not seem to have altered the inner structure of the collaborating Keian cities, as no new subdivisions of a common state or related provisions are attested. “The Keians” and “the cities of Keos” are used interchangeably.³⁷ However, a common *boulē* and *dēmos* of the Keians appear as the issuing authorities of their decrees (*IG* XII.5, 532, line 5). Another common action of the federated Keians may have been the joint dispatch of a *theōria* to Delphi, again a representation of pan-Keian interests towards Aitolia, which controlled Delphi in the same period.³⁸ It is unclear how long this new form of a Keian federation lasted. Two series of bronze coinage that bear some of the same symbols as earlier (legend KEI, obverse the hero Aristaios) have been dated to these later years.³⁹ But by the Augustan period, the federal experiments had come to a close; they were superseded by two large synoikisms that appeared to be more practical than federal cooperation, as Ioulis absorbed the *polis* Koressia, and Karthaia amalgamated with Poieessa (Strabo 10.5.6).

One may conclude that the Keian example aptly demonstrates the old force of both the basic substratum of ethnic connectivity and also the difficulties of transcending the autonomy of small-scale *polis* communities. Any Keian unity that went beyond a very basic collaboration seems to have been inspired, and perhaps in part dictated, by external powers. The typical pattern of independent *poleis* was only partially revised and did not prove to be stronger than that of synoikism, which simply enlarged the model of the *polis* rather than integrating it into a federal structure.

Federalism on Lesbos

Lesbos is one of the larger Aegean islands where several independent *poleis* developed side by side, yet independently from one another, since the Archaic period. The sense of a common ethnic origin as Aiolians might have fueled the cooperation between the Lesbian cities, but their actual institutional collaboration developed only restrictedly and belatedly.⁴⁰ An important factor in this was the superior yet not unrivalled power of Lesbos’ principal city, Mytilene, on the east coast of the island, which often appears to have claimed political leadership or even the representation of the whole

³⁷ Esp. *IG* XII.5, 532, lines 3–4; 539, lines 4–5. ³⁸ *FdD* 3.2.211 (cf. Reger and Risser 1991: 314).

³⁹ Papageorgiadou-Banis 1997: 47–49 and 2007: 31.

⁴⁰ A basic synthesis on Lesbian attempts at federalism has been presented by Labarre 1994 and 1996. Cf. also Constantakopoulou 2007: 207.

island. Several smaller settlements seem to have fallen prey to this claim: for instance, Pyrrha in central Lesbos disappears as a *polis* at some point during late Classical or early Hellenistic times, with its *chōra* being incorporated into that of Mytilene.⁴¹ By the later Classical period, towards the end of the fourth century BCE, Lesbian cities included, apart from Mytilene, Eresos in the southwest and Antissa and Methymna in the north of the island.

An amphiktyony-like organization seems to have existed on Lesbos in the early centuries of Greek history. Its main sanctuary, which hosted a cult of Zeus, Theos Aiolis/Hera (most probably identified), and Dionysos, was located at Messon.⁴² This site was at a central place of Lesbos (*mesos*, in Aiolic *messos*, = “middle”), approximately in-between the territories of its main cities and allegedly at the site of the first installation of the Aiolians on the island. The poet Alkaios mentions this “common sanctuary”⁴³ as the site where he had taken refuge during the notorious *stasis* at Mytilene in the sixth century BCE.⁴⁴ Some sort of cooperation of the Lesbian cities in periods between the mid-sixth and fourth centuries BCE seems to be further attested by coin emissions with the legends ΛΕ and ΛΕΣ (= ΛΕΣΒΙΩΝ).⁴⁵ However, as is the case with other cooperative coinages, it is unwarranted to postulate the existence of a proper league based solely on these emissions. What the literary sources imply is rather a common action of the Lesbians under the aegis of Mytilene on various occasions in the Archaic and Classical periods. Histiaios came to Mytilene during the Ionian Revolt and received the naval aid of the Mytilenaians; in Herodotus’ report of the event (6.5–6; cf. 14. 26–28. 31) the latter are simply labelled as Lesbians. The Lesbians seem then to have participated under similar conditions in Xerxes’ invasion of Greece as Persian allies until their subsequent defection from the Persian camp and entrance into the Delian League.⁴⁶ The Lesbian cities’ membership in the league might have inspired, but it also ended, ultimately, Mytilene’s ambition of uniting Lesbos politically. The method

⁴¹ See Labarre 1996: 196–198; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 1030–1031. By Herodotus’ times (1.151), Methymna also managed to incorporate the *polis* Arisbe in the central part of the island.

⁴² Alkaios 24a D = 129 LP, 5–9. See Labarre 1996: 42. An Archaic forerunner of the fourth-century BCE temple at Messon now seems to have been found, see Vavliakis-Lyrou 2010: 115.

⁴³ Alkaios 24a D = 129 LP, 1–3.

⁴⁴ The *stasis* was ended by Pittakos’ legislative activity. See Berve 1967: 1.91–95. II.572–575; Gehrke 1985: 370.

⁴⁵ See Vavliakis and Lyrou 2010: 115–118.

⁴⁶ Lesbians as subdivision of the Aiolian naval contingent in Xerxes’ fleet: Diod. 11.3.8; their defection to the Greek camp and joining the Delian League: Hdt. 9.106; Thuc. 1.19; Plut. *Arist.* 23. It is noteworthy that in Thuc. 3.10 the Mytilenaiian envoys speak on the Lesbian conditions of participation in the Delian League in the first person. Mytilene apparently conceived of itself as the representative of the whole island.

envisaged to achieve that simply repeated the inveterate, standard Greek practice for the communities of a limited area: synoikism.⁴⁷ It is well known how the recalcitrance of Mytilene's main Lesbian antagonist, Methymna, and the brutal Athenian reaction, prevented the execution of that plan (Thuc. 3.5.1; 50). The *polis* model was already too advanced on Lesbos to succumb to the pressure to merge those communities into one single city. In the membership list of the Second Athenian League (377 BCE), Mytilene, Methymna, Antissa, and Eresos all appear as separate members, with no reference to a collective identity (contrast the case of Ioulis, Koressia and Karthaia on Keos).⁴⁸

The four Lesbian cities continued to exist as separate entities in Hellenistic times. The first step in reinstating some sort of common identity policy on the island through the active care of local sacred traditions was the building of a monumental temple at the above cult place at Messon in the late fourth century BCE. Guy Labarre (1996: 49–50), who has studied the history of Hellenistic and Roman Lesbos in great detail, raised the question of whether that building plan was paralleled with the revival of the Ionian League in Asia Minor, now centering on the cult of Alexander. Founded on the approximate dating of the construction of the Classical temple at Messon alone, this cannot be more than a legitimate hypothesis. However, we do know that the Ptolemies in the third century BCE exercised significant control over three of the four Lesbian cities (Methymna, Eresos, Antissa), while we lack such evidence for Mytilene.⁴⁹

It is against this background that the evidence of a fragmentary inscription from Delos should be understood. The document is usually dated to the early second century BCE. It is often considered as some sort of 'foundation charter' of a Lesbian Confederacy (*Lesbioi*).⁵⁰ The large gaps in the preserved text offer only tantalizingly incomplete insights into the agreement. However, some

⁴⁷ See Diod. 12.55.1 (events of 428 BCE).

⁴⁸ *IG* II² 43 (R&O no. 22), lines 80–81 and 116–117. The restoration of "Pyrrhaiaans" in lines 97 and 98 is uncertain (R&O, p. 105).

⁴⁹ Methymna: *IG* XII.2, 498 = Labarre 1996: choix d'inscriptions no. 52; *IG* XII Supplement, 115 = Labarre 1996: choix d'inscriptions no. 54. Eresos: *IG* XII.2, 527 (+ *IG* XII Supplement, p. 33) = Labarre 1996: choix d'inscriptions no. 68; *IG* XII Supplement, 122 = Labarre 1996: choix d'inscriptions no. 70. Antissa: new inscription testifying the presence of a Ptolemaic garrison in the city, most probably under Philopator (unpublished; presented by A. Matthaiou at the Greek–Turkish Epigraphic Conference in the Epigraphical Museum, Athens, January 2005). Cf. *Papyri Tebtunis* 1.8 (Ptolemaic *phoroi* from Lesbos, the island listed as a financial–administrative entity, probably under Philopator), see Bagnall 1975 and 1976: 161–162.

⁵⁰ *IG* XII Supplement, 136 = Labarre 1996: choix d'inscriptions no. 89. The participation of Antissa (line a3) in this Lesbian Confederacy sets 167 BCE as a *terminus ante quem* for its foundation. The *koinon* does not seem to have produced any kind of collaborative coinage, see Vavliakis and Lyrrou 2010: 122. This is fully compatible with the apparent provision in its founding treaty (see above) that

basic points do emerge: (a) All four Lesbian cities (Mytilene, Methymna, Antissa, Eresos) participate in the union, which did not take the form of a *synoikismos* but that of a *koinon*.⁵¹ (b) The meeting place for the league's primary assembly (*eklēsia*: lines b 9, 10, 37) will be the sanctuary "at Messon" (lines a 5, b 31–2, 45). (c) A common military force is foreseen and questions concerning the soldiers' payment and the size of the contingents corresponding to each city's duties are specified. In the preserved entries, these contingents include 600 men from Eresos and 400 from Methymna (lines b 3–6).⁵² (d) Issues of common finances, relevant obligations on landed property, and percentage contributions (thus from one sixtieth of Mytilenaiian land) are laid down (lines b 13–26). (e) Some form of mutual conferment of citizenship and the respective mode of enrolment under the care of *stratēgoi* are regulated (lines b 27–28).⁵³ Labarre (1994: 429) concludes that the latter should be generals of the league and further posits the existence of a federal general with supreme command (after the model of a similar institution attested at Mytilene, *IG XII Suppl.* 137, line 2, and the need of a unitary executive for the army of the Lesbians). However, the generals mentioned in the text might be simply civic officers acting here as a body and thus being sufficiently able to co-organize the federal contingents. A supreme general or any other eponymous magistrate of the whole confederacy is not attested. Be that as it may, the text begins (lines a 1–4) with a dating after the *prytanis* of each separate city and its own calendar. More coordination on the level of federal leadership is not visible. (f) The care for a tighter organization of the confederacy is probably relayed to the future as common laws are to be prepared by a body of city delegates (lines b 29ff.). The composition of this committee is defined as follows: nine members from Mytilene, six from Methymna, and an unknown number from the other two cities. They will present the text of these laws at the next general assembly of the confederacy. Whether the committee was from the beginning understood as something more, and further assumed the role of a federal council (a sort of *boulē*), as known from other *koina* and supposed by Labarre,⁵⁴ is also uncertain. (g) In the service of the expressly mentioned "progress and concord" (line b 33) of the Lesbians, the implementation of foreign judges is attested (inferred from

some sort of financial transactions (purchases) should take place in the "coinage of the city (in question)" (line b17).

⁵¹ Labarre 1996: choix d'inscriptions no. 89, line b11.

⁵² One cannot be sure, however, on the basis of the preserved text whether these soldiers were citizens of the contracting cities or mercenaries sustained by them. See Labarre 1996: 70.

⁵³ See Robert 1927: 219; Labarre 1996: 71.

⁵⁴ Labarre 1996: 72 recognizes that the small number of representatives seems rather incompatible with such an arrangement. Therefore, he speaks of a "conseil restreint."

references to the characteristic officials escorting them: *eisagogeas*, lines 43–44). These judges mediated or decided pending trials, a procedure in the context of which a “basic agreement” (*synthēkas*: line b 51) of the four cities seems to be mentioned.

The last-mentioned clause becomes more intelligible if related, as first recognized by Louis Robert,⁵⁵ to the epigraphic dossier of honors for foreigners, in this case to the Milesian judges who had been invited to Lesbos to settle disputes between Eresos and Methymna and their respective citizens.⁵⁶ The activity of these judges was based on an “additional agreement” of the two cities in question concerning the details of the judicial procedure after the original provision in the Lesbian charter (Labarre 1996: 62). The two cities were able to specify in direct contact and agreement the conditions of their common use of foreign juridical aid. This shows that a considerable room of initiative was allowed to the confederate cities by the league.⁵⁷

A very fragmentary inscription found at Eresos preserves the local copy of a treaty between the Lesbian *koinon* and the Rhodians.⁵⁸ Antissa is not mentioned in it but, due to the fragmentary nature of the document, its absence does not offer a clue on the date. The careful consideration of Aegean affairs and related Rhodian policies in the early second century BCE have led Labarre to date the treaty to that very period.⁵⁹ Apparently, the Lesbian cities tried to join their forces and simultaneously search for external support at a time when the Ptolemaic kingdom could no longer safeguard them from external trouble. However, both actions did not necessarily coincide, and it might be that the Ptolemies themselves fostered the federal integration of the island.⁶⁰

Another detail in the decree from Eresos honoring Milesian judges sheds light on the historical foundation of the Lesbian Confederacy. The decree specifies that the thankful honors for the Milesian people, who had assisted Eresos with the dispatch of competent judges, will also be announced at the Eresian athletic festival of *Ptolemaieia* and *Herakleia*.⁶¹ This posits that this

⁵⁵ Robert 1925; cf. Labarre 1996: 72–74. ⁵⁶ Labarre 1996: choix d’inscriptions nos. 62 and 73.

⁵⁷ Labarre 1996: 73 sees this as a sign of a “structure assez lâche de cette Confédération.” Certainly, a rigidly centralized administration does not seem to be the case here, too.

⁵⁸ *IG XII Supplement*, 120; cf. Robert 1925: 41–43.

⁵⁹ See the detailed argument by Labarre 1996: 74–77.

⁶⁰ One may recognize a similar Ptolemaic policy behind the union (*homopoliteia*) of Kos and Kalymna (*SVF* III 545), the first phase of which is most probably to be dated to Philopator’s reign; see Buraselis 2000: 10.

⁶¹ Labarre 1996: choix d’inscriptions no. 73, line 77. The athletic contest was apparently named simply *Herakleia* in a previous period, as becomes evident from another decree of Eresos, Labarre 1996:

joint, dynastic–civic festival was still practiced at the time when the confederacy already existed. Therefore, it looks more probable that the foundation had taken place during, or not long after, the actual exercise of Ptolemaic political control on Eresos and other cities of Lesbos. In this case, it might not appear unreasonable to suggest a foundation date somewhere around the last decade(s) of the third century BCE.

There is no further evidence on the Lesbian Confederacy until Roman times when, as we know from epigraphic and numismatic sources, it was revived as a sort of miniature provincial council to honor emperors and local magnates.⁶² The existence of such a special institution on Lesbos – although the island was by then subordinated to the *provincia* Asia and the character of the Lesbian *koinon* was wholly different – shows exactly how stubborn the tradition of a Lesbian local political–religious identity had often been in the past, and how it could be further combined with Roman interests in imperial cult and indirect administration. On the reverse of one of the coins series issued by this late *koinon* we see an octastyle temple, while the obverse bears the portrait of Commodus.⁶³ The image of the temple does not seem to correspond to that of the old Lesbian temple precinct at Messon; rather, it represents a new edifice for the imperial cult.⁶⁴ The coinage might have invoked some continuity from the past days of Lesbos' history, but the actual relation was certainly not a simple realignment.

Epilogue

In all case studies examined here the tendency of Greek island *poleis* to coordinate their social, political, cultural, and economic interaction becomes evident, especially when joint religious infrastructures were in place (Delos for the *Nēsiōtai*, Messon for the cities of Lesbos). The obstacles imposed on the development of federal collaboration by geography as well as pre-existing *polis*-traditions are equally visible. At the same time, the effect of power relations on the sea emerges as an external and decisive factor, often, as on Keos, as a motor for federal integration on an island. This

choix d'inscriptions no. 69, lines 31 and 34. On this category of dynastic 'appended festivals' in Greek cities of Hellenistic times and their historical importance, see Buraselis 2012 (this Lesbian case may be now added to the material collected and discussed there).

⁶² Robert 1960: 309–311; Labarre 1996: 113–114, 138–139.

⁶³ Wroth 1894: 170, no. 6; Vavliakis and Lyrou 2010: 123.

⁶⁴ See Labarre 1996: 138–139, who points to the difference between the Ionic style of the old temple at Messon and the Corinthian one of the temple on the coin. Vavliakis and Lyrou 2010: 123 hesitantly identify the temple with that at Messon.

survey also invites the conclusion that the leading *poleis* on larger islands (e.g., Mytilene on Lesbos) were often inclined to turn to the principle of uniting their island worlds by means of a synoikism of its various settlements rather than federal integration. The small waves of federalism were in a sense structural intruders or self-preserving methods of adaptation to the imperatives of international policy in the waters of the Aegean. Federalism was perceived as a way of floating rather than sinking in the storms of the day, but the route of any collective political sailing naturally had to follow a dynamic trajectory that exceeded the microcosm of the island world.

Federalism on Crete: The Cretan Koinon and the koinon of the Oreioi

Angelos Chaniotis

Ancient authors sometimes refer to a peculiar Cretan custom: the Cretans were continually engaged in wars among themselves, but whenever they faced an external threat, they suspended their wars and united to face the enemy.¹ The ancient authors called this phenomenon *synkretismos* – the origin of the modern word syncretism. Any effort to associate this legend with a particular historical period is futile. The only real external threats that Crete ever faced before the Arab raids of the seventh century CE was the Roman campaigns of the early first century BCE (74 and 69 to 67 BCE), and even these campaigns did not find all the Cretans united in alliance.² The anecdotes about *synkretismos* express the division of the Cretans, not their unity. This feature of Cretan history before the Roman conquest also explains the peculiarities of the Cretan Koinon. Although the Cretan Koinon shared some of the features of Hellenistic regional confederations, especially the interest in conflict resolution among its members, it is unique in many respects. Its greatest differences from other *koina* are the lack of federal citizenship and the absence of federal magistrates; there were also no federal contests in pre-Roman Crete as, for instance, in Boiotia.

There is no evidence for federal structures in Crete before the early Hellenistic period.³ It was only on a regional scale that a federal state was created in the mountainous areas of southwest Crete, probably in the late fourth century: the *Koinon tôn Oreiôn* (“*koinon* of the highlanders”).⁴ Its

¹ Plut. *Mor.* 490b. Further sources and discussion: Chaniotis 1996: 6–7.

² E.g., Polyrrhenia seems to have favored the Romans: cf. *I.Cret.* 11.23.13 (honorary inscription for Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus).

³ For a few ambiguous and uncertain references to some sort of Cretan unity see van Effenterre 1948: 26–28. There is no evidence for a “tribal confederacy of the Dorians” (Willets 1975: 145–146) or for an early *koinon* (Cardinali 1907: 17, n. 2).

⁴ On the *Oreioi* and their history see van Effenterre 1948: 120–127; cf. Guarducci 1938: 50–55; Bultrighini 1993: 108–113; Chaniotis 1996: 421–422; Capdeville 1997: 299–301; Sekunda 2000, argues that the factors that promoted federalism in West Crete included the consciousness of common ethnicity, the presence of a common enemy, and the shared knowledge of mountain passes.

members were Elyros (with its ports Poikilasion and Syia), Hyrtakina, Lisos, Tarrha, and probably Kantanos.⁵ The earliest secure attestations of the Koinon are coins with the legend OP[ΕΙΩΝ] (late fourth or early third century BCE) and a treaty of alliance with Magas, king of Cyrene (c. 280–270). In the late fourth century, Theophrastos refers to the growing of cypresses “in the land of the Oreioi (*Oreia*), in Tarrha”; this can also be taken as evidence for the existence of a federal state with its own separate territory. The *Oreia* is also mentioned as a territory in an Athenian inscription of the early second century. “My fatherland is the Oreioi” is written on the tomb of a Cretan mercenary buried in Lakonia in the early third century BCE.⁶ The federal state of the *Oreioi* certainly existed in the late third century, when the *Oreioi* abandoned the Gortynian-Knossian alliance and allied themselves with Lyttos (c. 220 BCE; Polyb. 4.53.6). The *Oreioi* seem to have been a sympolity: they possessed joint citizenship and apparently a common territory, concluded alliances, and issued federal coins. The sanctuary of Diktynna at Lisos, where their treaty with Magas was displayed, must have been their federal sanctuary; Diktynna is invoked in the oath of this treaty. The other deity invoked by name is Zeus Kretagenes, the Cretan Zeus, possibly because this god had acquired the status of a pan-Cretan divinity in connection with the Cretan Koinon (see below). Other gods are invoked anonymously: the gods who were worshipped in the temple of Diktynna (*synnaoi*) and those worshipped in Poikilasion. We know nothing about other federal institutions (e.g., magistrates, assembly, council). In this sympolity, the members retained a certain form of autonomy: The Delphic list of *theōrodokoi* mentions separate *theōrodokoi* for three of the member-cities (Elyros, Lisos, and Tarrha). Hyrtakina and Lisos continued minting their own coins, with their own ethnics, using the same types as the Koinon.⁷ Despite the persistence of these elements of *polis* autonomy, the Koinon of the *Oreioi* developed a sense of regional identity that the Cretan Koinon never achieved. Since we cannot determine the exact date of the foundation of either the Koinon of the *Oreioi* or the Koinon of the *Krētaieōn*, we do not know if one of them exercised influence over the other. With its joint

⁵ Van Effenterre 1948: 122–125; Chaniotis 1996: 422. On these cities and dependent settlements see also Perlman 2004: 1146 (Poikilasion), 1161 (Elyros), 1166–1167 (Hyrtakina), 1174–1175 (Lisos), 1188 (Tarrha).

⁶ Coins: Svoronos 1888: 380–387. Treaty with Magas: SVA III 468. *Oreia*: Theophr. *hist. plant.* 2.2.2; IG II² 1130 = Bielman 1994: no. 55. Steph. Byz. s.v. Kantanos, refers to this territory, but the passage is corrupt. Grave inscription: IG V.1.723.

⁷ Sympolity: Chaniotis 1996: 422. Federal sanctuary: Guarducci 1938: 51; van Effenterre 1948: 123; Bultrighini 1993: 112–113. Coinage: Svoronos 1888: 380–387. *Theōrodokoi*: Plassart 1921: 19 III 105–107.

citizenship, coins, federal sanctuary, and sense of identity, the former seems to have had a firmer structure.

If we can date the origins of a Cretan Koinon to the early Hellenistic period, possibly in the early third century, it is not thanks to any direct source but rather to the confederation's name alone. The official designation of the league was *koinon tôn Krētaieōn* – an abbreviated form is *Krētaieis*.⁸ This name is clearly artificial, unattested in the Classical period and intentionally constructed in order to make a distinction between the *Krētes*, the inhabitants of the island of Crete and men of Cretan origin (usually mercenaries) living abroad, and the *Krētaieis*, the citizens of those cities that participated in the *koinon*.⁹ In this respect it resembles the artificial name *Nesiotai* – not the inhabitants of all the Greek islands but of those islands that were members of the *koinon tôn Nēsiōtōn*. Precisely because of the artificial nature of the name, it follows that the *terminus ante quem* for the establishment of the *koinon* must be the earliest reference to *Krētaieis* (267 BCE) and not the earliest direct reference to the *koinon tôn Krētaieōn*. The *Krētaieis* are mentioned in the decree proposed by Chremonides for the establishment of an alliance between Athens, Sparta, and Ptolemy II; consequently, the Cretan League existed at that point.¹⁰ The exact date of its establishment is not known. The artificial nature of its name, which distinguishes between members of the *koinon* and Cretans, implies – but does not prove – that from the outset it was an organization that did not unite the entire island. The initiative may have come from Ptolemy II, as an effort to federate his Cretan allies; but this is not more than a hypothesis, for which direct evidence is lacking.

The decree of Chremonides refers to “those of the *Kretaeis* who are in the alliance of the Lakedaimonians and Areus,” clearly showing that the members of the *koinon* could belong to separate alliances. Consequently, the existence of separate alliances under the leadership of the three major

⁸ IG II² 687, 844; IG IV 756; IG IV².1.244; IG XII.1.1033; IG XII.3.254 (*I. Cret.* IV 197); IG XII.5.868; *I. Oropos* 433; *FdD* III.2.135 (*SIG*³ 654 A no. 5); *I. Délos* 1517; *I. Cret.* 1.5.53; 1.8.6; 1.16.1; 1.24.2; II.3.4C; II.5.22; II.23.21; III.3.9; III.4.9; IV 174 (Chaniotis 1996: no. 27), 176, 179; *I. Magnesia* 46, 65+75; *I. Mylasa* 641–646, 650, 653, 654; *SEG* 39.1127; *SIG*³ 653 A no. 8; Durrbach 1921: no. 92. *I. Magnesia* 20, an ancient forgery presented as a decree of the *koinon*, does not offer reliable information on the league's structure and operation.

⁹ E.g., the *Krētes* who fought for Aspendos and Ptolemy I (c. 300 BCE) were Cretan mercenaries, not troops sent by “the Cretans”: *SEG* 17.639. A distinction between *Krētaieis* and *Krētes* is clearly made in *I. Mylasa* 644. Cf. Muttelsee 1925: 46.

¹⁰ *SVA* III 476, lines 25–26 and 39–40; Chaniotis 1996: 30–33. Efforts to place the foundation of the *koinon* in later periods, between 260–230 BCE (Muttelsee 1925: 45, 63; van Effenterre 1948: 132–138), in 222 BCE (van der Mijnsbrugge 1931: 58), or in c. 216 BCE (Guarducci 1940: 151; 1950, 143–147; cf. Martin 1975: 501; Brulé 1978: 34), do not consider the evidence provided by the artificial name.

cities, Gortyn, Knossos, and Lyttos, in the period before 222 BCE is compatible with the existence of a Cretan Koinon.¹¹ A treaty found in Chersonesos (c. 220 BCE) attests to a dual Gortynian-Knossian leadership of the *koinon*.¹² In light of the available sources, it is impossible to say whether the *koinon* was founded as one alliance (under the leadership of Gortyn or Knossos or both) that was then split into two separate alliances, or if it was formed through a treaty between two hegemonic alliances. There is also no evidence for the involvement of a foreign power (the Ptolemies?) in this process. It is only from c. 222 that we have some reliable sources that allow us to sketch the league's history as follows.¹³ In c. 223, Gortyn and Knossos agreed upon the creation of an alliance, which – with the exception of Lyttos – all the Cretan cities joined. This alliance can be interpreted as a re-establishment of the Cretan Koinon. The aforementioned treaty of Chersonesos (c. 220) is directly connected with this alliance and refers to the main institution of the *koinon*, a *diagramma* concerning conflict resolution and judicial matters. It is not known whether this *diagramma* dates back to an earlier phase of the *koinon* or was formulated for the first time when this alliance was concluded in 222. Shortly after its creation, this alliance was confronted with the defection of several allies (Polyrrhenia, Keraia, Lappa, Arkades, Oreioi), who joined the alliance of

¹¹ Chaniotis 1996: 99–100; Chaniotis 1999b. For the evidence for the separate alliances see Chaniotis 1996: 445–450.

¹² This treaty (henceforth referred to as the Treaty of Chersonesos) is unpublished (a publication is being prepared by Charalambos Kritzas and the author). For extensive summaries of its contents see Chaniotis 1999b and Chaniotis and Kritzas 2010. The relevant clause (partly restored) reads: “The Gortynians shall swear in the Knossians, placing curses upon their wives, their children, and their property; and the Knossians shall swear in the Gortynians in the same manner. And both Gortynians and Knossians shall jointly swear in the allies (or their allies), dispatching embassies to the cities within thirty days from the validation of this treaty. And the *kosmoi* in each city shall place the curse that is written below on behalf of what has been agreed, when the oath has been administered, assembling the citizens, the Gortynians in the presence of a Knossian embassy, the Knossians in the presence of a Gortynian embassy, and the allies in the presence of an embassy of Gortynians and Knossians.”

¹³ For the evidence see Chaniotis 1996: 36–56, 440–445. Main sources: Lyttian War (221–219): Polyb. 4.53.4–54.5; *I. Magnesia* 46, lines 10–12; Chaniotis 1999b. *Prostasia* of Philip V (216): Polyb. 7.11.9. Interruption of the *koinodikion* (c. 200): Chaniotis 1996: 255–264, no. 28 LL. 58–71 (*I. Cret.* III.3.4). Relations to Attalos I (197): *I. Cret.* II.3.4C. War against Nabis (192): *IG* IV².1.244. Arbitration of Appius Claudius (184): Polyb. 22.15.1–6; Chaniotis 1996: 281–285, no. 40. Treaty with Eumenes (183): *I. Cret.* IV 179; Chaniotis 1996: 43, n. 216. War between Gortyn and Knossos (169/168): Chaniotis 1996: 289–296, no. 43 (*I. Cret.* IV 181). *Prostasia* of Ptolemy VI (c. 164): *I. Cret.* III.3.9, line 10. Alliance with Ptolemy VI (c. 158–154): *I. Délos* 1517. Cretan war against Rhodes and Kos (c. 155–153): *IG* XII.1.1033; *I. Cos* ED 229 (with *SEG* 50.765); cf. van Effenterre 1948: 267–269 (Rhodes); Buraselis 2000: 5–24 (Kos). First century BCE and wars against the Romans: Cic. *Manil.* 46; Diod. II.1–2; Vell. Pat. 2.34; App. *Sik.* 6.3–4; cf. Chaniotis 1992: 301–303. On the *asylia* of Anaphe and Tenos, embassies, and grants of proxeny: see n. 21. Further bibliography: Chaniotis 1996: 48–49.

Lyttos; more cities followed the rebels (Aptera, Eleutherna, Kydonia). In the course of a war, which contemporary sources characterize as a “civil war” (*emphylios polemos*), and which was entangled with the Social War in Mainland Greece (c. 220–217), the *Koinon* fell apart. As Polybius reports, with some exaggeration, in c. 216, Philip V was acknowledged as the leader (*prostatēs*) of the island by “all *Krētaieis*,” and this probably meant the re-establishment of the *koinon* as an alliance under the leadership of Gortyn. Again, the *koinon* did not unite the entire island. Several cities cannot have been members of the alliance: the Ptolemaic protectorate of Itanos, Knossos, and some of the Knossian allies. In the course of the wars of the late third and early second century on Crete, the *Koinon* seems to have been reduced to Gortyn and its allies; it is mentioned in 197 BCE as having friendly relations with Attalos I, and in 192 BCE, it sent troops to the Achaian League in the war against Nabis. In 184 BCE, however, the Romans successfully arbitrated between the Gortynians and Knossians, and the latter must have rejoined the *koinon*.

A treaty between the *Krētaieis* and Eumenes II lists the following communities which must have been members of the alliance (possibly a complete list of league members): Gortyn, Knossos, Phaistos, Lyttos, Rhaukos, Hierapytna, Eleutherna, Aptera, Polyrrenia, Sybrita, Lappa, Axos, Priansos, Allaria, Arkades, Keraia, Praisos, Lato, Biannos, Malla, Eronos, Chersonesos, Apollonia, Elyros, Hyrtakina, Eltynia, Anopolis, Araden, Istron, and Tarrha. The most important city of West Crete, Kydonia, was certainly not a member. Other noteworthy absentees are Phalasarna, which suffered under a civil war, Itanos, which was under Ptolemaic control, and Olous, possibly due to the presence of a Rhodian garrison.¹⁴ The *koinon* must have existed at least until the death of Ptolemy VI in 145 BCE and the end of Ptolemaic influence on Crete, although it may have collapsed for a short period during a war between Knossos and Gortyn in 169. We have continuous references to its existence until the mid-second century: the *koinon* recognized the *asylia* of Anaphe in the first half of the century; it dispatched and received embassies (170 and 168), honored foreigners with the title of *proxenos* (165 and c. 158–150), recognized Ptolemy VI’s *prostasia* over Itanos (c. 164), signed a treaty of alliance with the same king, and sent him troops to assist in his war against Ptolemy VIII (c. 158–154); the war of the *Krētaieis* against Rhodes and Kos (c. 155–153) must have been waged jointly by the *koinon*. It seems that towards the

¹⁴ Kydonia: Polyb. 22.15.3–6. Phalasarna: Polyb. 22.15.3–6. Itanos: Bagnall 1976: 120–122. Olous: SEG 23.548; van Effenterre 1948: 230–234.

mid-second century, the leadership of the league transferred from Gortyn to Knossos.¹⁵ Several fragmentary decrees of Cretan cities concerning Mylasa – which refer to the *Krētaieis*, thus implying a strong sense of unity and even using the term *ethnos* – may date from this period.¹⁶ A new phase of wars (c. 145–109 BCE) probably explains the lack of evidence for the *koinon* in this period. The re-establishment of peace in 109 BCE must have made its existence possible again. The *koinon* certainly existed in the early first century, probably under the leadership of the Knossians, and played an important part in the wars between the Cretans and Rome (74 and 69–67).

Everything we know about the *koinon*'s structure and institutions derives from sources dating between the late third and the mid-second century BCE.¹⁷ The Cretan *koinon* lacked joint citizenship; each member-state retained its own citizenship and autonomy, as well as presumably its political, military, and social institutions. There is no evidence for permanent military or other officials of the *koinon* or for a permanent federal army. In case of war, the cities contributed troops and their command seems to have been the responsibility of the leading city.¹⁸ What is directly attested is a council (*synedrion*)¹⁹, but we do not know the principle according to which the members were represented in it. A general assembly (*koinon*, *plēthos*?), in which the citizens of the member-cities presumably participated, is known to have gathered (*synlogos*), probably in the leading city.²⁰ The council and the assembly discussed matters concerning the *asylia* of sanctuaries, the award of the title of *proxenos*, and the sending of

¹⁵ *SIG*³ 654 A no. 5; *I.Oropos* 433; *FdD* III.2.135; van Effenterre 1948: 271; cf. Strab. 10.4.7.

¹⁶ *I.Mylasa* 641–644, 654, particularly clear in 644. This text also implies an alliance between the Cretan *Koinon* and Mylasa.

¹⁷ Main studies: Muttelsee 1925: 39–64; see also van der Mijnsbrugge 1931: 14–15; van Effenterre 1948: 127–160; Guarducci 1950; Willetts 1955: 227–228, n. 3; Willetts 1975: 143–144; Martin 1975: 500–519; Brulé 1978: 83–88; Spyridakis 1982; Ager 1994: 2–3; Chaniotis 1996: 136–144 (modified by Chaniotis 1999b); Capdeville 1997: 302–307; Chaniotis 1999b; Chaniotis and Kritzas 2010.

¹⁸ This is how one can interpret the poetic term *symmachias hagemon*, attested for the Gortynian Telemnastos, honored by the troops of the *koinon* in Epidaurus (c. 192): *IG* IV².1.244. For the sending of federal troops to Ptolemy VI see *I.Delos* 1517.

¹⁹ *IG* XII.3.254; cf. *I.Cret.* IV 175 = Chaniotis 1996: 443–445, no. 77 (reference to *synedroi* in lines 4–6).

²⁰ The existence of an assembly can be inferred from the *asylia* decree for Anaphe (*IG* XII.3.254), which uses the expression “it was resolved by the *synedroi* and the *koinon* of the *Krētaieis*”; the *synedroi* (council) must be different from the *koinon* (i.e., the assembly). The meeting of the assembly in Knossos is mentioned in this decree. The expression *plēthos* is used in a decree of Prianos for a Samian envoy to the *Krētaieōn plēthos* (*I.Cret.* 1.24.2). It may also be restored in the treaty of Chersonesos (Chaniotis and Kritzas 2010: 175). In c. 70 BCE, the followers of Lasthenes of Knossos, the leader of the resistance to Rome, are mentioned as appealing to the *plēthē* (Diod. 40.1). This may be a reference to the assembly.

troops to allies; they also dispatched and received envoys.²¹ The expression *Kretikon argyron*, used in connection with the payment of fines, refers to standards accepted by all Cretans and not to coins minted by the *koinon*.²²

The most important and best-known institution of the *koinon* is the *diagramma*, which established a procedure for conflict resolution among the member-cities, citizens of different *poleis*, and Cretan citizens and foreigners.²³ The *diagramma* contained a list of offenses and their respective fines (*timai*), and laid out the principles for two types of legal procedures. According to the first procedure, the dispute was first assigned to an arbitrator (*prodikos*); if he failed to reconcile the two parties, the case was assigned to a court (*koinodikion*). According to the second procedure, the case was directly brought before the *koinodikion*, without the involvement of an arbitrator (*dika aprodikos*) and without the payment of bail (*dika aparbolos*). The *koinodikion* was a federal court, whose constituents represented the members of the league (possibly the assembly or the *synedrion*).²⁴ The treaty from Chersonesos shows that every *Krētaieus*, i.e., every citizen from a member-city, had the right to prosecute a magistrate of any city for violation of the treaty. In peacetime the *koinodikion* was responsible for such cases, unless the prosecutor wanted to follow the procedure established for interstate agreements (*synbola*). The *koinodikion* only existed in peacetime and suspended its work whenever the *koinon* faced an internal conflict. The *koinodikion* was responsible for legal disputes between citizens of different cities, between cities themselves, or between a city and a foreigner. We know almost

²¹ *Asylia* of Anaphe: *IG* XII.3.254 = *I.Cret.* IV 197 = Rigsby 1996: no. 175. *Asylia* of Tenos: *IG* XII.8.868 = Rigsby 1996: nos. 59–60. Embassies: Polyb. 29.10.6 (168); Liv. 43.7.1–5 (170); *I.Cret.* I.24.2. The reference to a Parian “envoy to Crete, three times, for the repayment of debts” (*SEG* 32.825) is not connected with the *koinon*; it concerns embassies to cities in Crete (*contra* Spyridakis 1982). Grants of proxeny and honorific decrees: *SIG*³ 653 A no. 8 and 654 A no. 5; *I.Dél.* 1517. Also the honorary epigram for Lichas, which refers to a crown awarded to him by *Krete* (*Miler* I.2.12a, c. 200 BCE), may refer to an honorary decree of the league. Sending of troops: see n. 18.

²² Attested in the unpublished treaty from Chersonesos (Chaniotis 1999b) and in *I.Cret.* II.5.35, line 14 (first century BCE). The standard followed by the Cretan mints (the reduced Aiginetan standard) differed from that used by some cities and confederations of Central Greece, and this explains references to the Cretan standard. Cf. the expression *krētikoi statēres* used in the Delian accounts: e.g. Melville-Jones 1971: 127–128.

²³ References to the *diagramma*: Chaniotis 1996: 225–231, no. 18, lines 36–38 (*I.Cret.* I.16.1; *SVA* III 569); 245–255, no. 27, lines 53–54 (*I.Cret.* IV 174); 255–264, no. 28, lines 64–65 (*I.Cret.* III.3.4); 407–420, no. 69 B 16, 19? (*I.Cret.* IV 184 + *SEG* 23.589); *I.Cret.* IV 197, line 27 (decree for the *asylia* of Anaphe); Chaniotis and Kritzas 2010. Most recent discussion: Chaniotis and Kritzas 2010 (on the evidence provided by the treaty of Chersonesos). Main earlier treatments: Gauthier 1972: 316–325; Chaniotis 1996: 136–144.

²⁴ Chaniotis and Kritzas 2010: 175–176, with reference to *I.Cret.* I.8.9; Ager 1996: 350–355, no. 127 II; Chaniotis 1996: 281–285, no. 40 Testimonium b, lines 16–21; Magnetto 1997: 262–271, no. 43.

nothing about the composition of this court, other than the fact that the judges came from different cities; they may have been the representatives of the cities in the *synedrion*. A decree of Knossos concerning their conflict with Gortyn in the late third or early second century proposes to assign this conflict to the jurisdiction of their allies:²⁵ “the allies of the Gortynians and the allies of the Knossians shall jointly pass a verdict as judges on this matter.” This joint court of the allies may well be the *koinodikion*. With respect to the efforts in conflict resolution, the Cretan Koinon certainly resembled the other Hellenistic *koina*, especially the Boiotian and the Achaian Leagues.²⁶

Unlike other Hellenistic *koina*, the Cretan Koinon did not have a federal agonistic festival, but there are indications that the sanctuary of Zeus Idatas or Idaios on Mt. Ida, which traditionally attracted visitors from the entire island, served as a supralocal sanctuary, possibly a federal sanctuary during the periods in which the *koinon* was under Gortynian leadership.²⁷ Zeus Idatas is invoked in the oaths of many cities, such as Arkades, Eleutherna, Gortyn, Hierapytna, Knossos, Lyttos, Olous, Priansos, and Sybrita. Two distant cities, Apollonia and Kydonia, erected a stele with a treaty in this sanctuary. A golden stater of Alexander the Great inscribed with the graffito ΠΟΛΥΡΗΝΙΩΝ seems to have been part of a dedication (or a fine paid) by Polyrrhenia in West Crete. Since we lack reliable sources about the sanctuary’s status in the Hellenistic period, we must leave this question open. Another puzzle is presented by Zeus Kretagenes.²⁸ His epithet alludes to contradictory myths about his upbringing in Crete. Zeus Kretagenes was invoked in oaths of the Koinon of the *Oreioi*, Gortyn, Hierapytna, Lato, Lyttos, Olous, and Sybrita; however, unlike other deities invoked in Cretan treaties, he cannot be associated with one particular sanctuary (e.g. the Idaean Cave or the sanctuary at Palaikastro). But the very existence of the epithet evidences a sense of Cretan identity and local pride.

A local pan-Cretan identity was usually expressed outside of Crete. The ethnic *Kres*, not always followed by a city-ethnic, does not refer to federal

²⁵ Chaniotis 1996: 143.

²⁶ Boiotia: Roesch 1982: esp. 397–401 and 1985: 127–134. Achaia: Harter-Uibopuu 1998; Arnaoutoglou 2009/2010 (with earlier bibliography).

²⁷ Chaniotis 1988: 34–35 and 2009: 62–63. Treaty of Apollonia and Kydonia: Polyb. 28.14; Chaniotis 1996: 285–287, no. 41. Stater of Alexander: Sakellarakis 1985: 38–40 and fig. 22. Zeus Idatas in oaths: Chaniotis 1996: 70 with n. 371.

²⁸ On Zeus Kretagenes see Verbruggen 1981: 140; Mastrocinque 2002 (cult outside of Crete). Invocation in oaths: Chaniotis 1996: 70 with n. 371. Zeus Kretagenes and Zeus Idaios/Idatas are mentioned separately in the treaty-oath of Lyttos and Olous: Chaniotis 1996: 352–358, no. 60 (*I. Cret.* 1.18.9; *SEG* 33.638).

citizenship, but simply to the Cretan origin of an individual, usually a mercenary. Only occasionally do grave epigrams present Crete as the fatherland or as the stage of one's achievements, thus implying the existence of a regional identity.²⁹ These texts date from the second century, a period in which the *koinon* displayed coherence for long periods. Perhaps this sense of identity was a product of the wars that the Cretans jointly fought, especially the Cretan War of the mid-second century.

After the Roman conquest, the Cretan Koinon was re-established, probably by Marc Antony.³⁰ It was now chaired by a *Kretarchas*. A further re-organization took place after Actium. The old name (*koinon tōn Krētaieōn*) was kept until the reign of Augustus,³¹ but under Tiberius a new name was adopted: *koinon to Kretōn*. Since all the communities that retained the status of a city were now members of the *koinon*, a distinction between *Krētes* and *Krētaieis* was no longer needed. The new *koinon* of Crete resembled the other so-called provincial *koina* in structure and responsibilities. It was chaired by the high priest of the imperial cult, whose main responsibility was the organization of the pentaeteric *agōn* in Gortyn.³² The cult of Zeus in the Idaean Cave was revived in Roman times, probably in association with the Cretan Koinon and the imperial cult.³³ Exactly as the cult cave of Zeus on Mt. Ida, the Diktynnaion was also closely connected with local myths and may have served as a federal sanctuary; its funds were used for the construction of a highway that connected West Crete with Gortyn, the league's capital.³⁴ Under the new conditions of the Empire, the new *koinon* was not threatened by the endemic strife of earlier periods, and to some extent it did forge a feeling of local identity.

²⁹ Peek 1955: no. 1076 (Kition, early second century BCE): "Crete is my fatherland." *IG* XII.3.47 (Telos, second century BCE): "all of Crete praised me for my skill in shooting at a mark." *SEG* 8.269 (Gaza, late Hellenistic): "your witness is Crete."

³⁰ The Cretan Koinon under Roman rule: Rouanet-Liesenfelt 1994.

³¹ *IG* XII.1.77; *I.Cret.* IV 330.

³² Members: Aptera, Arkades, Axos, Chersonesos (?), Eleutherna, Gortyn, Hierapytna, Itanos, Kisamos, Kydonia, Lappa, Lato, Lyttos, Olous, Polyrhēnia, and Priantos; see Rouanet-Liesenfelt 1994: 17–18. High priest: *I.Cret.* IV 330. Contests: e.g., *IG* XII.1.77; *CIG* 1719; *IG* V.2.662; *IG* VII 1859.

³³ On the importance of the Idaean Cave in the Roman period see Alcock 2002: 126–129. The cult is attested until the mid-fourth century CE: *IG* XII.6.584. The only stone inscription found in the Idaean Cave (*I.Cret.* I.12.2) may be an honorary inscription for an emperor.

³⁴ Tzifopoulos 2004; Chaniotis 2013; cf. Sporn 2001.

*The Italiote League and southern Italy**Michael P. Fronda*

Any discussion of Greek federalism in southern Italy must necessarily center on the Italiote League, a fluctuating association of Greek cities located in Italy, mostly in the ‘toe’ of the peninsula. The Italiote League as a proper federal institution was founded in the late fifth century by several Achaian colonies, though a precursor organization may have existed as early as the middle of the sixth century. The league expanded in the early fourth century and eventually included nearly every Greek colony along the coast of the Italian peninsula from Neapolis to Taras, and it survived at least until the late fourth century, if not longer. Yet despite its long history, we are poorly informed about the Italiote League. This is why Larsen dedicated only about two full pages to the league, focusing exclusively on its most explicitly attested period, c. 420 to 390 BCE.¹ Larsen concluded that the Italiote League was important only inasmuch as it stands as an early example of a Greek federal state, and one that may tell us something about another more famous institution, the Achaian League, on which the Italiote League was reportedly modeled. Yet perhaps more can be said about the Italiote League. Its structure and organization – as far as the meager sources reveal – illustrate how the broader phenomenon of Greek federalism developed in individual cases along unique trajectories, conditioned by specific regional and local contexts (geopolitical, topographical, and historical). It also presents an intriguing case study of the kinds of strategies adopted by otherwise rival Greek communities to foster a sense of shared identity in order to achieve common goals.

The Italiote League is a modern name, derived from the Greek term *Italiōtēs* (pl. *Italiōtai*), meaning a Greek inhabitant of Italy. Greek communities were planted along the coasts of the Ionian and Tyrrhenian Seas in several waves of colonization between the eighth and fifth centuries. Many early Greek colonies claimed Euboian origins: Pithekoussai,

¹ Larsen 1968: 95–97.

Kyme, Rhegion, and Neapolis. Others colonies declared that they were founded by the Achaians. These were mostly clustered in ancient Bruttium, modern Calabria, the narrow toe of Italy: Sybaris, Kroton, and Metapontion. In turn, Kroton founded secondary colonies, including Terina and (perhaps) Kaulonia; Sybaris founded Laös and Poseidonia. Lokroi Epizefiroi was planted by Greek Lokrians. Italian Lokrians then founded Nikotera, Medma, and Hipponion. Taras was Sparta's only overseas colony; Kolophon founded neighboring Siris. Settlers from Phokis founded Elea (Velea) in the late sixth century; Rhegion founded a secondary colony, Pyxos, in the early fifth century. In *c.* 444 Thourioi was founded on the site of Sybaris, which had been previously been destroyed. It was a Panhellenic colony, but dominated by Athenian settlers. In 433 the Tarantines founded Herakleia on the site of Siris, which too had previously been destroyed. The term Italiote referred to these many communities with diverse origins and histories, and often with little shared identity or common purpose.²

The Italiote world was also geographically extensive. In total, more than 1,000 kilometers of coastline stretched between the extreme points of Greek settlement in Italy, Neapolis and Taras (the overland route between these two cities was more than 300 kilometers). Significant distances often separated major centers. Thus, Metapontion was situated about 40 kilometers to the west of Taras and 25 kilometers to the east of Herakleia. Another 75 kilometers separated Sybaris/Thourioi from Herakleia, and more than 100 kilometers of coast lay between Sybaris/Thourioi and Kroton. Much of what we know about the Italiote League involved the Achaian colonies in the toe of Italy. Here too, significant distances separated the principal cities: more than 40 kilometers between Lokroi and Kaulonia and about 120 kilometers along the coast between Kaulonia and Kroton. Overland distances in Bruttium were not as extreme. The peninsula narrows to about 35 kilometers between modern Cantanzaro and St. Eufemia, in the vicinity of ancient Terina. However, the interior of Bruttium is rugged, with a series of mountain chains rising only a short distance from the sea. Although a number of passes cut across the toe, the topography presented a major obstacle to cross-peninsular communications. The coastal plains of southern Italy are not continuous, so travel along the littoral was also difficult, especially along the Ionian coast of

² Summary of the Greek colonization in southern Italy: Graham 1982a: 94–113; Graham 1982b: 169–175, 181–184; Lomas 1993: 22–25, 28–30; Antonaccio 2007: 201–213.

Bruttium.³ In most circumstances, the sea was the primary means of communication and travel.

Italiote settlements along the southern Ionian coast typically had access both to the sea and to broad, fertile coastal plains. Several controlled extensive territories and developed into very wealthy and populous cities. For example, Metapontion's population has been estimated as high as 40,000 inhabitants in the sixth century BCE. Aerial photography and surface survey at Metapontion have revealed traces of several hundred rural sites as well as land divisions extending almost fifteen kilometers from the coast into the hinterland. The area enclosed by the city walls was an impressive 140 hectares. The enclosed areas of other Italiote cities were even larger. Lokroi was about 230 hectares, Kroton about 280 hectares, and Taras more than 500 hectares, which suggests that they too had very large populations. The population of Taras may have well exceeded 100,000 during its heyday in the fourth century BCE. As Kathryn Lomas observes: "[I]n point of fact, the size of many Greek colonies in the west, both in Italy and Sicily, was larger than that of most others in the ancient world."⁴

Some of the principal Italiote cities also managed in the sixth and fifth centuries to exert their hegemony over neighboring settlements, both Greek and non-Greek, carving out extensive 'empires.' The most successful such hegemonic power in the sixth century was Sybaris. According to Strabo (6.1.13), the Sybarites controlled four *ethnē* and twenty-five *poleis*. Their territorial control may have stretched as far as the Crati, Esaro and Coscile Rivers, encompassing about 6,500 square kilometers. Sybaris founded Poseidonia and Laös, the latter situated at the end of the overland route from Sybaris to the Tyrrhenian Sea. Whether Laös was politically independent or subordinate before c. 480 BCE is not clear, though numismatic evidence suggest that it was firmly within the Sybarite sphere.⁵ Kroton also extended its power across the isthmus, founding Terina and dominating Temesa. To the south, Kroton controlled Skylletion and founded Kaulonia, which tended to be dominated by its mother city until the early fourth century.⁶ Lokroi established Medma and Hipponion on the Tyrrhenian coast at junctures that allowed the

³ Topography and lines of communication, see Dunbabin 1968: 194–210; Lomas 1993: 19–20.

⁴ Graham 1982b: 169–171, 184–185; Carter 1990; Lomas 1993: 21; Pani 2005: 22.

⁵ Dunbabin 1968: 153–159; Graham 1982b: 182–184; Rutter 2001: nos. 2270–2288.

⁶ Dunbabin 1968: 159–163; Graham 1982b: 181–182; Rutter 2001: no. 2566, nos. 2567–2653. According to Strabo (6.1.5), Temesa was an Aitolian colony, though it is assumed to have been connected with Sybaris before falling under Kroton's domination in the early fifth century: Rutter 2001: 192–193. Strabo (6.1.10) and Pausanias (6.3.12) record that Kaulonia was an Achaian colony, while Ps-Skymnos 318–319 and Steph. Byz. s.v. Aulōn claim it was a Krotoniate foundation. Kaulonia's foundation was

Lokroians to control the best overland routes to the opposite coast.⁷ Thus, the toe of Italy was divided into several territorial bands each dominated for a period of time by a locally powerful, hegemonic Italiote city. To the east, a similar dynamic played out, as Taras emerged as the regional hegemonic power, asserting its influence both to the east into the Sallentine peninsula (the 'heel' of Italy), and to the west along the Ionian coast, where it founded Herakleia and came to dominate neighboring Metapontion.⁸

Not surprisingly, Italiote cities shared their mainland Greek counterparts' tendency towards internecine conflict and rivalry, especially between the aspiring local hegemonic powers. Rhegion and Lokroi opposed each other in a series of conflicts between the fifth and third centuries.⁹ Lokroi crushed Kroton at the Battle of Sagra in mid-sixth century, and Kroton and Kaulonia were the targets of Lokrian expansion in the fourth century.¹⁰ A fierce interstate rivalry later developed between Taras and Thourioi.¹¹ Fighting between Italiote communities could be devastating: Siris was destroyed by a coalition of Italiote cities including Kroton, Sybaris, and Metapontion,¹² while the Krotoniates twice destroyed Sybaris.¹³

In addition, Italiote cities faced mounting external pressure throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. Ancient literary sources paint a picture of ubiquitous conflict between the coastal Greek settlements and inland 'native' Italic groups such as the Brettians, Lukanians, Samnites, Apulians, and Messapians. This tradition should be approached with caution, as it conforms to the ancient trope of unsettled (or at least un-urbanized) barbarian natives inevitably in conflict with civilized, city-dwelling Greeks. The reality was certainly more complex, as Greeks and non-Greeks at times interacted peacefully and found mutual accommodations.¹⁴ Indeed, in some cases Italiote communities allied with natives, even against other Greek cities.¹⁵ Yet in broad terms the literary tradition is

probably sponsored by Kroton regardless of where the oikist and settlers originated, see Ciaceri 1928–40: I.173–183; Graham 1982b: 180; Rutter 2001: 163–164.

⁷ Dunbabin 1968: 163–170. Hipponion and Medma: Thuc. 5.5; Strabo 6.1.5; Ps-Skymnos 307–308.

⁸ Dunbabin 1968: 146–153; Fronda 2010: 193–199, 219–222.

⁹ Thuc. 3.86.2, 4.1.2–3, 4.24.2; Diod. Sic. 14.44.3–7, 14.100.1–2, 14.106.1–3, 14.107.2–5; Strabo 6.1.9; Dion. Hal. *ant.* 20.7.3; Just. *Epit.* 21.2.1–9; Fronda 2010: 183–184.

¹⁰ Diod. Sic. 11.90, 14.106.3, 19.4.1; Strabo 6.1.10–12; Just. *Epit.* 20.2.10–3.9; Fronda 2010: 169–170, 176. Fronda 2010: 225–227. ¹² Just. *Epit.* 20.2.3–8; Graham 1982b: 194.

¹³ Hdt. 5.44–45, 6.21; Diod. Sic. 11.90.3, 11.48.4; Strabo 6.1.13; Rutter 2001: 144–145.

¹⁴ For example, close relations between Oscan Nola and Greek Neapolis, as well as Oscan–Greek integration in Neapolis in the fourth century: Leiwo 1995: 58–87, 165–172; Lomas 1993: 111–112; Fronda 2010: 133 n. 139, 139–141.

¹⁵ In particular, Taras showed a willingness to use 'foreign' (i.e., non-Italiote) allies, both Greek and non-Greek, against other Italiote cities. For example, the Tarantines allied with Kleonymos of Sparta

plausible, as several Italiote settlements were destroyed or overrun by Italic groups, while other Italiote cities saw their territories contract, especially in the fourth century, presumably from native pressure.¹⁶ The expansionist policies of Dionysios I, the tyrant of Syracuse, posed an additional, major external threat to the Italiote cities. The increasingly threatening geomilitary environment appears to have been the driving force behind Greek federalism in southern Italy.

As early as the sixth century BCE some Italiote cities attempted to overcome the tendency towards interstate conflict and build enduring coalitions. According to Justin (20.2.3–4), Kroton, Sybaris and Metapontion formed an alliance against Siris. The conflict cannot be dated precisely but took place probably after 550 BCE and certainly before 510 BCE, when Sybaris itself was destroyed. Although Justin mentions only three cities in the coalition, numismatic evidence – several series of coins struck on the same weight standard using a difficult incuse technique – indicates a somewhat broader alliance, including at least Kroton, Sybaris, Metapontion, and Kaulonia. All four cities claimed either a direct or indirect Achaian connection. Their incuse coinage will be discussed at greater length later in this chapter, but for now it suffices to observe that it seems to have been an expression of shared Achaian identity. Share cultural heritage, rooted in perceived (or even invented) sense of Achaianness, was probably drawn upon to strengthen the military alliance.

About a century later, several Achaian colonies formed the core of a more formal federal association, what is generally referred to as the Italiote League. Polybios (2.39.1–7) provides the most detailed account of its foundation and organization: Italiote cities were wracked with political unrest following the suppression of Pythagorean clubs, and so looked to the Achaians to help them quell the disturbances. So impressed were the Italiotes with Achaian political principles, that

a short time afterwards, they resolved to model their own constitution exactly on that of the [Achaian] League. The Krotonians, Sybarites, and Kaulonians, having called a conference and formed a league, first of all established a common temple and holy place of Zeus Homarios, in which to hold their meetings and debates, and next, adopting the customs and laws of

and Messapians against Metapontion and (perhaps) Thourioi: Diod. Sic. 20.104.1–20.105.3; Liv. 10.2.1–2; Strabo 6.3.4; Fronda 2010: 193–198. 219–223.

¹⁶ Italiote cities attacked or occupied at various times: Laös, Temesa, Terina, Hipponion, Pandosia, Poseidonia, Sybaris/Thourioi, Kaulonia, and Rhegion: see Fronda 2010: 151–152, 207. Contraction of territories: Kroton, Thourioi, Taras, and perhaps Metapontion: Carter 1990; Carter 2006: 195–237; Lomas 1993: 37; Osanna 1992: 19–20, 146–147, 167; Poulter 2002: 272–276.

the Achaians, decided to conduct their government according to them. (2.39.5–7).

Most scholars place the foundation in the last quarter of the fifth century, probably *c.* 420 BCE.¹⁷

Polybius' claim that the Italiote League was modeled on the Achaian League cannot be accepted at face value. His discussion of the birth of the Italiote League is situated within a larger discourse that extols Achaian virtue and tries to demonstrate their antiquity and the high regard in which other Greeks held them. One suspects that he has exaggerated the degree to which the constitution of the Italiote League was copied from the Achaian League. Moreover, Polybius places the foundation of the Italiote League (albeit vaguely) in the late fifth century BCE. It has been argued, however, that there is little evidence that the Achaian League functioned as a formal institution before the second quarter of the fourth century, and that even if the Achaian League existed in some form at that early date, little can be determined about its structure since what Polybius tells us about the league refers mostly to the period after its refoundation in 280 BCE, after which the league underwent subsequent constitutional revisions.¹⁸ Larsen suggested that we should not put too much weight on Polybius' report that the Italiote League was a precise copy of the Achaian League, as the two institutions were undoubtedly not identical in every respect, even if the Italiotes adopted some Achaian laws and customs.¹⁹

Nevertheless, some details of the league's organization and workings can be deduced from the information that Polybius supplies, combined cautiously with references in other sources. First, Polybius mentions that the league held *synodoi* and *diaboulia* in the sanctuary of Zeus Homarios. *Synodos* clearly refers to a general federal assembly, while *diaboulia* ("debates, deliberations, resolutions") probably references regular meetings of the league's federal council. Diodoros (14.91.1) explicitly mentions a federal council, reporting that member-states created a *synedrion* when the league was formed. The *synedrion* probably handled the regular business of the league, though, unfortunately, we can do no more than guess at how it was composed.²⁰ The general assembly presumably met less frequently. There must have been at least one annual meeting, perhaps during the

¹⁷ Thuc. 6.44.3 appears to confirm that the Italiote League was functioning by 415.

¹⁸ Morgan and Hall 1996: 193–199. However, others are more optimistic in reconstructing the early Achaian League: for example, see Athanassios Rizakis in Chapter 6.

¹⁹ Larsen 1968: 96–97.

²⁰ Ghinati 1961–1962: 119 n. 7 speculates that the *synedrion* comprised representatives from a single city in rotation.

festival for the federal cult,²¹ while additional meetings could have been called in specific circumstances.

Polybius states that the Italiote League conducted its assembly and council meetings at the federal sanctuary, the temple of Zeus Homarios. Indeed, he reports that the shrine was newly built at the same time the league was instituted. He gives this information as evidence that the Italiote League was based on the Achaian League, whose federal sanctuary was the shrine of Zeus Homarios near Aigion.²² There is, however, no secure evidence outside of Polybius' account that the Achaian League met at the sanctuary of Zeus Homarios in Aigion prior to c. 370 BCE. Thus, the building of the federal sanctuary of Zeus Homarios in southern Italy may have predated the establishment of the corresponding Achaian federal sanctuary at Aigion.²³ This does not require a total rejection of Polybius' testimony. Zeus Homarios was a uniquely Achaian cult, and the temple at Aigion surely had achieved regional importance already before it was selected as the federal sanctuary of the Achaian League. It is possible that the Italiote cities established the worship of Zeus Homarios in southern Italy in emulation of the Achaian cult, even if the latter was not yet Achaian League's federal cult. If so, then the founding of a cult of Zeus Homarios and the construction of a new temple represents a genuine example of the Italiotes adopting Achaian customs.²⁴

The location of the southern Italian sanctuary of Zeus Homarios has yet to be securely identified. One attractive suggestion is the otherwise unidentified Doric temple complex at modern Monasterace, near ancient Kaulonia.²⁵ The sanctuary had a wide temenos situated on a terrace

²¹ Ghinati 1961–1962: 119. There is no explicit mention of a festival for Zeus Homarios, but there are references to later Italiote *panygêreis* at the shrine of Hera Lakinia in Kroton (*Mir. Ausc.* 96 p. 838a) and at an unnamed shrine in Herakleia (Strabo 6.3.4). Presumably, there was a *panygêris* in honor of Zeus Homarios so long as it remained the federal cult of the Italiote League.

²² Polybius (2.39.6, 5.93.10) gives the name Zeus Homarios, though the forms Omarios, Amarios, and Hamarios are also found in literary and epigraphical sources. Strabo (8.7.3 and 8.7.5) gives the names Arnarios and Ainarios, which are usually emended to Amarios. Pausanias (7.24.2) mentions a sanctuary of Zeus Homagyrios in the territory of Aigion, which is sometimes identified with the Homarion. For a discussion of the variants, see Walbank 2000: 23; Mackil 2013: 200–201.

²³ Morgan and Hall 1996: 195–197.

²⁴ It is often assumed that the Italiote federal sanctuary was initially the temple of Hera Lakinia in Kroton: Ghinati 1961–1962: 123–124; Papadopoulos 2001: 415; Papadopoulos 2002: 25; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 269. The Italiote League federal sanctuary was relocated to the shrine of Hera Lakinia at a later point, but there is no direct evidence that Hera Lakinia was the federal cult when the league was founded, c. 420. There is also little archaeological or literary evidence for the position of De Sensi Sestito 1982, that the shrine of Zeus Homarios was located within the sanctuary of Hera Lakinia. See Fronda 2013.

²⁵ Torelli 1987: 593; Osanna 1989: 60–63. Ghinati 1961–1962: 124 objects that the temple's location within the city walls of Kaulonia makes it an unlikely choice for a federal sanctuary.

overlooking the sea.²⁶ The temple building was large, measuring approximately twenty by forty-five meters. Stele were displayed to the south of the sacred area, and a heavy limestone cover for a container, possibly part of a treasury or archive, was discovered in the sanctuary.²⁷ Architectural analysis dates the construction to about 425 BCE, contemporaneous to the foundation of the Italiote League.²⁸ The most striking feature of the sanctuary is an L-shaped course of five rectilinear steps, whose long side runs parallel to the north flank of the temple. The steps probably formed a monumental staircase for worshippers coming from the town center of Kaulonia, but they also could have provided adequate seating for well-attended meetings of league representatives.²⁹ The federal sanctuary was transferred to the temple of Hera Lakinia in the early fourth century, and later it was relocated at least once more, to Herakleia.³⁰ The *synedrion* and assembly were presumably transferred to the new federal sanctuaries along with associated religious rites.

The only federal office mentioned in the sources is *stratēgos*; there is no record whatsoever of lower ranking league magistracies. What we know about the *stratēgos* comes mostly from Diodoros' account of the league's military activities in the early fourth century. In c. 390 BCE, Dionysios I of Syracuse led an army across the Straits of Messina and prepared to lay siege to Kaulonia. The Italiote League responded by placing Kroton in charge of the war effort because it was the most populous and powerful member of the league. The Krotoniates in turn selected Heloris, an exile from Syracuse, as *stratēgos*.³¹ The league's member-states each sent troops to Kroton for a general muster. The Italiotes appear to have fought in 'national' units, while unit displacement was left to Heloris, who acted as commander-in-chief for the campaign.³² It is clear that each city was responsible for selecting its own *stratēgos*.³³ Even the federal *stratēgos*, in this case Heloris, was chosen by the people of a single city rather than by representatives of all member-states. The episode also implies that the league placed affairs in the hands of a single *stratēgos* only during particular circumstances. Thus, the *stratēgos* of the Italiote League does not appear to have been a regular (i.e., annual) office. The process for deciding when the

²⁶ However, it may have been farther from the coastline in antiquity than it is today: Stanley et al. 2007.

²⁷ Ianelli 1992; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 265; Osanna 1989: 62–63.

²⁸ Gullini 1987: 393–397; Tréziny 1989: 132. ²⁹ Osanna 1989: 61. ³⁰ See below, pp. 400–401.

³¹ Diod. Sic. 14.103.1–5. ³² Diod. Sic. 14.103.4, 14.104.4.

³³ See also Diod. Sic. 14.108.4: the people of Rhegion chose their own general, Phytion, who led their unsuccessful defense of the city against Dionysios' assault.

league should have a *stratēgos* and from which city he should come is obscure; presumably the *synedrion*, or possibly a general assembly, made the call. Only two generals are actually known by name: Heloris and Archytas of Taras.³⁴ Both came from the most powerful city in the league at the time. Larger cities in the league undoubtedly wielded disproportionate influence, so we may speculate that member-states simply deferred executive power to the hegemonic state's general, though a decree of the *synedrion* or the assembly may have formalized the process.

The sources make no explicit reference to federal law courts (*dikastēria*). However, Diodoros (14.101.1) does mention that the Italiotes were bound by an agreement: should the Lukanians attack any city in the league, all member-states were expected to come to its aid, and if any city failed to respond, its generals were to be executed. Diodoros specifies that the mutual defense stipulation was triggered by a Lukanian incursion, but it probably applied to any situations when a member-city was attacked, regardless of the enemy. In either case, the provision to punish a city's generals for failing to supply troops for common defense implies that the league had some mechanism for holding trials.

There is no clear indication of a federal treasury, though archaeological remains at the Monasterace sanctuary hint that a treasury could have been located there. Likewise, there is little evidence for the minting of federal coinage. The incuse coinage minted by the members of the Achaian alliance in the sixth century, mentioned above, was not a strictly federal coinage. Kroton minted coins in the fifth and fourth centuries bearing the Krotoniate tripod on the reverse and an eagle, in various poses, on the obverse. The eagle may be a reference to Zeus Homarios, though the iconography is not certain.³⁵ In the early fourth century, several Italiote cities struck a series of coins with the identical image of Hera, perhaps Hera Lakinia, on the obverse. There is evidence that some settlements shared obverse dies, indicating close cooperation in minting between some (but not all) of the member-states.³⁶ These may be considered federal coins of some sort, issued when the federal sanctuary was located at the shrine of Hera Lakinia. It should be noted, however, that the reverse iconography

³⁴ Archytas was a well-known Pythagorean philosopher who was also elected *stratēgos* of Taras several times and enjoyed considerable military success. According to the Suida (s.v. Archytas), "he commanded the Italiote *koinon*" (*tou koinou tôn Italiōtōn proestē*). The Suida also records that he was chosen by the citizens of Taras and by those in the region. If this late tradition is trustworthy, it may indicate a change in the selection process.

³⁵ Rutter 2001: no. 2141–2152 and commentary. ³⁶ See below, p. 395, n.40.

varies from city to city, and the coins do not bear a corporate Italiote legend.³⁷

League membership grew over time. Polybius names explicitly only three founding member-states in *c.* 420 BCE: Kaulonia, Kroton, and Sybaris, the last referring to either Sybaris-on-the-Traîs or Thourioi.³⁸ Other communities were probably members, such as smaller settlements subordinate to the principal member-states. Thucydides (6.44.3) reports that during their infamous expedition to Sicily, the Athenians landed at Rhegion and asked the citizens to join their campaign against Syracuse. The people of Rhegion responded that they would first wait to hear what “the other Italiotes” decided before choosing whether or not to join the expedition. This may be a reference to the Italiote League. The context suggests that the league had broad membership by *c.* 415 BCE. The wording is ambiguous as to whether Rhegion was a member-state at this time or remained outside the league though followed its lead with respect to policy. If Rhegion was a member-state, then the league had already expanded to include non-Achaian communities. The league certainly expanded by the early fourth century. According to Diodoros (14.91.1), “the Greeks inhabiting Italy” formed an alliance (*symmachia*) in 393 BCE against Dionysios I and the Lukanians. The passage displays some confusion on the part of Diodoros, as the formation of the alliance surely refers instead to an expansion of the league. Member-states can be inferred from references to Italiote cities that fought against Dionysios: Kroton, Kaulonia, Thourioi, Metapontion, Elea, Hipponion, and Rhegion.³⁹ In addition, several Italiote cities minted similar Hera Lakinia coins: Kroton, Thourioi, Poseidonia, Pandosia, and three otherwise obscure Campanian communities (the Fenserni, Hyrietes, Phystelia). Rutter dates these emissions to no earlier than the end of the fifth century, and links them to the reorganization of the Italiote League, *c.* 395 BCE.⁴⁰ Lastly, Taras, its subordinate colony Herakleia, and Neapolis may have been league members at this

³⁷ Mackil and van Alfen 2006 underscore the difficulty in assigning political, military, and religious alliances to such “cooperative coinage.”

³⁸ Sybaris was destroyed in 510 BCE and perhaps again in the early fifth century. Sybarite refugees fled to Laös and Poseidonia. Their descendants along with colonists from Athens and other Greek cities resettled Sybaris in middle of the fifth century. The old Sybarite families and new settlers quarreled. Eventually, the older families left and founded a new city named Sybaris-on-the-Traîs. Sybaris meanwhile was renamed Thourioi. Polybius may refer to Sybaris-on-the-Traîs (Walbank 1957–1979: 1.225–226), or he has conflated Sybaris and Thourioi (Fronza 2013).

³⁹ Diod. Sic. 14.100.1–3, 14.101.1, 14.103–104, 14.107.2, 15.24.1; Dion. Hal. 20.7.2–3; Polyain. 5.2.22, 6.11.1.

⁴⁰ Rutter 2001: nos. 538, 540–542, 611–612, 1140, 1796, 2159–2169, 2450–2452 and commentary. The Fenserni, Hyrietes and Thourians used the same obverse die for some coins. Pandosia was originally

time.⁴¹ Thus, it appears that as early as the first half of the fourth century the Italiote League had expanded to include every, or nearly every, Greek city in southern Italy.

Despite adding new members, the Italiote League did not enjoy much military success. When Dionysios I attacked Rhegion in *c.* 393, the league responded by sending a fleet. Although the Italiote force was badly mauled, it succeeded in holding off Dionysios' force. However, when the Italiotes next tried to retake Laös, which the Lukanians or Brettians had previously captured, they suffered a disastrous defeat.⁴² Meanwhile, the Syracusan tyrant led another expedition into southern Italy and crushed the combined army of the Italiote League at the battle of Elliporos (*c.* 389).⁴³ He successfully besieged Rhegion (*c.* 387), which may have supplied him with ships and money after its capitulation.⁴⁴ Dionysios also captured Kaulonia and Hipponion, and then handed over their territory to his allies, the Lokroians.⁴⁵ According to Polybios (2.39.7), Dionysios dissolved the Italiote League; this probably occurred in the wake of these campaigns.⁴⁶ Around 380 Dionysios again went to war again with "the Italiotes" – presumably a reformed Italiote League – who were now allied with the Carthaginians.⁴⁷ He subsequently captured Kroton (379), which he ruled for twelve years until his death.⁴⁸ The chronology of events is muddled in the ancient sources, but the overall thrust of the narrative is clear: the Italiote League was repeatedly incapable of defending its member-states.

At some point in the fourth century hegemony of the league passed from Kroton to Taras.⁴⁹ A mention of Archytas of Taras as the league's *stratēgos* implies that Taras had assumed leadership of the league by *c.* 350 BCE (see above, p. 394). The timing makes sense, given that Kroton had suffered repeated disasters while Taras was perhaps at its height of power and prosperity. According to Strabo (6.3.4), the Tarantines invited Alexander

a Greek settlement, perhaps an Achaian or Thourian colony (Strabo 6.1.5; Ps-Skymnos 326–329, Ps-Skylax 12) though by the time of the Second Punic War it was Brettian (Liv. 29.38.1).

⁴¹ Ghinatti 1961–1962: 127–128; Lomas 1993: 32–33.

⁴² Diod. Sic. 14.101.3–14.102.3; see also Strabo 6.1.1, 6.1.5.

⁴³ Diod. Sic. 14.103–105; Dion. Hal. *ant.* 20.7.2; Polyb. 1.6.1–2.

⁴⁴ Diod. Sic. 14.100.1–5, 14.106.1–3, 14.107.3–14.108.6, 14.111, 14.113.1; Dion. Hal. *ant.* 20.7.2; Polyb. 1.6.1–2.

⁴⁵ Diod. Sic. 14.106.3, 14.107.2; Strabo 6.1.10; Dion. Hal. *ant.* 20.7.2; Polyb. 1.6.1–2.

⁴⁶ Diod. Sic. 14.105.4 adds an interesting note that after his victory, Dionysios "concluded peace with most of the cities and left them independent," which implies that he had broken up the Italiote League.

⁴⁷ Diod. Sic. 15.15.2–4. ⁴⁸ Dion. Hal. 20.7.3.

⁴⁹ Ghinatti 1961–1962: 129–130; Intrieri 1987–1988: 33–34; Lomas 1993: 32–35; De Sensi Sestito 1994: 211–216.

the Molossian to help fight against neighboring Italic peoples, but soon thereafter the alliance broke down. Alexander then “tried to transfer to Thourian territory the general festival assembly of all Greek peoples in that part of the world, the assembly which was wont to meet at Herakleia in Tarantine territory” (ibid.). This plainly attests to the functioning of the Italiote league under Tarantine hegemony as late as c. 330. The league endured into the third century under Taras’ leadership, although the evidence is less explicit. According to Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 13.5–6), when the Tarantines decided to invite Pyrrhos to Italy, they sent ambassadors to him not only from Taras but also from the Italiotes. Later Pyrrhos allegedly offered to arbitrate between Rome and the Italiotes (*Pyrrh.* 16.3). The language is echoed by Dionysios of Halikarnassos (19.9.1–2, 19.14.4), who records purported letters from Pyrrhos to the Roman consul in which the king claims to be helping the “Tarantines and other Italiotes”⁵⁰. The use of the ethnic denominator is strongly suggestive that the Italiote League existed during the Pyrrhic War.⁵¹ Unfortunately, one can little more than speculate about the league’s organization on the eve of the Pyrrhic War: how league offices, deliberative bodies and other structures had evolved, if at all, is obscure.

In the overall view, however, the Italiote League appears clearly to have been a rather less integrated federal organization from an institutional perspective. It was basically a military alliance with at most a few shared political and religious structures: a federal sanctuary and cult, at least one deliberative body tasked with determining foreign policy, and a federal army composed of contingents from the member-states, and, at least occasionally, a single *stratēgos* acting as commander-in-chief. Some member-states cooperated in minting coins. On the continuum of ancient Greek federal experiences, the Italiote League is closer to a *symmachia* than to a highly integrated *koinon*, accepting that such categories are in any case artificial.

The league’s martial emphasis and its loose structure make sense given the historical and geographic context. As discussed, the league was founded in response to mounting external threats both from ‘native’ Italic populations and the expansionist policies of Dionysios I. One reason that Italic peoples were more dangerous is that they too had begun to form federal arrangements beginning perhaps as early as the fifth century. It is much

⁵⁰ The letters are evidently literary inventions, but the terminology may represent historical traces, though Appian (*Samn.* 10.1) and the *Ineditum Vaticanum* (*BNJ* 839 fr. 2, ed. Beck) have Pyrrhos fighting for the autonomy of the Greeks rather than for the Italiotes. See Intrieri 1987–1988: 30–33.

⁵¹ Intrieri 1987–1988: 31; Aymard 1938: 2 n. 1, 52 n. 1, 80.

debated whether such organizations as the Samnite League or the Brettian League were themselves integrated federal states or much looser structures that served primarily religious functions but also provided for mutual defense. It is also not clear whether the various Italic leagues were influenced by Italiote federalism or whether they developed independently.⁵² In any case, the native groups' increasing capacity to cooperate translated into greater military effectiveness, and as a result they now posed a more serious threat. Thus, it is not surprising that the Italiote League's foremost mandate was defense.

At the same time, the member-states were spread over a considerable distance, especially during at its most inclusive phase. Even when the league was centered in Bruttium, long distances separated the member-states. Communication and coordination between widely separated communities must have been difficult. Moreover, geographically dispersed member-states surely faced very different local conditions. Outside of very broad concerns such as defense, they probably had few shared interests. They may have perceived, therefore, little benefit in ceding much autonomy to a federal organization that could not respond adequately to their specific parochial needs. Thus, greater federal political integration was probably seen as impractical to implement, and possibly it was considered undesirable.

Military alliances are often unstable and rarely endure beyond the immediate threat(s) that bring them together. Since the Italiote League lacked strong integrative political structures, the member-states needed to find other means to encourage unity and build more enduring cohesion. Thus, the Italiotes fostered and exploited a sense of shared culture and identity – whether it was 'real' or 'perceived' or 'constructed' is not so important. As touched upon already, when the league was established in the fifth century, it comprised communities that had allegedly been founded directly or indirectly by the Achaians. Expressions of southern Italian Achaianess are already visible in the Archaic period. This can be seen, for example, in the coins that Kroton, Sybaris, Metapontion, and Kaulonia minted, beginning in the sixth century and continuing in some places well into the fifth century.⁵³ These were struck on the same weight

⁵² On the various Italic leagues, see Purcell 1994: 386; Letta 1994; Gabba 1994; Frederiksen 1984: 139–141; Salmon 1967: 95–99; Cappalletti 2002: 222–248; Senatore 2006: 89–92; Cornell 2004: 126–128; Fronda 2010: 18–19, 122–123, 151 n. 12.

⁵³ Graham 1982b: 194; Rutter 2001: no. 1459–1489, 1729–1756, 2035–2053, 2075–2096, 2100–2112 and commentary.

standard, the so-called Achaian standard,⁵⁴ and employed the same difficult incuse technique. While the obverse and reverse images varied from city to city, the iconography tended to allude to the heroic origins of the Achaians.⁵⁵ Thus, while not federal coins or even true “alliance coins,”⁵⁶ they nevertheless represent an assertion of Achaianness. Use of the Achaian dialect, reflected in the distinctive Achaian alphabet, provides another example. The vast majority of inscriptions using the Achaian alphabet have been discovered in southern Italy, versus only a handful in Achaia itself. It has even been suggested that the ‘Achaian alphabet’ was more or less invented in the colonies and then exported to the homeland. The colonies’ relatively wide use (and possibly the invention) of the Achaian script is a certain expression of common Achaian identity.⁵⁷ According to Jonathan Hall, the Achaian colonies of southern Italy also displayed “a distinctive material culture identity” that, interestingly, had little connection stylistically with their Achaian homeland.⁵⁸ This too indicates that the Achaian Italiote communities had some sense of a common Achaian identity. It is certain that the founding states of the Italiote League invoked their alleged shared Achaianness in order to strengthen the political and military ties.

This is surely why they chose to establish a new shrine of Zeus Homarios as the federal sanctuary. The shrine of Zeus Homarios at Aigion became the federal sanctuary of the Achaian League no later than *c.* 370 BCE, and possibly earlier. Moreover, the decision to make Zeus Homarios the Achaian federal cult presupposes the importance of the deity within an Achaian context. In other words, the shrine at Aigion had probably already achieved regional (i.e., Achaian) significance before it was adopted as the federal sanctuary of the Achaian League.⁵⁹ The epithets Homarios (for Zeus) and Homaria (for Athena) are found almost exclusively in Achaian

⁵⁴ The Achaian colonies of southern Italy minted coins much earlier than most cities in the Achaian homeland. Moreover, the Achaian weight standard was unique to Italy (i.e., not used in Achaia), though it employed the same system of sub-divisions as used in early Corinthian coinage. See Papadopoulos 2002: 23, 28; Kraay 1976: 164, Stazio 1998. Thus, it is probably the case that the Achaian standard was mostly a colonial product, though this does not mitigate it as an expression of (constructed) Achaianness.

⁵⁵ Papadopoulos 2002: 28–39.

⁵⁶ There are examples of Kroton and Sybaris alliance coins: they are double-obverse, bearing the tripod of Kroton and the bull of Sybaris; they probably date to the early fifth century after Sybaris had been refounded. It is interesting to see this continued effort to promote shared identity even after the destruction of Sybaris at the hands of the Krotoniates, see Rutter 2001: 2098–2099. See also Mackil and van Alfen 2006: 208–210 for a discussion of various “alliance coinage” from Magna Graecia.

⁵⁷ Ardovino 1980; Jeffrey 1990: 224, 259–262, 451; 456–459; Papadopoulos 2002: 26–27.

⁵⁸ Hall 1997: 137. ⁵⁹ See Fronza 2013.

epigraphic contexts.⁶⁰ Strabo (8.7.1–3) preserves a tradition that traces the origins of the cult in Achaia to mythical times, as the Achaians allegedly adopted the cult from the Ionians during the return of the Heraklidai. Thus, the cult was a key component of Achaian mytho-historical origins and identity. The decision of the Italiote League founding members to establish their own shrine of Zeus Homarios was a strong statement of their Achaianness, which clearly they invoked to legitimize and strengthen the league.

As the league expanded to include non-Achaian member-states, appeals to Achaianness would have become less relevant. Thus, it was necessary to tap into a broader sense of shared identity in order to overcome the divergent traditions and potentially competing interests among the league's members. Although the Greek cities of southern Italy were highly diverse, a nascent common identity may have begun to emerge even before the league expanded. Indeed, Thucydides' reference to Italiotes suggests that the name was in circulation by the late fifth century, and so perhaps sense of 'Italioteness' had begun to coalesce by that time. Its importance should not be overstressed, as whatever sense of Italioteness there was existed in tension with intra-Italiote conflict and rivalry. Nevertheless, shared Italioteness was a potential source of cohesion for the sprawling league. This at least partly explains the league's decision to move the federal sanctuary to the shrine of Hera Lakinia. The transfer may have occurred in 389, after Dionyios I besieged and captured Kaulonia, though it is more likely that the sanctuary was relocated a few years prior, when the league was expanded. This accords well with the numismatic evidence, as several Italiote cities began to mint Hera Lakinia coins around the beginning of the fourth century (see above, p.395). Hera Lakinia was an extremely important regional cult. The temple was a major structure, perhaps the most splendid in southern Italy, and it had developed into a pan-Italiote sanctuary by the fifth century.⁶¹ Hera Lakinia was, therefore, an ideal federal cult for a league looking to rebrand itself as a larger association.⁶²

The federal sanctuary was later transferred to Herakleia, perhaps to the shrine to Demeter. The temple was certainly important – and it received major improvement in the fourth century, including an elaborate system of terraces, perhaps corresponding to its new status as a federal sanctuary – yet

⁶⁰ Walbank 2000: 27–30.

⁶¹ Orsi 1911; Spadea 1996; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 267. Liv. 24.3: "the Temple of Lacinia Juno was sacred to all the surrounding people"; cf. Ps-Arist., *Mir. Ausc.* 96 p. 838a, referring to "the festival of Hera to which all of the Italians assemble."

⁶² On this point, see also Kazimierz 1987.

it probably did not have the pan-Italiote significance as the more famous sanctuary of Hera Lakinia.⁶³ The relocation of the shrine was no doubt related to the declining fortunes of Kroton and the rise of Taras as the hegemonic state in the Italiote League. Herakleia was nominally independent but clearly within the Tarantine sphere of influence. Moving the federal sanctuary to Herakleia allowed Taras to further dominate league affairs. Thus, while the Italiote League's primary mandate was to protect member-states from outside threats, in reality it was a platform for furthering Taras' hegemonic aspirations. This had undoubtedly been the case when Kroton was the league's hegemon, and we may surmise that the transfer of the federal sanctuary from the temple of Zeus Homarios to the temple of Hera Lakina, only a few kilometers from Kroton, was exploited to strengthen Kroton's position. The Tarantines may have been even more heavy-handed in their manipulation of the league. Indeed, the Tarantines repeatedly employed "outside" allies, not only Greek condottieri (e.g. Kleonymos of Sparta and Pyrrhos of Epeiros) but also native Italic groups, to further their own interests even against other league members. The long-term failure of the Italiote League to protect Greek communities from native incursions, and indeed Taras' willingness to use Italic allies against league members, greatly undermined the credibility of the league and convinced some Italiote cities to seek protection from another outside power, Rome.

Rome's widening interstate relations had intersected with Italiote League affairs, and Roman and Tarantine interests had collided already by c. 330.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, disaffection among Italiote communities with Tarantine hegemony as well dates to this period.⁶⁵ Both interrelated trends came to a head in the late 280s. The people of Thourioi sought Roman help against the Brettians and Lukanians; the Romans responded by sending an army against the Italic tribes and installing a garrison in the city. The Rhegians also asked the Romans for protection against not only the Brettians and Lukanians, but also the Tarantines.⁶⁶ According to Appian (*Sam.* 7.1–2), the Tarantines were angry that the Thourians had "preferred the Romans to themselves although they were Greeks." They attacked

⁶³ De Sensi Sestito 1984: 41–50; Pianu 1989; Lomas 1993: 33, 129–130; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 260.

⁶⁴ E.g., Liv. 8.25.6–11, 8.27.2–5, 8.29.1; Dion. Hal. *ant.* 8.29.1; Fronda 2010: 194–195.

⁶⁵ Anti-Tarantine sentiment in the league: Urso 1998. Alexander the Molossian's attempt to weaken Taras by moving the Italiote federal sanctuary to Thourioi may also be seen as a Thourian effort to challenge Tarantine leadership: Urso 1998: 154.

⁶⁶ Dion. Hal. *ant.* 19.13.1, 19.16.3, 20.4.2; Polyb. 1.7.6–8; Diod. Sic. 22.1.2–3; Liv. Per. 11, 12; Val. Max. 1.8.6; Fronda 2010: 197–198.

Thourioi and sacked it, exiled pro-Roman aristocrats, and ejected the Roman garrison. They also sank a Roman fleet cruising off the Ionian coast. Next, the Tarantines, probably in the name of the Italiote League, asked Pyrrhos for military assistance in the looming war with Rome. Ultimately the war proved to be another major defeat for the league, and by c. 270 BCE Rome had conquered the remaining Italiote cities. The subsequent status of the Italiote League is unclear. If the Romans did not completely dissolve it, they surely stripped it of any coordinated policy-making capacity. Thus, the *syndrion* and assembly, if they continued to meet at all, would have been largely symbolic. Its religious institutions were more likely to have been left intact, so perhaps the Italiote League endured as a sort of amphiktyony.⁶⁷ Regardless, Rome's conquest of southern Italy effectively brings to a close the history of the Italiote League.

⁶⁷ Kazimierz 1987 argues that an Italiote amphiktyony survived well into the first century BCE.

*The Lykian League**Ralf Behrwald*

The Lykian League has, for a long time, occupied an important role in the research on Greek federalism. Conceived as a role model of federalism by Montesquieu, it was praised as a particularly advanced federal state by Jakob Larsen (1968: 240–263) and adduced as an example of pre-Greek, indigenous influences on the development of an essentially Greek federal state by Luigi Moretti.¹ Written sources are extremely scarce, as only Artemidoros (around 100 BCE) gives a description of its constitution, which is referenced by Strabo (14.3.3, see below). Thus, epigraphy is crucial for our understanding of the league. Explorations in the nineteenth century led to the publication of some two thousand Lykian inscriptions, and archaeological fieldwork since the 1950s has triggered a virtual explosion of epigraphic material, a process that continues unabated and that has set our knowledge of the Lykian League on an entirely new footing.² It has also helped to understand Lykian federalism as the result of a profound (auto-)Hellenization from Classical times through the Hellenistic period, and set it into the historical and structural framework of Lykian society and culture. Most Lykian inscriptions pertain to imperial times, and Lykian federal institutions are much more visible after the region was reduced to a Roman province in 43 CE. In what follows, however, the focus will be on the early development of Lykian federalism, firmly rooted in the developments of contemporary mainland Greece. Later changes, to be read against the background of the so-called *Provinziallandtage* (“provincial assemblies”) of imperial times, will be treated only in order to put earlier stages of the development into perspective.

¹ Moretti 1962: 186–195, repeated by Lozano 2005 (esp. 359), whose discussion is marred by ignorance of recent research on Lykia.

² Recent analyses include Kokkinia 2000, Reitzenstein 2011, and the monograph on the league, Behrwald 2000. For earlier research, see Larsen 1968: 240–263; Jameson 1980; Moretti 1962: 171–218. The studies by Fougères 1898 on the league and Treuber 1887 on Lykian history are somewhat dated. Historical overviews: Bryce 1986; Kolb and Kupke 1989; Brandt and Kolb 2005. Geography and topography: Hellenkemper and Hild 2004.

The region and historical background

Situated in southwestern Asia Minor and extending roughly 130 kilometers from Telmessos in the west to Phaselis in the east, the Lykian peninsula is defined by rough, mountainous areas, in large part above 1,000 meters altitude, with some ranges reaching well over 2,000 meters. It is structured in the west by the Xanthos valley, extending some 50 kilometers to the north, which harbors cities like Patara, Xanthos, Pinara, Tlos, and Araxa, and is linked with the coastal plain of Telmessos in the west. In the east, a large alluvial plain develops around Limyra, Rhodiapolis, and Akalissos. While most *poleis* in central Lykia are situated on rocky hilltops, one central valley connects through the river Myros to a smaller alluvial plain around the city of Myra. In many parts of the region, communications by land are difficult, and geography favored a small-scale political organization that was typical of Lykian history.

The Lykians were an indigenous people speaking an Indo-European language attested epigraphically in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE; only in eastern Lykia did Greek colonization, starting in the early seventh century BCE, lead to the foundation of Phaselis and other Rhodian colonies in the eastern plain and on Lykia's eastern coast (Adak 2007). Achaemenid expansion turned Lykia into part of the Persian Empire until the end of the fifth century, ruled by small-scale local aristocrats among whom the dynasty of Xanthos reached domination over large parts of western Lykia. After a brief period of Athenian predominance when Lykians (as well as Phaselis) appear in the *Athenian Tribute Lists*, Achaemenid rule was re-established and later, in the 360s BCE, entrusted to the Hekatomnid dynasty of Karia.

Local dynasts had used Greek culture and art in their self-representation since at least the fifth century BCE, and from the fourth century onwards political Hellenization set in, with local communities reinventing themselves as Greek-style *poleis*.³ By the third century, the use of the Lykian language ceases and inscriptions both public and private are exclusively Greek, while local onomastic traditions persist well into imperial times. As is clear from the language used – current *koinē* Greek – neighboring Rhodian colonies such as Phaselis played no role in this Hellenization. It

³ This process can best be seen at Xanthos, where in the second half of the fourth century, regulations by the Karian satrap Pixodaros are published in both Lykian and Greek, along Achaemenid imperial Aramaic (*FdXanthos* vi). These regulations presuppose a limited autonomy of Xanthos (also attested in *TAM* 1 45), when the people of Xanthos together with inhabitants of the surrounding territory (*perioikoi*) can decree, and finance, a new cult.

must be understood as an integration into the cultural and political mainstream of Hellenistic times, and an adaptation to the values and the language of Hellenistic monarchs ruling over Lykia.

For most of the third century BCE, Lykia belonged to the Ptolemaic kingdom. Occupied by Antiochos III in 197, it was attributed by Rome to Rhodes in 188 BCE and, after bitter resistance, set free by Rome in 167. It is in these years that the Lykian League would have been founded; however, the date of its foundation remains contested.⁴ Its existence already under Ptolemaic rule, as postulated by Moretti (1962) on the basis of inscriptions bearing a federal ethnic, such as a “Lykian from Xanthos,” bears little plausibility. Of five inscriptions bearing these ethnics, only one belongs to the third century BCE (*Milet I.3* 46).⁵ Different motifs may have led to the occasional imitation of an ethnic which, in other leagues, was the standard way of denoting league citizens. What is more, Ptolemaic Lykia was under the firm control of royal officials, and while Lykian towns were allowed a limited independence, could grant honors and dispose of their own funds, they only transformed into Greek-style *poleis* slowly and gradually. This process was not yet finished when the Romans assigned Lykia to Rhodes in 188 BCE.⁶

The attribution to Rhodes led to conflicts, however, especially in the west of the region, between Rhodes and her Lykian subjects.⁷ In 177, a first decision by Rome entailed no formal change but stated that Rhodes was to respect the Lykians as allies; only when Rhodes fell out of Roman favor after 168 did the Romans decide to grant Lykia full freedom. In c. 182 to 180, the league honored a high-ranking Ptolemaic official (*OGIS* 99). It is difficult not to see this as an attempt to find allies against Rhodes, which tried to get the Attalids involved on its side. An honorary decree from Araxa, set up in Rhodes for a Rhodian probably in 181/0 BCE, seems to show that not all Lykians joined in the war against the Rhodians, and an unpublished inscription reportedly attests to a treaty Xanthos signed with Rhodes which should date to after 188 as well, in which it accepted Rhodian suzerainty. The circumstances under which the league came into being remain obscure: Xanthos, as well as Araxa, may not have joined from

⁴ Foundation after 188 BCE, see Behrwald 2000: 89–105. A foundation by c. 200 BCE was favoured by Larsen 1968: 240, who speculates that “the Lykian Confederacy was Anatolian rather than Greek” (241). Similarly, Moretti 1962: 186–195.

⁵ Behrwald 2000: 78–79.

⁶ Restricted sovereignty of Lykian cities under Ptolemaic rule: Behrwald 2000: 49–68.

⁷ The events and sources have been treated convincingly by Wiemer 2002: 260–271, 277–288; cf. Behrwald 2000: 84–99.

the beginning, which would render the Lykian league initially a coalition of opponents to Rhodian domination. But Xanthos might just as well have joined the league at its inception sometime after Ptolemaic rule, and later have left the league in a move to find a compromise with Rhodes. Some or all Lykian *poleis* could also at first have sought an agreement with Rhodes, as is attested by the treaty of Xanthos, with military resistance, and possibly the foundation of the league, beginning only later.⁸

Some institutions of the Lykian League appear to have imitated the Achaian League, which is best explained if these institutions were installed before the year 167 BCE, when the Achaians fell from Roman favor and were hardly an attractive model for a new league in alliance with Rome.⁹ Federal coinage set in during or immediately after the war against Rhodes, and when in the middle of the second century BCE a conflict arose in the upper Xanthos valley between Tlos and its neighbor, Oinoanda (which was to become a league member only in imperial times), it was the Lykian League rather than its member *polis* Tlos that led negotiations, reached an agreement and shouldered financial obligations resulting from the treatment. The decree in honor of Orthagoras from Araxa (*SEG* 18.570), passed sometime after 167 BCE, attests to joint league operations and a functioning federal military in the second century, as well as to the admission of a new member *polis*, Orloanda.¹⁰

After 167 BCE, if not earlier, the league introduced a common cult of *Thea Romē* with penteteric games, and in one instance its priest is used as an eponym, expressing the devotion to the new superpower which is also reflected in a dedication on the Capitol Hill in Rome commemorating the liberation from Rhodes.¹¹ In eastern Lykia, Phaselis and Olympos joined the league only briefly; the rise of piracy at the end of the second century BCE and the fact that some pirates occupied strongholds in the vicinity made these cities leave the league, to become part of the Roman province of Cilicia after piracy had been squashed by Rome. In the following

⁸ Araxa decree: *ASAA* 8/9, 1925: 315, no. 1; Xanthos inscription: see Wiemer 2002: 264, n. 15. Adak 2007 has published another treaty between Melanippion in eastern Lykia and Rhodes which is placed in the same context.

⁹ In particular the *apoteleios* and representation according to size of the members (see below, p. 410); see Behrwald 2000: 163.

¹⁰ Coinage: Troxell 1982; Ashton 2008. Agreement with Oinoanda: Rousset 2010; Orthagoras: Wiemer 2002: 261–262, n. 6, and Rousset 2010: 129–133 accept a date in the latter half of the second century BCE (as proposed by Errington, *Chiron* 17, 1987: 114–118); for an earlier date, cf. Behrwald 2000: 90–98 and Kokkinia 2008: 20–23. Orloanda: *SEG* 55.1452.

¹¹ Games: Robert, 1978: 277–290 (= *Opera Minora Selecta* VII [1990]: 681–695). Eponymous function of priest: Rousset 2010: 16. Dedication: *OGIS* 551 = *IGUR* 15 = *ILLRP* 174.

Mithradatic Wars, the league stayed loyal to Rome, and in a newly found inscription claims to have fought “for the hegemony of Rome and the liberty of all Lykians.”¹²

A formal treaty with Rome ensued which seems to have been concluded under Sulla.¹³ In 46 BCE, after his victory over Pompeius, Caesar granted Lykia another treaty, preserved on a bronze tablet that has only recently come to light (Mitchell 2005). In the course of the civil war that followed Caesar’s assassination, Lykia together with Rhodes remained loyal to the Caesarians. Brutus defeated league forces and invaded Lykia in 42 BCE; after their victory, the triumvirs granted fiscal privileges to their supporters. Their loyalty helped retain an independence which also survived the Battle of Actium, where Lykians must have participated along with Antonius’ troops. Thus, the league retained its independence even if Roman, now imperial, influence was growing: federal drachms of this time bear the imperial portrait on the obverse, whereas the reverse displayed the same federal symbols that also continued to be put on the *aes* coinage (Troxell 1982: 111–225), and the imperial cult was established: city cults for Augustus and a league cult for Tiberius are attested.¹⁴ Officially independent, the league displayed many elements of contemporaneous provincial assemblies.

The league of Hellenistic times, then, was heavily influenced by external forces, especially the rise of Rome: one of the latest leagues in Greek history, the Lykians drew on well-established models which would allow their small *poleis* to assert themselves in front of those forces. The league is not an expression of a particular Lykian patriotism, much less the result of indigenous traditions. Rather, internal strife and, as will be seen later, a vivid sense of competition among Lykian *poleis* were checked by outer pressure and by the emergence of a Lykian elite whose possessions, and whose perspectives, reached beyond their native *polis*.

Lykian independence ended in 43 CE, when conflicts that must have verged on civil war led to Roman intervention and the installation of a Roman province.¹⁵ The first governor, Quintus Veranius, has left many

¹² SEG 55.1503, see Baker and Thériault 2005.

¹³ Published by Schuler 2007b. A Sullan treaty had been postulated earlier, see Behrwald 2000: 11. The new situation is echoed by the second Lykian dedication on the Capitol, CIL VI 30027 = CIL I² 726 = ILLRP 1 175; cf. Schuler 2007b: 60–62.

¹⁴ See Kolb 2002; Reitzenstein 2011: 35–37; also the case study of Limyra by Wörrle 2007.

¹⁵ Cass. Dio 60.17.3–4; Suet. Claud. 25.3. The most conspicuous monument of the provincialization is the *stadiasmos* of Patara, edited with ample commentary by Adak and Şahin 2007, who comment on the foundation of the province (49–79); cf. most recently Vitale 2012: 283–290. Apparently, some Lykian cities had sent envoys to Rome to negotiate the new status: TAM II 508 and 583.

traces of a profound reorganization of Lykia, and the league's institutions changed accordingly. Coins issued on this occasion, which display the imperial titulature along with the emperor's portrait on the obverse, but bear traditional symbols of the league coinage on some of the reverses, herald the personifications of *Spes* ("Hope") and *Libertas* ("Freedom") on other issues. Apparently, Lykia initially retained some privileges, possibly exemption from the so-called *tributum capitis*, or poll tax (Troxell 1982: 244–251). This privileged position of Lykia was abolished under Vespasian (Suet. *Vesp.* 8.4), and under Hadrian, minor changes were introduced in the structure of the league. It had become the main framework for contacts between Rome and Lykia, and if it lost its political sovereignty, it nevertheless continued to be the principal point of reference of Lykia's *polis* elites.

The structure of the Hellenistic league

The Hellenistic league institutions are famously depicted in a passage of Strabo, who emphasizes the sober policy of the Lykian League, the *Lykiakon systēma*, and continues (14.3.3, trans. H. L. Jones):

There are twenty-three cities that share in the vote. They come together from each city to a general congress (*koinon synedrion*), after choosing whatever city they approve of. The largest of the cities control three votes each, the medium-sized two, and the rest one. In the same proportion, also, they make contributions (*eisphoras*) and discharge other liturgies. Artemidoros said that the six largest were Xanthus, Patara, Pinara, Olympus, Myra, and Tlos, the last named being situated near the pass that leads over into Cibyra. At the congress they first choose a *lykiarch*, and then other officials of the league (*systēma*); and courts of justice (*dikastēria*) are designated together. In earlier times they would deliberate about war and peace and alliances, but now they naturally do not do so, since these matters necessarily lie in the power of the Romans, except, perhaps, when the Romans should give them permission or it should be for their benefit. Likewise, judges and magistrates are elected from the several cities in the same proportion. And since they lived under such a good government, they remained ever free under the Romans, thus retaining their ancestral usages.

Whether the entire passage or only the information on the leading cities is considered to be taken from Artemidoros, who wrote c. 100 BCE,¹⁶ this outline of the Hellenistic league has remained the single most important

¹⁶ Its editor (R. Stiehle, *Philologus* 11, 1856: 193–244) considers only the sentence following "Artemidoros said" a verbal quotation. Later research on the league has assumed the entire passage up to "In earlier times . . ." to stem from Artemidoros.

description of its structure and processes. Earlier research, focusing on formal means of integration, on questions of representative government and proportional participation, stressed the modernity of proportional distribution of votes in the Lykian *koinon synedrion* (Jameson 1980: 842–843). Such a system is attested for the *boulē* and *nomographoi* of the Achaian League, probably the model upon which the Lykians drew,¹⁷ but apparently is unique for the principal assembly: for *koinon synedrion* in Strabo, a term which occurs in no other Lykian document, should refer to the *archairesiakē ekklēsia* (“electoral assembly”) in which, at least in imperial times, *archostatai* (“delegates”) elected the magistrates.¹⁸ An inscription published in 1972 proves the existence of this model well into imperial times.¹⁹ Whether a *boulē*, attested in imperial times along with the *ekklesia*, existed in Hellenistic times is unclear, but mention of *bouleutai* in an inscription from Pinara (*TAM* II 508) could give the decisive clue: this text, referring to *bouleutai*, *archostatai* and former league officials, seems to reflect a situation prior to the loss of Lykian independence, since after that point former league officials do not occur as a distinct group any more, probably because the *boulē* had developed into a board of retired officials, automatically promoted to *bouleutēs* after office. This could also be the reason why no inscription from the imperial period mentions membership of the federal *boulē* among the achievements of the honorand.

The role of the *lykiarch* in Hellenistic times remains unclear.²⁰ The lack of other Hellenistic documents led Larsen to assume that this, in fact, was the *stratēgos*, known as the highest official in other leagues and attested in Hellenistic documents from Lykia as well.²¹ However, epigraphic testimonies are too scant to decide this issue, and while the documentation of Hellenistic military officers – *stratēgos*, *hipparchos* (“cavalry commander”), *hypohipparchos* (“deputy cavalry commander”) and *nauarchos* (“naval commander”) – has increased in recent years, their relation to (or, in case of the

¹⁷ Lehmann 1983: 245–247; see also Chapter 6 by Athanassios Rizakis above. *Nomographoi* are attested in Lykia as well (*TAM* II 420, Tiberian period), but probably with a different function: Behrwald 2000: 164, n. 11.

¹⁸ It seems this assembly met three times a year in late Hellenistic times, or once a year in three sessions: *TAM* II 583.

¹⁹ *BE* 1973.451: Boubon is honoured with a third vote in the assembly, becoming one of the *tripsephoi poleis* of the league.

²⁰ Larsen 1968: 251–252. Cf., most recently, Reitzenstein 2011: 27–35, but see the objections of Jameson 1973: 283; Kokkinia 2000: 221–222.

²¹ See Larsen 1968, followed by Jameson 1980: 836. Against an identity: Balland 1981: 243, but see the objections raised by Baker and Thériault 2005: 357; Reitzenstein 2011: 28, n. 5.

stratēgos, identity with) the *lykiarch* remains a puzzle.²² From the Orthagoras decree – which, uniquely, mentions the (federal?) rank of *apoteleios* – it appears that member *poleis* sent contingents under their own officers (in this case, *ephippos*).²³ Cassius Dio (47.43.1) speaks of *to koinon tōn Lykiōn strateuma* (“the common army of the Lykians”), but in an honorary inscription for their commander, they call themselves somewhat vaguely *Lykiōn hoi synstrateusamenoi* (“of the Lykians those who served together”), with no indication of an internal structure of the force (*SEG* 45.1825). The federal commander apparently could, as a *stratēgos autokratōr*, be invested with special prerogatives to negotiate on behalf of the league. Among Strabo’s “other officials of the league”, only a *tamieus* (“federal treasurer”) is attested epigraphically.²⁴ Nothing, however, is known about the contributions mentioned by Strabo.²⁵

The other feature of formal integration or statehood of the league that has, along with representative government, occupied modern research is the common law system alluded to by Strabo. From two inscriptions some traveling law courts are known, honoring the responsible *epistatēs* (“chairman”), both dating from shortly before the end of Lykian independence (*TAM* II 420 and 583). They have been identified as foreign judges from outside the league, but should rather be regarded as part of the legal system alluded to by Strabo: foreign judges, called from abroad for a neutral judgement, would hardly have operated under a Lykian *epistatēs*.²⁶ The *nomographēs* (“officer codifying the law”) in *TAM* II 420, on the contrary, would have served in an irregular function, probably connected with the internal conflicts that ultimately led to the loss of independence.²⁷ The recently published treaties with Rome regulate competences of Roman and Lykian courts but, tantalizingly, remain silent as to the latter’s structure.²⁸

²² *SEG* 55.1502; Marek, *Lykia* 2, 1995: 9–21 (= *SEG* 45.1825). Other inscriptions (except for forefathers, mentioned in imperial texts): *TAM* II 261, 264, 265, 319, 420. The officers were appointed also in times of peace, as attested by an inscription from Tiberian times: *TAM* II 420.

²³ The singular mention of an *hēgemōn* (“commander”) in an Hellenistic inscription from Myra (Petersen and von Luschan 1889: no. 67) is unclear in its context and might equally refer to an allied commander or to a Lykian officer.

²⁴ See *TAM* II 583, for Tlos.

²⁵ It is not clear whether the *paragogia* in Rousset 2010 were federal or civic fees, see his commentary pages 34–35.

²⁶ See Behrwald 2000: 168; for foreign judges Robert 1973; Crowther 2007. Identification as foreign courts was most recently argued by Kantor 2006. Two other inscriptions show they continued into imperial period: *TAM* II 905 II D 11; *FdXanthos* VII 86 (restored).

²⁷ *TAM* II 420. Reitzenstein 2011: 38 assumes that the *metapempta dikastēria* were also an irregular institution. The small number of testimonies does not warrant this conclusion, given the scantiness of our evidence. They are attested in the second century CE as well (*TAM* II 905).

²⁸ See Mitchell 2005; Schuler 2007b.

The Hellenistic coinage of the Lykian League, studied by Troxell (1982), adds to our knowledge of the league's structure. Its date has recently been called into question: Troxell proposed a beginning of a few issues (her period I) before 167 BCE,²⁹ followed by an expansion of minting after 167 (periods II and III) and a reorganization of the league's silver coinage in 81 BCE (period IV), accompanied by bronze coins from the period of Augustus onward (period V). Ashton and Meadows, on the basis of the Letoon Hoard published in 2007, have recently tried to lower the dating of period II to the second half of the second century BCE.³⁰ If correct, this would have no small impact on the early history of the league: without a common coinage for half a century after its foundation, it would appear less advanced and coherent than previously thought. However, the league's first coinage (Troxell's period I bronze coins) is still considered to predate 167: the conflict with Rhodes seems to have sparked an initiative for union that entailed a first experiment in unified league coinage. And autonomous coinages of Hellenistic Lykian *poleis*, usually dated in the second century BCE, are small in numbers and can hardly have lasted for long.³¹

Minting at first operated among the member *poleis*, marking their issues with abbreviations, and even small *poleis* minted on behalf of the league. In the first century BCE, minting was more restricted and organized in two federal districts. These are named after mountain ranges to the west of the Xanthos valley and in central Lykia, Kragos and Masikyτος, and an imperial inscription mentions a *synteleia pros tō Kragō* (the "district towards the Kragos": *OGIS* 565; *IGR* 488). Troxell took the coinage, and the districts that underlie its organization, to be a reaction to Roman demands after the Mithradatic Wars, but her dating has inspired criticism, and it is more likely that the districts attest to an internal organization introduced by the league at an uncertain date.³²

The *poleis* in the Hellenistic league

The Lykians developed their league late, with respect to other Greek *koina*, yet at a time when *polis* institutions were not yet fully developed in Lykia.

²⁹ Metrological considerations (the only solid dating criteria) point to a date pre-167 BCE. Troxell 1982: 23 assumes a date under Antiochus III (197–190 BCE), but cf. Ashton 1987: 15. Initially, the Lykians also countermarked foreign coins: Ashton 1987; Behrwald 2000: 101–105.

³⁰ Ashton and Meadows 2008; cf. Marcellesi 2007.

³¹ Coinages of western Lykia: Patara, Xanthos, Tlos, Pinara, Kadyanda; of some central Lykian *poleis*: Nisa, Antiphellos, Kyaneai, Kandyba, Myra, Limyra, Arykanda.

³² Troxell 1982: 112–117; criticism: Ashton and Meadows 2008: 113–116.

Since the middle of the fourth century BCE Lykian towns had been granted limited autonomy by their respective overlords, but full-scale *polis* constitutions were to emerge only in the second century BCE, with a *boulē* alongside city officials (*archontes*) and an assembly (*ekklēsia*), attested already in the third century.³³ Yet a major *polis* like Xanthos by the end of the third century BCE prided itself on mythological *syngeneiai* with the Greek motherland, which were suggested and propagated at least twice by partners from the mainland and from Troy.³⁴ Inscriptions from Xanthos conceive of them as being ties of their particular *polis*, not of Lykia as a whole, and if a recent analysis of foundation myths and cults in the Xanthos valley is correct, in the third century Tlos and Xanthos promoted different narratives of *syngeneia* between Lykian towns, narratives that were mainly concerned with feelings of rivalry between neighboring towns and the assertion of dominance through myth (Behrwald 2000: 73–76).

The integration of individual *poleis* in the league must be understood against this situation. Strabo's description of the league knows of no capital and has the federal *synedrion* convene in alternating *poleis* of Lykia. Yet, as Larsen showed (1968: 256), over time Patara developed into a federal capital (see Behrwald 2000: 181–187). Even before Patara turned into the Roman governor's main seat in Lykia,³⁵ Livy calls it *caput gentis* ("capital of the nation"); its role as the center of the league has recently been put into the limelight by the excavations of the federal assembly hall.³⁶ This *bouleutērion* could host some 1,000–1,400 people, which may give a hint towards the size of federal assemblies; the excavators have suggested a date in the second century BCE. Its monumentality attests to the role of Patara as federal capital, which entailed a financial commitment on behalf of the league. While its building inscription is lost, other buildings in Patara are known to have been (co-)financed by the league.³⁷

Patara not only served as political center, its sanctuary of Apollo of the Forefathers also served as a federal sanctuary. The treaty with Oinoanda published by Rousset (2010) seems to indicate that in the second century

³³ Behrwald 2000: 49–62; Wörle 1988: 118–122.

³⁴ SEG 38.1476 (from 206/5 BCE, embassy from Kyttenion in Central Greece); SEG 33.1184 (from 196 BCE, honours for Themistokles from Ilion). For these texts, see Curty 1995: 183–193; Lücke 2000: 30–37, 52–65; Behrwald 2000: 77–78, 82–83.

³⁵ Patara was probably the administrative center under Ptolemaic rule as well, bearing the dynastic name Arsinoë.

³⁶ Korkut and Grosche 2007: esp. 79–81.

³⁷ An aqueduct, SEG 57.1673; cf. Şahin 2007: 103; Eck et al. 2008. A bath house, TAM II 396 (cf. Eck et al. 2008: 269–275). There is no reason to expect similar financing practices in other places, as suggested by Adak and Tüner 2004 for east Lykian Olympos.

BCE, the federal priest of Apollo was eponymous in Lykia,³⁸ and in the early first century, the treaty with Rome recently published by Schuler (2007b) was to be set up in the sanctuary of Apollo.³⁹ In its coinage as well, the league promoted Apollo, while Artemis enters into the iconography only at a late date. However, the most prominent sanctuary of Lykia apparently was and remained the Letoon at Xanthos, and it was here that the Lykians installed their federal cult of Roma in the second century BCE. In the treaty with Oinoanda, its priest shares in the eponymy, and this treaty was to be set up, not at Patara, but in the Letoon: even if one assumes that the original treaty was archived at Patara, the Letoon apparently was considered the main sanctuary of the league in the second century BCE. The Letoon hosted the federal cult and festival of the goddess Roma that bore the name of *Romaia Letōa tōn Lykiōn* (“Games of Roma and Leto of the Lykians”), which is attested since the middle of the second century BCE.⁴⁰ Later on, the imperial cult of the league would be installed in the Letoon as well.

The question of federal capital and sanctuary, or rather sanctuaries, reflects an integration that avoided a predominance of Xanthos, yet accorded its sanctuary a role that was, theoretically, almost equal to Patara, while *de facto* the Letoon remained the dominant place of worship. A sense of rivalry between these sanctuaries resounds in the honors Xanthos, in imperial times, accorded to a federal *archiereus* because he had organized the games in “Leto’s holiest sanctuary, to be found here” – honors set up at Patara, i.e., in the other federal sanctuary.⁴¹ The sense of superiority aired in a text like this may explain why the Letoon became the federal sanctuary, but only via incorporation of the cult of Roma. It fits into a situation in which the ranks attributed to member *poleis* – with those of the highest rank holding three votes in the assemblies – equalled ranks of honor. In imperial times, Patara and Myra in central Lykia were regarded the highest ranking Lykian cities, with Xanthos following suit in a list that still, as in Hellenistic times, consisted of six “*poleis* of the first rank”, or *metropoleis*.⁴²

³⁸ This is the convincing interpretation proposed by Rousset 2010: 16. The text is ambiguous, however, and might also refer to a civic cult of Apollo at Xanthos. The priesthood is still attested in imperial times, when it was an annual office, yet with no eponymous functions: *OGIS* 565 = *TAM* II 905.

³⁹ Schuler 2007b: 55–57, who considers the possibility that two copies were set up in Lykia, one at Patara, one at the Letoon.

⁴⁰ *SEG* 28.1246 and *SEG* 25.457.

⁴¹ *TAM* II 495; cf. *FdXanthos* VII 65; similarly, *FdXanthos* VII 92.

⁴² See Balland 1981: 177. Only once does terminology directly link to the administrative structure in the league, see above, n. 19 on Boubon.

Below the top echelon of largest *poleis*, the voting system distinguished between *poleis* with one or two votes in the assembly. Especially in central Lykia, political fragmentation was high and very small *poleis* could coexist in tiny territories. Two of these small centers, Aperlai and Trebendai, are known to have minted an own-league coinage.⁴³ Their successive history shows how *polis* development and league structure were linked. Trebendai, to be located in the hills north of Myra, at some time must have been integrated into Myra: a citizen of Trebendai calls himself “Myran from Trebendai” (*Myreus apo Trebendon: SIG³ 1234*), combining citizenship of Myra and local identity from Trebendai. At some time between the second century BCE and the second century CE – it is not possible to be more precise – there must have been a peaceful merger of Trebendai into Myra, and membership in the league did not protect small *poleis* from such developments.⁴⁴

Other smaller *poleis* united in a sympolity without a larger partner (Schuler 2010). Aperlai became head of a sympolity whose members retained their own identity, and this fact must account for an extraordinarily high sum accorded to Aperlai by the benefactor of the second century CE, Opramoas: even at this point in time, the members of the sympolity continue to exist as separate urban centers, each in need of help, but Opramoas bundled the funds and gave them to the joint *polis*, Aperlai.⁴⁵ In the sympolity of Akalissos, Idebessos, and Kormoi in the east of Lykia, inscriptions are even conspicuously vague about the status of the members. While they are usually called “demes joined in one polity” or just “demes”,⁴⁶ in one case an honorand is called a “citizen of Akalissos from Idebessos” (*Akalisseus apo Idebessou*), acknowledging that Idebessos had joined Akalissos in *sympoliteia*; the inscription is set up by the *polis* of the Idebessians. What is striking here is not only the way in which towns that had lost *polis* status could retain their local identities for centuries. More pertinent to our topic is the fact that below the structure of the league – which obviously had clear rules which community was considered a member *polis*, and which a subordinate settlement – witness the donations of Opramoas to Aperlai – there existed enough flexibility to adapt the

⁴³ Trebendai: Troxell 1982: 55 (one drachma), 103 (three bronze coins); Aperlai: Troxell 1982: 103 (four bronze coins), 251 (one drachma).

⁴⁴ See Zimmermann 2000, who tries to trace this back to Hellenistic times, referring to the mention of *peripolia* in SEG 44.1218; cf. also Zimmermann 1994.

⁴⁵ Zimmermann 1992: 123–144, and 138, n. 66 on the sum of Aperlai.

⁴⁶ TAM II 830, 833 (*dēmoi*); 832 (*polis* Idebessos). Idebessians are regularly called “x from Idebessos.”

legal structure to changing patterns of settlement, even if we do not yet know to what extent league institutions were involved in these processes.⁴⁷

One observes a similar situation when it comes to the assertion of independent *polis* politics by Lykia's larger *poleis*. While the league could be partner in a settlement of border disputes that originally had concerned only the federal *polis*, Tlos and neighboring Oinoanda (Rousset 2010), Lykian *poleis* to some extent could maintain a foreign policy of their own. When Pisidian Angeira, in the later second century BCE, sent out for a foreign judge to the people of Xanthos, whom the Angeirans considered to be relatives, the league had no role in this interstate exchange – long before the *pax Romana* despoiled such relations of any political importance.⁴⁸ The same can be observed inside the league, when – again in the second century BCE – the *poleis* of Xanthos and Myra entered into an *isopoliteia*, admitting citizens of the other *polis* who happened to live in their territory into their respective citizenships. In this treaty, which entirely ignores the league, the two partners behave just as any sovereign Greek *polis* would (SEG 49.1864). Even the date is given by the civic eponymous magistrates, with no reference to a federal eponym.

The later development. People and elites

The annexation of Lykia as a Roman province under Claudius led to profound changes in the league. These are beyond the scope of this volume, but to some extent the imperial league merits brief consideration, insofar as its development in turn also sheds light on the earlier league.

After those internal conflicts that later were represented as struggles between “the best” and “the confused masses”, the Lykians allegedly returned to unity, justice and their *patrioi nomoi* (“laws of the forefathers”).⁴⁹ In fact, the league's constitution underwent profound changes, with the loss of all military offices, the rise of the *archiereus Sebastōn* (“archpriest of the emperors”) to prominence⁵⁰ and the institution of new offices, such as *archiphylax* (“head guardian”) and *hypophylax* (“under guardian”).⁵¹ What

⁴⁷ This is stressed by Reger 2004a: 171.

⁴⁸ SEG 43.986. Xanthos would send out judges to Karian Mylasa in imperial times, again without apparent involvement of the league: *IK Mylasa* 361, 362, 369, and 370.

⁴⁹ In the words of the *stadiasmos* from Patara: SEG 51.1832.

⁵⁰ The relationship of this office to the *lykiarch* remains contested, see Behrwalld 2000: 209–216 and most recently Reitzenstein 2011: 51–61, S. Şahin, *Gephyra* 9, 2012: 119–123. The offices of *archiereus* and *grammateus* were regularly assigned jointly: Reitzenstein 2011: 81–82.

⁵¹ *Archiphylax*: Behrwalld 2000: 216–221; Kokkinia 2000: 218–222; Reitzenstein 2011: 80–86. *Hypophylax*: Zimmermann 1993. Larsen (1968: 254) considered both offices (as well as the *paraphylax*, a civic office) to derive from Hellenistic times, but there is no evidence for this.

is more, however, Rome to a large extent relied on the league in matters of administration, especially taxation. The role of the *archiphylax* in tax collection has long been known (Kokkinia 2000: 218–22); customs regulations from Myra (Wörle 1975) showed that in Lykia, as opposed to other provinces, instead of Roman *publicani*, league officials were responsible for the collection of customs dues, farmed out to local tax-collectors (*SEG* 35.1439). An unpublished inscription from Andriake will considerably add to this picture; it shows, among other things, that the league paid an advance lump sum to the Roman authority and managed customs collection autonomously.⁵² Both inscriptions also show that even in imperial times, the league did not form a customs union – a situation which *a fortiori* must also be assumed for the Hellenistic league.⁵³ While the league was formally reduced to a *Provinziallandtag*, in fact it differed substantially from other provincial assemblies and enjoyed a degree of administrative sophistication which also stands as a tribute to the Hellenistic league.

The proliferation of epigraphic evidence means that the imperial Lykian elite becomes more visible to the modern eye. A federal career could, as in other provinces, lead to imperial recognition in the guise of Roman citizenship and equestrian rank, the next generation might even enter the senate (Reitzenstein 2011: 108–113). More important to this contribution, however, is the internal structure of Lykian elites. The league itself fostered coherence through its sophisticated system of honors:⁵⁴ not only could federal dignitaries be recompensed with federal honors that followed a clear scheme of numbered hierarchy. These were awarded only in the years a person actually held office; in addition, the league or – as an increase in honor – the league in conjunction with the cities could vote yearly honors, to be paid each following year. Such honors were awarded in return for exceptional euergetism. Opramoas, one of the figures whom we know best, earned such honors for financial distributions among all councilors and assemblymen of the league. After an earthquake in 141 CE, he funded reconstruction works in each and every *polis* of Lykia, and an inscription from Xanthos stresses the very fact that Opramoas had favored each Lykian *polis*.⁵⁵ In recompense, high dignitaries could be decorated with citizenship in all Lykian *poleis*: interpretation of this honor is still contested, but most probably it meant that all individual *poleis*, in a coordinated act, endowed

⁵² See B. Takmer, *Gephyra* 4, 2007: 165–188 (*SEG* 57.1666).

⁵³ See Brandt 1987: 91–95; Marek 2006b. ⁵⁴ This is best discussed by Kokkinia 2000: 222–233.

⁵⁵ See the table in Behrwald 2000: 176, n. 74; *TAM* II 905, *FdXanthos* VII 66 and 67 (?).

the honorand with their citizenship.⁵⁶ This honors system, which seems to date back to Hellenistic times⁵⁷ but is attested mostly in imperial inscriptions, triggered elite euergetism all over the province, and enhanced the internal cohesion of the league substantially.

The socio-economic background to this was the development of an elite whose possessions went well beyond *polis* boundaries, and who intermarried freely. Although not attested, *enktēsis* and *epigamia* rights must have been common to all Lykians by Hellenistic times, since they are never granted to a fellow Lykian from another *polis*. Recently, Reitzenstein has stressed the fact that the provincial elite was composed of at least two echelons, and that the upper stratum of *lykiarchs* was a small, exclusive group of families with ties all over the region (Reitzenstein 2011: 124–128). While intermarriage with neighboring regions is all but unattested, the emerging elite of Lykia was a ‘national’ one. Ironically, only after the end of the independent league can we see to what extent league institutions fostered coherence among their highest ranks. However, the socio-economic conditions would reach back into Hellenistic times just as the honors system of citizenship in all Lykian *poleis*. As a result, league affairs, offices and institutions in imperial documents can be described as *koinos*, the formally correct phrase, but they will just as often be called *ethnikos*, and the *koinon* can also figure as the *ethnos* which, all reserves dutifully made, can be rendered as “nation.”⁵⁸ This happens even in inscriptions from places that were assigned to the league only at a later time, such as part of the Kibyratis or northeastern Lykia, or Phaselis.

Conclusion

The surge in new source material that continues to appear unabated has changed the picture of the Lykian league substantially since the days of Jakob Larsen. Modern research cannot discuss the league as a particularly advanced form of representative government, nor should the view of indigenous traditions showing through Greek institutions be maintained. Lykia developed Greek institutions only late on, but adopted them thoroughly in an act of profound self-Hellenization. The interest of this league to modern research is twofold: it shows how discourses of

⁵⁶ See the convincing synthesis of Kokkinia 2012 with the literature cited there; cf. also Reitzenstein 2012.

⁵⁷ TAM II 261 and 575. ⁵⁸ See Behrwald 2000: 169–174.

federalism were absorbed by local elites in an effort to assert themselves in more than one crisis; consequently, this invites us to reflect upon the relationship between the cultural and political development of Lykia. And it allows us, in a singular way, to discern the close inter-relationship between the socio-economic situation in a small, highly fragmented yet politically unified region and its political structures which, imported from abroad, resembled those of many *ethnē* in the Greek world.

Federalism in the Kyrenaika?

Alex McAuley

In 1925 an inscription unearthed during an Italian excavation in what was then their colonial possession of Libya was first published by Silvio Ferri in the proceedings of the *Akademie der Wissenschaften* in Berlin. The edition sparked a blaze of learned debate that raged across dozens of articles over the course of the next decade, with various emendations and counter-emendations being tossed onto the heap along with competing dates.¹ “Few, if any inscriptions discovered in recent years,” remarked Larsen in 1929, “are of greater importance for the student of the Greek state” (351). All revolved around the famous text of what was alternately labelled the ‘Constitutional Inscription from Kyrene’ or the ‘*Diagramma* of Ptolemy’. Over the ninety lines of the document, the tantalizing outline of a government is sketched whose form can be branded as a provincial constitutional monarchy, some form of civic government, or even a regional federal state with seemingly equal facility, thanks to the ambiguity afforded by the text’s enticing lacunae.

All concerned concur that the inscription was carved at a pivotal point in the long trajectory of Kyrene’s constitutional history; precisely where that trajectory led was, and remains, more obscure. The competing reconstructions of the inscription’s first lines speak to the opposing schools of thought. In the *SEG* edition (9.1, lines 1–2), following German emendators, it begins “[Good fortun]e. The [cit]izens shall be [the men] (born) of a Kyrenaian father . . .” (*A[gatha tych]a. [pol]itai esontai o[i and]res ex pa[tr]o K[yre]naiou . . .*). So according to the *SEG*, the *politai* were the citizens of the city of Kyrene, as stipulated by the decree. According to the Italian school, however, the opening regulations read differently. Drawing on Ferri’s publication, Gaetano De Sanctis (1926: 151) conjectured that this

¹ The *editio princeps* of the inscription was published by Ferri 1925. A full recapitulation of relevant scholarly literature is provided by the preface to *SEG* 9.1, and Larsen 1929: 351, n. 1, as well as Machu 1951 and Cary 1928.

was not a decree governing the citizenship of a *polis*, but rather that of a *koinon*. Accordingly, the words “The [cit]izens shall be . . .” were prefaced by another regulation that preceded the parental requirement: “The citizens of the *koinon* shall be all Kyre]na[ian men . . .” Effectively, De Sanctis took this document as representing nothing less than evidence of a “*repubblica federale cirenaica*” (1926: 145). A very different picture thus emerges out of the mutilated opening of this inscription: the constitution of a federal state, with federal citizenship stretching to encompass a broad swathe of modern-day northern Libya, is literally and figuratively being carved into stone. While this *diagramma* has long been the base from which some have tentatively hypothesized the existence of a Kyrenaian *koinon*, it is not the only potential foundation for such an argument.² Federalism in the ancient world was neither an instantaneous nor consistently coherent phenomenon. The aim of this chapter is to reach back into the colonial history of the region and identify transient hints at a federal state in Greek Libya.

When we consider the typical signifiers of a federal state – to borrow from Jeremy McNerney’s recent list (2013: 470–471), ethnic affiliation and mythical attachments, a religious center, a federal meeting place, assembly, magistrates, army, judiciary, and coinage, all in juxtaposition to a grounding of these at the local level – we realize that Kyrene could potentially fulfil all of these and happily be classified as a ‘true’ federation. Although the introduction to this volume brings the grey areas among such characteristics to light along with complexities of regionalism and double citizenship, for the analytical framework of our current discussion McNerney’s list nonetheless gives us a conveniently succinct list of federal criteria. But the same characteristics preceded by the word ‘federal’, seen from a different angle, could just as well appear ‘regional’ or ‘civic.’ As is the case in Elis or Euboia, Kyrene is something of a chameleon: in a certain light it seems distinctly federal, in another, hegemonial, or even plainly regional in yet another; its constitution varies according to analytical context. Yet certain recurrent crests in the region’s various upheavals, I will argue, can plausibly be seen as flashes of a nascent tendency towards the federal that coalesced over centuries to make Kyrene into a unified entity in the eyes of Ptolemaic and Roman conquerors that was, by all appearances, much more than just a city. But in a broader context, the case

² De Sanctis 1926 and Ferri 1925, along with Machu 1951 have dated this inscription to the same time as the production of the *koinon* coinage, and hence indicating a mid-third century BCE emergence of the federation.

of Kyrene moreover causes us to pause and reconsider precisely where to draw the dividing lines among city, region, and federation – and whether such lines can sometimes be drawn at all.

From the foundation to the fall of the monarchy

Unlike every other federal state considered in this volume, Kyrene is a Greek colony situated a substantial distance from the Greek mainland, and represents the only region of Greek settlement in North Africa. The two points may seem facile to make, but they are not without their import. While the leagues and federal states of the Greek mainland and the islands cultivated and refined their respective institutions in response to the pressures of congruent processes among their contiguous neighbors, Kyrene stood isolated and alone on the margins of the Greek world – connected to it, to be sure, but not with the same geographical immediacy. While the claustrophobic mainland made border disputes and territorial warfare pressingly commonplace, Kyrene consistently enjoyed an abundance of what was regarded as the *terra nova* of the fertile Libyan plateau into which to expand and settle (Hdt. 4.159.2–4; 4.163.1; Laronde 1987: 257–323). Its bilateral diplomatic interactions were only exceptionally conducted with their fellow Greek peers; its routine treaties were instead negotiated with Persian, Egyptian, and Libyan potentates (e.g., Mitchell 1966). Though it was linked to the Greek world through trade, athletic competitions, Delphic offerings, and the like, such were more vectors of communication than concrete political interaction.³ Thus in Kyrene we are dealing with a very different set of internal and external pressures than were typically exerted in the Greek world; it stood on the periphery, listening carefully to Greek developments but seldom directly feeling their touch.

This isolation is reflected in an onomastic caveat that must be made: the Greeks themselves, at a vast geographical remove, variously used the term *Kyrēnē* to refer to the city itself, its *chōra*, or the entire area of Greek settlement in Libya leading to the edge of Carthaginian territory.⁴ While today we distinguish the region with Kyrenaïka, this appellation does not appear among the ancient sources until the time of Augustus (e.g., Plin. *nat.* 2.115; 5.28; 6.209; Strabo 2.5.20. 33; 17.3.20). Thus whenever Classical or Hellenistic sources speak of *Kyrēnē*, we must bear in mind that they

³ Austin: 1244–1245 provides a useful summation of external interactions and epigraphic testimony.

⁴ Kyrene is first referred to as a *polis* by Pind. *Pyth* 5.81, and Hdt. 4.156.3; 203.1. See Austin: 1243 for a full list of references.

could equally be referring to the physical city or the entire perceived zone of Greek influence in northern Libya. I would argue that the latter is more often implied by the ancients than modern observers would tend to suspect.

Kyrene has a conventional colonial foundation myth preserved in Herodotus and Pindar – albeit in slightly competing iterations – that can be somewhat misleading when we bear in mind this onomastic ambiguity (Calame 2003: 36–43; Hdt. 4.151–153; Pind. *Pyth.* 4; 5). Despite variations, the core of the myth is typical: drought in Thera necessitates dispatching a colonial expedition in the interest of demographic relief, and under the guidance of the Delphic oracle the *ktistēs* Battos leads a small fleet to Libya (Hdt. 4.151–152). The city itself was thus founded in *c.* 630 BCE, and proceeded to settle the region from a fledgling urban core (Chamoux 1953: 118–126). In subsequent documentation we are given the impression that Kyrene was the only major nexus of settlement, though a closer examination in concert with the archaeological record brings to light a more diverse state of regional affairs (Jeffery 1961). Immediately subsequent to the foundation of the city itself we have traces of settlement at the harbor that would later be known as Apollonia; Aziris (Wadi el-Chalig) was an early stopping point for the Kyrenaian expedition but remained inhabited after the main city's foundation, perhaps as a *polis* or simply a settlement (Austin: 1236; Boardman 1966: 152–153). Barke, the region's second-largest city, was founded by a rival branch of the Battid dynasty at some point in the early sixth century BCE, as it appears as a full-fledged *polis* by the time of Kyrene's subsequent upheavals (Austin: 1240–1241; Laronde 1987: 49–51). Excavations suggest that Taucheira, founded at the close of the seventh century, persisted in its tertiary importance (Austin: 1247–1248), and Euhesperides was also probably a *polis* since its foundation in the sixth century.⁵ Though ill-attested, the recurrent use of city-ethnics from many of the above during the fifth century likewise hints at well-entrenched local civic identities.⁶ The salient point to be taken is that from its earliest generations Kyrene was not as unipolar as the literary sources may lead us to consider. Larger Greek federations have been built on fewer cities than this. Instead of Larsen's view (1929: 352–355) that Kyrene was a highly prominent city with an exceptionally large *chōra*, the region is better understood as a constellation of Greek cities, varying in size and importance, with Kyrene acting as *prima inter plures*. Such a constellation is

⁵ Austin: 1241–1243; Ps.-Skyl. 108; Hdt. 4.198.2; Chamoux 1953: 173–175 for the foundation.

⁶ See Austin for variations of city-ethnics and their various appearances.

much more conducive to shifting federal interaction than simple Athenian-style regional dominance; an observation to which the economic fluctuations of the Classical period will shortly lend credence.

The first episode I am inclined to view as leaning more towards the federal than the civic occurred in the wake of the Kyrenaian defeat by the Libyans at the disastrous Battle of Leukon (Hdt. 4.159–161), which prompted the murder of Arkesilaos II and the accession of Battos III. The loss of a grave portion of Kyrene's hoplite class created a power vacuum in which latently simmering regional, economic, and ethnic tensions came markedly to the fore (Robinson 1997: 105–106; Jones 1987: 216). In the political upheaval between the traditional Dorian landowners in the city itself and the diverse immigrant settlers in the broader region, the assistance of Demonax of Mantinea was sought to assuage social dissent.⁷ The constitution of Kyrene as shaped by the hand of Demonax, though often taken to be strictly civic in character, seems to have a much broader scope when we consider the reformed tribal divisions of the populace and distribution of magisterial power.

The details as related by Herodotus, though scant, still speak loudly enough: Demonax extended citizenship to all of the new immigrants and settlers, and incorporated them into a reconfigured version of the traditional Dorian three-*phylai* division of the populace. Accordingly, the original Theran settlers and *periokoi* comprised the first tribe, the second was composed of settlers from the Peloponnese and Crete, and the third of the Islanders. Despite much debate over the identity of the *periokoi* in the first tribe, it is highly unlikely, given recent hostilities and a total lack of precedent, that they would be native Libyans (Robinson 1997: 105; Chamoux 1953: 220–222). Instead I would argue that the group was comprised of all settlers and landowners who can be considered *periokoi* of Kyrene itself by residence in its *chōra*. The subsequent two tribes are either regional or ethnic in character, determined by provenance, and remain ambiguous save for the observation that they implicitly must not be *periokoi*, strictly speaking, if they do not form part of the first tribe (Hdt. 4.162). Instead we are dealing with two substantial groups – two-thirds of the enfranchised population – which could quite plausibly have hailed from throughout the region and its various cities, instead of just the immediate vicinity of Kyrene. The early Kyrenaian tendency to dispatch groups of colonists (presumably groups of new arrivals) into

⁷ Herodotus provides the ancient narrative at 4.160–162; on Demonax see Chamoux 1953: 138–142; Jones 1987: 216; Jeffery 1961: 141–147; and most recently Hölkeskamp 1993.

Libya to establish such secondary settlements as I have listed above seems reconcilable with such categorization by provenance (see Hdt. 4.159.2–4). L. H. Jeffery's suggestion (1961: 139–142) that the *phylai* were themselves cross-sections composed of a *moira* from each group, while hypothetical, would also align neatly with this proto-federalistic reconstruction of Demonax's reforms (cf. Hölkeskamp 1993). Regardless of the details – which we at any rate lack – when we bear in mind the diversity of the region's contemporary civic settlements and reconsider the scope of Demonax's reforms, the early shadow of a federally integrative structure begins to emerge. Unfortunately Herodotus does not elaborate his remark that the powers of the king were distributed among officials and magistrates; would that we had more precision of their character and duties.

The integrative trend of Demonax's constitution is similarly perceptible beyond the realm of government in a way that begins to satisfy McNerney's criteria of ethnic affiliation, mythical appurtenance, and religious commonality. Concurrent with the lawgiver's mediation, François Chamoux notes the inclusion of non-Dorian dialects and the linguistic tendencies of recent arrivals into an emergent dialect unique to the region (Chamoux 1953: 75–80). Architectural styles similarly changed as part of a pattern that Sandro Stucchi describes as “a loosening of links with Thera and incorporation of closer relations with other surrounding Greeks” (Stucchi 1965: 69–70). The tomb of the heroic *ktistēs* Battos I in the *agora* was enlarged and monumentalized, marking the development of a common mythical tradition (Stucchi 1965: 60–75). Sculptural style became more integrative of diverse traditions, as did the Kyrenaian pantheon (White 1971: 52–55; Pedley 1971). The cults of Zeus Lykios and Hermes took on a new-found importance, and the former's sanctuary on the hill of Zeus Lykios came to regional prominence, while Apollo's broad Hellenic appeal ensured his enduring popularity (White 1971: 55–58). The regional stock of the extramural sanctuary of Demeter and Persephone, established contemporarily with the colony, was similarly rising, evidenced by the presence of votives from Taucheira and other cities (White 1984). The persistent prominence of the sanctuary through to the Imperial period makes it a fitting but by no means certain candidate for a regional/federal sanctuary. Frustratingly, the haphazard state of our data does not permit us more than speculation into the importance of such things as the cult of Battos or the sanctuaries in the region's other cities, and while we can see in them the shadows of a federal sense of ethnic belonging, linguistic unity, mythic tradition, and cultic solidarity, more conclusive evidence remains tortuously elusive.

The long fifth and fourth centuries

In an immediate sense, the careful reforms of Demonax and motion towards regional integration were rendered inconsequential barely a generation later, when everything was brought forcibly back under the yoke of the monarchy. Though the violent unrest in Kyrene and Barke during the reign of Arkesilaos III (who was murdered in the latter city, not the former) speaks to the depth of nascent Kyrenaian solidarity; his mother Pheretime would soon thereafter restore the monarchy under the young Battos IV with Persian backing.⁸ Here again we have another trait that separates Kyrene from its other Greek counterparts: its progression from monarchy to oligarchy/democracy was not linear, but rather vacillated between the two over the course of centuries. The kings of Kyrene, though typically described as such, are better understood as the *de facto* rulers of the entire Greek-speaking region; a nuance noticed by Pindar when he describes Arkesilaos IV as “King of Cities” instead of simply “King of Kyrene” (Pind. *Pyth.* 5.15). Although stifled by the resurgence of the monarchy, the proto-federal tendencies of the region did not disappear altogether.

The next century and a half is the most poorly documented period in the history of Kyrene, but in the midst of the prevailing evidentiary darkness we can still find some glimmers of suspiciously federal activity. Although the precise date of the monarchy’s next fall from power is uncertain, after *c.* 460 it appears that the Battid kings had been overthrown by a more popular (democratic?) regime in Kyrene itself. A reversion to the sort of structure envisioned by Demonax would be plausible, though again we lack the requisite detail to make this a firm assertion. Yet after the fall of the monarchy – the time at which Herodotus was writing as a *terminus ante quem* – the mytho-history of Kyrene’s foundation was re-written and in the process, Battos, the *ktistēs*, was stripped of his Theran descent and recast as ambiguously Kretan (Calame 2003: 38–42; Chamoux 1953: 95); perhaps this constituted a more inclusive myth for a revived sense of commonality. Regardless, the fall of the Battid kings seems also to have signified the fall from economic primacy of the city of Kyrene itself, to the benefit of the region’s other *poleis*.

Numismatic data provides most of the period’s few pinpoints of evidence, and sheds intriguing light on the economic dynamics in northern Libya roughly concurrent with the fall of the monarchy. Over the course of

⁸ For the narrative: Hdt. 4.163–164; Mitchell 1966 on Pheretime; Pedley 1971; and Robinson 1997: 106. Also Chamoux 1953: 160–167.

the fifth century (for lack of a more precise date) the Greek cities of Libya repeatedly struck what we can identify as ‘collaborative coinage’ bilaterally among each other, in the form of silver coinage on the Attic standard bearing two city-ethnics.⁹ I defer to Emily Mackil’s chapter for a more detailed analysis of the federal connotations of such cooperative currencies, but in the Kyrenaian instance the dynamics are rather more complex. This ‘alliance coinage’ reveals the extent of economic cooperation not just hegemonically between Kyrene and the smaller cities of the region – as is generally presumed to be the case – but more importantly among these other cities themselves, without any apparent recourse to Kyrene. For the former case, we have alliance coinage bearing the city-ethnic of Kyrene on the obverse and Barke on the reverse, perhaps hinting that – interestingly – Barke was the dominant partner in the endeavor. Euhesperides similarly issued a series with its ethnic on the obverse and Kyrene on the reverse, again silver coinage. But Kyrene is not always present: contemporaneous numismatic finds show collaborative minting between Taucheira and Barke, again with both city-ethnics, but no mention of Kyrene. Regardless of which two cities are named on such coinage, iconographic similarity across the board demonstrates the coherence of region’s economy and identity: all the types bear regional symbols of the Silphium plant as well as the head of Zeus Ammon (Robinson 1927: CLXXXVIII–CXC VII and 109–112). This iconographic congruence, along with the standard weights and metals (Attic standard, silver) of the coins, hints at a broader arrangement of economic integration, one which must have been regulated by some form of collaborative agreement among all the cities of the region – not just between Kyrene and its purportedly subordinate dependents. The coinage provides a fitting physical testament to the depth of the region’s integration: common cultic symbols, common economic activity, common currency, common standards, all at a time when we would expect Kyrene to be at its most unravelled after the fall of the Battid monarchy. Perhaps we glimpse instead a subtle resurgence of the federal inclination nurtured by Demonax.

Roughly a century later, just before the dawn of the Hellenistic period was beginning to crest over Egypt and Libya, we have one of the more perplexing pieces of Kyrenaian evidence: the so-called stele of the *Syla* (*SEG* 20.716; cf. Oliverio et al. 1961–1962: 273–280). The date of this fragmentary inscription is uncertain, and estimates vary from as high as

⁹ Robinson 1927: XLIV–XLVI and 107–108; further bibliography provided under the respective city entries in Austin. Remarkably little has thus far been written about these issues.

368 to as low as 320 BCE, roughly contemporary with the *diagramma* of Ptolemy I (Laronde 1987: 149–165). Regardless of the specificities, we can safely place this inscription in the mid-fourth century before Kyrene fell under Ptolemaic sway. The stele records embassies of Kyrenaian ambassadors dispatched to the Peloponnese and beyond, to negotiate a *dialysis* that would be recorded throughout. The inscription notes that supposed *damiorgoi* are charged with preserving the *dialysis* in “the cities,” (*en tais polissin*), which Gaspare Oliverio and Giovanni Pugliese-Carratelli have sensibly taken to mean “the Greek cities of Libya” in which the *damiorgoi* are charged with preserving archives.¹⁰ That the ambassadors themselves were all Kyrenaian (line 15) is hardly surprising given the city’s international prestige and its deep ties to the locations visited along the route.

The local *damiorgoi*, however, are more enigmatic, but equally interesting: the dynamic of power that emerges is one in which an embassy composed of Kyrenaians is entrusted with negotiating a settlement on behalf of the Greek cities of Libya that will be honored by all parties involved. The cities themselves, for their part, all have a magistrate who performs a specific archival legal function, and has a recognized analog in neighboring cities (Laronde 1987: 156–157). That the inscription, discovered near the spring of Apollo in Kyrene, did not feel the need to list specifically in which cities (simply “*en tais polissin*”) this *dialysis* was to be preserved presumes that the reader would automatically be aware of the region or group in question. It would be redundant to mention “the cities of the region of Kyrene” when the inscription is being displayed there. All of these characteristics have been taken together (e.g., by Oliverio et al. 1961–1962) as implying that this inscription presupposes the existence of a *koinon* in Kyrene, and such a hypothesis seems logically well-informed: an embassy sent throughout the Greek world by a prominent city on behalf of a regional organization that empowers equivalent magistrates in each of its constituent cities is a quintessentially federal act. The internal power structure lurking behind this inscription suggests that such organization was neither transient nor exceptional. Considered against the longer backdrop of the fall of the monarchy and the evolving economic integration of the region in the fifth century, this inscription thus comes at the end of what might well be a longer trajectory leading Kyrene back down a federal path.

¹⁰ Although the specific title of the magistrate tasked is missing in the inscription, the formulaic character of lines 8–10 make it clear that some kind of official is being made responsible for the preservation of the *dialysis*. The issue is taken up by Laronde 1987: 156, who refers to Oliverio’s *exempla* of other *damiorgoi* at Kyrene (*Documenti antichi dell’Africa* 1 2. 116 and 149–153) as well as Oliverio et al. 1961–1962: 277–281.

The birth or the death of the Kyrenaïka? From the fourth century to 250 BCE

As ever, Kyrene swung between monarchy and participatory government in fits and spurts, and as we progress along towards the close of the fourth century, the regional pendulum suddenly swings back towards monarchy. Thus we arrive back at the Ptolemaic *diagramma* with which we began. More than enough ink has been spilled over the specifics of date, institutional heredity, and personal agency; spilling more here would do little to advance the debate and I must limit myself to a few observations which now stand in more stark relief against our reconsidered federal backdrop. After nearly a century of debate, the date of 322/1 BCE has emerged as the prime contender, thus placing this as Ptolemy was expanding and consolidating his power, though before he had taken the royal title (Laronde 1987: 41–5; Consolo Langher 1998: 149). This generation of Kyrenaïans (in the city proper) had been plagued by rampant *stasis*, leading rival factions to solicit the intervention of first Alexander, then Thibron, and more lastingly, Ptolemy (Diod. 18.19.2–7; Just. *Epit.* 12.17–21). Throughout the *diagramma* Ptolemy seems to be gingerly treading the line between maintaining the impression of institutional continuity, while also implementing mechanical reforms by which to ensure the longevity of his dominion over the region.¹¹

The most pertinent section of the inscription to our current inquiry lies beyond the first lines I have already quoted above (regardless of how we restore the opening two lines). According to the *SEG*, it reads as follows (lines 1–7):

[Good fortun]e. The [cit]izens shall be [the men] (born) of a Kyrenaian father and a Kyrenaian woman, and [those born of] the Libyan women, within the Katabathmos and Autamalax, and those born of the [settlers] of the cities (*tôn poleôn*) on the other side of Thinis, whom the Kyrenaïans sent away as settlers, [and those] Ptolemy may designate, and those the government (*politeuma*) may accept according to these following laws.

Such a definition of citizenship seems to stand as an insurmountable barrier to those who hold that this inscription only concerns Kyrene itself. As stated, all men born of Kyrenaian fathers and Kyrenaian or Libyan mothers meeting the requisite property qualification in the region stretching from the Katabathmos to Autamalax qualify for the citizenship. This territory is massive, by a rough estimate covering nearly 18,000 square

¹¹ See also Larsen 1929: 160–168 for a full description of the institutional structure; also Cary 1928; Machu 1951.

kilometers: the eastern border of the Great Katabathmos lies near the modern Gulf of Sollum, east of Tubruq, at the northwestern tip of contemporary Egypt, while Autamalax is in the Great Syrte (Gulf of Sidra), identified with modern Sidi Bu Sceefa on the eastern outskirts of Misrata (Austin: 1235).¹² The area is much too large to even be identified as the Kyrenaïka, to the extent that the region thus defined is larger than the area of traditional Greek settlement in Libya. Blanket conferral of citizenship on every Greek male born with the stipulated parentage would include a massive number of people in a region exponentially larger than the Athenian *chōra*, for instance, to which, as discussed, Kyrene's postulated hegemony has long been equated. Such an extent of land, which as we have seen was populated with various *poleis* among other settlements, naturally leads us towards viewing this constitution as federal. Most eminently, the region's long history of diverse urban settlement leads me to disagree with Larsen's assertion (1929: 354–355) that this document represents a Kyrenaian *synoikismos*. In the same vein, De Sanctis' supposition (1926: 161) that there was no other citizenship distinct from Kyrenaian citizenship is challenged by independent actions like a fourth century *proxenia* decree from Euhesperides (*SEG* 18.772, lines 1–2).

The scope and character of the government thus defined also has an unmistakably federal air. The melange of oligarchic and democratic institutions enumerated by the inscription have been well-discussed elsewhere and their heritage aptly accounted for; what strikes us is the size of the outlined government and the federal aura of the magistrates.¹³ The “ten thousand” (figurative number) comprise the primary assembly or *ekklēsia*, open to all who meet citizenship requirements. Out of them are selected the 500 representatives of the *boulē*, normally to be chosen from among citizens of more than 50 years of age. Half of the members would be replaced at a time, while the other half continued in their term of office. The high age requirement, fairly high turnover of magistrates, and high number of councilors all lead us to surmise that the pool of eligible citizens

¹² The figure of c. 18,000 square kilometers, though only a very rough geographical estimate, nonetheless gives some sense of the sheer scale of the region outlined by the *diagramma*. The area has been calculated using geographical tools as follows: the traditional area of Kyrenaïka from south of modern Benghazi to Tubruq following the coast, presuming c. 50 kilometers of inland penetration yields c. 8,000 square kilometers. From there, following the coast westwards from south of Benghazi to the eastern outskirts of Misrata (Sidi Bu Sceefa) gives an area of approximately 10,000 square kilometers. Again, these figures ought to be taken as imprecise estimates, but even as such give some insight into the vast territory nominally legislated by this inscription.

¹³ I have here followed the institutional reconstruction of Larsen 1929: 356–368. See also O'Neill 2000: 425–429. Also this document as Austin no. 264.

must have been much larger than what Kyrene itself could provide. In addition to the *boulē* there is a *gerousia*, whose 101 members served for life and represented the most important decision-making body in the revised constitution – according to which the *gerontes* were appointed by Ptolemy, whereas previously they were elected. Elsewhere we find other typically federal magistrates: a board (or boards, depending) of *stratēgoi*, a group of ephors, and colleges of *nomophylakes* and *nomothetai*. In light of the size of territory and breadth of enfranchisement this inscription affords, such a governmental structure for the region now satisfies McNerney's federal criteria of a federal assembly and federal magistracies. And neither should we think this configuration to be revolutionary: by all accounts Ptolemy seems to have opted for institutional continuity over drastic change, preferring instead to rig the mechanisms of magisterial appointment and oversight in his favor. He was ensuring his enduring – albeit subtle – control over an extant apparatus, not forging a new one.

Ptolemy succeeded in his endeavor too well, to the expense of the Kyrenaïans. As he tied the royal diadem around his head, at the same time he tightened his control over Egypt and the Kyrenaïka, with governors of vacillating loyalty and mandate like Ophellas and later Magas (Laronde 1987: 349–370; Machu 1951; Will 1964). The might of Ptolemaic armies along with the breadth of the empire must have suffocated federal aspirations that had begun to take form in the mid-fourth century, and the oversight of the Ptolemaic governor-come-subordinate-dynast that was Magas (Paus. 1.6.8; 1.7.1) backed by a garrison in the city itself, kept most hopes of substantive federal resurgence in check. Still, during the reign of Magas, we are given the occasional reaffirmation that the region over which he held sway was more than just the city itself: internally, an epigram in honor of Magas (Chamoux 1958) lauds that “under his patronage, he protects. . . his peoples and his cities” (note the plural), while in his treaty with the Oreioi of Crete he is referred to as being at the helm of *eparchia*, not a simple city (Bile 2005).

As with the Battiads and Ophellas before him, the monarchic regime of Magas would come tumbling down after his death as the Kyrenaian pendulum swung – briefly but fiercely – back towards participatory government after his death at some point in the mid-250s. The years that followed are among the most intriguingly turbulent in the region's history, but as the dust settled around 250 BCE we arrive at what many prefer to use as the starting point for Kyrene's federal history.¹⁴ Given the longer

¹⁴ De Sanctis 1926, among others, views the *koinon* coinage as the beginning of a federation. On Kyrene's interregnum, see McAuley forthcoming.

trajectory I have traced in the preceding pages, it is more fitting here as the culmination of a centuries-long trend. With the spectacular failure of Apama's attempt to steer Kyrenaian succession, the characteristically unruly populace invited two tyrannicides, Ekdelos and Demophanes, who then proceeded to "preserve their liberty", according to Polybius (10.22.4). Preservation of Kyrenaian liberty was by all accounts resonant with restoring whatever federal structure had been brought down by Ptolemy: at this period we have the sole piece of concrete evidence of the existence of a Kyrenaian *koinon* attested only by coin issues. The aptly entitled "*koinon*" series from Kyrene was struck around 250 BCE and features the diademed head of Zeus Ammon on the obverse, and a Silphium plant on the reverse with the legend KOINON inscribed around.¹⁵

Though Laronde (1987:405–406) has taken this coinage to be the product of a subsequent regional settlement after the restoration of Ptolemy III, I think that the pattern is one that we have seen before: the monarchy falls from prominence, and a more popular form of federal-leaning government steps into the breach. When the monarchy is smothered, federal inclinations are revived – and I do not think it unreasonable to suppose that this short-lived iteration of the Kyrenaian *koinon* would have been inspired by the structural precedent outlined in Ptolemy's *diagramma*. The conscious archaism of the coins themselves identified by Jean Machu (1951: 50) aligns with this generally restorative program neatly. In this *longue durée* consideration of Kyrene's federal history, the *koinon* coinage thus comes at the end, rather than the beginning, especially considering the iconographic congruence between this series and the "alliance coinage" of the fourth century. The automatic Kyrenaian reversion to regionalism in the absence of monarchic oversight by this point becomes almost reflexive.

Significance

This regional penchant among the inhabitants of the Kyrenaïka did not go unnoticed by either the Ptolemies or their Roman successors. Both groups of administrators did little to modify borders when they encountered a coherently organized region, and such was certainly the case with Kyrene – to the point that if Kyrene's regional coherence was so obvious to them, so should it be to us. The Ptolemaic reconquest of the area almost immediately after the *koinon* coinage was struck is, in a different light, almost as

¹⁵ For the coins, see Robinson 1927: CXXXVI; Reinach 1927: 15; discussion by Machu 1951: 47–51.

telling of the region's coagulation as the coins themselves.¹⁶ It is during the reign of Berenike II and Ptolemy III that we can begin to speak accurately of the Kyrenaïka, as the area was transformed over two decades into a Ptolemaic province with Kyrene as the capital and seat of administration. To do so entailed the selectively systematic dismantling of the region's traditional identity: beginning with geography, Ptolemaic control was embodied in the renaming of Euhesperides to Berenike, Taucheira was erased behind the name Arsinoë, and Barke disappeared to the benefit of Ptolemaïs (Laronde 1987: 382). The Ptolemaic royal cult, previously all but invisible during the reign of Magas and resurgence of the *koinon*, was now imported with no degree of subtlety into Kyrene itself with statues of the *theoi euergetai*, and we can presume the same also occurred simultaneously in the region's other's cities (Marquaille 2008). Conquer, but not divide, seems to have been the *modus operandi*, as the region was made the territory of Ptolemaic magistrates who are intermittently attested, but frequently enough for us to presume their regular presence. A *libyarchês tôn kata kyrênên topôn* is attested in Polybius (10.25); the Roman senate, for its part, preferred to maintain this *status quo* while treating the region's various cities as a coherent whole (Machu 1951: 53–55). No such regional coherence would have been possible without the winding path Kyrene followed as it veered towards and away from federalism over the course of centuries.

But what are we to make of this Kyrenaian path, and how ought it be understood and classified in constitutional terms? Should these episodes outlined above be seen as flashes of federalism intermittently piercing through the prevailing evidentiary darkness that blankets the region, or, in the sense of Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, are they full of sound and fury but signifying nothing? Some pieces of the federal puzzle certainly fit together in Kyrene: an enduring and unifying mytho-historical tradition, an identifiable dialect spread through several urban centers, religious commonality expressed at regional shrines, numismatic iconography and collaborative coinage. Others are less concrete but no less suggestive: a constitution that could well be federal given its territorial scope, recurrent hints at federal magistracies, as well as a federal assembly at the head of a complex system of government. But too many other pieces are missing and the chronological gaps too gaping for us to say without a hint of reservation that a Kyrenaian *koinon* existed in some form, when possible, between 550 and 250 BCE. Still,

¹⁶ On the period: Laronde 1987: 380–423; Machu 1951: 50–55; Marquaille 20089. Regarding Berenike II: Calabiano 1996 and 1998; Marquaille 2003.

the weight of the evidence that we have at our disposal pulls us, despite our trepidations, towards acknowledging its likelihood.

The tie that binds the otherwise frayed constitutional history of Kyrene, however, is not federalism, but rather its regional coherence among Kyrene, Barke, Taucheira, Euhesperides, and Apollonia. Regardless of whether it was ruled by a monarchy, hegemony, or some form of popular government, we can always consider it as a bounded whole with a high degree of internal consistency. Once we acknowledge this, though, we must ask whether this inherent regionalism among the Greeks in North Africa was a product of their federal aspirations, or simply the after-effect of several cities having been held in one monarchical grip for centuries at a time. The answer probably lies in a combination of the two, and whatever its precise balance, we must admire the potency of this regional attachment, which becomes ever more striking when we recall that we are considering a Greek colony founded at a vast remove from the mainland. Yet compared against all of the other Greek states in this volume, Kyrene is especially illustrative of Greek federalism and regionalism writ large precisely by virtue of its seeming exceptionalism: it had been built on 'virgin' land that had yet to be marked by the Greeks, it was populated by diverse groups of Greeks whose various origins are a veritable cross-section of Greek ethnicities, and matured in an almost experimental isolation. That this naturally gave rise to *poleis* that in turn nurtured such vectors of commonality as I have listed above perhaps makes it speak to more than just the experience of Greeks in Libya. Its obscurity, though disappointing to some, reveals to us the various shades of federalism that can be found in various corners of the Greek world. Far from forcing us to concede analytical defeat, Kyrene's impenetrability rather reminds of the need to look beyond the institutional idiosyncrasies by which Greek federalism was girded, and look instead for the implicit assumptions and underlying inclinations towards regionalism and collaboration that crystallized elsewhere – but not in the Kyrenaïka – with such institutional complexity.

*Forerunners of federal states: collaboration
and integration through alliance in Archaic
and Classical Greece*

Kurt A. Raaflaub

This chapter discusses forms of interstate collaboration through alliance from their earliest attested beginnings to more complex and comprehensive agreements in amphiktyonies and alliance systems, ending with the League of Corinth of 337 BCE. Its purpose is to analyze the institutional developments that made the federal states possible on which this volume focuses. I have to be selective and refrain from discussing some phenomena (e.g., the constitution of the Boiotian League) that, although dated to this period, are analyzed in other chapters. I begin with a brief historical and systematic survey and conclude with an analytical section.¹

The background: laws, treaties, and alliances in early Greece

Communal interests and treaty-making in Homer's epics

Rationalizing epic traditions, Thucydides insists that Agamemnon was able to raise a large force against Troy not because Helen's suitors were bound by an oath to her family but because the other leaders feared Agamemnon as the most powerful ruler in Greece (1.9). In the *Iliad* Agamemnon is overall commander because he has the largest force, but the other leaders support him for personal reasons, to redeem his and Menelaos' honor (*Il.* 1.152–60, 280–81; 2.569–80). The most prominent oath, however, is sworn by the entire army when it assembles in Aulis: to return home only after Troy is sacked (2.284–88, 339) – an element that will be utilized later in formal treaties of alliance (*symmachia*; see below).²

The *Iliad* was composed around 700 BCE (Latacz 1996), in a time of rapid change, when the *polis* was developing, long-limited horizons were

¹ For general surveys of relations among Greek states, see Martin 1940; Giovannini 2007.

² Baltrusch 1994: 4–5.

opening up³, and Panhellenic concepts were beginning to crystallize (Morgan 1990 and 1993; Mitchell 2007). The *Iliad* conceptualizes the Trojan War as a conflict between a Panhellenic coalition of Achaians and a 'Pan-eastern' coalition of Trojans and their allies, illuminated by the catalogs in Book 2 (Finkelberg 2011: 1.150–155). In the limited conditions of the poet's age, though, such a vast enterprise was not concretely imaginable; hence in practical terms the narrative relies on two simpler models that were familiar at the time and occur in the epics: a violent counter-raid responding to an initial raid (as in Nestor's account, *Il.* 11.669–762), and a war between neighboring *poleis* (as on Achilles' shield, 18.509–541): Troy and the temporary Achaian *polis* on the shore, fighting across (and about?) a fertile plain, a constellation attested in Greece precisely from the late eighth century BCE (Raaflaub 1997b).

Unlike the heroically elevated events and deeds, the 'epic world' is essentially historical and close to the poet's own time (Finkelberg 2011: 2.359–361): a world of *poleis*⁴ with institutions (leadership, council, assembly, army) in which both elite and commoners play a communally indispensable role (Raaflaub 1993, 1997a, 2008, and 2011). Norms and instruments are in place that determine interactions among *poleis*, help avoid and end war, and meet the need of fighting just wars. As the story of Odysseus' bow (*Od.* 21.11–21) and the prehistory of the Trojan War show (*Il.* 3.205–24; 11.122–25, 138–42), leaders, council, and assembly are involved in decisions about foreign relations, and diplomatic means are used to settle conflicts before they erupt into war. Heralds and ambassadors, vulnerable when moving between *poleis*, enjoy divine protection (Wéry 1967; Finkelberg 2011: 2.346–347).

The *Iliad* describes the conclusion of a treaty (sealing a truce and defining conditions for peace) before a duel between Paris and Menelaos, perpetrator and victim of the offense that caused the war. The leaders set the terms; prayers, oaths, and sacrifices confirm them, and both armies witness them. The winner will keep Helen and the treasures Paris took from Menelaos' palace, the losing side will give up all claims, and the peoples will live in friendship (*Il.* 3.67–323). Yet the duel remains inconclusive, and a Trojan ally violates the truce. The episode's purpose is to confirm, within the *Iliad*'s narrative, both the Trojans' guilt as well as the justice of the Achaian cause that determines the gods' support (4.155–68, 234–39, 269–71).

³ Snodgrass 1980; Raaflaub 1993; Morris 1998.

⁴ Citizen- or microstates, not city-states: Hansen 1993b; Davies 1997.

Such treaty-making rituals may have been influenced by models common in much older Near Eastern traditions or embedded in a cultural *koinē* that encompassed the eastern Mediterranean world.⁵ They also anticipate elements of later formal treaties (Baltrusch 1994, 3–15) – just as only a small step seems necessary to get from the informal *polis* institutions in ‘epic society’ to the earliest known ‘*polis* constitution’, the Spartan Great Rhetra.⁶

Alliances, though not explicitly mentioned, seem conceivable at that time (Raaflaub 1997a: 24–25). A community can hold another responsible for perpetrations committed by individuals: by siding with Paris, the Trojan assembly becomes co-responsible for his deed and has to bear the consequences (*Il.* 11.122–25, 138–42; 7.345–407; cf. 3.56–57, 453–454, and see 11.670–762 for a raid escalating into communal warfare). When Messenian raiders invade Ithaka, the leaders send Odysseus to Messene “after the debt which *the entire dēmos* owed him” (*Od.* 21.11–21). Hence the community limits its members’ freedom of action (16.424–430) in order to avoid communal retaliation and harm to all. Soon interstate treaties will hold individuals (officials or private persons) and the entire *dēmos* equally responsible for offenses (e.g., M&L no. 17, on which see below; Ehrenberg 1937: 151).

Early laws and treaties

Greek laws, inscribed on stone or bronze (Gagarin 2008; Hawke 2011) and often placed in sanctuaries (Thomas 1996; Whitley 1998), are preserved from the mid-seventh century BCE.⁷ Early lawgivers are attested in several *poleis* (Hölkeskamp 1999), and large collections of laws are known from Gortyn (Willetts 1967; E&R) and Athens (Ruschenbusch 1966, 2010). Such laws often deal with political and constitutional issues. The opening formula “This was decided by the *polis* (or the *dēmos*)” (e.g., M&L no. 2; Koerner no. 90; E&R no. 81; Fornara no. 11), suggests that usually the collectivity of citizens enacts the laws. The early *poleis* thus have a communal will and voice, begin to regulate their government apparatus and relations among citizens, and are on the way to formalizing institutions and ‘institutionalizing’ the *polis*.⁸

⁵ Karavites 1992, and 2008; Knippschild 2002; Rollinger 2004.

⁶ E&R no. 61; Fornara no. 12; Cartledge 2002: 116–117; Schulz 2011.

⁷ Gagarin 1986; Hölkeskamp 1994; Gehrke 2000; Farenga 2006.

⁸ See Raaflaub 2009a, 41–48 on differences in Near Eastern societies, and Meier 2011 on the roots of Greek culture in citizen communities.

Similar means served to record and regulate relations with neighbors and the larger community of *poleis* and non-*polis* states (*ethnē*, see Morgan 2003). Inscriptions and literary testimonia attest, for example, to victory monuments, honors bestowed on representatives of other states (*proxenoi*, see Gschnitzer 1973; Marek 1984), or the foundation of colonies and regulation of relations with these.⁹ Early treaties among Greek states illuminate the historical and conceptual background to later multi-lateral agreements. Thus literary sources mention an early seventh-century agreement between Ionians and Aioliens about possession of Smyrna¹⁰, or between Chalkis and Eretria about limitations in their feud about the Lelantine plain¹¹. Both may contain a historical core but are distorted by later accretions and reinterpretations.¹² A probably authentic mid-sixth century treaty between Sparta and Tegea (Fornara no. 27) followed upon a Spartan defeat by Tegea and later victory, sealed by an alliance (see below).¹³ Sparta's concern to prevent outside support for Messenian helots and refugees explains the treaty's focus on demanding expulsion and prohibiting enfranchisement of Messenians.¹⁴

The earliest epigraphically attested treaties are preserved on bronze tablets in Olympia and date from roughly the middle (a) to the end of the sixth century (b and c) or later (*LSAG* no.12). (a) is a "binding agreement" between the Sybarites and their allies and the Serdaioi in southern Italy "for friendship (*philia*) faithful and without guile for ever. Guarantors, Zeus, Apollo, and the other gods and the city Poseidonia."¹⁵ While this friendship pact is set "forever" but does not specify any active obligations of mutual support, a similar one (b), called *fratra* (> *rhētra*, "pronouncement: Wade-Gery 1958: 62–64) between Anaitoi and Metapioi is limited to fifty years and determines sanctions for violations: "And those who do not observe (the agreement), those the *proxenoi* and seers shall keep away from the altar. If they break the oath the priests of Olympia shall judge it."¹⁶ A treaty between Elians and Heraians (c) is even more specific:¹⁷

This is the covenant (*fratra*) between the Elians and the Heraians. There shall be an alliance (*synmachia*) for a hundred years, and this (year) shall be the first; and if anything is needed, either word or deed, they shall stand by

⁹ Collected in M&L, E&R, and Fornara. ¹⁰ *SVF* II 101 = Hdt. 1.150; Asheri et al. 2007: 179.

¹¹ *SVF* II 102; Fornara no. 7; Nenci 1994: 308–309; Stein-Hölkeskamp 2005.

¹² Tausend 1992 discusses other examples.

¹³ Hdt. 1.66–68 with Asheri et al. 2007: 128–131; Boedeker 1993.

¹⁴ Plut. *Mor.* 292b; Jacoby 1944; Cartledge 2002: 118–120.

¹⁵ Trans. M&L no. 10; cf. *SVF* II 120, E&R no. 42, Fornara no. 29. ¹⁶ *SVF* II 111, E&R no. 51.

¹⁷ *LSAG* no. 6; M&L no. 17, *SVF* II 110, E&R no. 52, Fornara no. 29.

each other in all matters and especially in war; and if they stand not by each other, those who do the wrong shall pay a talent of silver to Olympian Zeus to be used in his service. And if anyone injures this writing, whether private man or magistrate or community, he shall be liable to the sacred fine herein written (trans. M&L).

The Archaic record is thus thin. Still, a few essentials emerge: the familiarity of the term *symmachia*, the focus on friendship and mutual support especially in war (expressed in the term *symmachia* itself), and the display of such treaties in a Panhellenic sanctuary, which, like that of laws in *polis* shrines, emphasizes respect, enhances their authority, and endows them with divine protection.

Systems of collaboration and alliance

Amphiktyonies

Amphiktyonies were associations of *poleis* and *ethnē* “living around” (*amphiktyontes*) a sanctuary, originating in festival and cult communities and involved in the shrine’s cult and protection and the management of common concerns. Examples are the sanctuaries of Poseidon at Onchestos in Boiotia (Strabo 9.2.33) and Kalaureia at the Saronic Gulf (8.6.14) and that of Apollo on Delos (Thuc. 3.104, below). Whether a few others were centers of amphiktyonies as well is contested.¹⁸

The most important, but in significant ways unique, amphiktyony was the Pylaiian-Delphic¹⁹, centered in two sanctuaries: that of Demeter at Anthela near Thermopylai and that of Apollo at Delphi. It was governed by a council consisting of representatives of twelve *ethnē* who met twice a year at Thermopylai and Delphi. Their responsibilities included the protection of the sanctuary at Delphi, supervision of its administration, care for the buildings (especially Apollo’s temple), and the organization of the festival and games of the quadrennial Pythia. No Archaic amphiktyonic treaty is preserved, but the sources mention an agreement among members, supported by an amphiktyonic oath:²⁰

that they would raze no city of the amphiktyonic states, nor shut them off from flowing water either in war or in peace; that if anyone should violate this oath, they would march against the perpetrator and raze his cities; and if anyone should violate the shrine of the god or be accessory to such violation, or make

¹⁸ Busolt and Swoboda 1926: 1280–1292; Tausend 1992: 8–63; Funke 2013a.

¹⁹ Busolt and Swoboda 1926: 1292–1310; Tausend 1992: 34–47; Lefèvre 1998a; Sánchez 2001.

²⁰ *SVF* II 104; Daux 1953; Kiechle 1958.

any plot against the holy places, they would punish him with hand and foot and voice, and all their power (Aischin. 2.115; trans. Adams, modified).

That this oath mentions *poleis* only within the amphiktyonic member-states, which thus must be *ethnē*, suggests an early date – as does the Archaic language – while the apparently later curse formula envisages *poleis* as agents: “If anyone should violate this, whether *polis* or private individual or *ethnos*, let them be under curse of Apollo and Artemis and Leto and Athena Pronaia” (Aischin. 3.110). Such political concern with rules of behavior in war and interstate relations may be tied to the increasingly prominent role of the Delphic oracle in promoting moderation and giving advice in matters of colonization. This role was unique and cannot be applied to all amphiktyonies.

An amphiktyony thus was not an alliance system. It did not oblige the members to support each other, it instead bound them to take action on behalf of the sanctuary around which it had evolved. In Delphi’s case, membership gradually changed to include more distant and powerful states (Sparta, Athens, and even Makedon); Sparta especially developed close ties to Apollo’s sanctuary, and attempts were not lacking to manipulate or abuse the oracle in favor of partisan interests (Hdt. 5.62–65; Davies 1994).

The Peloponnesian League

Like others, “Peloponnesian League” is a modern term. The ancients spoke of “the Lakedaimonians and their allies,” since it was a network of bilateral alliances with Sparta as *hēgemōn*.²¹ The league apparently developed gradually, with Sparta’s transition, in the mid-sixth century, from conquest and annexation to control through alliance (see Tegea, above). By the late sixth century, Sparta’s influence extended over most of the Peloponnese. Argos, and at various times others (Elis, Corinth, or Mantinea), refused to be part of the alliance, while conversely *poleis* outside the Peloponnese (Aigina, Megara, Thebes) joined the alliance too.

It is unknown when the formulae were introduced that are attested in Xenophon (e.g., *Hell.* 2.2.20; 5.3.26) and confirmed epigraphically in a Spartan treaty with the Aitolian Erxadieis:²² “They shall follow wherever the Spartans lead both by land and by sea, having the same friend and the same enemy as the Spartans” (M&L no. 67 bis). The former, to follow

²¹ Busolt and Swoboda 1926: 1320–1337; Larsen 1933–1934; Wickert 1961; Kagan 1969: 9–30; Ste. Croix 1972: 96–124, 333–342; Cartledge 1987: 9–13, 242–273; 2002, ch. 9; Tausend 1992: 167–180.

²² Dated variously from the early to the late fifth century: Gschnitzer 1978; Cartledge 1987: 9.

wherever the Spartans led, is certainly old (Baltrusch 1994: 17–21), while the latter prescription perhaps is not (Ste. Croix 1972: 108–110). Herodotus says that by the late sixth century the Spartans “already held most of the Peloponnese in subjection” (1.68.6), but he judges from a much later perspective when even the Spartans began to display imperialist attitudes (Thuc. 5.27–31; Raaflaub 2004: 128–132). It seems doubtful that the treaty formulae early on “formally . . . robbed the allies of their *eleutheria* or freedom to determine their own foreign policy and so converted them into subjects” (Cartledge 1987: 10–11). Although the allies’ sovereignty was limited by their treaty obligations, there were significant mitigating circumstances (Raaflaub 2004: 122–26). The allies participated in decisions about common actions (below), and as an agrarian land power Sparta depended on the allies’ support and army contingents and was not able to monopolize military power as Athens could in its naval alliance.

Most likely, during the sixth century BCE the alliance’s structures were loose – they were never really tight (Lendon 1994). At various times, some allies even grouped together in separate alliances, created their own *archē* (Funke 2004: 432–433), and even engaged in war against each other. By the time of the Peloponnesian War, however, decision-making procedures within the alliance were set.²³ Allies sent complaints to Sparta about alleged Athenian violations of a treaty (Thuc. 1.67). At a meeting in Sparta the allies’ representatives discussed these allegations and decided upon a common reaction (67–71). The Spartan assembly then discussed the proposal and voted on it (79–87). The allies were informed of that decision (87) and later returned to Sparta to confirm the vote for war and determine details of preparations (118–25): “The Spartans had now heard everyone’s opinion, and put the vote city by city to all their allies who were present, both great and small. The majority voted for war” (125). Herodotus claims that an important step towards formalizing these procedures was taken in the late sixth century BCE. After the allies had abandoned a campaign that was marred by disagreements between the two Spartan kings (5.74–75), the Spartans invited the allies to discuss their next plan and dropped it, when it was voted down upon a negative recommendation by Corinth (5.90–93).

According to custom (see for instance *Il.* 1.277–81), Sparta, as the strongest member, held the hegemony; wars were thus always conducted under Spartan command. Moreover, the treaties were probably concluded “for-ever”; hence, Sparta considered defection from the alliance an offense that

²³ Hence some scholars date their emergence to the mid-fifth century: Cawkwell 1993; Thommen 1996: 54–60.

justified forced reintegration (apparently without status diminution). Otherwise the allies were autonomous and not tied by treaty to each other; they occasionally concluded “mini-alliances” among themselves, fought their own wars and, rarely, wars against each other (e.g., Thuc. 4.134). Even so, the alliance’s mere existence contributed to reducing wars in Sparta’s sphere of influence. Except for rare crises, Sparta’s hegemony was uncontested.

Due to its unique internal situation – a small and shrinking citizen body controlling a huge territory with a large slave population and numerous dependent *poleis* (Cartledge 2002: chs. 10 and 14) – Sparta developed the characteristics of an exceptional, militarized *polis*.²⁴ Its interests therefore focused on preserving the *status quo*, not on imperial rule. In the later fifth century, Sparta had the reputation of supporting oligarchies, which was retrojected as a principle to earlier periods (Thuc. 1.19, 144.2), but before the breakthrough of ‘radical’ democracy and tensions with Athens in the 460s, such claims were probably as unjustified (contra: Cartledge 1987: 10) as those that Sparta was opposed in principle to tyrannies (Bernhardt 1987). The status quo was not tied to a specific constitution. Only at this late stage and as a result of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta’s policy towards its allies became much more interventionist, domineering, and eventually imperialist (Cartledge 1987: ch.13), which provoked serious and violent challenges to its leadership (below, pp. 444, 446). After the defeat of Leuktra in 371 BCE it was no longer able to control its alliance, which effectively dissolved shortly thereafter, in 365 BCE.

Earlier, Sparta’s positive reputation was so strong that it was considered the “leader of Greece” (*prostatēs tēs Hellados*; Schaefer 1932: 251–272) and the obvious choice to lead the fight against Persia; similarly, its declared intention in 432 BCE to fight Athens in order “to liberate the Hellenes” from the tyrant city (Thuc. 2.8) was widely popular. Until that time, the model of a hegemonial alliance that Sparta and its allies had developed worked well. It provided the template for two subsequent alliance systems.

The Hellenic League against Persia

The League of Ionian *poleis* (*to koinon tōn Iōnōn*: Hdt. 5.109.3) that led the Ionian Revolt against Persia in 499–494 BCE was based in the common Ionian sanctuary near Mykale, the so-called Panionion, where delegates (*probouloi*) met to make decisions.²⁵ Similarly, those who formed the

²⁴ Finley 1982; Cartledge 2001: ch. 3; Hodkinson 2009: chs. 11–13.

²⁵ Hdt. 1.141; 5.108–109; 6.7; Larsen 1955: 27–30; Roebuck 1955; Murray 1988: 480–482.

Hellenic League against Persia²⁶, however they called themselves – “Hellenes” or “the Lakedaimonians, Athenians, and their allies”) – were represented by *probouloi* at common meetings. The list preserved on the famous Serpent Column, the allies’ victory monument set up in Delphi (now in Istanbul) names thirty-one members but some of these joined only after Xerxes’ withdrawal (Hdt. 9.90–92, 106), and a few seem to be omitted (SVA II 130).

According to Pausanias (3.12.6), a preliminary meeting took place at the Spartan *Hellenion*. Herodotus mentions, without place, a first meeting in the fall of 481, when Xerxes was still in Sardes. The delegates gave each other “promises and guarantees” (*logoi, pistis*) and decided “to reconcile enmities and put a stop to existing wars between each other,” to find out about Xerxes’ plans, and to seek additional allies (7.145.1–2). They assigned the supreme command on land and sea to Sparta and swore an oath to punish, after their victory, those Greeks who had ‘medized’ without compulsion, and to dedicate a tenth of their property to Delphi (7.132.2). Although the alliance had only one clearly defined purpose, to repel the Persian invasion, apparently its termination was not defined by event or date. Henceforth, the council of *probouloi* met at intervals, often on the Isthmus, to decide upon policies and the next steps in the campaign; in addition, a war council of commanders was convened whenever necessary. Despite frequent disagreements among commanders about strategy and political issues (Hdt. 9.106), the alliance met its purpose splendidly. Further disagreements surfaced after the final victories in 479 BCE (9.114). The Peloponnesians’ withdrawal from the war a year later ended common activities, though apparently not the league’s formal existence.

The Delian League

In the winter of 478/77 BCE, various reasons prompted the non-Peloponnesian members of the Hellenic League to seek a change. Under Athens’ leadership, a new alliance was established, centered in an ancient sanctuary of the Ionian *poleis* (Thuc. 3.104), Apollo’s temple on Delos (hence Delian League). That Delos was the center of an amphiktyony (above, p. 438) involving non-Ionians as well, made it even more attractive for Athens’ purposes, as did the connection with Apollo that helped balance Sparta’s privileged relationship to Delphi, but league and amphiktyony had different functions and remained separate entities (Smarczyk

²⁶ SVA II 130; Brunt 1953; Hignett 1963: 98–102; Hammond 1988: 540–545.

1990). The new arrangement probably served the interests of all involved: the allies expected more favorable treatment from Athens than from Sparta (Hdt. 9.106; Thuc. 1.95.1, 96.1); Athens was eager to establish demonstrable parity with Sparta through its own *prostasia* (Hdt. 8.2.2–3.2; Thuc. 1.91.7, 95.2), and Sparta wanted to withdraw from warfare abroad and still trusted Athens (Hdt. 9.106.3; Thuc. 1.95).²⁷

Thucydides emphasizes that Athens initially was *hēgemōn* over allies (*xymmachoi*) “who were autonomous and reached their decisions in common meetings” (1.97.1) on Delos where the treasury was kept (see 96.2). Each member had an equal vote; whether the delegates’ votes were tied to a previous decision by their home governments is unknown but seems certain at least in Athens’ case. Since this was a naval alliance and naval warfare was going to predominate, provisions for maintaining a fleet and financial reserves were crucial. Athens therefore assessed the members’ contributions in money (*phoros*) or ships and appointed treasurers (*hellēnotamiai*; 1.96.1–2). The League’s purpose was defined in two ways: “to compensate themselves for their losses by ravaging the territory of the king of Persia” (1.96.1) and “to complete the remaining task” by “liberating the Hellenes from Persian rule” (3.10.2–3).²⁸ Another purpose was obvious: to be prepared for another Persian attack. According to [Aristotle] (*Ath. Pol.* 23.5), they swore an oath “to have the same enemy and friend” and sank lead weights in the ocean as symbols of the alliance’s unlimited duration.

In sum, like the Peloponnesian and Hellenic leagues, this was an alliance of free and equal *poleis* bound by oath for an indefinite time to maintain mutual defense, to conduct wars jointly, after decisions made in joint deliberation and by equal votes, and to contribute to the alliance’s actions according to individual ability. Based on existing precedents, despite the power difference between the *hēgemōn* and the others and the prerogatives connected with the former’s leadership, all this was entirely unproblematic (Raaflaub 2004: 118–28). Scope and purpose of the alliance were limited and clearly implied, though not formally defined, and the alliance had no political function and required no integration beyond what was given by its military purpose.

No one could anticipate what actually happened: for various reasons, Athens interpreted its leadership actively and pursued an aggressive policy of expansion; power shifted ever more to Athens’ side, while the allies grew

²⁷ On the Delian League, see *SVF* II 132; Larsen 1940; *ATL* 1950: 183–243; Meiggs 1972: ch. 3; Schuller 1974: 141–148; Steinbrecher 1985; Petzold 1993–1994; Baltrusch 1994: 52–64. Giovannini and Gottlieb 1980 argue that this was no new alliance.

²⁸ Rawlings 1977; Raaflaub 1979; Hornblower 1991: 1.144–145.

weaker, were fragmented, and incapable of mounting united resistance. As a result, Athens turned its hegemonial alliance into an *archē*, a thalassocracy, that was increasingly centralized, ruled with an iron fist by the Athenian assembly that replaced the allied synod, and the Athenian fleet dominating the seas.²⁹ This process, described by Thucydides (1.89–117), is documented by numerous decrees and treaties preserved on stone.³⁰

The League was dissolved upon Athens' defeat in 404 BCE. Many members had defected earlier and joined the Spartan alliance. In 412, Sparta sacrificed those on the Anatolian coast to Persia in exchange for financial support (Thuc. 8.18, 58; Lewis 1977; Raaflaub 2004: 199–201). The others found the liberty they hoped to gain quashed by Sparta's increasingly oppressive rule and were soon affected by incessant wars about hegemony in Greece. These wars eventually prompted new efforts to gain some measure of stability and perhaps even peace.

*The "King's Peace," Treaties of "Common Peace" (koinē eirēnē),
and the League of Corinth*

Sparta's rule eventually prompted a rebellion among its own leading allies and new wars (Hamilton 1979). After an initial success, Sparta's enemies (especially Athens, Thebes, and Argos) were forced by the combined pressure of Sparta and Persia to accept a humiliating peace in 386, the "King's Peace" or (after the Spartan negotiator) "Peace of Antalkidas"³¹: it confirmed, with few exceptions, Persian sovereignty over the Greek *poleis* in Asia Minor, on the islands, and Cyprus, and established the principle of autonomy for all other Greek *poleis*, threatening those with war who did not accept these terms (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31).

This was the first peace achieved in Greece since 404, ominously dictated by Persia. All *poleis* involved eventually signed it, although Thebes and Argos complied only under threat of an immediate Spartan attack (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.32–35). Sparta took further advantage of its power as "leader (or guarantor) of the peace" (*prostatēs tēs eirēnēs*, 35) by settling old scores with neighbors and interfering in the domestic affairs or regional arrangements of other *poleis*. All these circumstances, and the lack of an

²⁹ Meiggs 1972; Schuller 1974; Fornara and Samons 1991: ch. 3; Rhodes 1992.

³⁰ Published in *IG* 1³ and *ATL*; cf. also M&L, Fornara; many dates are contested, see Mattingly 1996; Schuller 2002; Rhodes 2008; Papazarkadas 2009.

³¹ *SVA* 11 B242; Crawford and Whitehead 1983: no. 263; Ryder 1965: ch. 2; Seager 1974; Cawkwell 1981a; Badian 1991; Urban 1991; Jehne 1994: 31–47.

institutionalized consultation and decision-making process based on the equal vote of all signees, combined to make the “King’s Peace” fail, despite its purpose to establish peace on a broad base. Other efforts followed to stop feuding among Greeks by setting up similarly broad peace arrangements (*koinē eirēnē*), often explicitly referring to the King’s Peace, always based on the condition of general autonomy, but sometimes complemented by other clauses (Ryder 1965; Jehne 1994): in 375/74 (*SVA* II 265), in 371 when a first attempt failed because of Theban objections (*SVA* II 269; abolishing the rule of Spartan harmosts and decreeing disarmament (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18)) and a second succeeded (*SVA* II 270, aimed at Thebes after the battle of Leuktra and thus containing a clause of mutual assistance (*Hell.* 6.5.2)), and in 362 (*SVA* II 292), among others. They all failed after a short time for the same reasons that had doomed the King’s Peace (Jehne 1994: 269–273).

Eventually, after his victory at Chaironeia in 338 BCE, Philip II of Makedon imposed a Common Peace on the Greeks in the League of Corinth of the following year.³² Only Sparta refused to join. Its structure was probably influenced partially by that of the Second Athenian League (below, pp. 446–447). At a meeting in Corinth, Philip laid down the conditions for peace, established a common council (*synedrion*), and fixed the size of the forces each member had to supply, which in turn determined the number of representatives in the council (Just. *Epit.* 9.5). The oath, preserved on stone, bound the members to abide by the peace and treaty, not to wage war against those who did, to be loyal to the monarchy of Philip and his heirs and to the *politeiai* of the members, and to support war against transgressors as determined by the council and requested by the *hēgemōn* (R&O no. 76). All we know about the activities of the *synedrion* (for example, in condemning Thebes after its revolt against Alexander, on which see Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.9, and in yielding to Alexander’s decision in the matter of the Greek rebellion in 331/30: Diod. 17.73.5–6) suggests that it was an instrument of empire in the service of the Makedonian kings. Still, by “linking a general peace with the obligation to recognize his leadership and with proportional representation . . . Philip created a procedure for efficient enforcement of the general peace, and at the same time gave his hegemony over the Greeks a form that was more acceptable to them” (Rhodes 2003: 792).

³² R&O no. 76; Crawford and Whitehead 1983: no. 350; Harding no. 99; Ryder 1965: ch. 7 and app. 10; Jehne 1994: part 3.

The Second Athenian League

By the late 380s hostility towards Sparta because of its interventionist policies was wide-spread (Sealey 1976: 405ff.; Seager 1994). Chios, Thebes, and Byzantion entered an alliance with Athens, which set itself up as the leader in anti-Spartan resistance³³ and in 378 created the nucleus of a new alliance system, based on the members' autonomy, Athenian hegemony, and a common *synedrion* meeting in Athens and representing each ally with an equal vote (Diod. 15.28.2–5). In early 377, after tensions with Sparta increased (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20–33, Athens advertised the new alliance more widely.

This document, known as the 'Decree of Aristotle,' is a charter or prospectus for what modern scholars call the Second Athenian League, preserved on stone, together with an (incomplete) list of allies.³⁴ It was to be a defensive alliance only (lines 46–51), and its purpose was clearly defined: "So that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous, and to live at peace occupying their own territory in security" (lines 9–12). The alliance presents itself as intending to enforce the King's Peace (lines 12–15) – which the treaty's guarantor, Sparta, has violated. The measures (imposition of democracy, stationing of garrisons or officials, and collection of tribute) that had enabled Athens in the fifth century to rule over its allies are emphatically excluded: "If any of the Greeks or of the barbarians living in Europe or of the islanders, who are not the King's, wishes to be an ally of the Athenians and their allies, he may be – being free and autonomous, being governed under whatever form of government he wishes, neither receiving a garrison nor submitting to a governor nor paying tribute" (lines 15–23, trans. R&O). Equally excluded is Athenian (public or private) ownership of property in allied territory; violations are to be handled by the *synedroi* (lines 25–45; Diod. 15.29.8).

The *synedrion* is mentioned only here; its functions are not defined, there is no mention of a constitution of the alliance, the powers of the *hēgemōn* are not determined or limited, and the relationship between decisions by the Athenian *ekklesia* and those by the *synedrion* is not clarified. Given the experiences of the Delian League, all this would seem essential and was perhaps formulated in a lost document (Seager 1994: 171–172; R&O: 100). A subsequent treaty with Methymna (*SVA* II 258, R&O no. 23), already allied with Athens, has the purpose of

³³ *SVA* II 248, 255–256, R&O no. 20, Harding nos. 31, 33–34.

³⁴ *SVA* II 257, R&O no. 22, Crawford and Whitehead 1983: no. 269, Harding no. 35; see Ryder 1965: ch. 3; Cawkwell 1973, 1981b; Cargill 1981; Schmitz 1988; Badian 1995; Dreher 1995.

establishing an alliance between Methymna and the other allies as well, and the oath is to be sworn to the *synedrion* and the *stratēgoi* and *hipparchoi* (the commanders of the Athenian forces), not the Athenian demos. This suggests that the *synedrion* was consciously intended to be independent of Athenian political control. Moreover, when contributions (*syntaxeis*) were introduced after all, the *synedrion* was charged with assessing them (R&O no. 72, lines 26–27). It is thus likely that “final control of policy was divided between two bodies, the Athenian assembly and the Synedrion of the allies” – but how exactly would be important to know. “This second step founded the new League; it bound the allies by a multilateral agreement, linking them to one another as well as to Athens” (Sealey 1976: 410). If so, the intention was indeed to create a more integrated organization.

The league seems to have functioned well for a few years but changing conditions – Thebes’ rise to dominance after Leuktra in 371, a peace (371) and alliance (369) between Athens and Sparta and their allies (which made the league’s initial purpose obsolete), and Athens’ renewed ambitions in the northern Aegean – led to tensions, dissatisfaction, and eventually a war with the allies (357–355) which Athens was unable to sustain. The League shrank massively and was formally replaced by the League of Corinth in 337 BCE.

Concluding analysis

The Greek world that evolved in the Archaic period eventually comprised hundreds of *poleis* (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), fiercely independent microstates based on exclusive and more or less egalitarian citizen communities. For most of the Archaic and Classical periods, the culturally and politically dominant *poleis* overshadowed the *ethnē*. Emerging in clusters, they were able to support each other and balance the power of those growing too ambitious or large (Raaflaub 1990). Among those that were exceptionally large,³⁵ Sparta’s unique structural problems forced it to aim at preserving the status quo (above); Athens achieved full communal integration only by the late sixth century (Anderson 2003), allowing it to bring its power potential to bear in foreign relations; and Syracuse was turned into Sicily’s most powerful *polis* by the ambitious policies of its early fifth century tyrants (Asheri 1988, 1992; Luraghi 1994: ch. 9). Archaic Greece thus lacked the potential for empire building and, with few exceptions, its

³⁵ Ruschenbusch 1983 discusses sizes.

wars, though frequent, were not about conquest for the sake of subjection and permanent exploitation (Raaflaub 1994: 114–18) but limited to neighborhood feuds about booty and contested lands. Conquered territory was integrated into that of the victorious *polis*, and the destruction of cities and enslavement of populations was rare (Ducrey 1968). These conditions encouraged the development of political instruments (diplomacy, truces, and bilateral treaties) to avoid and resolve conflicts, and prompted Sparta to build up the first large alliance system in Greece that was defensive in nature and intended to maintain the status quo.

Multilateral agreements among associations of neighbors of important sanctuaries (amphiktyonies) enhanced collaboration among those involved but were limited to protecting the integrity of shrines, cults, and festivals. Amphiktyonies illustrate the importance of such regional or supraregional sanctuaries (Ulf 1997 and 2006; Freitag et al. 2006; Funke 2009) – although not all sanctuaries falling in this category had an amphiktyony – but, with the exception of Delphi that became widely influential because of its oracle, they did not advocate political principles or serve ulterior political purposes. Sparta early on developed a privileged relationship with Delphic Apollo, which perhaps prompted the Athenians to seek the same god's protection for their own league, but here Athena soon replaced Apollo, and overall, beyond oaths and other rituals, the religious dimension of alliance systems seems to have been minimal. For example, although the Hellenic League's *probouloi* met often in the sanctuary of Poseidon on the Isthmus and Zeus Hellenios and Zeus Soter were implored for assistance, while Zeus Eleutherios received lavish thanks after the final victory (Raaflaub 2004: 102–17), there is no evidence that affiliation with a specific cult was crucial for the league's fight against Persia – perhaps not least because the priests at Delphi had miscalculated and strongly advised against resistance. Nor are such affiliations attested for any of the Common Peace agreements in the fourth century BCE.

The Persian Wars changed the experience of war in the Greek world. Whether or not the Athenians' imperial impetus was inspired by Persian rule over the eastern Greeks – they certainly borrowed their instruments of empire from the Persians (Raaflaub 2009b) – they were the first to turn a hegemonial alliance systematically into a tool for the advancement of their own imperial domination. This proved a crucial setback for the potential for collaboration and integration inherent in such alliance systems. This potential had been enhanced in the late sixth century by the formalization of common decision-making procedures in Sparta's Peloponnesian League, where the number of allies was relatively small, the *hēgemōn*

depended on the allies' military contributions, some allies (especially Corinth) were capable of standing up against the *hēgemōn*, and Sparta's intentions could thus be influenced (against war in 506, for war in 432). Hence, well into the Peloponnesian War, Sparta could not act on behalf of the league without the consent of a majority of its members.

Similar procedures were initially institutionalized in the Delian League, providing for deliberation in common meetings (*xynodoi*) and decision by equal vote of all allies on any common action. But here these institutional safeguards proved too weak: in a much larger maritime league with way over a hundred members, power through control of the fleet and treasury shifted rapidly in favor of the leader (above); the votes of the few powerful allies with their own large fleets (Samos, Lesbos, Chios) were drowned by the mass of votes (*polypsēphia*) of many small allies (Thuc. 3.10.5) who depended on Athenian protection, and these powerful allies apparently preferred to guard their privileged 'autonomous' position rather than seeking to combine their strength to balance that of the *hēgemōn*; Athenian control of the seas made large-scale collaboration among allies against the *hēgemōn* almost impossible; a policy of 'divide and rule' enabled Athens to defeat isolated revolts with the support of the others; and assistance by Sparta failed to materialize before the Peloponnesian War, and even then was often ineffective. By the time the powerful few felt sufficiently oppressed to risk their own revolts – one after the other – the league council had long been replaced by the Athenian assembly.

As a result, the integrative potential of alliance was thwarted; alliance became *archē* and in fact a tool for ever farther-reaching imperial aspirations. Because of the exclusive concept of citizenship common in the Greek world (Whitehead 1991), Athens lacked the means to integrate allies fully into its own state and thus to increase its manpower and resources in order to sustain continuing imperial expansion (Schuller 1978: 19–21). Hence the condition of its allies remotely began to resemble that of Sparta's dependent perioikic *poleis*³⁶, and from this perspective Ian Morris' suggestion (2009) to replace "Athenian empire" by "greater Athenian state" deserves attention. Rome here offers an impressive counter-example.³⁷ In Sparta, the problems of integration were even worse (Cartledge 2002: ch.14). Whatever its declared goals in the war against Athens, its self-centered interests were conspicuous from the beginning (Raaflaub 2004: 193–202), it was soon drawn into the spiral of imperialism, began to disregard the

³⁶ On which see Cartledge 2002: ch. 10.

³⁷ Sherwin-White 1972, 1973; for comparison, Gauthier 1974, and 1981; Eder 1991.

egalitarian safeguards built into its own alliance system, and eventually turned it into the core of its own empire.

This vicious cycle continued into the fourth century BCE, fueled by Persian money and driven by Spartan, Athenian, and Theban ambitions. Efforts to establish general peace through multilateral treaties suffered from multiple handicaps: they were dictated by an outside power, tied to the hegemony of Sparta (or, later, Athens and Thebes) that vigorously pursued its own purposes, interfered with many long-established interests, and provided no governing body that gave the members voice and vote and a stake in maintaining the system. Oaths sworn under compulsion and threat of war were insufficient to stabilize peace.

A new and potentially promising path was chosen by Athens in its Second League. It explicitly renounced the oppressive instruments of empire used in the fifth century and based the alliance on a different structure. The allies were bound by treaty to Athens and to each other through an oath sworn to a council (*synedrion*) that decided upon allied actions by equal vote of all allies and was set up to be independent of Athenian political control. Whether or not Athens had a seat and a vote in the *synedrion*, decisions for allied actions now needed the approval of both the *synedrion* and the Athenian assembly, and the former, not the latter, was supposed to direct the alliance's policies. In details and intention the principle of separate decision and common action was carried much further than ever before in Greece.

This arrangement, too, did not last long because the defensive purpose justifying its creation soon became obsolete and the *hēgemōn* yielded to the temptation of using the league to support its own interests. Still, it offered a model for the League of Corinth established by Philip II in 337. There too a council represented all member-states but it did so not on the basis of one-member-one-vote but proportionally, taking into account the size of each member's military contribution. This council too stood beside the *hēgemōn*. But the chairmen (*proēdroi*) represented the king, there was no pretense of a power balance, and the *synedrion* could do little more than to rubber-stamp the proposals of the Makedonian king or his representatives, who essentially used it as an instrument for imperial control and expansion.

Even in these cases, therefore, integration did not progress beyond very rudimentary stages. In contrast to Larsen (1955: 25; 1968) who uses "confederacy" and "federal states" indiscriminately, I distinguish the two and consider a confederacy or confederation an intermediate stage between alliance and federal state (for discussion, see the editors' introduction; Funke 2007b), characterized by binding decisions passed by the council

of member-states and executed by the organs charged with doing that. If so, some foundations for a confederacy were laid by the Peloponnesian League, and in their beginnings the Delian and the Second Athenian League at least approached this stage – although, and this is crucial, always only in regard to defense and war. Farther-reaching political integration or even merely a harmonization of foreign policy lay beyond the interest of the *poleis* or hegemonial powers involved. True, Athens achieved in its *archē* a higher level of harmonization through specific laws and institutions but these were designed entirely to control the allies-turned-into-subjects, not to integrate them in any meaningful way; Russell Meiggs thus rightly speaks of “instruments of empire” (1972: ch. 11; cf. Raaflaub 2009b). Again, Rome offers an impressive and successful counter-example: the alliance system it built up in Italy in the fourth and third centuries – whether we judge it to be hegemonial or imperial (Harris 1984) – was openly based on military defeat and capitulation (*deditio*), thus removing any ambivalence about status and rights; the treaties of alliance were unequal (*foedus iniquum*), but they fully respected the allies’ domestic autonomy and obliged them only to accept Rome’s foreign policy and furnish troops for its wars (Salmon 1982; Cornell 1995: ch. 14).

The philosopher Thales supposedly urged the Ionians fighting the Persians in 545 BCE to set up a common council in their center, on the island of Teos, while the other *poleis* would continue in existence but in the status of districts (*dēmoi*, Hdt. 1.170.3); this reminds us of the relation of the Attic *dēmoi* to the central place, Athens, after Kleisthenes’ reforms in 508/7 (Whitehead 1986) and suggests that Greek political theory – or utopia (Asheri et al. 2007: 191) – early on anticipated the idea of a federal state.³⁸ The road to its practical realization remained long and difficult.

³⁸ Moggi 1976: no. 16.

*The Hellenic leagues of late
Classical and Hellenistic times and their
place in the history of Greek federalism*

Bernhard Smarczyk

The political map of the interstate relations in the Greek world changed significantly over the course of the sixth century BCE to the Hellenistic era. The number of participants in 'international' relations increased primarily because more and more *poleis* went through a process of state formation. Besides, there were many tribal states and, from the fifth century, genuine federal states (*koina*). The latter reduced the number of foreign policy actors because the centralized institutions of the federal states decided on (most) foreign affairs, thus mediatizing their member *poleis*. Between these states of different structures, interests and distributions of power shifted constantly, resulting in numerous wars, many interstate treaties, the refinement of 'international' law, and the formation of greater and longer-lasting coalitions. Since the third century in particular, federal states clearly outweighed genuine *polis* states. Consequently, the Hellenistic monarchies found their opponents in foreign policy primarily in the tightly structured, dynamic *koina*.

Besides many other impulses on its development, federalism responded to the failure of Greek treaty law and to the inability of the hegemonic *polis*-powers to establish a solid and (to some degree) peaceful 'international' environment. In this sense, federal states also answered to the problems which arose from Greek particularism. A major contribution of *ethnē* and *koina* consisted in their ability to diminish the danger for their often rather weak members to succumb to the predominant pressure of the great powers, without any prospect of self-assertion. The emergence and success of the *koina* had, in this sense, profound consequences for the development of foreign policy, because federalism tied together the potentials of many relatively small and insignificant states.

The chances of the Achaian or Aitolian *koinon*, which had already transcended their original ethnic boundaries to grow further and had the potential to unite the Greek states under the umbrella of a single *koinon* of Hellenes in the future, could only be assessed by complex deliberations.

However, all steps in this direction were first impeded and then ruined, because the Romans interfered too early, as it were, in Greek affairs east of the Adriatic Sea (Walbank 1981: 157–158). It is certainly not by coincidence that nearly at the same time also the Hellenic League founded by Antigonos III Doson failed. It was the last attempt to establish a great Hellenic coalition with a distinct hegemonic component as a permanent element of Greek interstate politics. In other words, the regulatory model of hegemonic alliances remained until then an important feature in Greek interstate affairs, despite the growing importance of the federal states.

This in turn triggers the question of what was the contribution of the hegemonic Hellenic leagues of the Late Classical and Hellenistic periods to the history of Greek federalism, and what was the potential for development they provided. Their main characteristic was that they were no longer headed by a single *polis*, but combined the hegemony of Makedonian kings with the inclusion of *poleis* and *koine* in a federal macro-structure. Thus it is all about the concepts of federal organization which were offered by the Corinthian League of Philip II, the alliance founded by Antigonos the One-Eyed and Demetrios Poliorketes as well as by Antigonos Doson, and what developments were possible for them. Next to the genuine *koine*, these leagues take their own place in the history of federal ideas and their application by the Greeks; their institutions and structural principles should be read against the models of federal states as well as confederations of states.

Another aspect needs to be considered. Like any other state environment, the Greek ‘international’ system was confronted with the problem of stabilizing the relations between its multiple actors. With its increasing complexity, different approaches towards this challenge can be detected, yet by the fourth century BCE the symptoms of crisis become apparent (Davies 1995). The obvious question comes to mind here: what was the achievement of the above-mentioned confederations in this respect, measured against the existing ideals, principles, and legal forms of interstate politics as they were in place, and which prefigured their conceptual frame of treaties and structures?¹

Philip II and the Corinthian League

Philip’s organization of 338/7 BCE heralded its systemic importance for the Greek world by its official denomination, *hoi Hellēnes*. The Corinthian

¹ The relevant sources are unevenly distributed and the body of evidence is fragmented. Many aspects of the topic are subject to scholarly debate, but they cannot be discussed here in detail. Many sources are conveniently assembled in *SVF* III (esp. nos. 402, 446, 507).

League is important to the history of models of federation and interstate politics mainly because its design absorbed numerous elements and principles which until then were prevalent in the Hellenic discourse on confederacies, maintaining peace and international law in Hellas (Perlman 1985). The blueprint of Philip's league has equally given special attention to the distinctive features of earlier confederacies to obtain a sustainable result. There is no dispute that Philip, apart from the legally binding safeguarding of his dynastic rule (*IG* II² 236a), with his conception of the league attempted to maintain Makedonian predominance without interference and to cover his back, as it were, for the planned war against the Persians. This implied that he could not design the Makedonian control of Hellas as an open system of rule, as this would have caused resistance and instability. So he had to find a form that corresponded to the expectations and the 'moral' standards of his time. Therefore Philip advertised the league by referring to the role model of the Common Peace (*koinē eirēnē*), with an established council that appeared as governing force behind it (Plut. *Phok.* 16.4). For the same reason, the ideas of freedom and autonomy were prefaced to the resulting *koinē eirēnē* agreement with the Greeks. Consequently, the securing of his pre-eminence could not be separated from a program acceptable to them. With both aspects in place,² Philip aimed at a permanent arrangement, based on multilateral treaties, that would last throughout his own lifetime and also in the future, securing his successors' supremacy over the Hellenic world.

In order to control Greece and unlock its military resources for the Persian war, Philip needed a position of ultimate power from which to act. This was crafted by the creating the official position of a *hēgemōn* of the league, who could be only Philip himself. The judicial safeguard of his hegemonic rights allowed him to mobilize the league for a war by land and sea after a specific decision of the allied council. Theoretically, then, the military forces of Hellas were largely united. With the support of a corresponding resolution, the *hēgemōn* had far-reaching authority to call out and command the forces of the member-states.

With the agreement on freedom and autonomy, the most powerful part of the league accepted the prevailing set of values and swore on the self-determination of all independent actors of the 'international' sphere. With this, the thrust towards the freedom of the Hellenic *poleis* was formally acknowledged; accordingly, the admission of members to the league was in

² See *IG* II² 236 = Tod 177 = *SVF* III 403 = Heisserer 1980: 8–10 = R&O no. 78. See further Hammond and Griffith 1979: 571–579; Jehne 1994: 139–267.

principle considered voluntary.³ After other great powers in Greece had been eliminated and their confederacies dissolved or impaired, there was no imminent threat to autonomy from that side. The *koina*, however, were apparently not abolished,⁴ because there was no reason to exploit the *autonomia* against them, as was done by Sparta a few decades earlier. With Makedonian predominance firmly in place, the destabilizing impact of the call for *autonomia* (Jehne 1994) on interstate politics was thus neutralized. Indeed the claim for *autonomia* could not be turned against the current hegemonic league by any potential Greek rival with the aim of its dissolution – simply because there were no rivals left. It was only logical that the Great King, as the single remaining opponent to the Corinthian League, demanded the return to the *autonomia* clause of 387/6.⁵ How Greek *autonomia* would be substantiated in the Corinthian League, however, depended, under the existing conditions, on the unilateral will of the *hēgemōn*.

As *hēgemōn*, Philip's political and military competences were attached to a confederation of *koinē eirēnē* that could be called a *koinon tōn Hellēnōn* (Arr. *Anab.* 3.24.4.), whose members, "those who participate in the peace" (*oi tēs eirēnēs koinonountes*⁶), partook as autonomous states. This implied that the duties and rights of the *synedrion* had to be specified and spelled out, and that the hegemonic element in the structure of the league was cast in an arrangement that recognized the role, no matter how inferior, of its participating members. The mutual obligations of the member-states were a) to keep peace among each other, and b) to punish offenses against the *koinē eirēnē* collectively, under the leadership of the *hēgemōn*. Such obligations were the legal basis of the political and military activities of the league. When violations of the agreement occurred, it was the members' duty to intervene; in that case, the hegemonic executive had the right to request forces from them and to lead punitive action against potential perpetrators.

Since aggressive acts on land or sea against other league members were prohibited and any transgression prompted the executive reaction of the league,⁷ the outcome of the reciprocal obligations was a significant pacification of the relations between league participants, amounting to a non-aggression pact. From the securing of peace and the mutual obligations among members it appears that such participation in the *koinē eirēnē*

³ [Dem.] 17.30; Plut. *Phok.* 16. ⁴ Ryder 1965: 104; Beck 1997: 48.

⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 2.1.4; Heisserer 1980: 88–90.132–3.

⁶ Tod 177, lines 9–10; cf. 192, lines 12–13 = *SIG*³ 283 = Heisserer 1980: 79–95 = R&O no. 84; [Dem.] 17.6; 10; 15–6.

⁷ *IG* II² 236a; [Dem.] 17.6; 10–11; 16; 19.

actually constituted a defensive alliance,⁸ whether or not a *symmachia* treaty existed separately from the Common Peace agreement.⁹ To keep peace in Hellas, a supplementary *symmachia* was in any case not required, since the obligation to observe the *koinē eirēnē* and to support every executive action against its violation committed the participants de facto to symmachic cooperation. But, in a second step, Philip and the Hellenes probably agreed on a separate *symmachia*, which formed the basis of the offensive war against Persia.

The second vital institution of the league was the council, that could rightly be seen as *koinon tōn Hellenōn synedrion* (Hypereid. 4.20). The establishment of a council was well in accordance with the experiences in other hegemonic leagues and federal coalitions from as early as the sixth century BCE.¹⁰ In 338/7, the establishment of a council was a bare necessity. Since a Common Peace was established and, as such, linked with the ideology of freedom and autonomy, the participating states had to be organized in a joint forum, guaranteeing their institutional involvement in all important decisions of the league. All political and military provisions were thus sanctioned and authorized by the league. This, in turn, required a sharing of competences between the council and *hēgemōn*. Regardless of the dispute about its legal basis and the actual power gradient, the dyarchic character of the league's constitution should be emphasized: *hēgemōn* and council were dependent upon each other. Without mutual agreement, neither of the two institutions could operate. Therefore the council had to be arranged as a permanent institution, in order to ensure its undisturbed function also during periods of absence of the *hēgemōn*, in particular to oversee the terms of the Common Peace. This implied a considerable number of duties and competences of the *synedrion*.¹¹

1. the appointment of the *hēgemōn* by election;
2. proceedings and decisions about the opening and conclusion of a league's war against member-states, other Hellenes or 'barbarians';
3. the commissioning of the *hēgemōn* with the enforcement of decisions made by the council, e.g., the beginning of a war;
4. legislation in relevant matters, exemplified with the prohibition of collaboration with the Persians, which was subject to penalty;

⁸ Heuss 1938: 173–174; Larsen 1955: 52; R&O p. 376–377.

⁹ IG II² 236a; Arr. *Anab.* 3.24.5; Just. *Epit.* 9.5.2–6; also Diod. 17.63.1. See esp. Patsavos 1956; Ryder 1965: 150–162; Heisserer 1980: 16–19. 24; Jehne 1994: 139–267; Buckler 1994: 115–116.

¹⁰ See Chapter 24 by Kurt Raaflaub above.

¹¹ Competences of the *synedrion*: Schwahn 1930a; Ryder 1965; Perlman 1985: 171.

5. decisions after the end of military campaigns as, e.g., on the treatment of Thebes in 335 BCE. In this sense, the *synedrion* worked as a *de facto* court of justice;
6. judicial decisions regarding individuals;
7. oversight over specific domestic activities in the member-states and securing their compliance to the league statutes regarding constitutional change and upheaval;
8. involvement in the common guardianship (*koinē phylakē*), i.e., supervision of the Common Peace;¹²
9. initializing arbitration procedures by recruiting third-party judges in conflicts between league members; the *synedrion* itself might have absorbed some arbitrating qualities itself.¹³

What follows from this was that the league's council was designed as an active and effective working tool in the overall organization of the league, not as an empty shell. Because of its functions, it occupied the role of the guardian of the treaties, protector of peace and constitutions, and occasionally 'warlord' against enemies of the Hellenic order. Its outstanding position was documented by the binding force of its *dogmata* without secondary ratification by the authorities of the allies.¹⁴ In legal terms, the *synedrion* of representatives of *poleis*, *ethnē* and *koina* was the authoritative decision-making body for the contracted agenda. Due to its competences and authority at the very center of the confederation, the *synedrion* might be regarded as a Panhellenic organ that was considered to speak for all Greeks (Doukellis 2005). A high number of council members and the impressive geographic extent of the league supported the idea that the representative council provided the Greeks with an institutional foothold. The *synedrion* clearly came very close to a federal decision-making body in charge of important questions of interstate politics.

A new element of the league's constitution compared with older alliances confirmed this role. Corresponding to their weight (according to citizen figures or contributions to the army, or both), members were assigned a different number of votes in the council, a political arithmetic that was possibly copied from the Boiotian League. Thus, the *koinonountes* were organized by the principle of proportional representation, which realigned the voting rights in council according to the size of the citizen

¹² IG II³ 329 = Tod 183 = SVA III 403 II, lines 12–13; [Dem.] 17.15.

¹³ SIG³ 261 = Tod 179 = Piccirilli 1997: no.1 = R&O no. 82; Liv. 38.34.8.

¹⁴ IG IV² 1 68 = SVA III 446, lines 75–76; cf. Ryder 1965: 103, 160–161.

bodies of member-states and their military capacity.¹⁵ The league venues in centers that were charged with the notion of Hellenicity, such as Corinth, supported the impression of a comprehensive league of all free Greeks.

The political distribution of power and its mechanisms after the Battle of Chaironeia elucidate, however, that Philip and Alexander had a severe and regulating influence on the *synedrion* to win majorities that served their interests first and foremost. Besides, the council apparently needed the *hēgemōn*'s military authority because it had no right to mobilize forces itself and therefore it could not act independently as a military leader. Since the forces of the allies could be deployed for defensive and aggressive purposes,¹⁶ the *hēgemōn* had a wide range of operations at his disposal to pursue his aims by means of a league war. The League of Corinth nevertheless marked a flexible and multi-adaptable point of departure for future projects of federal integration of all Greeks (Ehrenberg 1960: 119), particularly with its thrust towards proportional representation and the concentration of wide-ranging competences and authorities in the league council. But such a trajectory, which, according to Larsen (1944: 161), led to "something in the nature of a federal constitutional monarchy", was obstructed by factors that constrained the further development of the concept in later Hellenic leagues. Those leagues will be considered next.

The Hellenic League of Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes

The Corinthian League was used as a paradigm for the organization of the relationship between Makedonian rulers and the Greeks. After the failure of Polyperchon's attempt to reinstate the league in 319 BCE,¹⁷ Antigonos the One-Eyed and Demetrios Poliorketes returned to its design when structuring their relations with mainland Greece. Their (probably) multilateral confederation, founded in the spring of 302, indicated a considerable dynamic. Its royal protagonists, who had already planned such a league in 307 (Diod. 20.46.5) and now controlled the greatest part of southern and central Hellas, regarded it openly as a remake of Philip's confederacy (Plut. *Demetr.* 25.3). To support this claim, the founding meeting was held at the Isthmus near Corinth. Panhellenic overtones were further voiced by the regulation to choose the sanctuaries of the crown competitions, the Grand

¹⁵ *IG* II² 236b; Schwahn 1930a: 61–62; Ryder 1965: 153, 160; R&O p. 378; Worthington 2009: 220–221; pace Cawkwell 1978: 172 and 174; Jehne 1994: 187–190.

¹⁶ So Just. *Epit.* 9.5.4–6; cf. Diod. 16.89.3. ¹⁷ *SVA* III 403 III.

Four (Delphi, Olympia, Nemea, Isthmia) for the meetings whenever possible.

To what extent the new league was consciously modeled after the one from 338/7 is not explained in the sources,¹⁸ but some common features are conspicuous. For the Antigonids, reference to the preceding league resulted from their political and military situation, which was similar to that of Philip. This also implied that, in historical retrospect, the Corinthian League was not solely viewed as a blunt coercive institution by the Greeks at the end of the fourth century. As the movements of the kings were directed against Kassandros and his forces, they accordingly hard pressed to win over the favor of the Greeks with an attractive order. Like the earlier league, its successor prohibited warfare against, and amongst, members of the league, provided a guarantee of their territorial integrity, and required assurance not to overthrow the monarchy of the Antigonids. The standards of freedom and autonomy were probably also codified in the [opening section](#) (now missing) of the foundation treaty.

Other than the Corinthian League, the iteration of 302 was a *symmachia* on a legal basis. The relationship of the members to each other was stipulated to be determined by friendship and alliance. Their adherence to the kings was cemented by the provision to have the same friends and enemies, a commonly used clause in such treaties. Therewith the vital interests of the Antigonids were satisfied, who aimed at a comprehensive organization and better governance of their positions in Hellas (Diod. 20.102.1) while at the same time seeking to realize the military potential of their *symmachoi*.

For the sake of peacekeeping they agreed to refrain from attacks against the territories of member-states. Their present constitutions were frozen, as it were, i.e., the distribution of political power in each state was guaranteed as it was currently in place, curbing threats to the peace from domestic turmoil and violence. This amounted to a non-aggression pact of the partners and a peace association at land and sea. In this sense, the Antigonids reinstated the idea of a Common Peace, which was intertwined with the notion of a *symmachia*.

The hegemony of the kings resulted, of course, from the historical context as well as from their superior armed forces. Naturally, the league executive in case of a common war was assigned to them or to a *stratēgos* chosen by them. Again, the intervention of the executive was mandated in

¹⁸ IG IV² 1 68 = SVA III 446; Patsavos 1956; Ryder 1965: 113–115. 163; Harter-Uibopuu 2003; Doukellis 2005: 55–58.

case of any transgression of the contractual terms. Also, the league was based on the combination of the *hēgemōn*'s power with the prerogatives of a council. The *synedrion* was staffed with appointed *proedroi* ("chairmen"); during wartime the kings had special rights to designate them. The measure evidently aimed at increasing the efficiency of league procedures and securing the council's loyalty to the kings. Whether the council achieved a certain degree of independence through its *proedroi* is, however, difficult to assess. If more than 50 per cent of the *synedroi* entitled to vote were represented in the assembly, their decisions were binding on the allies. They were prohibited from prosecuting their representatives for decisions of the *synedrion*. Accordingly, the *synedroi* had the right to deliberate independently, i.e., they were not necessarily liable to account to the member-states; they had a free mandate. This, along with the quorum clause, made both the council and the alliance in general more effective, as binding resolutions were passed more easily and more quickly. Efficiency itself was considered tantamount because sufficient attendance at the *synodoi* and the safeguarding of the communication between council and member-states were apparently seen as potentially problematic, in particular during times of war. The council's convocation was the task of the *basileis* and the *proedroi*, or was assigned to a *stratēgos* appointed by the kings. If necessary, the chairmen also instituted legal proceedings against *poleis* as well as individuals. The work of the *synedrion* as a court of justice seems to have resembled the league of 338/7.

These functions affirm that the council of the league from 302 again possessed far-reaching competences. The *synedrion* was designed as a second pillar of the alliance, indispensable for all activities and formally coequal, and watched over its integrity beside the royal leaders.¹⁹ Surely the conservation of peace between the members was a key task, and in case of violation the *synedrion* was empowered to intervene. It might have also absorbed arbitration and conflict resolution powers, although the details of this are not attested.

If certain *synedroi* failed to appear at the assemblies, fines were incurred. Although the league comprised city-states as well as *koina*,²⁰ in each case the *poleis* (also in federal states) were obliged to send the delegates and therefore liable to incur penalty payments if they did not attend a meeting. This accentuation of the *poleis*' responsibility might be interpreted as an

¹⁹ See Bengtson 1937: 157–158. 164–165; Harter-Uibopuu 2003: 333–334.

²⁰ *Poleis* and *ethnē*: SVA III 446, lines 78 and 138–139. Demetrios' later *koina*-policy: Ryder 1965: 114–115; Lehmann 1988: 138. 147–148.

indication that Demetrios tried to weaken the federal center of *koina* members (Buraselis 2003: 43). But the Antigonids did not apply any kind of freedom rhetoric against *koina*, whose integrity remained on the whole untouched. And the league council itself most likely drew on the principle of proportional representation when staffing its benches.²¹ It was easy, apparently, for the Antigonids to win a majority vote in the *syndrion*, as the governments of most member-states were obliged to them. This resulted in the council being easily controlled by the *hēgemōn*.

However, because of further developments on the battlefield, the league had very limited chances of consolidation. With the defeat at Ipsos (301) it was actually disbanded, although Demetrios never formally dissolved the league. When he withdrew to Asia Minor, the *symmachoi*, left to their own devices, did not carry on with the league organization on their own account. The very short time since its inauguration had clearly contributed to the fact that the league had no chances of survival without its hegemonic component. But its life expectancy was generally low without its founders, who were almost synonymous with the league executive. Hellenic sympathies for the league probably decreased anyway, in light of some direct interventions of the kings and their functionaries in vital aspects of the confederation, although the attitudes of the member-states remain somewhat uncertain.

The Hellenic League of Antigonos III Doson

The confederacy of Antigonos Doson, probably founded in the autumn of 224, came into existence because several states in the Greek homeland felt it was advantageous for them to intertwine their fate with that of Makedon in the second half of the 220s BCE. Accordingly, treaties were concluded which earned Doson the role of *hēgemōn* over Greece and strengthened the position of Makedonia. The result was a hegemonic league that integrated the greater parts of Hellas again after a longer interval.²²

The league relied on the use of Makedonian armed forces to serve the mutual interests of the king and his subjects as well as the Greek member-states. In fact, the league operated effectively because of the military capacity of Makedon. Resulting from the imbalance in the distribution of military power, armed forces were, as in the older leagues, only deployed

²¹ *SVA* III 446, lines 78–79 and 92–94. For a different view, cf. Cawkwell 1978: 17; Harter-Uibopuu 2003: 321–322.

²² The sources: *SVA* III 507; history and constitution of the league: Scherberich 2009.

if the *hēgemōn* decided to do so. The possibility to outvote the *hēgemōn* by a majority decision of the league's members was excluded from the start. Jakob Larsen (1968: 324) observed that "[a]ll the regular members of the Hellenic League were federal states." However, dynasts also entered the league and, after the admission of Sparta, individual *poleis*. Makedonia itself joined in the organization (Polyb. 4.9.4). But the greater majority of members were actually *koine*. One of them, the Achaian League, appeared from the outset as the strongest and most agile member of the new league, next to Makedonia.

The league's constitution reflects that the states, admitted as *symmachoi*, were not willing to accept blunt Makedonian domination; such an attempt would have jeopardized the project. In order to win an initial set of allies, Doson proposed a loose contractual relationship, which probably comprised the guarantee of *eleutheria* and *autonomia* and, moreover, also freedom from garrisons. In accordance with this character of 'soft' encroachment upon members' affairs, the *symmachoi* retained a scope for foreign policies of their own, beyond the organization of their sacred relations. It was possible, for instance, for league members to wage wars separately if they were not directed against other members of the league or negatively impacted their interests. Furthermore, they were allowed to conclude alliances with states outside of the confederacy, without the consent of the league council (Polyb. 4.9.5). The oaths, periodically renewed, knitted them together in the legal form of a multilateral *symmachia* with a *hēgemōn* at the top. Apparently, no *koine eirēnē* was stipulated in conjunction with the league. The administration of interstate arbitration remains uncertain.

The league members came together for consultations of common matters in a *synedrion* that regularly held meetings on fixed dates or, if necessary, on an ad hoc basis. The Makedonian king certainly had the authority to convoke a league meeting whenever he thought necessary. In the *synedrion*, violations of the league's terms were discussed, and warfare was decided. Not all of the allies, however, were bound to participate in such wars; they were not subject to a binding majority vote (Polyb. 4.26.2; 4.30). Only those states which had the decision in favor of going to war ratified by their home authorities would participate in the conflict. This laborious procedure of submitting syndrial decrees to the decision of every member-state could significantly impair the league's ability to strike. Generally, the cohesiveness of the league was harmed simply because not all members were obliged to partake in a war resolved by the council. Apparently, the final say on the acceptance of new allies also was reserved to

the home authorities.²³ These regulations evidently satisfied the wish of the members to preserve their political self-determination. For example, the possibility to abstain from a league war and not to ratify it at the level of the member-states was intended to save them from being outvoted and thus forced into an unwanted conflict.

As in the previous leagues, the *synedrion* and *hēgemōn* depended on each other in the pursuit of their affairs. But this time, the *hēgemōn* was more heavily involved in the workings of the *synedrion*, as he could not only convene it, but also presided over it as chairman. In a military context, cooperation was indispensable because the members desperately needed the forces of the *hēgemōn*, who for his part was not allowed to call for troops without a majority decision of the council *and* the approval of the individual states. He could probably initiate the admittance of new members into the league or peace agreements, but not complete the process without the council.

The members, in turn, looked for Makedonian support but they were unwilling to trade it off for their political freedom. This explains, *inter alia*, why they were prepared to delegate competences to the level of the confederacy only to a limited degree. A common treasury and finances (e.g., fixed contributions) were lacking, as was the right to oblige members to implement common decisions. Nor were they compelled automatically to support *symmachoi* who had been attacked; there was no guarantee for their territorial inviolability. Any concerted military action by the league had to be preceded by a separate decision in every allied state.

In sum, the constitution of the league appears to have been a fairly fragile structure. With regards to the decision-making process, Doson had to make concessions which threatened the mechanics of both the *symmachia* and its intended hegemony.²⁴ To secure their functioning, additional diplomatic intervention or some pressure was often required to win the approval of as many members as possible. This betrays one motive as to why the Makedonian hegemony tried to reinforce itself by separate and supplementary treaties with each member, apart from the covenants of the league, which was not considered to be adequately reliable. This possibly led to the decision of Philip V to neglect the Hellenic League more and more in the course of his reign, so that it ultimately withered away. Since the rights and claims of the Makedonian kings vis-à-vis their partners were pronounced more clearly by means of bilateral treaties than in the multi-polar legal framework of the Hellenic league, the latter was not used as a

²³ Scherberich 2009: 183 and 186.

²⁴ Scherberich 2009: 78; Ehrenberg 1960: 120.

comprehensive concept for an overall organization of Greece under Makedonian control. So the *symmachia* did not advance to an organization based on an self-supporting *eirēnē* and balance of interests. Doson's league temporarily operated in a stabilizing and peacekeeping way, but it was a variant of *symmachia* that did not transform or develop the concept of an alliance. It illustrates the flexibility, but also the weakness of hegemonic symmachies as supranational organizations in Greek history.

Some common features and structural problems of the Hellenic leagues

As the survey of the Hellenic leagues of Late Classical and Hellenistic periods indicates, the structure of those organizations combined various elements of treaties, principles of international law, and norms for the conduct of interstate politics in varying blends, to account for a sense of political integrity, insisting on self-determination and security of the incorporated *poleis* and *ethnē*, and at the same time to acknowledge, and execute, the interests of the Makedonian kings. Therefore, the call for autonomy and peace were articulated in variable degrees and were accordingly defended by the leagues, whereas at the same time they served as their obligatory normative framework. All three leagues reflected the new importance of monarchy as the pre-eminent and most forceful element of interstate politics. The *basileis* were, however, not simply partners among others, but they absorbed the role of the *hēgemōn* in each case. Moreover, it should not be ignored that the foundation of the Hellenic leagues arose out of the initiatives of these kings, not from *poleis* and *ethnē* aspiring to a stabilization of interstate relations.

By appointing the kings to the leading position, the rights to govern the alliances and their executives were invested with the most powerful partner, because the league's military capacity was based above all on their available resources. As a consequence of the superiority of the monarchs, and in light of the experiences of previous federal organizations, this recourse to a hegemonic structure was both understandable and, ultimately, without any alternative, because the distribution of power simply fostered a hierarchic structuring of the alliances. The monarchic *hēgemōn* was the strongest partner, who safeguarded the internal cohesion and ensured the pursuit of the league's goals, because the means of coercion to enforce the agreements rested by and large with him. The degree to which members might be obliged to provide guarantees and to render services varied from league to league. Nevertheless, the Hellenic leagues

amounted to a *de facto* system of peacekeeping, regardless of whether *symmachia* treaties existed or not, and to a defensive alliance with hegemonic leadership. Despite all its flaws, *hēgemonia* with its distinct internal power gradient proved to be the only practicable way, not least because no other viable solution was conceived or suggested to cope with the imbalance of power between the kings and the other members.²⁵

The Hellenic leagues linked federalism to the concept of hegemony, with the main goals of military cooperation and the peacekeeping between the members. All of them integrated *poleis* and *koīna*; in Doson's league the latter actually presented an overwhelming majority. Thus the hegemonic frame was also flexible enough to integrate states which for their part were already comprised of city-states and/or districts of an *ethnos* or a region, without striving for their dissolution.

The limited efficiency of these leagues in terms of an actual realization of their political objectives is evident. This was, in part, conditioned by contingent factors. None of them stood the test of time, simply because there was no time available to them to consolidate. Each one rapidly suffered a loss of cohesion and functionality as soon as the *hēgemōn* forfeited his power or pursued different aims. This is illustrated in the crises after the deaths of Philip and Alexander, or the battle of Ipsos, and proved positive by the political reorientation of Philip V which led to the demise of Antigonos Doson's league. The chances for the development of a Hellenic league concept remained unexploited due to such factors and events. A more intensive focalization of the kings and their instruments of power on Hellas might have led to the result of a Makedonian empire in Greece, where the Hellenic states would have disappeared as autonomous actors. In that sense, the role of a *synedrion* would have mutated into an assembly of subjects, similar to a Roman provincial *conventus*. One can speculate that an alternative way of development might have enhanced the syndetric structure of the league and its strength in relation to its hegemonic element.

The actions of the kings were, of course, not altruistically directed towards the establishment of the best possible living conditions for the Greek states, but rather was led by the desire to implement political structures that made interstate affairs more governable, and Makedonian rule a more indirect experience. For the hegemonic powers, the main objective of the idea of Common Peace among their allies implied an efficient control of (a part of) Hellas and/or the basis for further-reaching

²⁵ Persistence of hegemonic concepts, Walter 2003: 90.

goals in hostile competition with their rivals. However, it was neither their concern nor 'historical mandate' to unite Hellas. In so far as they focused their attention on the Hellenic leagues, they had no reason to encourage a process of federal integration that resulted in the strengthening of collective political institutions. Impulses in this direction ought to have emanated from the other members, provided that the Hellenic leagues were designed to offer an organizational frame of reference for Hellas.²⁶ In this vein, it would have been possible to employ, e.g., the constitution of the Corinthian League as a blueprint for a self-adjusting confederacy of Greek states, with or without a (weakened) hegemony.

The leagues' councils would have been the obvious point of departure for this. Formalistically speaking, the oaths safeguarding the *eleutheria* and *autonomia* of members spoke to the voluntary nature of these confederacies. Rooted in the *synedrion*, the expression of freedom and self-governance was enshrined in a central pillar of the leagues' structure. The *synedrion* was the appropriate political institution to manage common issues, because the council embodied above all the federal element of military cooperation and preservation of peace. But the councils held their meetings neither cyclically nor frequently. If so, it would have been easier to establish a comprehensive identity within the leagues, especially if the *synedroi* were not accountable to their home governments. Besides, because the tasks of the leagues were primarily related to interstate and military matters, most of the activities of their councils originally were initiated by the *hēgemōn*. It was generally difficult for the *synedria* to take action on their own, to establish an independent authority and to initiate, for instance, mediation in unresolved conflicts. It had become clear after Philip II's death and again in 323 BCE that, despite its substantial rights, the Hellenic council had not grown into a self-supporting institution.²⁷ In its actions, it would have required an executive, for better or for worse. The simplest solution, but the most unpopular at that time, would have been the election of a new *hēgemōn*. Alternatively, the members would have had to agree – as a result of open deliberation – on the continuation of the Common Peace treaty and organize the forces of the league. Such a course of action might have given rise to a freely negotiated association of peace and alliance with all states interested in participating, a league in which they were represented proportionally and capable of acting in accordance with an institutionalized executive. Such an approach would have required the formulation and implementation of an overarching interest (see Diod.

²⁶ See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 623–625.

²⁷ Cf. Kaerst 1927: 283–285.

20.46.5), and also the capability of collective defense without a hegemonic device orchestrating affairs.

Only a reinforcement of the synedrial component, i.e., the establishment of a council institution with members regularly present in times of peace and war, could have balanced the powers of a *hēgemōn* or supplanted him altogether. But any impulse leading in this direction failed to materialize. In 323 BCE, for example, not even a basic approach to this can be detected, as the Greek states, seemingly freed from Makedonian dominance, considered such a project to be nothing more than a continuation of the Corinthian League. They made no attempt to translate meaningful elements of integration from Philip's confederacy into valid concepts of order, which now could have been accomplished without a hegemonic power.

The Hellenic leagues examined here and the older hegemonic *symmachiai* share the inability to create an authority of their own, which functioned independently from their hegemonic leaders. Participating members perceived these leagues too much as an expression, and instrument, of hegemonic powers, rather than a structural matrix for further cooperation. No feeling of an 'extended concept of inside' emerged, to which the members ascribed themselves.²⁸ Without the *hēgemōn* uniting them, these leagues had very little, if any, capacity of integration enabling them to regulate interstate affairs and conflicts between *poleis* and *koina*.

The inability of the leagues to provide for compliance with existing treaty obligations without the constituent power of the *hēgemōn* shows the dilemma. Their functionality depended on *hēgemonia*. But this was conceived as oppressive and soon equated with confederacies as such. Consequently, hegemony and federal organization were both disposed of in promising situations; their potential to alleviate the problems resulting from the insufficient regulation of interstate relations remained unused. Experiences of hegemonic arbitrariness hampered the familiarization of the members with strategies of peacekeeping and conflict resolution, because the respective rules and activities were considered to be part of power politics on behalf of the *hēgemōn*. Therefore, each organization was dropped as soon as possible, as the Greek states preferred to pursue a 'sovereign' policy, and maybe even a hegemonic agenda of their own.²⁹ This pattern of behavior can be detected already

²⁸ See Hans Beck and Peter Funke in the [introduction](#), above. ²⁹ Polyb. 2.37.9; Dem. 18.206.

in the Corinthian League. To put it in Isokrates' words: what was lacking was voluntary acceptance (*eunoia*), the existence of which was considered to be the prerequisite of a 'sound' hegemony and stable (peace-) alliance.³⁰

The impression emerges that, in full-fledged military and peace-keeping alliances, the functionality of such leagues depended mostly, if not solely, on the *hēgemōn*'s capacities to implement those policies. Without their hegemonic component, interstate politics were on the verge of declining to the 'traditional' pattern of relationships shaped to a high degree by competition, persistent change, and great potential for conflicts with a marked inclination to respond to any kind of conflict rapidly and militarily – despite the existing procedures and norms that might have been applied to preserve peace and safeguard the political self-determination of communities. In other words, in a non-hegemonic alliance, a federal *eirēnē* was likely to fail. The most common and successful peace was, consequently, enshrined in the league initiated by Philip II, simply because Makedon was the strongest power that had led the *koinē eirēnē* until 338/7. Yet the greater the divide between the *hēgemōn* and the other league members, the more danger this power gradient posed to the *eleutheria*, *autonomia*, and, ultimately, the multipolar character of the league. This dilemma could not be resolved in hegemonic alliances. Non-hegemonic Hellenic leagues, however, neither existed long enough nor offered structures that were convincing enough to counter sceptical assessments of their efficiency.³¹

Other than the great federal states of the day, the Hellenic leagues with a king at their top were unable to secure peace and at the same time preserve the political integrity, and statehood, of their participating members. "The building of the bridge that led to the federal state," the beginning of which was seen by Viktor Ehrenberg (1960: 119) in the Corinthian League,³² failed to materialize. The common basis of all three leagues considered here remained in the realm of international law; the use of citizenship as a means of political integration was beyond their scope. The Hellenic program heralded in their names was nowhere translated into the desire for an Hellenic union neither by the hegemons nor by their treaty partners. Polybius (2.37.11) might have viewed the entire Peloponnese as one *polis*,

³⁰ See de Romilly 1958; Dobesch 1968.

³¹ E.g., the Hellenic League of Demosthenes (*SVF* II 343) or the one of the Lamian War (*SVF* III 476).

³² Cf. also Schwahn 1930a: 55 and 58.

united under the umbrella of the Achaian League, but for all of Hellas such a view was apparently impossible.

The structures of the Hellenic leagues may have been influenced by those of some older federal states like Boiotia. Yet the sources do not allow us to identify a converse impact of the Hellenic leagues on the federalist constitutions of the third and second centuries. However, at least the mechanisms of decision-making in the leagues, especially the working of the *synedria*, offered a wealth of experience to the integrated *koina* concerning the operating principles in political bodies overarching *poleis* and *ethnē*. Moreover the leagues furnished the *koina* with a concrete idea of organizing peace, conflict resolution, cohesion, proportional representation, while simultaneously adhering to the principle of self-determination. In spite of the strong influence of the kings on the *synedria* it became obvious that they could operate as superior advisory councils for common issues of the Greek states, and were able to handle them more systematically as, e.g., the Delphic Amphictyony. Furthermore the *synedria* had a potential capacity for conflict resolution. That meant a lot in view of the insufficient regulation of interstate relations. Accordingly, the federal states could learn a great deal from the Hellenic leagues. Besides, the *koina* were quite prepared to be assimilated into the Hellenic leagues, if this seemed opportune, because an efficient hegemony could also ease the hard climate of rivalry on the interstate level for them.³³

In comparison to the pattern of hegemonic confederacy the federal states of Greece offered many *poleis* a more manageable, reliable, and calculable opportunity to protect themselves against the risks of interstate politics and combine their military forces while safeguarding their own interests and freedom.³⁴ The refinement of federal constitutions added considerably to this, since their institutions and rules allowed for a constantly adapting balance between the claims staked both by the member *poleis* and the federal center. This encouraged stability and comprised more effective mechanisms for a proper balance of interests than the synderial organization of the Hellenic leagues.

With the dissociation of Philip V from Doson's confederacy, the development of the hegemonic, federal, and synderial concept of these confederacies ended. There was no other opportunity for Greeks and Makedonians to organize political hegemony, peacekeeping, autonomy, and interstate participation among themselves, as is well known. Unlike

³³ See Buraselis 2003: 42, 44–45 and 50.

³⁴ For the growing attraction of federal states, see Funke 2007a.

the *koina*, however, the potential of the hegemonic leagues for further development was exhausted at the moment of Rome's arrival. The elaborate combination of the hierarchic element of hegemony, egalitarian aspects of the peace- and/or alliance-treaties, and the forces of federalism, embodied in the *synedrion*, was functional for as long as the first element prevailed. As soon as it vanished, the common frame of reference collapsed.

*Peaceful conflict resolution in the world
of the federal states*

Sheila Ager

One of Jakob Larsen's more earnest arguments was that federation might function to mitigate conflict and promote peace. In his 1944 article, "Federation for Peace in Ancient Greece," Larsen examined the world of ancient Greece and its federations as a potential model for the contemporary world, at that time so convulsed by war. "The story will be one of failure," he says in his introduction, "but lost causes frequently deserve study, and this at one point was so very near success" (Larsen 1944: 145). In a similar vein, over two decades earlier, Arthur Boak (1921) had addressed the matter of Greek interstate associations in the context of naïve contemporary comparisons of such associations with the League of Nations.¹ Larsen, writing in the midst of war, expressed a cautious – very cautious – optimism for the peaceful possibilities of federalism. Boak, writing two years after the Treaty of Versailles, expressed ominous doubts: "Will the League of Nations [also] fail unless some one powerful state or group of states is made responsible for the enforcement of its terms and has coercive power over the remaining members?" (Boak 1921: 383.)

While Larsen did not use the language of contemporary international relations theory in presenting his analysis, he – and Boak also – presaged a core debate that has long dominated modern theoretical frameworks used to describe the international system: the tension between Realism and Liberal Institutionalism.² Realism posits the following: the interstate system is demonstrably an anarchy, with no superior power to enforce peace; every state is therefore responsible for its own security; and all states therefore tend to become highly security-conscious. For the sake of their very existence, states must maximize their own power. Liberal

¹ Compare also Bickerman 1944; Murray 1944; Whitby 1991; King and LeForestier 1994; Wilson 2011.

² For the purposes of this chapter there is no need to distinguish between Realism and Neo-Realism, etc; for classic statements on these theories, see Keohane and Nye 1977 and Waltz 1979. Much current scholarship eschews the strict divide between these frameworks; see Baldwin 1993; Sanders 1996; Fioretos 2011.

Institutionalism, on the other hand, puts greater faith not only in the positive impact of IGOs such as the United Nations, but also in the potential for other forms of interstate action (such as commercial collaboration) to build relationships of trust and mutual gain. Thus, while there may be no superior power to enforce international peace, the various international institutions can operate to mitigate the negative effects of anarchy.

Realism and Institutionalism both seem to offer relevant theoretical perspectives through which to examine the federal states of ancient Greece.³ These *koina* equipped themselves with at least some institutions – assemblies, councils, executive – that could operate to promote peaceful relations among their members.⁴ The umbrella of a *koinon* served to shield its members from the anarchy of the world beyond its borders, while at the same time constraining those members from violent behavior towards one another. The most powerful leagues of the Hellenistic period, the Achaians and the Aitolians, saw themselves moreover as equipped to extend their gifts of peace and protection to the outside world. But that world remained an anarchic one, and in it Achaians and Aitolians could behave collectively with all the brutal force and power-seeking that forms the basis of the Realist paradigm.

Conflict resolution

This chapter's focus is on modes of peaceful conflict resolution, even though such pacific methods are very often grounded in the implicit (or explicit) threat of military action. In particular here we are interested in third-party conflict resolution, whether through the stricter forms of arbitration or through the more flexible methods of mediation and good offices. Arbitration is a judicial procedure. It does not primarily seek to reconcile the parties to the dispute; its focus is on determining the 'legal' rights and wrongs of the case. Arbitration is typically thought of as binding, though interstate arbitration in an anarchic system generally lacks an enforcer. States may bind themselves to arbitration ahead of time by entering into a contract that makes arbitration of any future disputes obligatory; or a compromise may be made by the parties in the midst of

³ On contemporary IR theory and the ancient Greek world, see Lebow and Strauss 1991; Low 2007; Koehn 2007; Eckstein 2006 and 2008.

⁴ On federal structures and institutions, see, among others, Larsen 1968; Urban 1979; Daverio Rocchi 1993; Salmon 1994; Beck 1997; Mafodda 2000; Grainger 1999; Scholten 2000 and 2003b; Roy 2003; Siewert 2005a. For a juridical approach, see Ténékidēs 1956.

their quarrel to turn to the arbitration of a third party. Our first example of an obligatory arbitration compact in the Greek world comes from the early fifth century BCE: the Ionian states, once again under Persian rule after their failed rebellion, were informed by the Persian satrap Artaphernes that in future they were to turn to arbitration rather than arms to settle their conflicts.⁵ Herodotus remarks that this was a great improvement over the way the Ionians usually did things.

Mediation, on the other hand, is not a judicial process. Its chief concern is reconciling the parties by assisting them in finding a mutually acceptable solution to their problem(s). A mediator is not given the authority to make a judgement: legalities matter less than putting an end to conflict. Often the first move is made by the would-be mediator, offering the service in order to bring an end to a situation that is harmful to all concerned, including perhaps the mediator as well. Mediators are not usually completely disinterested parties; they are serving their own interests as well as the interests of the disputants. A mediator with a stake in the outcome is more apt to be expeditious and creative in resolving the conflict.⁶

For the federal states of ancient Greece, the evidence for such third-party conflict resolution is rich in the Hellenistic Age, but much sparser in the earlier periods. Luigi Piccirilli (1973) has collected the evidence for the Archaic and Classical Ages and finds a bare handful of cases involving an *ethnos* or *koinon*. A few inscriptions and brief remarks in the literary sources are all the testimony we have from the eighth to the fourth centuries BCE.⁷ For the Hellenistic period, by contrast, the epigraphic record is in all ways far more dense and extensive, and we also have authors such as Polybius, a writer interested in institutions and their functioning. Part of the imbalance, then, results from the shape of our sources. But there is another factor as well: the Hellenistic Age was the era in which the federal state came into its own as a mature player on the Greek stage. The revival of the Achaian League in 280 BCE, and the Aitolian defense against the Gauls in 279 and subsequent domination of Delphi, marked the beginnings of a period when these two federal collectives would play a role played in previous centuries by the *poleis* of Athens and Sparta and their respective symmachies.⁸

⁵ Hdt. 6.42.1; see Piccirilli 1973: no. 11.

⁶ See Touval and Zartman 1985; Bercovitch 1992; Bercovitch and Houston 2000; Bercovitch and Schneider 2000.

⁷ On the challenges of the early epigraphic record, see Morgan 2003: 73–80.

⁸ See Urban 1979, Scholten 2000, and Chapter 6 by Athanassios Rizakis above. On the *koinon* in the fourth century BCE, see Beck 1997.

The power base of a federal state rested in its constituent parts, in the *poleis* and the villages that were home to the population that self-identified as ‘the Aitolians’ or ‘the Boiotians’ or ‘the Thessalians’. The rationale of a *koinon* – from the perspective of its members – was that the whole was greater than the sum of the parts. Membership in a federal state brought with it a level of security unobtainable by small communities on their own. Giving up a little of one’s sovereignty – chiefly that which related to foreign affairs – was for them worth the clear benefits that one reaped in return from integration into the larger whole. And even so, it seems that member-states of various leagues exercised more independence than has at times been thought. The granting of *asylia*, the honors decreed for a benefactor, the establishment of *proxenia*: these were all international diplomatic activities that posed no threat to the larger *koinon*. Matters of war and peace, of alliance and treaty-making were larger issues and were therefore generally the prerogative of the league, though of course member-states could make their voices heard through the league institutions. And even in these circumstances we can still find evidence for independence of behavior by a member-state, such as when Pellene, alone of the Achaian states, joined Sparta at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.9.2).⁹

While many smaller *poleis* welcomed the protection of a federal state and willingly scaled back their autonomy expectations for the sake of the security of integration, there were some who either resented being forced into a *koinon* by military means or who continued to dream of asserting themselves at the interstate level, whether inside or outside the *koinon*. States such as these could disrupt a league’s ability to guarantee peace within its own borders and could also embarrass it on the international stage by acting with complete disregard for a league’s claim to manage foreign affairs on behalf of its members. The most blatant example of this behavior – and of a *koinon*’s inability to cope by other than military means when cooperation was not voluntary – was Sparta in the second century BCE.

Brought into the Achaian League after the death of Nabis in 192 BCE, Sparta itself was internally convulsed by decades of attempted reform and internal dissent. Some Spartans favored the association with Achaia; others did not. Over the next several decades, the Spartans persisted in acting independently and in flagrant defiance of the norms of the league by

⁹ For discussion of the tension between autonomy and integration in the sphere of foreign relations, see Giovannini 1971: 39–40, 58–59; Larsen 1971: 86; Walbank 1976/1977; Cabanes 1981; Daverio Rocchi 1993: 117–120; Beck 1997: 181–185; 2003: 183–187; Baltrusch 2008: 54–55.

sending their own embassies to Rome, embassies that frustrated Achaian leaders such as Polybius' father, Lykortas, and Philopoimen, who forced Sparta back into the federation in 188 BCE after it had seceded. The Spartans insisted on their right to behave on an equal footing with the Achaian *koinon* in the international sphere, while the more nationalistic among the Achaians insisted that their relationship with Sparta was purely an internal affairs matter and had nothing to do with the Romans. Matters were not helped by Roman ambiguity and ambivalence.¹⁰

An inscription from Olympia informs us that sometime in the early second century BCE an arbitration was carried out between Sparta and the Achaian federation.¹¹ The point of contention was Sparta's refusal to recognize the authority of the court (Roman? Achaian?) that had decided its dispute with Megalopolis in favor of the latter. Sparta further refused to pay a fine it was assessed for its refusal to recognize the earlier arbitral judgement. The inscription makes it perfectly clear that the parties to the dispute were Sparta and the Achaian League. Far from a federal state being able to control its own members through judicial instruments, we have here a situation where that state is submitting to the resolution of a conflict with one of its own members by an outside party. Both the disputants were bitterly determined to stick to their own positions. The judges tried for a long time to reconcile them, and restore a spirit of harmony within the *koinon*, but this proved impossible in the end, and the judges were forced to render a formal judgement.

A common thread that runs through the sources on mutual Achaian–Spartan frustrations is the irredentism of Sparta. The Spartans never accepted the loss of Messenia and their own fall from hegemonic dignity in 369 BCE. They refused to participate in peace treaties that recognized Messenia as an independent state, and for centuries afterward tried repeatedly to advance their borders against both Messene and Megalopolis. Occasionally such efforts might consist of military campaigning – as when Kleomenes in the 220s BCE briefly resuscitated Sparta's military reputation – but the bulk of our evidence suggests constant appeals for new territorial arbitrations, arbitrations which usually (but not always) went against Sparta.¹²

¹⁰ On Spartan relations with Achaia between 192 and 146 BCE, see Cartledge and Spawforth 1989: 77–90; Harter-Uibopuu 1998: 163–195.

¹¹ *SIG*³ 665 (Ager 1996: no. 137; Harter-Uibopuu 1998: no. 11). Taeuber 2006 argues persuasively that the judges were from Rhodes; he also backdates this arbitration from its conventional date of after 163 BCE to about 180 BCE.

¹² See Piccirilli 1973: nos. 60 and 61; Ager 1996: nos. 45, 50, 135–137, 147, 150, 159; Magnetto 1997: no. 48; Harter-Uibopuu 1998: 163–195 and no. 11.

The most common type of dispute to arise between Greek *poleis* was territorial. Boundary arbitrations abound in the epigraphic record.¹³ Land was a state's most precious asset, desirable for agricultural purposes, mineral resources, water sources, hunting, fishing, strategic defense and so forth. The Boiotians settled boundaries for their member *poleis*, as did the Thessalians, the Elians, the Achaians, the Aitolians, the Lykians, and no doubt other federal *koina* for which evidence does not survive.¹⁴ Disputes over land can also be ideological, and certainly Sparta's conflict with her northern neighbors featured a significant degree of symbolic import. Reclaiming these border territories would be a way of reasserting Sparta's claim to 'ancestral' territories, and hence ancestral rights, privileges, and status. Sparta's land dispute with Messene included conflicting claims to a sanctuary of Artemis, and disputes over access to or control of border sanctuaries was another common ideological contest.

Also ideological were quarrels over religious representation, a kind of conflict particularly prone to appear in the context of an ethnic *koinon*. The original constitution of the Delphic Amphiktyony, for example, guaranteed representation to the various ethnic groups (Dorians, Ionians, Lokrians, Thessalians, etc). Such representation meant attending the Amphiktyonic council as a *hieromnēmōn*, a sacred representative of one's *ethnos*. That this was a treasured and jealously guarded right is clear from the inscriptions we have recording disputes over the hieromnemon vote. The touchiness and emotional tone of some of the argumentation as recorded in these inscriptions may speak to the intensity of feeling around these matters, and perhaps account also for those instances where arbitration was sought from a party outside the *ethnos* or ethnic *koinon* altogether. In 161/0 BCE the Spartans and the Dorians of Central Greece quarreled over the share of the Dorian Amphiktyonic vote; the matter went to a different ethnic group for arbitration: the Thessalians.¹⁵ The little Lokrian *poleis* of Skarphai and Thronion, in addition to quarreling over land, battled out (in judicial terms) their claims to a share of the Lokrian hieromnemon vote before judges from the Ampiktyony itself, from Athens, and perhaps even from Rome.¹⁶

One of the challenges to peaceful conflict resolution in an anarchic world is finding an appropriate mediator/arbitrator. There is a great deal of modern scholarship on the characteristics required for an individual or

¹³ See Bignardi 1984; Daverio Rocchi 1987, 1988, and 1998; Freitag 2007c; Funke 2007b.

¹⁴ Piccirilli 1973: no. 51; Ager 1996: nos. 16, 17, 20, 38, 40, 41, 43, 46, 55, 56, 79, 116, 130; Magnetto 1997: nos. 15, 36, 38, 39, 42, 54, 63, 68; Harter-Uibopuu 1998; see also Taeuber 1983.

¹⁵ *SIG*³ 668 (Ager 1996: no. 139). ¹⁶ Ager 1996: nos. 133 and 167.

polity to be considered an acceptable choice.¹⁷ Such characteristics generally include: stature and authority (disputing parties are unlikely to welcome arbitration or mediation from a state they consider as having little or no legitimacy in the international system); leverage (whether of the carrot or the stick sort); and impartiality (but not necessarily neutrality).¹⁸ One vital characteristic is cultural understanding and/or sympathy.¹⁹ Democratic states are unlikely to find the arbitration of a dictator acceptable; countries where the language is Spanish will have difficulty with a mediator who speaks only Mandarin; and Islamic states are not going to turn to the Vatican to settle their differences. In today's world, regional organizations can at times be more efficacious than the United Nations in resolving conflict. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU) have the kind of shared cultural (or at least regional) understanding that can make them acceptable to peer states seeking third-party dispute settlement; the charters of these bodies specify peaceful conflict resolution as part of the organization's mandate.²⁰

The point here is that ancient ethnic *koina* could also represent for their members a shared cultural heritage, though both Aitolians and Achaians extended the membership of their *koina* far beyond the original ethnic tribe.²¹ As such, they provided opportunities for peer-to-peer conflict resolution. Furthermore, the very existence of leagues as formally constituted bodies (rather than an amorphous collection of towns and villages) provided the kind of pre-existing institutions that could channel and mitigate conflict before it became violent. The authority exercised by a federal state was supported by its collective military: federal mediation was backed up by the implicit threat of federal force. Thus the usual pattern in federal states – a pattern in general supported by the evidence for boundary disputes – was for the *koinon* to arrange for, and/or carry out, arbitration between its own members when quarrels arose.²²

¹⁷ Among others, Touval and Zartman 1985; Bercovitch 1986; Bercovitch 1992; Bercovitch and Houston 2000; Bercovitch and Schneider 2000.

¹⁸ These rules are not absolute: there are always exceptions arising from particularity of circumstances. On neutrality vs. impartiality, see Bercovitch 1992: 6.

¹⁹ See Bercovitch and Schneider 2000.

²⁰ See Amoo and Zartman 1992; Kanet 1998; Moore 2009; Karns 2009; Yamashita 2012.

²¹ On *ethnē* and cultural ties, see Morgan 2003.

²² Harter-Uibopuu 1998: 119–129 argues that there is little evidence to show that the Achaian League obliged its member-states to turn to the *koinon* for conflict settlement. Her detailed study is much more nuanced than my own treatment of the subject (Ager 1996), and she is right in pointing to the paucity of positive evidence. Nevertheless, the evidence we do have shows that disputes between members of the League were usually – though not always – resolved within the League.

While the existence of federal institutions might serve to channel a conflict towards a peaceful resolution, those institutions themselves may not always have been very highly engaged with the actual process. In the Achaian League we find evidence for the referral of the conflict to a third party, usually another member-state.²³ Entry into the Achaian collective may have entailed an explicit forswearing of conflicts a state might have with another member-state. The fragmentary inscription detailing Epidauros' admission into the Achaian League references Epidauros' contemporary territorial quarrel with Corinth; it is possible that Epidauros was only to be allowed to become a member if it agreed to submit its differences with Corinth to the arbitration of the *koinon*. That this almost immediately took place is demonstrated by another inscription.²⁴ The latter contains the findings of a court of Megarian arbitrators in a classic boundary dispute between Epidauros and Corinth. It is dated by reference to the *stratēgos* of the Achaian League, and we are told that the Megarian court drew its authority from a decision of the Achaians, perhaps taken by the council or the assembly of the *koinon*.

Like the Achaians, the Aitolian federation generally oversaw the task of operationalizing the resolution of a conflict between its members. When Thyrrheion in Akarnania settled the boundary dispute between its neighbors Matropolis and Oiniadai in the 230s BCE, it may have done so at the behest of the Aitolian *koinon* (all three states were members of the *koinon*, and the inscription is dated by reference to an Aitolian *stratēgos*).²⁵ In 214/3 BCE, a commission of arbitrators was chosen from among the Aitolian *poleis* to settle the borders of two small *poleis* in Achaia Phthiotis, Melitaia and Xyniai; in this case (if we are reading the inscription correctly) the individuals may have been chosen directly by the *koinon*'s council, rather than by a delegated third *polis*.²⁶

For *koina* other than the Achaians and the Aitolians, the evidence for process is generally much less full. In the third century, arbitrations undertaken simply by "the Boiotians" settled the borders of several Boiotian towns.²⁷ Similarly, "the Thessalians" carried out boundary arbitrations

²³ *IG* iv².1 70, 71 (Ager 1996: no. 38; Magnetto 1997: no. 36; Harter-Uibopuu 1998: no. 3); *IG* v.2 344 (Ager 1996: no. 43); *IG* iv².1 72 (Ager 1996: no. 46; Magnetto 1997: no. 42; Harter-Uibopuu 1998: no. 5).

²⁴ *IG* iv².1 70, 71; (Ager 1996: no. 38; Magnetto 1997: no. 36; Harter-Uibopuu 1998: no. 3).

²⁵ *IG* ix² 1.3B (Ager 1996: no. 41; Magnetto 1997: no. 39). Scholten, however, argues that Thyrrheion was not part of Greater Aitolia at this time, suggesting that the *koinon* did not always need to control such operations (2000: 90–91, and 2003b: 75).

²⁶ *IG* ix² 1.177 (Ager 1996: no. 55; Magnetto 1997: no. 54).

²⁷ *SEG* 23.297; *IG* vii 2792 (Ager 1996: nos. 16, 17; Magnetto 1997: nos. 15, 63).

between Melitaia and NARTHAKION, once in the fourth century and again in the second century BCE.²⁸ Little more can be inferred from epigraphic evidence such as this than that the federal state held this kind of activity to fall within its jurisdiction.²⁹ The *koinon* of the Cretans, however, provides us with a considerable number of epigraphic exceptions. Numerous inscriptions recording treaties, arbitrations, and decrees survive, particularly from the Hellenistic period.³⁰ These inscriptions demonstrate that, in spite of Polybius' pejorative characterization of the Cretans as excessively deceitful and pugnacious, the member-states of the *koinon* often settled their differences peacefully, through the assistance of a third party.³¹ What the Cretan evidence suggests, however, is that at least on Crete, foreign mediators or arbitrators were preferred over the home-grown variety.³² This may say something about the sporadic existence and loose nature of the Cretan *koinon* itself. Even so, it is possible that the Cretan material provides evidence for a *koinon* tribunal (*koinodikion*), a body whose mandate might have included the resolution of disputes between member-states.³³

We have other surviving – and significant – evidence for departures from the general rule of leagues keeping their internal disputes, and their resolution of those disputes, within their own borders. Both Sparta and Messene repeatedly attempted to have their quarrels with the Achaian League arbitrated by outside parties, though in these cases such attempts were not generally authorized by the federation. Other cases, however, demonstrate that under certain circumstances, a *koinon* could be willing to turn to outsiders to settle conflict. A boundary dispute that set two *poleis* belonging to different *koina* against each other – Boiotian Aigosthena and Achaian Pagai – was resolved by individuals from outside both *koina*: Kassopa in Epeiros and Thyrrheion in Akarnania dispatched judges at the request of both the Boiotians and the Achaians.³⁴ Similarly, a dispute between Azoros, a member of the Perrhaibian *koinon*, and its neighbor

²⁸ IG IX.2 89 (Piccirilli 1973: no. 51; Ager 1996: no. 79). See Baker 2000.

²⁹ Cf. also Ager 1996: no. 130 (Lykian *koinon*). Occasionally a single lengthy inscription provides important information that compensates for the brevity of most of the evidence: see FdD III.4 355 (Ager 1996: no. 153) and Freitag 2006, especially on the provenance of the inscription.

³⁰ Chaniotis 1999 provides a convenient survey of the epigraphic evidence for the Cretan *koinon*; see also his Chapter 20 in this volume.

³¹ Pol. 2.4.3; 4.8.11; II.46–47. See Ager 1994 and Chaniotis 1996.

³² Among the polities we find settling disputes or offering to settle disputes on Crete are: Argos; Sparta; Magnesia; Rhodes (?); Antiochos III; Ptolemaic Egypt; and Rome (Piccirilli 1973: nos. 18, 19; Ager 1996: nos. 29, 58, 95, 110, 127, 144, 158, 164; Magnetto 1997: nos. 24, 53, 58).

³³ See Chaniotis 1999, *contra* Ager 1994. ³⁴ SEG 13.327; Ager 1996: no. 85.

Mondaia, a Thessalian *polis*, was judged by three men from the western Greek *poleis* of Apollonia, Korkyra, and Dyrrhachion.³⁵

In both these cases, it is easy to see why judges external to the *koina* were chosen: the disputes had already crossed *koinon* boundaries. It is less clear why, in an arbitration of around 200 BCE or later, the two Achaian *poleis* of Hermione and Epidauros had a boundary disagreement settled by representatives from Miletos and Rhodes. The inscription, yet another record of an arbitration set up at the Asklepieion in Epidauros, makes no mention of the Achaian federation at all.³⁶ Hans Taeuber, however, points to other evidence for Rhodian arbitral activity within the Achaian League – such as the arbitration between Sparta and the *koinon*, discussed above – and suggests that Rhodes may have had a special relationship with the Achaians in this regard (Taeuber 2006).

There was quite a cluster of arbitrations among the Achaian states in the third quarter of the third century.³⁷ This was a time when the *koinon* was spreading its wings under the leadership of Aratos, extending its boundaries beyond the confines of ethnic Achaian territory. Much of this extension involved liberating *poleis* from pro-Makedonian tyrants, and the peaceful settlement of existing border disputes as *polis* after *polis* joined the league meshed well with the democratic and peer-governance policies the Achaian federation was advertising.³⁸ As Clemens Koehn remarks, the Achaian federal state, in the eyes of Polybius at any rate, presented itself as an alternative to dictatorial rule: their expansion was framed simply as a positive and benevolent unification of the Peloponnese, beneficial to all parties.³⁹ It is interesting to compare Pausanias' tale of the Elian women settling differences between the Pisatans and the other *poleis* of the Elians in the early sixth century BCE. Pausanias states specifically that once the tyrant of Pisa was out of the picture, the citizen-ruled polities of Pisa and the

³⁵ *IG* IX.1 689; Ager 1996: no. 118. Compare the early fifth-century inscription (*IPArk* 21; discussed by Morgan 2003: 77–78, 184) recording (perhaps) an agreement between Arkadian Lousoi and an Achaian neighbor; but the inscription is so fragmentary, and its provenance is so uncertain, that few conclusions can be drawn. On the agreement between the Aitolian and Akarnanian Leagues, an agreement that included a boundary arbitration between an Aitolian and an Akarnanian state (Ager 1996: no. 33; Magnetto 1997: no. 27), see Scholten 2000: 78–83 and Chapter 4 by Klaus Freitag above.

³⁶ Two copies of the inscription survive: *SEG* II.377 and 405 (Ager 1996: no. 63; Magnetto 1997: no. 69; Harter-Uibopuu: 1998 no. 10). Dixon 2001 suggests a date of between 175 and 172 BCE.

³⁷ Ager 1996: nos. 36, 38, 43, 44, 46; Magnetto 1997: nos. 33, 36, 41, 42; Harter-Uibopuu 1998: nos. 1, 3–5.

³⁸ On the growth of the Achaian federation after 250, see Urban 1979: 38–96; cf. also Chapter 6 by Athanassios Rizakis above.

³⁹ See especially Pol. 2.43.8–9; Koehn 2007: 27–31.

Elians had no difficulty in resolving their disputes.⁴⁰ This example also resonates with contemporary findings that democratic states do not make war on each other, and that they are more liable both to turn to peaceful conflict resolution in the first place and to accept compromise solutions when they are offered.⁴¹

The picture of Achaia in the first half of the second century seems rather different than in the mid- to later third century. As the league took on a more significant diplomatic role – offering to mediate between Philip V and Rhodes, sending representatives to settle a significant war in Asia Minor, attempting to resolve the conflict between Antiochos IV and Ptolemaic Egypt⁴² – its internal politics became more strained. Under leaders like Diophanes and Philopoimen, Sparta and then Messene were brought into the Achaian federation and kept there by force. The Achaians, in all the years of their disputes with Sparta, never played the peer card and rarely seem to have found Sparta's complaints worthy of an impartial settlement. As for Messene, it, like Sparta, sought Roman support in its vain struggle to assert itself against the overbearing power of the larger collective, a collective that seems in the accounts of the second century to be rather less 'democratic' in its interstate relations than in those of the third.⁴³

By adopting a system that limited the sovereign freedom of its members and at the same time established a higher authority above and beyond the *polis*-level, a Greek federal state modeled at least an interior world that was cushioned from the harsh realities of interstate anarchy.⁴⁴ Federal custom forbade active inter-*polis* conflict within the *koinon* and federal standing bodies served to mediate points of contention that otherwise might lead to such conflict. The strong leagues of the Hellenistic Age, in particular the Achaians and Aitolians, were therefore able to enforce a certain amount of peace within their borders.⁴⁵

Such peace, however, was only at the intra-*koinon* level. War of course continued to pit leagues against each other and also against other polities.

⁴⁰ Paus. 5.16.5 (Piccirilli 1973: no. 5).

⁴¹ See, e.g., Levy 1988; Dixon 1993; Raymond 1994 and 1996.

⁴² Pol. 16.35, 28.19, 29.25; *SIG*³ 588 (Ager 1996: nos. 61, 109, 122; Magnetto 1997: no. 61).

⁴³ See Ager 1996: nos. 86, 96, 111, 113, 115, 135, 137, 147; Harter-Uibopuu 1998: 164–95. Arbitration nevertheless remained a tool of interstate relations within the federation. For a similar fluctuation between violence and diplomacy (including arbitration) among the Aitolians, see Scholten 2000: 90.

⁴⁴ See Funke 1994.

⁴⁵ Sparta was an exception, but only the most obvious one. Plataia and Thespiiai, for example, were resistant to Boiotian (Theban) domination, a resistance that ultimately led to their destruction: see Rhodes 1993: 172; Salmon 1994: 219.

Hellenistic kings and Roman commanders demonstrated that the outer world continued anarchic and that league survival meant the ability to negotiate the game at the meta-level.⁴⁶ This is particularly true of the two most powerful Hellenistic federal states, the Achaians and the Aitolians. Their bids to control significant portions of the Greek mainland involved them in uneasy relationships with the Antigonid rulers of Makedon.⁴⁷ As mentioned above, however, both federations advertised themselves as distinctively different polities from the monarchic hegemons. As federal collectives, they were able to claim a democratic outlook (even if they were not always strictly democratic) and a natural role as protectors of the Greeks. Clemens Koehn's careful study (2007) of the Achaian and Aitolian *koina* as examples of Hellenistic 'middle-powers' has demonstrated that their actions in framing alliances and making war were carefully crafted in order to portray themselves as very different from the hegemonic powers of the day. Not having the military resources of the Hellenistic kings or of Rome, these *koina* played out their role on the world stage through alliances that featured multilateral egalitarian relationships and wars that were fought against the 'natural enemies' of the Greeks (tyrants, Gauls, pirates).⁴⁸

One area that remains somewhat under-explored in Koehn's book is that of diplomacy other than alliance-making. Both the Aitolians and the Achaians actively engaged in the kind of foreign diplomacy that was (and is) quite typical of middle-powers: such states will often perform mediation in order to "enhance their influence and prestige" (Touval and Zartman 1985: 252). Examples of Achaian efforts to resolve the conflicts of others – Philip V, Rhodes, the Seleukid and Ptolemaic kingdoms, as well as the states of Asia Minor – have been cited above. The Aitolians also engaged in such activity, employing mediation as an instrument of foreign policy at a time when they were interested in expanding their influence in the Peloponnese.⁴⁹ On a much larger scale, the Aitolians also participated in the attempts to mediate between the two sides in the Fourth Syrian War.⁵⁰ But Achaian and Aitolian efforts to play the role of third-party diplomats on the world stage were largely unsuccessful. Their middle-power diplomatic activity – like that of Rhodes – was still less effective when it came

⁴⁶ See Beck 1997: 212–249; Eckstein 2006: 83 and 97 (on the warlike expansionism of both the Achaian and Aitolian federal states); Low 2007: 55–56.

⁴⁷ See Scholten 2003a. ⁴⁸ See Koehn 2007: esp. 75–168; see also Bastini 1987.

⁴⁹ Aitolian ambassadors mediating between Messene and Phigaleia, c. 240 BCE: *IG* v.2 419 (Ager 1996: no. 40; Magnetto 1997: no. 38); cf. Scholten 2000: 121.

⁵⁰ Pol. 5.63 (Ager 1996: no. 52; Magnetto 1997: no. 51).

face-to-face with Rome in the second century BCE. Suggestions that Rome submit to the mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution were non-starters, though the Romans did seem willing to accept deprecation on behalf of a defeated enemy.⁵¹ Rome itself, as time went on, became less and less respectful of *koinon* boundaries, agreeing to receive independent Spartan embassies and entertain Spartan requests in the face of Achaian protests.

If we are to attempt some measure of the success of “Federation for Peace” (Larsen 1944) in ancient Greece, it would have to be at the grass-roots level of the *poleis* who were members of a given *koinon*. At such a level, being a member of a federal state could mean not only protection and peace, but also order and good government. Even so, it is a basic axiom of conflict resolution theory that small and medium polities are in any case much more likely to accept third-party solutions than are large powers. Many of the little *poleis* who submitted to federal judgements in their conflicts, such as Melitaia, had also turned to other parties over the centuries. It remains something of an open question, then, whether our assessment of the effectiveness of the institutions and the leverage of a Greek federal state is not perhaps somewhat skewed in the direction of undue optimism.

Koinē eirēne and the federal states

A discussion of peaceful conflict resolution in the world of Greek federations necessitates also a few words on the concept of *koinē eirēnē*. *Koinē eirēnē* – “Common Peace” – was a fourth-century BCE phenomenon, inaugurated by the King’s Peace of 387/6 BCE and ushered out by the Hellenic League of Antigonos and Demetrios in 302.⁵² Several Common Peace treaties were struck over the decades of the fourth century; these treaties became more sophisticated with time, but not until the peace of 338 BCE, which established the League of Corinth, did a Common Peace treaty create the kind of institutions vital to making the peace work. Earlier Common Peaces failed in large part because no institutions existed to facilitate or compel the adherence of all to the

⁵¹ Liv. 35.32–33, 35.45 (Ager 1996: no. 84) and Liv. 37.6–7, 38.3, 38.9–10, Pol. 21.4, 21.25, 21.29–31 (Ager 1996: no. 94). On deprecation see Ager 2009.

⁵² The Hellenic League of 302, although it was a military alliance rather than a peace treaty per se, shared some of the characteristics of the *koinē eirēnē*. For sources on the Common Peace treaties of the fourth century see Ryder 1965 and Jehne 1994. On the fourth century *koina* and *koinē eirēnē*, in particular the tension between federation and *polis*-autonomy in the context of the Common Peace, see Beck 1997: 235–248.

terms of the treaty. In spite of the existence of a compact that extended to all Greeks, the Greek world of the fourth century remained an anarchic one. Individual *poleis* such as Athens, Sparta, and Thebes continued to strive for mastery, shifting friendships and alliances continuously, and while some federations began to make headway against the *polis*-dominated system,⁵³ it was only in the third century that federal states and their institutions became prominent enough to have a significant impact on regional peace and security.

The basic concept of *koinē eirēnē* was that the peace treaty extended to all states; fundamental also was the notion that each state was to enjoy autonomy. Taken together, it could be argued that federation in and of itself could be contrary to the terms of a *koinē eirēnē*. If federation was (conveniently) interpreted as a single *polis* imposing its own hegemony on its weaker neighbors, then federation might contravene both the autonomy clause and the inclusion of all states under the protection of the treaty.⁵⁴ This, at any rate, appears to have been the logic employed by Sparta in the years after 386 BCE, when the Spartans broke up the Mantineian synoikism and the nascent Olynthian federation.⁵⁵ Corinth and Argos were also forced to dissolve their union, and the Boiotian League disintegrated.

The Spartan actions of these years more than anything demonstrate that federation equalled strength, the kind of strength Sparta was not willing to allow in any potential rivals. It was an extension of their fifth century policy as well: in 421 BCE, Sparta had used its judicial authority to separate Lepreon from Elis.⁵⁶ Spartan attention after the King's Peace focused on polities perceived to be threats, while completely ignoring federations such as Achaia, which was friendly to Sparta at the time. Thebes fell victim to Spartan fears, when the Spartans seized the Theban acropolis in 382 BCE. The Theban recovery after 379, and the resuscitation of the Boiotian League, justified those fears: Thebes went on to defeat Sparta at Leuktra in 371, insisting upon its own right to sign a *koinē eirēnē* on behalf of the Boiotian League as a whole.⁵⁷ Cynical and outrageous as Spartan actions and motivations might have been, in this case at least it seems that their

⁵³ See, on the Peloponnese in particular, Funke and Luraghi 2009; see also Beck 1997.

⁵⁴ *Autonomia* is a flexible term; for arguments supporting the compatibility of autonomy with federalism, see Beck 1997: 236–238, and 2003: 184.

⁵⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.32–34 and 5.2; Diod. 15.5 and 15.19. See Ryder 1965: 39–57; Buck 1994: 58–59; Jehne 1994: 48–56; Consolo Langher 2004; Siewert 2005a: 32. See also Chapter 18 by Michael Zahrtnt above.

⁵⁶ Thuc. 5.31 (Piccirilli 1973: no. 28). ⁵⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.19; Jehne 1994: 65–79.

interpretation was vindicated: the restored Boiotian *koinon* of this period was definitely under the Theban thumb, and Thebes was able to exploit the power of the *koinon* to challenge successfully Sparta's hegemony.⁵⁸

Implicit in the concepts of state autonomy and the extension of the peace to all states is the corollary that any state that subsequently engaged in war was breaking the treaty, and that other states covered by the treaty therefore had the right and obligation to make war on the offending state in turn. The concept of a guarantee such as this, however, was not made explicit until the Peace(s) of 371 BCE (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18; 6.5.2). The lack of a clear statement and an institutional mechanism for enforcement was what enabled Sparta to aggrandize itself by taking on the role of enforcer after the King's Peace. Clarification followed in subsequent treaties, but no institution was created until the peace of 338 BCE, when the League of Corinth was created. The *synedrion* of the league was then able to hear claims and referee quarrels, and shortly after its formation instructed the state of Argos to resolve a conflict between the two islands of Melos and Kimolos.⁵⁹

In 1944, Jakob Larsen's view was that the League of Corinth – which was (i) a Common Peace; (ii) a symmarchy embracing all the Greek states, with the determined exception of Sparta; (iii) a federated body with officials and a representative council; and (iv) an alliance that recognized Makedonian hegemony – was the single federation that might have been able to bring about a lasting peace among the Greeks (Larsen 1944). Events, as it turned out, interfered with this potential: the death of Philip, the conquests of Alexander and his death, the Wars of the Successors, and the ambitions for freedom of states such as Sparta and Athens. It was, as Larsen says, only Makedonian force of arms that had made the Common Peace of 338 effective.⁶⁰ Thus we arrive back at the eternal irony: peace can only be secured by military means. The Common Peaces of the mid-fourth century had tried to spread the task of guarantor amongst the Greek states generally, and hence came closer to the idea of self-governance than either the King's Peace or the peace of 338. But these peaces failed as well.

The appearance of the Makedonian hegemons – at first the Argeads, and ultimately the Antigonids – dealt a blow to the concept of the

⁵⁸ For a debate on the status of the Boiotian cities' *autonomia* in the Boiotian League after 446 BCE and again in 371, see Hansen 1996 and Keen 1996. See also Buckler 1980: 18, 30; Rhodes 1993: 172; Buck 1994: 106–10; Salmon 1994; Siewert 2005a: 30. Cf. also Chapter 7 by H. Beck and A. Ganter above.

⁵⁹ *SIG*³ no. 261 (Ager 1996: no. 3; Magnetto 1997: no. 1). The loneliness of this example should prevent us from overestimating the efficacy of the League of Corinth as a mechanism of dispute resolution.

⁶⁰ See also Jehne 1994: 139–267.

self-governing Common Peace embracing all Greek states, even though Makedonian military power might have operated to support the terms of the treaty of 338. I would like to suggest, however, that the notion of Common Peace did not die because it was strangled by Makedonian might. Rather, the idea was to some extent rendered redundant and obsolete by the rise of the powerful federal states in the early third century BCE. Federal states took over the most fundamental role of *koinē eirēnē* as envisioned in the fourth century: that of collective action against potential disturbers of the peace. The federations were unities in a way that the anarchic, independent and often hostile *poleis* subject to a Common Peace treaty in the fourth century were not, and they offered both institutions to create peace and power to enforce it. The Hellenistic Greek federal states, at least within their own borders, were thus both the heirs of *koinai eirēnai*, and their replacement.

This chapter has dealt with the search for peace and security in an anarchic world. The federal states of ancient Greece, particularly those of the Hellenistic period, mitigated that anarchy and provided the kind of institutions that facilitated peaceful resolution of conflict. But Institutionalism, as an alternative framework to Realism, functions only with cooperative effort, and is admittedly fragile. States such as Sparta, unwilling to surrender some degree of autonomy for the sake of integration into a larger polity such as a federal state, place not only themselves at risk. They are also capable of damaging the prospects of peace for others within the federation and of compromising the authority and legitimacy of the league as a whole, rendering it useless as a protective against the anarchy of the over-arching system. As Jakob Larsen remarked, at the conclusion of his work on federation for peace, “peace, as well as many another desirable end, cannot be attained by passivity and wishful thinking but requires earnest effort and continued vigilance.”⁶¹

⁶¹ Larsen 1944: 162.

The economics of federation in the ancient Greek world

Emily Mackil

Political federation has, throughout history, had economic effects, but the exact relationship between political and economic federation has seen tremendous variety, depending upon the kind and distribution of natural resources available to the partners in a federation, their history of economic interaction prior to federation, and the institutions they devised to structure their state. In some cases, the creation of an open economic zone facilitated the formation of a federal state among participants, as when the *Deutsche Zollverein*, founded in 1834 as a union of trading cities that agreed to eliminate custom dues, then adopted a common currency, developed a common commercial law, and finally formed the German Reich, the precursor of the modern German federal state (Fischer 1960; Dumke 1984). In others, the political need for alliance drove a concern for equitable tax burdens, the distribution of natural resources, and a common commercial policy. Free interstate trade and equal tax rates for all citizens in all states were central components of the Articles of Confederation that governed the United States of America from 1781–1789. In the constitutional reform that followed, Alexander Hamilton expressed the conviction that such policies promoted not just prosperity but also peace among the states, and that therefore a stronger federal government was needed to protect them (*Federalist Papers* no. 7). The Nobel Prize-winning economist Friedrich Hayek (1948) laid out three reasons why political federation always entails economic cooperation among its members. First, exclusive federal authority over foreign policy must include its authority to control exports and imports, for this is a subject over which conflicts, and indeed wars, can arise. Second, barriers to commerce between member-states within a federation tend to undermine the basic commitment to common defense, for they lead to regional protectionism and restrict the mobilization of resources. Third, economic federation promotes solidarity, and therefore peace, among member-states.

Despite the close relationship between political and economic federation in early modern history and modern economic thought, historians of Greek federal states have paid less attention to the economic implications of federation than to the political ones. This is certainly in part a response to the emphasis placed by ancient authors on the political issues of autonomy, representation, diplomacy, and war. Yet the literary sources are not silent, and much evidence, especially epigraphic, has emerged that allows us to focus on the question. I have written in greater depth about these issues elsewhere (Mackil 2013: 237–325), focusing on the evidence for Boiotia, Achaia, and Aitolia. In this chapter I draw from a wider array of federal states, but space constraints prevent an exhaustive treatment of all the evidence from every one of them. What follows, then, is an attempt to sketch the varieties of fiscal federalism in the Greek world and to offer some explanations for them.

From fragmentation to integration

In vast swathes of territory, often governed in the modern world by federal states, as in America, Canada, and Australia, the distribution of natural resources can vary tremendously, and strong locational advantages and disadvantages arise. The same is true of the ancient Mediterranean, but on a far smaller scale. Here extreme ecological fragmentation resulted in a complex mosaic of microregions and the highly localized distribution of resources, as Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell (2000) have shown. In a world in which most communities swung on a pendulum from scarcity to glut but never did so synchronically, in which autarky was a cherished ideal far from lived reality, economic mobility was vitally important. Yet the political fragmentation of the Greek world created significant barriers to mobility of this kind. *Poleis* granted the right to own property within their territory only to citizens and a few honored individuals, like *proxenoi* and benefactors, and as a rule collected taxes on both imported and exported goods (Bresson 2002: 109–30; Purcell 2005). Legal protection was occasionally extended to foreign merchants as an inducement to commerce; the maritime courts of fourth-century Athens are the best example. Bilateral agreements were occasionally drawn up to extend reciprocal legal protections and economic privileges to the citizens, and sometimes resident foreigners, of two communities. These could take several forms. *Symbola* established the legal protections available to citizens of one *polis* in the other (Gauthier 1972), while *isopoliteia* agreements opened citizenship, with its attendant legal and economic privileges and

obligations, to citizens of another community (Gawantka 1975). *Asylia* agreements assured freedom from seizure but their efficacy was again restricted to the two contracting parties (Rigsby 1996). The effect of these practices was probably to restrict most individuals' economic mobility to those communities with which their own *poleis* had concluded some such agreement; without them, a foreign trader's access to justice was difficult, and exchange across political boundaries was particularly laden with risk.

One of the most striking effects of the creation of a *koinon* was that the expanded scale of the state created the potential to expand the size of the territory within which a citizen could pursue his economic affairs in secure conditions. Most *koina* of the Greek world took advantage of this opportunity and established institutions that tended to promote the economic integration of the entire region that they governed. This took two main forms: adopting common coinage, weights, and measures for exchange; and extending property rights to all citizens throughout the *koinon*. In some cases it is possible that regional economic integration was also promoted by adopting tax regimes that facilitated the regional movement of goods.

The provision of a common coinage was widespread among Greek federal states and the numismatic evidence has been recently surveyed (Psoma and Tsangari 2003). Precise minting arrangements varied from one federation to another, and over time within individual federations. Decentralized production allowed individual member *poleis* to mint coins in their own name but with a type common to the entire *koinon*, as occurred in early fourth-century Boiotia (Kraay 1976: 114). Sometimes the *koinon* and its *poleis* produced different denominations on the same standard and type, as in Achaia in the first half of the fourth century (Mackil 2013: 251–252) and Aitolia in the third (Tsangari 2007: 250–53), where the *koinon* produced high-denomination coins and the *poleis* minted smaller change. Highly centralized arrangements, in which all coins were issued in the name of the entire *koinon*, tend to be associated with contexts in which political power was highly centralized, as for example in Boiotia from the 370s to 335 (Kraay 1976: 112–14), when all Boiotian coins came from the Theban mint. Despite these important variations, common coinages were ubiquitous among Greek federal states. We need to ask why.

For many federal states, the production of a common coinage was an extension of existing minting practices or the full implementation of earlier experiments. Seven Boiotian *poleis* produced coins with a common type from the late sixth century BCE, when we have no positive evidence for a

formal regional state in the region but many indications of increasingly vigorous efforts at coordination (Hansen 1995a: 30–31; Mackil 2013: 26–29, 247–249). When the Chalkidian *koinon* began to produce coins in the last quarter of the fifth century BCE, at least some of its member-cities had already had the experience of producing a common coinage with the legend XAΛK, probably in order to meet their tribute obligation to Athens (Psoma 2001: 253–61). The Lykian communities had a long history of economic cooperation prior to the establishment of a formal *koinon* in the second century, sometimes paying tribute to the Athenian empire as a group (*IG* I³ 261 I.30; 262 v.33; 266 III.34), like the Chalkidian *poleis*, and using coins united by the common reverse type of the *triskeles* (Behrwald 2000: 15–18, 22–39). Three of the four *poleis* of Keos (Ioulis, Karthaia, and Koressos) issued coins on the Aiginetan standard with a common dolphin type from the late sixth century, and like the Chalkidians and Lykians they sometimes paid tribute to Athens as a group (Lewis 1962: 2). The early common coinage of Keos has been explained as an attempt to facilitate inter-*polis* trade on the island and to engage successfully in trade with Aigina, including the export of the island's famous *miltos* (ochre) and possibly grain (Sheedy 2006: 32–33), but it was not until the early fourth century that the Keian *koinon* began to produce issues in its own name (Sheedy 1998: 250; 2006: 32; see also Reger and Risser 1991; Papageorgiadou-Banis 1993, 2007). The *poleis* of Euboia first coordinated their minting practices in the 370s BCE (Picard 1979: 164–70), but may not have formed a federation until 194 (Knoepfler 2001a: 122 with n. 97; cf. also Knoepfler in Chapter 8 above).

The production of a common coinage requires a significant degree of coordination by multiple communities, and when it occurs outside the context of federation it can only be taken as evidence for an intention to promote and facilitate exchange between the participating communities. Coinages of this kind that were produced by partners who never became members of a federation have been labeled cooperative and interpreted as an economic rather than a strictly political phenomenon (Mackil and van Alfen 2006). Pre-federal cooperative coinages, like the XALK coinage issued by the Chalkidian cities prior to federation and the Boiotian shield coinage of the early fifth century, can be seen in the same light, as cooperative instruments of exchange and payment rather than as badges of a federal state that is otherwise unattested. Yet cooperative minting practices tend to become more regular with formal federation; in the Hellenistic period, when federal institutions were most robust, the production of a coinage in the name of the entire *koinon* was standard.

Several explanations for this are possible. First, *koina* wanted to promote regional exchange and the facilitation of common payments, like taxes to the *koinon* (on which more will be said below) or wages for troops. The regional exchange hypothesis is confirmed by hoard evidence, which shows that federal coinages tended to circulate within the region in which they were produced, and beyond it only into the super-regions formed by the easy flow of coins produced by different mints on the same weight standard (Psoma and Tsangari 2003). Second, federal control over monetary production may also have improved the *koinon*'s ability to manage the supply of coinage in the region and to meet emergency needs to increase production, as the Achaian *koinon* may have done in the 160s BCE (Warren 2008, with Grandjean 2000). Finally, given the long histories of economic cooperation preceding federation in some regions, it is worth considering the possibility that communities agreed to form a *koinon* partly in order to strengthen existing economic ties.

Polybius famously claims (2.37.10–11) that under the Achaian *koinon* the entire Peloponnese was united by common laws, weights, measures, and coins, as well as by common magistrates, councilors, and judges. While the regulation of weights and measures was a standard responsibility of Greek states (Plat. *Leg.* 746d; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 10.1–2 with Plut. *Sol.* 15.3–4), the assignment of this function to federal states, rather than to their individual member *poleis*, would have done much to promote regional exchange. Weights issued by *koina* have been found in Aitolia (*IG IX 1*² 1.83 with Antonetti 1990: 201 plate 18), Olynthos (Robinson 1931: 56), and Phokis (Kroll 1971: 90–93). Polybius' claim about the Achaian *koinon* suggests that such weight standards were applied and enforced throughout the territory governed by the *koinon*, in all of its member-cities.

Regional economic integration was also promoted by granting citizens the right to own property throughout the territory of the *koinon*, rather than restricting the right to the citizen's own *polis*, as was the norm in independent city-states. The evidence is clearest for the Chalkidian *koinon* in the fourth century BCE. In a speech attributed to one Kleigenes of Akanthos on an embassy to Sparta in 382 seeking support for his city's resistance to incorporation by the Chalkidians, Xenophon reports that the *koinon* granted to the citizens of all member *poleis* the rights of intermarriage (*epigamia*) and property ownership (*enktēsis*) throughout its territory (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.19). This claim may well be supported by the long series of inscribed deeds of sale from the Chalkidike, which are strikingly formulaic and dated by an eponymous federal priest (Game 2008: nos. 13–35, 38). The similarities among them point to their having been concluded in

accordance with a federal law on property ownership, an inference that is supported by the fact that deeds of sale from nearby Amphipolis, which was never a member of the *koinon*, are strikingly different (Game 2008: nos. 1–12).

Xenophon's Kleigenes goes on to warn his Spartan audience that the Chalkidians will become powerfully united by these rights, such that over time it will become more difficult for its enemies to break up the *koinon* (*Hell.* 5.2.19). Why should the right to own property throughout a region have been considered so advantageous? To make sense of it we return to the basic ecological parameters of the Mediterranean: in this fragmented landscape in which resources were highly localized, diversification was an economic strategy of vital importance. The regional right of *enktēsis* enabled the citizens of a *koinon* to diversify their land holdings and thereby their crops. Kleigenes describes the resources of the Chalkidike: "there is plenty of timber in their territory for ship-building, revenues from many harbors and ports, and a large population produced by an abundance of food" (*Hell.* 5.2.16). Few, if any, small *poleis* within the Chalkidian *koinon* would have had access to two, let alone all three, of these resources. The right of *enktēsis* had the potential to change that.

The practice appears to be widespread, but the sources are less explicit for other states. It has long been noticed that Boiotian *poleis* do not grant *proxenia* (proxeny) to citizens of other member *poleis* of the Boiotian *koinon*, either in the fourth century, when the series of Boiotian proxeny decrees begins, or in the Hellenistic period, whereas the right to own property is almost universally granted to the non-Boiotian *proxenoi* of Boiotian *poleis* in the same period. It is believed that such inter-Boiotian grants are unattested because they would have been redundant: the *koinon* made such representatives unnecessary, and by virtue of the laws of the *koinon* they already had the rights that went along with becoming a *proxenos*, including the right to own property (Knoepfler 1999: 242 n. 66; Müller 2007: 41). In Hellenistic Achaia the integration of a new member *polis*, Arkadian Orchomenos, created the opportunity for all Achaians, that is, citizens of the Achaian *koinon*, to purchase land and houses within the territory of the new city (*IPArk* 16). Other evidence shows that Achaian citizens owned property in member *poleis* other than their own, and it has been inferred that this must be the result of a federal law (Larsen 1971). On Keos in the third century BCE, citizens had the right to own property in all member *poleis* of the *koinon*, and granted the same right to the Aitolians when they granted them the right to become Keian citizens (*IG* XII.5 532 with Gauthier 1972: 255–6). And for Lykia in the imperial period we have

plentiful epigraphic evidence for citizens owning property in cities other than their own within the *koinon* (Larsen 1957). All of this evidence points to a conscious strategy of using federation to promote regional economic mobility.

Throughout the Greek world, however, mobility was costly: taxes were levied on the import, export, and transit of goods (Purcell 2005). Although these taxes were most easily, and therefore probably most often, collected at harbors, where movement was most easily controlled (Bresson 2007), they were also routinely levied at *polis* boundaries that faced the interior (e.g., *SVA* III 456). The abolition of customs and transit taxes for inter-*polis* trade within the *koinon* would, *a priori*, have had the effect of pushing the economic integration of the region further still. Did it happen? Certainly not in one case, but perhaps in others. Several inscriptions that refer to a Lykian tax law show that Lykian *poleis* did collect duties on goods moving across *polis* boundaries within the territory of the *koinon* (Marek 2006a: 204–206 and Takmer 2007: 176, *contra* Engelmann 1985). The federal legal context shows that this was done with the full consent of the *koinon*, and perhaps even as a complement to other tax revenues (see also below). But for other *koina* a kind of customs union is a possibility. We know that the coastal *poleis* of Boiotia collected customs dues, but we do not know whether they did so for themselves or simply as local agents of the *koinon*.¹ The lack of positive evidence for the levying of taxes on goods in transit or for import/export across *polis* boundaries within other *koina* is striking, but to conclude that they generally created customs unions would be a rash argument from silence.

Kleigenes' prediction that the *koinon* of the *Chalkideis* would be hard to break apart because of rights of intermarriage and property ownership seems to have been intended by Xenophon as a dire warning against the dangers of federalism from an advocate of *polis* autonomy (Beck 2001b; Bearzot 2004a: 45–56). The unifying force of such economic rights is well illustrated by a rather different case. When in 167 BCE the Romans sought to break Makedonian power once and for all, they divided the kingdom into four separate districts and prohibited the inhabitants of these districts from intermarrying or trading with one another (Liv. 45.18.6–7, 29.5–10; Diod. Sic. 31.8.7–8). Makedonian opposition was virulent: “to those whose commercial activities were prohibited by the division into districts, their country seemed as mutilated as an animal torn limb from limb, each of

¹ Tax collectors are attested at two, and possibly three, Boiotian ports. Oropos: Herakleides Kritikos *BNJ* 369A F 1.7). Thespiiai: Roesch 1965a: 214–219. Possibly also Anthedon: Lytle 2010: 272–273.

which needed the other” (Liv. 45.30.2). These districts were not artefacts of Roman imperialism; they were administrative districts used by the Antigonids for military, financial, and political purposes (Hatzopoulos 1996a: 231–260). From at least as early as the reign of Philip V they issued their own coins, with a common obverse type and a reverse legend marking each coin as a product of one of the district mints (Kremydi-Sicilianou 2007 and 2009). The monetary and legal structures that promoted the economic integration of Antigonid Makedonia were thus strikingly similar to those at play in many Greek federal states. The Makedonian response to the revocation of their rights of economic mobility may be a good indication of the value placed on such rights by the citizens of federal states, like Xenophon’s Chalkidians. And the Roman refusal to restore these rights, over local objections, suggests that economic disintegration supports political disintegration, which was the Romans’ real concern.² All of this resonates strongly with modern findings. The economists Patrick Bolton and Gerard Roland (1997) have found that in the modern world high degrees of economic mobility within a state tend to dissolve other incentives for the breakup of the state, including those that are strongly politically motivated.

It might be objected that a formal prohibition on trading across political boundaries, as was imposed by the Romans in Makedonia, would have a more deleterious effect than the simple absence of common coinages and regional rights of intermarriage and property ownership. After all, currencies circulated widely, foreign traders and artisans (Feyel 2006) were commonplace in the Greek world, and many foreigners established residency and conducted flourishing businesses on rented property (Baslez 2007; Oliver 2011). Yet such transactions and enterprises faced costs that were dissolved by the economic and legal institutions of the *koinon*. The improvement in economic livelihood stemming from these institutions cannot be measured, and it may only have been marginal. But the Makedonian reaction to the partitioning of their state by the Romans may be an indication of how highly people valued intrastate economic mobility. And however important such advantages were, federal states frequently took additional steps to integrate and manage the regional economy that had effects reaching well beyond the individual agent.

² It is worth noting that when the Romans prohibited intermarriage and exchange across districts, they also prohibited the exploitation of gold and silver deposits in Makedonia; the latter were lifted in 158 BCE (Cassiod. *Chronicle on Livy* 47) but the former remained in place.

Fiscal federalism: regional economies and the politics of taxation

All states must collect taxes to generate revenue for common enterprises and the provision of public goods; many, throughout history, have also done so for rather different reasons. But how did *koina*, which encompassed many *poleis* with differing resource bases, tax them without generating resistance or opposition? The lucrative harbor taxes could be collected only by coastal *poleis*. If taxes were assessed on produce, the burden would fall disproportionately on those *poleis* in which populations were heavily engaged in agriculture. And if the *koinon* itself asserted the right to collect taxes on activities undertaken within its member *poleis*, how would it use the revenues thus generated so as not to provoke accusations of inequity? The fiscal policies and practices of the Greek *koina* seem for the most part to contribute further to the integration of the regional economy we saw in the previous section. Harbor taxes were, at least in many cases, collected by *koina* rather than the *poleis* in which those harbors were situated. Harbors were of vital interest to the regional state as a whole, for their economic as well as their military importance. Although customs dues are among the most visible, *koina* also collected other taxes and in so doing faced similar political challenges. There is some evidence that care was taken to levy direct taxes from member *poleis* in some proportion to their population, suggesting a concern for equity in fiscal matters, perhaps driven not so much by a principle of justice as by the practical concern of maintaining the loyalty of member *poleis*. We also have indications that *poleis* were willing to voice their objections to what they regarded as abuses of federal fiscal power. The ultimate fragility of federalism may explain why these negotiations were successful.

Customs duties (revenues from many harbors and ports) are among the valuable resources of the Chalkidian *koinon* adumbrated by Xenophon's Kleigenes. The early fourth-century treaty between the Makedonian king Amyntas and the Chalkidian *koinon* sheds some light on how this worked. Amyntas and the *Chalkideis* are to have reciprocal rights of export and transport of goods from their ally's territory, but each is to pay the duties levied on the export by the other state (R&O no. 12, line 16). Insofar as it is the *koinon* of the *Chalkideis* that has concluded the treaty, it seems safe to conclude that the taxes levied on the Chalkidian side were levied by the *koinon*. We want very much to know what it did with these revenues. Were they used to fund collective enterprises like defense and infrastructure? Or did the Chalkidian *koinon*, in which Olynthos seems to have held an

inordinate degree of power relative to other member *poleis*, retain these revenues for purely Olynthian purposes? We do not have the evidence to say.

In Thessaly the situation appears to have been quite similar. In the late 350s BCE the Thessalians appear to have surrendered to Philip II “all their taxes and revenues” (Just. *Epit.* 11.3.1–2) in exchange for his help in the Third Sacred War, but in 349/8 they resolved to retain them, according to Demosthenes (1.22), “to administer the common affairs (*ta koina*) of the Thessalians.” Although it is not absolutely certain, these passages suggest that harbor taxes throughout Thessaly were levied by the *koinon*. This was certainly the arrangement in the early second century, when the *koinon* collected a five per cent tax on imports and exports (Helly 2008b: 91–96).

Several inscriptions from the imperial period regarding the public law (*dēmosiōnikos nomos*) of the Lykian *koinon* on taxes, from Kaunos in the west (Marek 2006a: 175–221, no. 35) and Myra (*SEG* 35.1439) and Andriake (Takmer 2007; *SEG* 57.1666) in the east, expose collection mechanisms that are obscure in other cases. Here federal officials farmed out the customs duties levied by the *koinon* at all harbors, while, as we have seen, member *poleis* collected taxes on goods that moved across interior boundaries within the *koinon*, and used the revenues derived thereby to make their obligatory contributions to the *koinon*. The sums are strikingly small: we know that Myra owed 7,000 *denarii* per year to the *koinon* while Kaunos paid only 6,000 (Marek 2006a: 212–213). The *koinon* in turn used these regional tax revenues to pay an annual sum of 100,000 *denarii* (Takmer 2007: 174) to Rome. This imperial fiscal obligation placed pressure on the Lykian *koinon* that did not exist for the independent federal states of the Classical and early Hellenistic periods, and may explain the presence of the interior tax boundaries. Those levies may have been the only real means by which the small inland Lykian *poleis* could raise funds for a contribution to the *koinon*’s total obligation to Rome. But without clear evidence for internal taxation practices in other *koina*, this explanation remains purely hypothetical.

The levying of harbor taxes throughout the region by the federal state points to the treatment of harbors as regional resources, as essentially common to the entire *koinon*. From the narrow perspective of the individual coastal *polis*, this policy might appear unjust at best, extortionate at worst. But the right of citizens of coastal *poleis* to own property inland, and the possibility of tax-free transit across *polis* boundaries within the *koinon* (for example from the mountainous interior to the coast and vice versa) changes this perspective. The federal appropriation of harbor taxes may have been an acceptable cost for increased connectivity and a more

integrated regional economy. If inland and coastal *poleis* were to be equally committed to a state that encompassed them both, such a strategy was necessary. But its success was likely predicated on the use of those revenues by the *koinon* to meet the costs of public goods that would be enjoyed by all. This meant defense, above all.

Aside from Demosthenes' hint that the Thessalians wanted to use the revenues from their harbor taxes to administer their common affairs, we do not know how such money was spent. But Polybius gives us valuable evidence for the attitude of member *poleis* to violations of agreements, whether explicit or implicit, between themselves and the *koinon* about how other kinds of tax revenues were to be properly spent. When western Achaia was overrun by an Aitolian army during the Social War in the late third century, three of the Achaian *poleis* most directly affected (Dyme, Triaia, and Pharai) sought assistance from the *koinon* for the defense of their territory. Their request was denied because, according to Polybius, the Achaians still owed money to mercenaries who had fought on their side against Kleomenes. In response, these three cities "agreed with one another not to pay their common taxes (*koinas eisphoras*) to the Achaians" and used the money instead to hire their own mercenary force (Polyb. 4.60.4–5). An inscription from Dyme recording the grant of citizenship to fifty-two individuals "who fought the war with us and together saved the city" is certainly a record of how one of these *poleis* proceeded after refusing to pay their taxes (SEG 40.393; Rizakis 2008a: 49–54 no. 4). The western Achaian cities expressed their conviction that *eisphora* revenues were to be used by the *koinon* to defend its entire territory. When their request for defensive assistance was refused, they regarded their fiscal obligation as null and void. Polybius disagreed, arguing that their effective separation made the entire *koinon* more vulnerable, set a bad precedent, and was unnecessary because "according to the laws of the *koinon*, they were certain to recover their outlay" (Polyb. 4.60.6–10). But the episode reveals a willingness on the part of member *poleis* to hold the *koinon* to the terms of its bargain with them: if the *koinon* refused to deliver the public goods that were to be funded by tax revenues, then the *poleis* would not pay the taxes. From this perspective, one could argue that the cities actually strengthened the *koinon* in the longer term by prohibiting it from abusing its powers, a dynamic that has been isolated by political theorists as essential to the stability of federalism (De Figueiredo and Weingast 2005). Whether the *koinon* itself regarded the cities' action as tantamount to secession is unclear, but we know that within two years these cities were again active members of the *koinon* (e.g., Polyb. 5.94.1).

The problem in Hellenistic Achaia was how tax revenues collected from the *poleis* were to be used by the *koinon*. Apportionment of the tax burden was another political minefield: who pays what, and according to what principles? The careful handling of this issue in fourth-century Boiotia suggests that the *koinon* was concerned to collect these taxes from member *poleis* of varying sizes and resource bases in a way that could be construed as fair. Here the *poleis*, clustered together into districts (*merē*), paid a contribution (*eisphora*) to the *koinon* that was probably proportional, as with other obligations, to their territorial size and population (*Hell. Ox.* 19.4 Chambers). Whatever the nature of this *eisphora*, the tax was levied on a remarkably equitable basis, with each district paying a percentage of the total *eisphora* that is strikingly close to its percentage of the total Boiotian territory (González 2006: 53–54). Whether the *poleis* felt that the revenues from these taxes were being used appropriately by the *koinon* we do not know; given the turbulent history of Boiotia in this period, it is perfectly possible that discontent about the handling of tax revenues by the Theban-led *koinon* contributed to the unrest. The strong centralization of power in Theban hands certainly fueled a dynamic in which protests of the sort we saw in late third-century Achaia may have been met with force rather than negotiation.

Managing regional resources

Whether the institutions of Greek federal states tended to encourage regional economic integration for ultimately political reasons – to promote the loyalty of individuals and communities to the *koinon* – or as a means of collecting tax revenues adequate to fund collective enterprises and provide public goods at the regional level without provoking resentment or rebellion among member *poleis* is unclear. Both may have been at work. But other advantages to the arrangement seem to have become apparent over time, and by the Hellenistic period it becomes possible to see clearly the *koinon* engaging in the management of regional resources. This may have begun earlier.

The Keians, who as we have seen engaged in several forms of economic cooperation in the late Archaic and early Classical periods, appear to have found the creation of a federation an effective means of strengthening this practice. Keos was famed for its *miltos*, an iron oxide prized for multiple uses (Photos-Jones and Cottier 1997). After the Athenians dismantled the Keian *koinon* in 362 following its revolt from the Second Athenian Confederacy (R&O no. 39; see also *IG* 11² 404), they asserted control over the export of the island's most valued commodity (R&O no. 40). What is striking about this regulation is that it contains separate decrees for

each of the three Keian cities involved (Karthaiā, Koressos, and Ioulis), which suggests that the Keians had previously made collective decisions about the export, perhaps but not certainly via federal institutions. It would have been only logical for them to do so: archaeological traces of *mitos* exploitation have been detected in the territories of both Ioulis and Karthaiā (Cherry et al. 1991: 300–301), near the northern, eastern, and southeastern coasts of the island. Profits might have been increased by cooperating to export a product aggregated from the many active mines. This is, of course, only a hypothesis to make sense of the hints in the epigraphic and archaeological evidence, applying the regional logic that is more easily deduced from other cases.

Our clearest evidence for the involvement of a *koinon* in the management of regional resources comes from the second century. In the 190s BCE, the population of Phokian Elateia was driven from its home, and found refuge in Stymphalos, an Arkadian city that was then part of the Achaian *koinon* and one with which the Elateians claimed kinship. The Elateians were granted the right to return to their home by the Roman consul M'. Acilius Glabrio in 191, but they faced a problem: they would be without grain, since their fields had lain fallow since their expulsion from their home. The Stymphalians, their erstwhile hosts, wanted to help them but were constrained by an embargo on the export of grain from Achaia because of a grain shortage. So they sent an embassy to the Achaians, that is, the Achaian *koinon*, seeking permission for the Elateians who had lived in Stymphalos to export the grain they had grown there. The Achaians readily granted them this right, and when the Elateians returned home they issued an honorific decree for the city of Stymphalos, which recounts the entire episode in some detail (*IPArk* 18). If the *koinon* had the authority to grant an exemption to the embargo, we must infer that it was also responsible for initially imposing it. The logic is clear enough: there was a grain shortage (*sitodeia*, line 16) and the *koinon* exercised its regional authority to retain all the grain that was grown in the region for local consumption.

The same strategy seems to have been taken on at least one occasion by the Boiotian *koinon*. A decree of the small Boiotian *polis* Chorsiai, on the Gulf of Corinth, honors one Kapon son of Brochas for making an advance of grain to the *polis* when there was “a grain shortage throughout Boiotia, and all the *poleis* had voted against the export of grain.”³ This document is

³ *SEG* 22.410, lines 4–6. The restoration of the lacuna at the start of line 5, [...]*ἴαν*, is not certain. Roesch (1965b) followed Gaheis 1902 in reading [*τὰν χάρι*]*αν*, but later emended it to [*τὰν Βοιωτ*]*ἴαν*, which has been widely accepted since. The surface of the stone is badly eroded and reading is difficult. Either way, the sense is the same: a grain shortage “throughout the region” or “throughout Boiotia.”

extremely difficult to date, but it hovers somewhere around the late 170s, very close to the dismantling of the Boiotian *koinon* in 171 BCE, and this makes it difficult to assess its relation to the activities of the federal state. Paul Roesch, who re-edited the text in 1965, initially believed that the embargo referred to in the text was put in place by every Boiotian *polis* individually (Roesch 1965a: 258), but later expressed the view that this was unlikely and preferred to see in it an action of the *koinon* (Roesch 1973: 260–261). His later view was widely rejected (*BE* 74.266; Étienne and Knoepfler 1976: 209 n. 705, 244 n. 908; Migeotte 1984: 43), but comparison with the Elateian decree for Stymphalos, in which the Achaian *koinon*'s responsibility for the embargo is clear, speaks powerfully in favor of Roesch's revised view. It has recently been argued that the decree for Kapon belongs after 171 (Müller 2005: 100–104) and has therefore been further dissociated from any act of the *koinon*, but it is also clear that it recounts a series of events that unfolded over a period of years. It is most likely, then, that the embargo was imposed by the Boiotian *koinon* in the mid- to late 170s, a time when most of Central Greece was hard hit by a grain shortage, but the decree itself was not issued until some years later, when the *koinon* was no longer in existence (Mackil 2013: 448–453).

In Hellenistic Boiotia as in Achaia, then, we find the *koinon* deploying its authority to protect the region's resources for local consumption, a significant step towards improving grain supplies during major regional shortages. In Hellenistic Thessaly, long known as a major exporter of grain, it is possible to detect an increasing authority of the *koinon* over the regional economy. Prior to federation, the Thessalian *poleis* seem to have coordinated their response to requests for grain export. A fragmentary Koan decree of the third century (*IG* XII.4.I. 133) praises "the *ethnos* of the Thessalians in common and the *poleis* in Thessaly individually" for the grain shipments they sent to Kos during a shortage.⁴ The fact that the entire *ethnos* is praised and crowned, alongside the individual Thessalian *poleis*, suggests some kind of regional coordination in responses to requests for grain, despite the fact that during this period Thessaly was not governed by a *koinon*. Two later inscriptions show that the *koinon*, after it was formed, took an increasingly central role in meeting requests by outsiders for shipments of grain. A decree of Larisa dated to the period 196–190 suggests that individual member *poleis* still responded to requests for export; they were free to act within the evidently loose confines of federal

⁴ *IG* XII.4.I. 133 fragment b, lines 123–124, cf. also line 130. For the date of the inscription and the restoration of this critical line see Tziafalias and Helly 2004–2005: 401; Habicht 2007: 132–133.

measures (Helly 2008b: 87–91). The *koinon* was now operative but the situation seems to have changed little since the third-century Koan decree. Several decades later things look different. The famous decree of the Thessalian *koinon* recording its response to a request from the Roman aedile Q. Caecilius Metellus around 129 (Garnsey, Gallant, and Rathbone 1984: 36–38, with Garnsey and Rathbone 1985: 25 for the date), reveals a *koinon* with full control over grain exports from the entire region. It also reveals the internal process by which such decisions were implemented: the *stratēgos*, with the help of his fellow magistrates and the members of the federal council (lines 15–16), was to make allocations of grain to each member *polis* to make up the complete shipment promised by the *koinon*. The cities had to meet these allocations within specified deadlines, and were responsible for the cost of transporting the grain to one of several harbors; failure to comply was punishable by a heavy fine. To judge from the timeline established for shipments, two-thirds of the total grain exported to Rome was surplus from the previous year's harvest (Garnsey, Gallant, and Rathbone 1984: 40–42), so we cannot interpret the *koinon*'s decision as politically opportune but harmful to its own citizens.

The authority of the *koinon* to determine exports from the region should not be viewed simply as a large-scale replica of the same authority typically exercised by independent *poleis* (Bresson 2002: 109–130). What is interesting and important is that control over a larger territorial extent meant, in the fragmented Mediterranean landscape, jurisdiction over an array of resources and lands whose productivity varied tremendously from year to year. In these conditions, the assertion of regional economic control by a *koinon* was a means of pooling complementary resources, facilitating their redistribution, and, when necessary, preventing their export if they could benefit anyone within the region. It was an important part of the regional logic that drove fiscal federalism in the Greek world.

Conclusion

The ancient evidence suggests that Greek federal states used their authority to effect the economic integration of the regions they governed. With control over monetary policy, regional taxation, and the power to determine whether crucial goods like grain would be exported from the region, *koina* took a strong interest in promoting regional economies. Despite this vigorous involvement in fiscal matters, we find significant limits. Public debt remained a problem for member *poleis* of Greek federal states, and they handled it just as independent *poleis* did, by borrowing from private

individuals (e.g., Migeotte 1984: nos. 12–13, 16; *IG IX 1*² 70). It is striking that we have no evidence for a *koinon* lending money or bailing out indebted member *poleis*. We know that both the Aitolian and Achaian *koina* enacted federal legislation to relieve private debt (Polyb. 13.1.1–3; 38.11.10), but they never engaged, so far as we know, in the active redistribution of wealth from one community to another. At the same time member *poleis* retained the right to collect local taxes and to administer their own markets, which literally balanced their fiscal and other material obligations to the *koinon*, such as the provision of manpower and commodities in high demand. They remained fully responsible for their debts. Whether regional economic integration was a goal in itself or merely a byproduct of political federation, the policies and practices we have just surveyed had profoundly important political effects. The power of member *poleis* was reduced by restrictions on their ability to pursue an independent monetary policy, to set or affect prices by levying taxes, and in some cases by reductions in their tax revenues. Regional solidarity was increased by improving the distribution of often highly localized goods, which minimized local protectionism and separatist tendencies stemming from the desire to protect local resources. This condition facilitated the mobilization of resources for defense, a central function of the *koinon* and one on which all member *poleis* relied heavily. The federal commitment to managing the regional economy involved the protection of its citizens as well as interventions in disputes between them, and thus made a signal contribution to peace. Finally, a state that was charged with the conduct of foreign relations on behalf of its member *poleis* in matters of war and peace was bound to exert control over exports from the region, a subject over which wars could and did arise. The political results of federal economic policies expose the *koinon* as a delicate bargain struck by the *poleis* for the sake of greater security and prosperity than they could enjoy as independent states.

Ancient theoretical reflections on federalism

Cinzia Bearzot

In the volume *Federazioni e federalismo nell'Europa antica*, which collects the proceedings of a symposium held in 1992, I considered the issue of whether an ideology of federalism existed in Greek political thought (Bearzot 1994). The theme was developed further by Hans Beck with regards to federal thought in Xenophon's *Hellenika* (2001b), a topic to which I myself returned in a short monograph study a few years later (Bearzot 2004a). Peter Funke analyzed Aristotle's perception of federalism in an article from 1998 (Funke 1998; cf. also Beck 1997: 13–18). In 2001, Gustav Adolf Lehmann followed up on this in *Ansätze zu einer Theorie des griechischen Bundesstaates bei Aristoteles und Polybios*. Albeit a short book, the study was greeted as a “quantum leap” in the attempt to unravel ancient ideas of *polis*-integration and federalism.¹ These are the premises to this chapter, which focuses on ancient political reflections regarding federalism. In light of the available sources and of the critical debate as outlined, I wish to explore the extent to which ancient federal states as political structures of cooperation, and therefore of integration, were perceived in Greek political thought as an alternative to the *polis* and its policies of self-affirmation and exclusion.

That the Greeks saw federalism as an attempt that went beyond the experiences of military and hegemonic leagues² to reconcile interstate coordination and city autonomy is a fact which is attested vibrantly in the sources. I am referring, in particular, to the chapter on the Boiotian constitution in the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia*, to some passages in Xenophon's *Hellenika*, and to Polybius' pages on the spreading of Achaian power in the Hellenistic period, which he indeed saw as due to its federal structure. All these texts, albeit historiographic in nature, provide indicative insights on

¹ Beck 2001c: 51 (review of Lehmann 2001). Further contributions to the topic include Larsen 1968: xi–xiv; Lehmann 1981; Demandt 1995: 240; Hansen 1999; Consolo Langher 1996 and 2004.

² On the federal state as an alternative model to a symmachy, see Dreher 2003 and Buraselis 2003.

the development of a federal thought in the Greek world. This is particularly remarkable, considering that in *Politics* Aristotle devotes very limited space to federal states, and that at 1326b he even rejects the possibility that a federal state may have a proper constitution (if the passage refers, as I believe, to *ethnos* as a federal state). In particular, discussing the dimensions of the ideal state, the philosopher points out that a city having too few citizens cannot be self-sufficient – thus betraying the very nature of a city – while a city with too many citizens, despite being self-sufficient as an *ethnos*, is no longer a *polis* since it is very unlikely to have a *politeia*.³ Although in these remarks Aristotle enucleates a characteristic trait of federal *koina* or *ethnē*, namely their demographic size, he concludes by denying them the status of genuine states, because they had no real *politeia*.⁴

The first evidence provided by a Greek author on the issue of federalism is the description of the Boiotian *koinon* in the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* (*Hell. ox.* 19.2–4 Chambers). The Oxyrhynchos historian highlights the trait of equality of the federal system, which he proves he knows in depth, carefully distinguishing between the federal and a local level, the latter either in the city or in districts: the comment that “Boiotian affairs were managed in the following way,”⁵ as well as the concluding remark that “this was the constitution of the all people” (*ethnos holon*: 19.2) highlight the federal level of affairs in Boiotia. In juxtaposition to it, “there were four councils established at that time in each of the cities . . . they continued to run their internal affairs in this way.” In particular, according to the author, through the principle of proportional representation, the federal system ensured equality among the districts into which Boiotia was divided, and among its cities.⁶ The Oxyrhynchos historian emphasizes the idea of equal partnership among the members of the *koinon*, and their egalitarian sharing of honors and duties, advantages and disadvantages (19.4: “each community . . . shared equally in public burdens and benefits”).⁷ Most remarkably, this idea was proposed, with anti-Spartan intentions, in 395 BCE by the Theban ambassadors to Athens (*Xen. Hell.* 3.5.11–13, with

³ See Vimercati 2002, with much bibliography; and Moggi 2014.

⁴ The inferiority of the *ethnos* vs. the *polis* also emerges from *Pol.* 1261a22–29: the *polis* is superior to the *ethnos* because of the deeply rooted unity between its parts, which cannot be achieved in an *ethnos*, “be it structured *kata komas* [among villages] or like the Arkadians.” Hence, in an *ethnos* the quantitative aspect prevails over its qualitative trait. The passage has been extensively discussed: Vilatte 1984; Hansen 1999; Lehmann 2001; Moggi 2014.

⁵ Trans. McKechnie and Kern 1988. ⁶ See Beck and Ganter in Chapter 7, above.

⁷ See Bruce 1967: 163–164; Bearzot 1994: 166–169; Beck 1997: 13–14; Corsten 1999; Mafodda 2000: 89–92; Lehmann 2001: 25–33; Behrwald 2007: 119–120. Lérica Lafarga 2007 does not comment on this.

Bearzot 2004a: 21–30). Despite being historical, rather than theoretical in nature, the passage provides an example of an as-yet embryonic reflection on the values of federalism, a reflection that supplements the more widespread debate in Greek political thought on the values of the city experience (freedom and autonomy in particular).⁸ As has been observed, no mention is made of the religious elements of the union among the Boiotians, such as the federal temples of Poseidon in Onchestos and of Athena Itonia in Koroneia.⁹

Xenophon proves to be far more interested in these issues. All hints at the subject from his works can hardly be surveyed in full, yet some passages deserve special mention. Among these are the speeches by Kleigenes of Akanthus (*Hell.* 5.2.12–19) and Polydamas of Pharsalos (*Hell.* 6.1.5–12) and the narration of the *stasis* of Tegea (*Hell.* 6.5.6–9).

Kleigenes' speech (382) serves Xenophon's aim of identifying the specific characteristics of the federal experience. Besides attesting the term *sympoliteia* (in its verbal form, *sympoliteuein*), the speech also clarifies what the notion entailed in practice, namely common laws, sharing of military and economic resources, and the exchange of rights of marriage (*epigamia*) and property (*enktesis*).¹⁰ Of the states organized on the basis of *sympoliteia*, Kleigenes' speech highlights values (economic power, demographic size, military power, advantages deriving from political and legal unification) and limitations, i.e., the difficulty in calibrating the relation between federal and local entities, which was labeled by Hans Beck as a "vertical division of power"¹¹. For its part, Kleigenes' *polis* perspective hinders the proper assessment of the most interestingly innovative aspects of federalism which are connected with the creation of coordination structures characterized by a rigorously equal sharing of rights and duties. Kleigenes, like Xenophon himself, is among those Greeks who did not want to be bound to *sympoliteuein* and to shared laws (*nomois tois autois chrēsthai kai sympoliteuein*), and wished instead to continue being *autopolitai* and governed by native laws (*tois patrios nomois chrēsthai kai autopolitai einai*). In this respect it is, however, noteworthy that on concluding his speech, Kleigenes is finally forced to admit, stressing the need for urgent action, that federal

⁸ For a general update, see Bianchetti and Cataudella (eds) 2001; Behrwald 2007.

⁹ See Siewert 2005b: 16–17.

¹⁰ The earliest sources which record this notion, in the verbal form of *sympoliteuein*, are the *Hellenika of Oxyrhynchus* (19.3 Chambers) and Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.2.12): Sordi 1983, 1994, and 1997. On federal terminology and the notion of *sympoliteia* see Giovannini 1971, with the discussion by Wallbank 1976/1977; see also Cabanes 1976a; Stanton 1982; Bearzot 1994; Schmitt 1994; Demandt 1985: 239–240, 249; Beck 1997: 10–19; Funke 1998: 66–67; Corsten 1999; Rzepka 2002; Pascual 2007.

¹¹ Beck 2001b: 370.

states are attractive and can build and gradually increase consensus through the advantages granted to its members by *sympoliteia*.¹²

A similar impression is drawn from the speech of Polydamas of Pharsalos in 375/4 BCE (*Hell.* 6.1.5–12), who, reporting the words of Jason of Pherai, illustrates the great potential of Thessaly as unified under a single *tagos* in a solid federal structure, and evokes, exactly like Kleigenes with respect to the Chalkidians, its demographic and military power, great economic resources, and expansion capacity. Also in this case, Xenophon's ability in identifying the potential of federalism, as well as the difficulty of its integration with the *polis* experience, is evident.¹³

Finally, as in Kleigenes' speech, in the narration of the *stasis* of Tegea in 370 (*Hell.* 6.5.6–9) two conflicting political attitudes are juxtaposed, each referring to different ideal and terminological frameworks. On the one hand, federalism (the faction of Proxenos and Kallibios), which supports unity and cooperation among different cities and an articulation between *koinon* and *poleis*, a perspective according to which cities are explicitly requested to renounce part of their sovereignty in order to align themselves with common provisions ("the followers of Kallibios and Proxenos were making efforts to the end that all the people of Arkadia should unite, and that whatever measure was carried in the common assembly [*en tōi koinōi*] should be binding on the several cities as well"). On the other hand, autonomy (the faction of Stasippos), which insists on referring to "native laws" and on the close ties between sovereignty and "city" territory: "the followers of Stasippos made it their policy to leave their city undisturbed and to live under the laws of their fathers (*tois patrios nomois chrēsthai*)."¹⁴

Xenophon is undoubtedly the spokesman of those Greeks who did not want to be bound to *sympoliteuein* and to shared laws, and wished instead to continue being *autopolitai* and governed by native laws. Yet he has to admit that the *koina*, with their huge demographic, military, and economic potential, were alternative to the *poleis*; the latter characterized as they were by less articulated economies, progressive impoverishment and lower

¹² Thus, I find it hard to include the excerpt in the attestations sustaining the absence of the notion of *sympoliteia* in the Classical Age, as proposed by Bordes 1982. On Kleigenes' speech, see Bearzot 1994: 174–179; Lehmann 2001: 22–24; Beck 2001b; Bearzot 2004a: 45–56. The potentially more open nature of *ethnos* vs. *polis*, which results in a greater capacity of assimilation and integration, is emphasized by Cabanes 1989. For a survey on the role of federal states in the development of forms of supranational collaboration in Greece, see Whitby 1991; Funke 1994.

¹³ The affinities with Kleigenes' speech have been highlighted by Sordi 1951; and 2001; see also Sordi 1988; 1994: 11; and 1997: 107–108. On Xenophon's witness, see also Gray 1989: 121–123; Lehmann 2001: 21–22.

¹⁴ Trans. Brownson 1918–1921. Cf. Bearzot 2004a: 119–126.

demographic resources, which meant shrinking city armies and consequently led to a decline in military power.

Xenophon's remark according to which, in the establishment of a solid *koinon*, any forms of original coercion eventually evolve into mutual interdependence and solidarity is re-echoed in the political thought of Polybius which, among our sources, certainly is the most interesting contribution on Greek federalism and its characteristics. In his digression on the Achaian *koinon* in Book 2 of his *Histories*, Polybius celebrates the unexpected expansion and harmony (*paradoxos auxēsis kai symphronēsis*) of the *koinon*, and attributes its success to its federal structure. In effect, through identical laws, weights, measures, currency, and institutions (magistrates, counselors, judges) both at a federal and a local level (2.37.11), the federal structure promoted a community of interests among the members of the *koinon* such as existed in "a single city" (2.37.10–11: "not only is there in the Peloponnese a community of interests such as exists between allies or friends [*symmachikēn kai philikēn koinōnian*], but an absolute identity of laws, weights, measures, and currency. All the states have the same magistrates, senate, and judges. Nor is there any difference between the entire Peloponnese and a single city."). In addition, the commitment of the Achaians to common freedom (*koinē eleutheria*), and not to their own hegemony, allowed them to achieve the desired unification of the Peloponnese. Even if Polybius' ideal reference framework still appears to be the *polis*, it is evident that, partly by resorting to traditional terminology (*sympoliteia*, *synteleia*), and partly by innovating it with new terms – *systema*, *systasis*, *symphronēsis*, *synneusis*, *symmachikē kai philikē koinōnia*; also *koinē politeia* or *sympoliteia*, *koinon politeuma* – the historian here celebrates federalism, in its concrete realization in the Achaian *koinon*, as capable of promoting the common interests of all, ensuring freedom and harmony.

In fact, Polybius does not deny the existence of moments of resistance. In recalling the expansion phases of the *koinon*, he argues that while some Peloponnesians voluntarily accepted the Achaian political system based on equal rights (2.38.6),¹⁵ others had to be convinced by persuasion and argument, and yet others were forced to join the league, although they soon appreciated its benefits and advantages of their – compulsory – accession. In effect, the Achaians guaranteed equal rights to all, and by

¹⁵ Cf. also 2.42.3: "It was in virtue of this policy, by holding out the bait of equality and freedom (*isēgorian kai parrhēsan*) . . . that they finally accomplished the design which they had deliberately adopted." On the use of democratic terminology in Polybius, see Tuci 2003.

enforcing equality and fraternity (*isotēti kai philanthrōpiai*: 2.38.9) they allowed the great potential of federalism, as indicated by Xenophon, to fully bloom.

This led to the complete and harmonious integration of the different local realities into a federal context, which was the prerequisite for the equal distribution of honors and duties that the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* had celebrated as characteristic of the Boiotian federal experience. The result, noted with satisfaction by Polybius, was a federal system capable of promoting “the freedom of each state and the union of the Peloponnese” (2.42.6; cf. 2, 40, 1) and of “ensuring federal and local freedom to all” (2.43.8). Thus, despite being a partial witness, Polybius identifies the Achaian federal experience as capable of coordinating the local and federal levels effectively, solving the problem of the vertical division of power that had so severely affected other federal experiences.¹⁶ Finally, as in the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia*, remarks on the religious aspects in federal unification are here strikingly absent too.

Later tradition referring to Polybius is also noteworthy for its originality. A passage in Pausanias, centered on the notion of the *koinon* (7.7.1), discusses the origins of Achaian power and the reasons of its political success. The latter are identified in the adoption of a collaborative approach, in contrast to the *poleis* and their evident inability in operating as one. The passage opens with the image of a divided Greece. Then the rise of the Achaians is seen as deriving from one specific factor – alongside their immunity from troubles such as tyranny, wars, or epidemics that plagued Greece in the fourth and third centuries BCE – namely their state-structure, that is, a federal system based on sharing decisions and on the consequent possibility of taking common action. After detecting the inability of the Greeks to undertake joint action, Pausanias points out that the very fact of having adopted an institutional system capable of organizing and carrying out common purposes (the *syndrion Achaikon*) allowed the Achaians to grow as a political power and to compensate for the deficiencies of the Hellenic world, acting from the perspective of a joint rationale, both in their deliberations and actual deeds. Pausanias’ insistence on the positive effects of deciding and acting jointly contributes to including the ability of the federal system to sustain equality, aggregation and fruitful collaboration among different political entities in its positive features.

The same concepts are emphasized also in a fragment of Diodoros (29.18), which celebrates Philopoimen for having championed the

¹⁶ On Polybius, see Walbank 1957–1979: 1.221–222; Beck 1997: 16–18; Lehmann 2001: 46–61.

development of the Achaian *sympoliteia* in a communitarian and collaborative direction. The fragment confirms the importance of the theme of cooperation (alongside equality of rights and obligations) in the assessment of the federal experience, and seems to evoke the opinion of Polybius on the renewed unitary development of the Achaian League in 2.40.5–6: “I think the easiest method . . . will be to start from the period of the restoration of the Achaian League and federation after its disintegration into separate states by the Makedonian kings: from which time it has enjoyed an unbroken progress towards the state of completion which now exists.”

Plutarch’s contribution to the issue has received far less attention than it deserves, as it emerges from two passages, in the *Life of Aratos* (24.5–6) and the *Life of Philopoimen* (8.1–5) respectively.¹⁷ In the *Life of Aratos* Plutarch affirms that the Achaian *stratēgos*, worried in particular about the *auxēsis* of the Achaian League, believed that the cities, which were individually weak, would be preserved by mutual support if bound by common interest: “as the members of the body have a common life and breath because they cleave together in a common growth, but when they are drawn apart and become separate they wither away and decay, in like manner the several states are ruined by those who dis sever their common bonds, but are augmented by mutual support, when they become parts of a great whole and enjoy a common foresight.”¹⁸ The body metaphor effectively conveys the notion of the mutual strengthening of the members of a federation. The *poleis* are like limbs, which, to survive and be vital, must be attached to the body, the federation; the disruption of the latter threatens also the survival of the individual cities, which can only thrive if inserted into a whole (*holoutinos megalou merē*) and involved in a common design (cf. Polyb. 2.42.3). Here *sympoliteia* is the foundation of the stability of the *poleis* itself, if they unite in a federal structure in which they share common premises and political projects. This conveys the frank expression of the values of federalism and of their superiority over those of the *poleis*, which testifies to a reversal of the *polis*-centered perspective of the sources probably due to having resorted to Polybius’ works (where the image of the human body, *sōma*, as applied to the historiographical and political spheres, occurs frequently) and Aratos’ *Memoirs*.¹⁹ Granting the best possible sharing of interests and the primacy of the interests of the federation (*koinon*

¹⁷ See Vimercati 2005. ¹⁸ Trans. Perrin 1926.

¹⁹ Vimercati 2005: 58–59 points out the affinities between Plut. *Arat.* 9.7 and Polyb. 2.42.3–5, suggesting that their remarks may be traced back to the *Memoirs* of Aratos. On the importance of terms like *soma* in Stoic thought, see Vimercati 2005.

sympheron) over those of its individual members (*tēs hautou patridos sympheron*), the federal union is the only system capable of ensuring the survival of the cities, otherwise doomed to mutual destruction or enslavement at the hands of the strongest.

A similar notion emerges from the *Life of Philopoimen* (8.1–3). Resorting to Polybian concepts and terminology,²⁰ Plutarch affirms that “the commonwealth of the Achaians (*to koinon tōn Achaiōn*) was first raised to dignity and power by Aratos, who consolidated it when it was feeble and disrupted, and inaugurated an Hellenic and humane form of government” (*hellēnikēn kai philanthrōpon politeian*).²¹ Then, “at a time when Greece was weak and easily dissolved and drifting along by individual cities,” the Achaians united (*systantes*) by freeing some nearby cities from their tyrants and assimilating others through harmony and political institutions (*homonoiā kai politeia*), with the intention of turning the Peloponnese “into a single political body and one power” (*hen sōma kai mia dynamis*). This process, which began with Aratos and reached its completion at the time of Philopoimen, is precisely illustrated: “Then, just as in running waters, after a few small particles have begun to take a fixed position, others presently are swept against the first, adhere and cling to them, and thus form a fixed and solid mass by mutual support, so the Achaians”: 8.3). As mentioned before, the passage resembles the writings of Polybius; interestingly enough, however, alongside the human body metaphor, the image of particles that aggregate is evoked. Just as dispersed particles become a homogeneous and solid mass, so the Achaians, feeble and divided as they were like all Greece, joined politically to make the Peloponnese one body and one power. The metaphor of concretions that form in watercourses expresses, in new terms, the idea that the unity and cohesion of the federal state result from the harmonious fusion of entities united by shared principles, and oriented towards the common good.²²

While referring to Polybius, Plutarch does so in a twofold manner. On the one hand, he gives prominence to the federal system as embodying values that are even more crucial than those of the *polis*; on the other, he introduces original metaphors, such as those of the body and of concretions in watercourses, to underline the profound unity attained by the

²⁰ See Vimercati 2005: 72–75. ²¹ Trans. Perrin 1921.

²² On the image employed by Plutarch, which seems to hint at alluvial deposits, see Fuhrmann 1964: 250, n. 3; cf. Plut. *Publ.* 8 on the formation of the Tiber island. Ziegler 1934: 213–4, believes that this refers to the process of crystallization and consolidation which leads to the formation of ice. Vimercati 2005: 74–75, alludes to the union of molecules that gives life to water, yet the text mentions a “compact and thick mass” which makes this interpretation unlikely.

Achaian federal state. The reflection that had begun in the fourth century BCE with the Oxyrhynchos historian and Xenophon, appears here to reach its extreme consequences, overcoming the traditional *polis*-centered view: the *polis* finds its true value in its ability to interact with other *poleis* within a federation.

These are the elements of the ancient debate on federalism. As noted, that debate seems to lack an account of the religious and cultural bonds as factors of unity among the members of a *koinon*, to be ranked alongside political, military, and legal ties. This absence certainly requires consideration: it may perhaps be explained by the lack of specificity of the religious question in the federal context. While the ability to create structures of cooperation, higher availability of economic and demographic resources, greater military power, willingness to exchange rights and integration appear as qualifying aspects proper to the federal experience, common cults play instead a similar role in the definition of a common identity in the *polis* as well as in the federal state. Resorting again to Pausanias, for example, it is clear that the Attic cult of the ancient image of Athena in Athens (1.26.6), which was the unifying prerequisite to the future Athenian political community, does not play a different role from the so-called Common Hearth of the Arkadians in Tegea (*hestian Arkadōn koinēn*: 8.53.9).²³ In the former case, the religious element is the necessary foundation for a unified civic community; in the latter, it contributes to facilitating the meeting and development of common interests among the Arkadians. Thus, the expression of a common identity in the religious sphere reveals itself to be a factor that draws *poleis* and *ethnē* together, rather than apart.

²³ On the cult, which emphasizes the unifying feature of religious experience, see Beck 1997: 70, n. 16 (with bibliography).

*Greek federalism, the rediscovery of Polybius,
and the framing of the American constitution*

Gustav Adolf Lehmann

In modern times the historical reception and intense discussion of Greek federalism are firmly connected with the resurfacing of Polybius' *Histories* in Italy and western Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Momigliano 1974). At first, however, the high esteem of this great historical work was not founded on the chapters concerning the rise and the political achievements of the Achaian League in the third and second centuries BCE, but rather on Polybius' theory of a so-called mixed constitution, which he elaborated on in a lengthy excursus in Book 6 in his work. Polybius' expositions on the issue were in fact not original; as he himself acknowledged, Plato was the first author to develop this theory and appreciate the merits of a system of a mixed government with multiple built-in checks and balances – Plato dealt with this in his second (and significant) work about the philosophy of the state, the *Nomoi*. Arguing in favor of a constitutional government, Plato stressed the importance of an institutional balance of monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements in order to guarantee liberalism, public spirit and stability.¹

Drafting his institutional regulations in the *Nomoi*, Plato limited himself to the realm of a comparatively small *polis* – particularly one situated far away from any maritime links and the 'bad influences' coming from the sea, i.e., from abroad. When Aristotle picked up the thread in his *Politics* by discussing the notion of a mixture and combination of different and independent authorities in the *polis*, he did so primarily from a theoretical and abstract angle. As a consequence, it fell to the rather 'pragmatic' *Histories* of Polybius to promote for the first time a full-fledged analysis of a balanced mixed constitution that was both practically inspired and

¹ See *Laws* 715b–c. It is unclear whether Isokrates had this pattern in mind when he made some notes concerning an idealized 'Ur-Athens' and its constitutional as well as historical achievements in the *Panathenaikos* (from 341/339 BCE).

applicable to state systems that transcended the small realm of the *polis*. The concept fascinated many thinkers, intellectuals, and politicians, in early modern Europe.

Polybius was a young politician in the Achaian League when he was taken as a hostage in 167 BCE and detained in Rome subsequently for eighteen years. Rome at that time was the center of a dynamically growing Imperium, and Polybius was able to make contacts with powerful senatorial families that enabled him to gain good insight into political life at Rome. This was also the background against which the major parts of his contemporary history on the rise of Rome as a world power were written. In Book 6 of the *Histories* in particular, a part of his work which is mainly dedicated to systematic analyses, Polybius takes on the challenge of interpreting Rome's complex and mature constitution, something that had never been attempted before. When he did so, he juxtaposed the state of affairs at Rome against the model of other states, comparing and contrasting it critically with that of other states which he regarded as also having a mixed constitution, notably Sparta and Carthage. In his detailed examination, he highlighted the eminent advantages of the Roman republic, praising not only its conceptual divisions of power and assignments of responsibilities between the senate, the people and the magistrates but also – and even more so – the many institutional entanglements and cross-references. These linkages helped to create a system whose dynamics forced all its participants and officeholders to be self-controlled and behave respectfully within the system. At the same time, it enabled them to cooperate as a stable, reliable group and interact with the outer world with cohesion and determination.

The rediscovery of Polybius' work in western Europe coincided with the resurfacing of other major ancient Greek authors in late medieval and early modern Europe. In Florence, this rediscovery took place during the years around 1410 in the circle of the humanist Leonardo Bruni Aretino (1369–1444) and his Greco-Roman teacher Manuel Chrysoloras (c. 1350–1415, a refugee from Constantinople). Unfortunately, the rediscovery of Polybius was initially limited to the sole remaining manuscripts which contained the first five books; in the course of the fifteenth century CE, it was enlarged by collections of abstracts that dated from Late Antiquity and the early Byzantine Empire, including sections from Book 6. Due to this, Bruni regarded Polybius simply as a valuable supplementary source that added to the understanding of Livy. In contrast to this early reception, it is dazzling to notice the almost electrifying impact Book 6 had on the political leaders of sixteenth-century Florence who were

experiencing the imminent threat of the return of the Medici.² This impact is well attested in Nicolò Machiavelli's *Discorsi*, a treatise on the first decade of Livy's *ab urbe condita* (1513). More than *Il Principe* (*De Principatibus*), the *Discorsi* became Machiavelli's major contribution to the history of political philosophy, ultimately one of the key texts of Republicanism in the Early Modern era in Europe. Strangely enough, Machiavelli (1469 to 1527) himself incidentally did not know Greek – so he must have had some private translations of Polybius' text in Latin or Italian at hand.

During the second half of the sixteenth century the reception of the *Histories* made its way to central and western Europe as well. On top of the historically interesting passages, scholars now turned their attention again to Polybius' ideas on political philosophy. The strands of this second wave of reception began with the study by Justus Lipsius (1547 to 1606), *De militia Romana* (Leuven 1594), who drew on Polybius considerably, and ended with the written documents of Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange (1567 to 1625), who reformed, and refined, the army when he was *stadtholder* in the provinces of Protestant Netherlands.³

During the seventeenth century, Polybius' reputation reached new heights. This increase in attention was due to a philologically compelling (i.e. well translated) and beautifully produced typeset edition that was published by Isaac Casaubonus in 1609, comprising not only a translation in Latin and an elaborate introduction but also a personal as well as political dedication to Henry IV of France. After Henry's assassination in 1610, Casaubonus – a Huguenot – sought asylum in England. At the same time, Polybius' *Histories* gained much prominence there on the eve of the Civil War, when his *civilis prudentia* and his *scientia militaris* were discussed even in Parliament (see Nippel 1980). The main impulse for the study of federalism in Polybius' work came only a few years later, with the handbook *Vetus Graecia illustrata* by Ubbo Emmius.⁴ The work, which in the sections on the post-Classical periods is based largely on Polybius, included a systematic survey on the political history of the Greek world and its literary sources, with a special interest in the role of federal states in Greek history.⁵

² See Reinhardt 2012: 251–264.

³ See Hahlweg 1973, on the basis of a long series of studies. For a valuation of Justus Lipsius works, see Oestreich 1989.

⁴ Published in Leiden in 1626, with a preface of Ubbo's son Wessel Emmius.

⁵ See vol. III: *representaens Graecorum res publicas*. Ubbo Emmius (1547–1625) was the first principal of the University of Groningen (from 1596 to 1621). In that capacity, he was involved for many years in the politics of Netherlands' federal Union (representing his university); see Boer 1935: 85–86.

Federal states were characterized by Emmius in the terms of *gens* or *societas*, but even the term *communis res publica* is sometimes found in this context – as a convenient translation of the Greek word *koinon*. Within his description of the historical development of the federal states in Greece, Emmius focused in detail on the relation between the respective federated states, the *civitates*, and their central federal government. Dealing with these federal states in detail, he rubricized the Amphictyonic Council at Delphi as a federation. Emmius regarded the amphiktyony there – consisting of twelve member-states, each being allowed to delegate two representatives to the council irrespective of its size and political power – as the major Panhellenic law court and the highest political authority in the Greek *polis* world, recognizing it to be a major achievement in Greek history.

On several occasions in *Vetus Graecia*, references to the contemporary conflicts of the Union of the Dutch Provinces can be perceived. These references, along with other general remarks, touch upon the contemporary political crisis concerning the assignment of responsibilities and constitutional rights to either the province of Holland or to the *stadtholder's* regime, in alliance with the representatives of the smaller provinces in the council of states (the so-called *Staten-Generaal*) of the Union of Utrecht. Firmly connected with this political conflict was the difficult theological problem of the Question of the Remonstrants (*Remonstrantenfrage*), concerning an attenuation of the strict Calvinist doctrines about predestination. In May 1619 the crisis escalated when the *stadtholder* of the union, Maurice of Nassau, unlawfully arrested and executed the *Landsadvocaat en raadpensionaris* Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (the first minister of the province of Holland). Oldenbarnevelt's young counselor Hugo Grotius was sentenced to lifelong imprisonment at the same time, yet he managed to escape with help from his wife. But the powerful Oldenbarnevelt could only be brought to court and be punished under the accusation of being an anti-Calvinist and alleged heretic. The structural problems in the political sphere which had been the result of a continuous clash between the semi-hegemonic position of the province of Holland in Netherland's federal union and the semi-monarchic position of the *stadtholder* remained unresolved even after this crisis.⁶

Ubbo Emmius, as a scholar deeply involved in contemporary politics as well as in theological debates, took a clear stand in this crisis, despite his intention of dealing with these matters with a fair amount of reserve in his

⁶ See the essays in Kupperts 1994 (with a full bibliography); also den Tex 1973; Knapen 2005.

scholarly writings. According to him, as a true Calvinist and as a representative of the small and comparatively poor province of Groningen, he championed the Orange *stadtholder's* government, with prerogatives at least in the sphere of foreign policy (and internal security). Furthermore, he believed that the highest executive office should have an independent basis in the constitutional framework of the federation – just as in the Achaian League or in other ancient federal states – as the most visible and powerful element representing the *una communis res publica*. Against this intellectual background, Emmius dealt with the thriving federation of Achaia in the third and second centuries BCE. Evidently drawing on Polybius, Emmius praised the Achaian federation as a federal state that was formed in an extraordinary manner. For Achaia's constitution combined “a true democracy” (*status vere popularis*) with an *optimatum regimen* (the control of the state by a political elite) and a strong, elected executive. In this vein, Emmius attributed great significance to the military commandership of the *stratēgoi* as the highest executive of the Achaian federation. He also points to the fact that in the beginning (c. 280 BCE) this office had been performed by an annually elected board of two *stratēgoi* and one *grammateus* (“secretary of state”), and that after some decades this board was replaced by only one *stratēgos* who yielded full executive authority, in politics as well as in all military affairs. Emmius admired these constitutional changes and the new structure of the highest magistracy in Achaia as a truly outstanding act of political reform. To Emmius it meant that the federal state of Achaia – which he considered to be a suitable federal model even for “*Belgium Nostrum*” – did have a full array of structural elements of a successful mixed constitution at its disposal. This constituted the intellectual link in *Vetus Graecia* between the notion of a mixed constitution (which originally stemmed from Polybius' analysis of the Roman Republic) and the development of the federal constitution in ancient Achaia. The establishment of this link, in turn, marked the beginning of a growing interest in ancient federal states; since Emmius' writings, and thanks to his scholarly achievement, their constitutions and politics served now as new paradigms in the discussion of political theories throughout early modern Europe.

Beyond Achaia, Emmius also studied the Lykian Confederacy, stressing its ability to endure under the Roman Empire. In the sections on Lykia, he thoroughly analyzed the sketchy description of its federal constitution offered by Strabo; the latter had already appreciated Lykia's constitution and politics as an example of a well-ordered Greek state (14.3.3). In Emmius' eyes, the reported details of Lykia's constitution formed the

picture of an exemplary model of a representative government. The federation was made up of a general council, including delegates of all twenty-three federated *poleis* side by side with the highest executive magistrate, the *stratēgos*, and there were no other political assemblies at the federal level. The mandates or, rather, voting rights of the delegates in the federal council were calculated in proportion to the number of the citizens in the *polis* member-states: the six largest had three votes each, the medium-size members two, and the smaller communities only one each.⁷ Emmius typically applied this principle of proportional representation exclusively to the financial resources of the federated states of Lykia, as this was the politically paramount topic in the contemporary union of the Netherlands.

Ubbo Emmius' *Vetus Graecia* was a major success on the book market and maintained its reputation as the authoritative handbook on ancient Greece until the end of the eighteenth century.⁸ Due to this success, the publishers Elvezier in Leiden already published a special edition of the third volume of this work under the title *Graecorum res publicae Ubbone Emmio descriptae* in 1632. This special edition was limited to the (most interesting) historical parts, with a special focus on the political institutions. It was printed in beautiful Antiqua and bound in miniature-format, suitable for the saddlebags and jacket pockets of scholars and aristocrats eager to absorb knowledge in the field of Classics, from the court of Versailles to gentlemen clubs in England, Scotland, and Virginia. Emmius' work circulated widely through the learned circles of Europe and North America. With it, knowledge of the history and constitutional development of Hellenic federal states was disseminated, impacting the political discussions of the day.

An important and significant case can be made here with regard to the political debates surrounding the ratification of the federal American constitution. The substance of the constitutional draft was worked out at a convention in Philadelphia. It was designed to provide the newly liberated North American colonies with a strong federal structure as a common basis. The *Federalist Papers* played a decisive role in the fundamental debate that led up to the acceptance and ratification of the plan, comprising a series of eighty-five articles that were published in different New York newspapers between October 1787 and August 1788. The papers were swiftly reprinted in other American states and published in book format

⁷ For the details, see [Chapter 22](#) by Ralf Behrwald above.

⁸ Note that Emmius' work was incorporated in full into Jacob Gronovius' fundamental *Thesaurus Antiquitatum Graecarum* (Gronovius 1697–1702); 4th folio, pp. 84–671, under the title *Graecorum res publicae*.

(in 1788). The essays, which to this day are considered the major commentary on the American constitution and its institutions, were mainly written by Alexander Hamilton (1757–1804) – a confidant and assistant of George Washington – and James Madison (1751–1836), who would be president from 1809 to 1817.⁹

These *Federalist Papers* are impressive both in their overall line of reasoning and in their combination of balanced political–pragmatic analyses with explanations from political philosophy and history. This was the very first time in the history of American journalism that the major thoughts of Montesquieu’s political philosophy were received clearly and thoroughly, and the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial power was put into practice with the new constitution; of course, this happened without reference to the traditional feudal order that had figured so prominently in Charles de Montesquieu’s conception of politics.¹⁰ The essays also show a rich and deep knowledge of history, an astonishing familiarity with ancient political thought as well as its major proponents, and an open-mindedness and pragmatic conclusions that served the authors’ own political activity. Finally, they attest to a great enthusiasm for the ideal of civil liberty in a pre-Christian and pre-Roman imperial era.¹¹

The great interest in the Greek *poleis* in particular can be explained partly by the fact that Hellenic colonies (*apoikiai*), unlike Roman *coloniae* or *municipia*, usually demanded political independence from their mother-cities and were mostly able to achieve this. Promoting a strong union of the American States, the Federalists, however, were asked to counter the fundamental objection made by the Anti-Federalists with regard to the example of Rome: a vital and liberal republican constitution suited only small-scale states – at least this is what history seemingly taught. So a territorially large state that was designed for further large-scale expansion like the thirteen original British colonies would necessarily lose its liberal order in the course of further growth and would sooner or later either

⁹ *The Federalist Papers*, New York 1788, esp. nos. 4, 9, 18, 19, 20, 38, 43, 45, and 63. James Madison also composed a separate study *On Ancient and Modern Confederacies* (1787); see Kennedy 1976; Hanses 2011.

¹⁰ Montesquieu 1748, Book 9, chapters 1–3; see Lehmann 1985. On the long-scale results of the *Federalist* debate, see Heideking 1988. In the monumental (and unfinished) work of E. A. Freeman 1893, (written in 1861/62 in the midst of the American Civil War) the relation between the constitution of the USA and the Achaian League is also discussed. It is impossible to present a full bibliography here concerning this eminent historical issue; see now the instructive essays by Wood 2011.

¹¹ See Gummere 1963: 173–174; Reinhold 1979: 223–224; 1984: 94–95, 142–143.

degenerate into authoritarian dictatorship or lose its political unity, as the crises, revolutions, and civil wars in the history of the Roman Republic had shown. Amongst others, this is what the Prussian king Friedrich II predicted with regards to the future politics of the American States after 1783. Many American politicians and writers indeed were concerned about such a potential development. Consequently, they championed the idea of setting up comprehensive unions out of the thirteen independent states – the sovereign federations of the north, the central region and the south – in order to prevent the dangers attributed to a republic with an excessively large territory.

The complicated relation between territorial expansion and liberal republicanism was already addressed by different ancient writers, from Strabo to Augustine, but was fully recognized as a political dilemma and put into a gripping formula only by Montesquieu in his *L'esprit des lois*: “If a republic is small, it will be destroyed by a foreign force; if it is grand, it will be destroyed by domestic vice.”¹² Unlike in his earlier writings, in particular *Sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence* (1734), Montesquieu now recognized that there was an alternative to the dilemma by realigning the civic liberalism of a republic with the military and political powers of a large-scale monarchy. The only potential and historical system of government Montesquieu could think of was that of a federal republic as exemplified by the federal constitution of ancient Lykia – which was also sketched as a perfect model in Strabo’s *Geography*.

Lykia’s political organization, in particular the feature of proportional representation of its member-states and their voting rights in the central council, was therefore discussed to quite some extent – along with the model of the Delphic Amphiktyony – at the Philadelphia convention, with regards to the potential distribution of the votes of each member-state in the new American senate. The second chamber of Congress was supposed to balance the powers between the monocratic element of the executive led by the President, and the dynamic democratic element embodied in the House of Representatives. The authors of the *Federalist Papers* and their followers finally found a compromise by turning to the model of Delphi, according to which each state would hold two seats in the Senate, which acknowledged in particular the existential fears of some of the smaller American states (not to speak of the permanently strained relations between north and south). Interestingly enough, throughout the sections

¹² “Si une république est petite, elle est détruite par une force étrangère; si elle est grande, elle se détruit par un vice intérieur.” (Montesquieu 1748: Book 9, chapter 1.) Strabo: 6.4.2. Cf. also Lange 1980.

in the *Federalist Papers* that deal with the questions of political structures in modern-day republics and confederations, the references to history are dominated by negative examples. This was certainly true for the somewhat awkward entity of The United Netherlands (officially known as the *Republiek van de Zeven Verenigde Nederlanden*), with its unclear compromises concerning the powerful position of the Orange-Nassau *stadtholder-ship*, and even more so in the case of the hereditary aristocratic system of the Republic of Venice (*Repubblica di Venezia*). Even the weak federation of the Swiss cantons and the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations was considered “a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own members”, that was as strictly rejected as the semi-monarchic Republic of Poland.¹³

In comparison to positive examples from antiquity, among which the Achaian League is praised in particular as “the last hope of Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty”¹⁴, the English constitution is denigrated as a corrupt and in every respect unfair system. One should not forget, however, that all these positive ancient examples served as an important source of inspiration concerning the virtues of active civic engagement and citizenship, and also as a basis of fundamental legitimation, as they were regarded as elements of an ideal past in the public opinion of the enlightened eighteenth century – a time when innovations generally threatened tradition: so these ancient examples were much more than simply intellectual shades of humanist education and learnedness. Nevertheless, the English monarchy did indeed play a role in debate and decision after all – but only in the first draft of the constitution, proposed by Alexander Hamilton: this concept was passed over quickly and dismissed by the constitutional convention, due to the vigorous leadership of James Madison, who was soon joined by Hamilton.¹⁵ However, in different lines of argumentation in the *Federalist Papers* complaints can be perceived about the fact that the ancient evidence was too scanty to provide clear information and advice on systematic questions or on more intricate discussions about institutional rules and procedures. On other occasions, there are also remarks stressing the challenge and the singular task with which the young nation of the United States of America was confronted,

¹³ See *Federalist Papers*, nos. 19 and 20. Essay no. 47 contains some sharp critical remarks against Montesquieu’s admiration for the constitutional order of England.

¹⁴ See *Federalist Papers*: nos. 9, 18, 19.

¹⁵ The flamboyant personality of Hamilton, who soon became leader of the Federalist party and made a great political contribution as Secretary of the Treasury under George Washington, was to become the “father of the dollar” and founder of the Federal Bank. His political career ended abruptly when he was killed in a duel.

when a viable federal constitution had to be established in a particular situation in history that, actually, could hardly be measured against and compared with any other previous circumstances. Madison expressed the notion of incomparability of circumstances as well as the lack of alternatives:

I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well ancient and modern; and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained that there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention.¹⁶

It is thus obvious that familiarity with ancient paradigms offered in itself a resourceful tool of political legitimation and – in the face of the challenge posed by the revolutionary change and a new beginning that broke the ties with colonial rule and tradition – robust knowledge for a fresh start in politics.

At least two central aspects of the American constitution appear to result from a close reading and discussion of the ancient evidence. One of them concerns the strong development of the office of president, which was time and again justified in the *Federalist Papers* and explained with the constitutional arrangement in the Achaian and Lykian Leagues – just as Ubbo Emmius had made clear – and which seems to have become a necessary embodiment of the fundamental unity of the union. However, in the modern discussion, which is mostly dominated by political scientists, the strong role of the presidential office is interpreted primarily as an act of compensation for the monarch, a kind of substitute monarch (*Ersatzmonarch*), who was disposed of in the course of the American Revolution. More concrete and direct lines of reference to antiquity, however, can be detected in the *Federalist Papers* as well. This is clearly true for the elaborately construed fusion of the presidential executive on the one hand and the manifold senatorial rights of oversight on the other, in the appointment of the cabinet and in the realm of foreign policy. The driving force behind this appears surely to derive from Polybius' analysis of a mixed constitution in Book 6 of his *Histories* (see Chinard 1940). But above all, it is the relation between the Senate as a kind of an upper house, i.e., a powerful representation of the federated states, and the House of Representatives, which seems unimaginable without Polybius' diagnosis

¹⁶ *The Federalist Papers*, no. 63.

of the possibility of natural decline even under a perfect and successful mixed constitution. According to Polybius (6.57.11–12), it is the gradually radicalizing and dynamically growing democratic element within the constitutional system which leads to the downfall of the order by subscribing to populist and seemingly progressive slogans like “greater liberty” and “(social) justice for the *dēmos*.”

This was exactly the fear of the Federalists. They were concerned about a growing number of members in the House of Representatives (in accordance with the supposed growth of the population). Even the relatively short mandate that restricted office to only two years was considered as a disturbing opportunity for potential demagogues. The time frame of two years was in any case elbowed through against the Anti-Federalists at the Philadelphia convention; the latter had even demanded limitation to a single year by arguing with the universal principle of annuity, which was obligatory in all ancient republics and model federations.

This was the reason why a strong constitutional counterbalance against the allegedly vulnerable and potentially dangerous House of Representatives, thought to be easily accessible by demagogism, was created: the office of president, and even more so the Senate, whose vast amount of power as a council of states was indeed exceptional when compared to other bicameral systems. Without underscoring the influence of the actual factors and political circumstances in the years around 1787, and acknowledging the urgent need for compensating the different institutions due to perpetuated rivalries between small and large states of the Union at the time, it should be highlighted that this element of the constitution was directly and structurally influenced by the reference to Polybius’ ideas, including his draft of a pathology even of the best constitution.

This does not, of course, mean that the draft of the American constitution was in its major characteristics primarily deduced from literary reminiscences to ancient political culture and haphazardly pieced together along with other fragments of the legacy of the Classical tradition, to become some sort of *mixtum compositum*. Such an assessment is easily refuted by the fact that for more than two centuries the American constitution has provided a stable and liberal frame of institutions, despite rapid societal change, enormous demographical and political growth, and the storms of fierce civil war. Compared to the rather inhomogeneous and at times marred text of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (*Grundgesetz*) that has meanwhile been amended over sixty times, one

cannot help but admire the statecraft of the founding fathers and of the following generations of American politicians.¹⁷

Apart from the practical needs required by the specific political circumstances, and apart from the legacy of English colonial traditions, there was a thorough familiarity with the ancient political and historical traditions among the leading members of the American Revolution which contributed significantly to the fact that certain political concepts were encouraged and, consequently, that these again made an impact on the development of an all-new institutional culture. The rediscovery of these political and constitutional events undoubtedly happened at, and fostered, a striking turning point of modern Atlantic and European history. It should therefore always be included in every modern writing, and rewriting, of history that subscribes to a universal approach. Hannah Arendt has studied this particular cross-fertilization of political and intellectual history in her groundbreaking work *On Revolutions*, comparing the epochs of the American and French revolutions. Her critical assessment of the impact of antiquity on both events deserves to be cited at the end of this chapter: “Without the Classical example none of the men of the revolutions on either side of the Atlantic would have possessed the courage for what then turned out to be unprecedented action.”¹⁸

¹⁷ In their distribution of the votes in the Federal Council of Germany (*Bundesrat*), the makers of the Basic Law of Bonn (1949) clearly followed the model of Lykia and Achaia (with no explicit reference to it). But unlike the Classical example (and against the positions of statesmen like Konrad Adenauer and Theodor Heuss), that council is far from a true representation of the federated states on the level of the union, for the casting of the votes is reserved to the actual governors of the member-states and their administrations. This practice goes back to the tradition of the pre-modern Roman Empire of German Nations and was revived in the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) of 1815 and in the constitution of the ‘Bismarck Reich’ in 1866/1871. To date, the American constitution has been extended with only twenty-three amendments, of which the first ten were added as a declaration-catalog of human rights at the time when the constitution was ratified.

¹⁸ Arendt 1963: 284.

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